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INTHODUCTION
The central problem for this dissertation has the
follow:Lng dimensions.

Nineteenth-century historians and

philosopherr:i of history produced individually successful
but diverse accounts of both historiographical procedures
and historical events.

Not only were the accounts diverse,

in some cases they were mutually exclusive.

The crisis of

historicism occurred when historians recognized that no
adequate theoretical basis was available for comparing the
diverse accounts and settling the disputes among them..

In

contemporary terms, the conflicting accounts presented
effectively closed systems of thought; their differences
appeared fundamental and U..'1.resoJvable.
We identify the crisis of historicism with a series
of problems concerning historical objectivity, the relation
of history to science, and historical realism.

The dispar-

ity between the expectations and the actual achievements o:f
historians produced the crisis.

The general expectations

were that the aforementioned probleras could be solved.

But

nineteenth-century historians achieved something less than
consensus on these basic problems.

Throughout the centur-

ies, the lack of consensus among philosophers and philosophies has been the breeding ground of scepticism.
1

The

2

scandal of disunity repeated itself among historians.
Thus, historical works written durj ng the

a~;-~yet-u...rire-

solved crisis manifest an uneasiness over the foundational
issues of historical practice.
We distinguish the crisis of historicism from histor-

icism itself.

The latter is identified with two basic

theses: the content of the historical field is composed of
unique life forms, and these life forms can be explained in

terms of their historical development.

Historicism itself

we will treat as a special instance of the thesis of per-

spectivism elaborated jn Chapter Two.

The crisis of his-

toricism is the main issue in the five subsequent chapters.
Each of those chapters viill consider some aspect of the

crisis-problems which first confronted and eventually disillusioned members of the historicist tradition.
The literature both on
is extensive.

hi~toricism

and on the crisis

Georg G. Iggers has provided a survey of

. .
1
. t or1c1sm.
wares
1 on h is

Since our concern is w5.th the cri-

sis period, we are· chiefly interested in the methodologi-

cal problems usually identified with the analytical tradition in the philosophy of history.

Numerous historians

have reflected on those problems.

We will be making repeated references to the works of R. G. Collingwood, 2

1 The German Conception of J~story (Middleto~n, Connecticu-:C:~./esleyar1-Univ8rsi ty ri~es8-;-TI68), pp. 287-290.

2 The Idea of History (London: Oxford ·University l1rcss,
1971).

3
6
· I'>'
r.,...ou , 3 ·1/•''1rc v·~ 1 oc1,
l 4 £.
··~ • .t::.. 0vc.rr, 5 anci Car ..J B
,
henri
l'-"·....
J:ec~c:er.

severo..1 antho1oc-;i. er:> of pri m<:..ry source material will be

consulted on the wide-ranging issues of historical method. 7

The problems of objectivity and of the relation be-

tween science and history have been discussed at length
by philosophers of history.

A.':'.long the sources to be used

8
are works by Patrick Gardiner, W. H. Walsh,9 Arthur Dan12
to,10 Morton Wh"ite, 11 and D. H. Fischer.

The various methodological issues treated in the preceding literature are relevant to the crisis of historicism.

For, in the first place, this crisis proceeds from
7,

.?The Meaning of History (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966).
4

The Historian's Craft (New York: Alfred A. I~opf,
1953). 5\r.lhat Is I2_stor;z? (New York: Random House, 1961).
6 Tl1:_E_: HeavenlJ: City ££.__the 3:iJ;JJteenth-C_cmtl_!r;z PhiHlosoDhers {New Haven: Yale University J..>t"'ess, 19?1).

7pa trick Gardiner, ed. , Theor:J-es of Ei s:i::or;z (:New York:

Free Pres;.;;, 1965). Hans Meyerhofi', ed., '.I1he }).i.1iloscDhY of
[~~-.t12-Qur ?iS~ (Garden City, IJew ~oJ.:1{!.. D~:.l~eJ:a:y;~
1959). GGorge n • .i Iadel, ed., Stud:i.es J_n the J:-n:i_losophy of
1

Histor~t (New York: Harper and i{ow, 106)):
I'he-Tar~:._~:Les of }Iistor;y (Cleveland: Horld
pany, 195~

7

J:!'ritz Steri'-1~ ed.,
Publ i.shing Com-

81.I'he Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Ox-

ford University J?l'e;Js, 196:~
0

7

Philos~;y:_._of

Harper and How,

Histo:c:;z:: An In~roduction (New York:

19b8).

lO L~l_aly.:tt_cal_Fhilosoph;y of Histor,y (Ne\·J' York: Cambridge Univers:L ty Press, rc)60).
11

!£.~!?-da ti ons :?f Historical Kn owl e£G~ (New York:
Harper and Rov1, '"T967 j.
1 ':)

'-Historians' Fallac:i_es: Toward a Logic of JUstorical
Thour:ht
..
....__ (l\ei·.r ·York: Harp~rand n.0W;-1970 ):------·-------

___

4

a lack of

profess~on~l

consensus on basic issues, and ques-

tions of mGthodology involve public controls over jndividual effort;J

wj

thin a professional conmuni ty.

In the second

place, the crisis oi' historicism is marked by a recurrent
sce_;J-Cicis:m tov.mrd attemnts to provide critical fou.,'IJ.dations

for historical knowledge.

The analytical philosophers of

history have been particularly interested in clarifying
the foundations of historical inquiry and narration.
However, the previously mentioned works will be used
as secondary resoui·ces for this dissertation. Our primary
sources will be ·works by Hayden Whi te 13 and Bernard Loner-

gan.1~

The basic justification for this narrowed focus

will emerge only in subsequent chapters.

To anticipate

our defense of this selection--both White and Lonergan appreach the crisis of historicism in a novel recognition of
two levels in the hist;orical text.

Hayden White uses the

l3Hayden ~1ite's major work is Metahistory: The His11
,. ' 1 T"o:i~·
't•o
·
-\1 -in 8 t t;(.:oDv
. . . -:., +·h..• -ve
('f n't,1J.-'-,Y
. ,. .
·-.,.,I\. Op,-,
"'·-~(·T)~
,ll~c~;"lTid
·l. n
J.n
.!'..1u.
,Du..J.. t··'Mr-re·
..L.w.v
•
t 01J_Ca.
j "o1:fr:L8""Tiopki_ i1i~ "-~Dili ve rs { t~/?.r es 3-;-1 <]7:))-~--(B ei:;-eaf t er we ·wi 11
ref er to this work simply as 1-lctahl_~tor__;z.) We will also
mal\::e use of his transl a tor's introclucti on, "On History and
Historicisms~" in From.Ristory to .Soc:iolor;y, by Carlo Antoni (Detroit: Wayne ,St~e uniVersity '?Tess, 1959).
14LonerG;an 1 s latest work, Method j_n Theolog:z (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1972), provides his most extensive
remarks on historical method and on the probler.:is belonging
to the crisis i)eriod. On issues more di.stinctively philosophical, we will consult his earlier work, Insi~ht: A ·
St-~1y _(ff H"~~;i Unde:r:.§_~'.~nd:!_n5, Second ( studen~B 1 ·]°- edi t:L°on,
revised, (l~ei,.,r York: L'nilosophical L:t brary, 1958). (Hereafter we will refer to this i'TOrk simply as Ins:~ght.) Use
will also be made of articles published -in an ant1iology o.f
Lonergan' s 1..;orks, ColJ::...~ct:ton: P~::_:~ b;z_ Bernard,;__±i..£~~,
edited by F. E. Crmve (Rew York: Herder and Herder, ..L';;!of).
In subsequ0nt pages we will simply refer to this work as
CoJ.lectiont
.!_;_ ...

'"'"r

5
techniques of structuralism to investigate the linguistic
deep-structure of historical narratives.

Lonergan elab-

orates the connections between his transcendental method
and. the proceduxes of historical inqujry.

Both ap1n·oaches

move from the frequently discussed surface elements to the
often overlooked foundations of those surface elements.
Our argument is that, in the midst of continued disagrc<3JJLent over problems on the surface level of historical
works, an inquirer who investigates what lies "deeper" may
discover an exit from the theoretical labyrinth through
which those d'3bating the crisis appear to be wandering.
Both authors view their own works as contributing to a
resolution of the crisis.

As a preliminary note, we should

remark that neither author proposes a historical monism;
mul tiI>le perspectives on the past are required if one accepts the first thesis of historicism. 1 5

Their proposed

solutions, rather, envision some satisfactory antidote to
the prevailing scepticism which characterizes works of the
crisis

period~

Chapter One will work out the details of White's
attempted solution to the crisis.

For reasons to be given

there, we will argue that his attempt is insufficient.

In

subsequent chapters Bernard Lonergan's attempted solution
l5Again, the first thesis {s that the content of the
historical field is composed of unique life forms. The
"uniqueness" of these forms discourages the generalizing
ambition of the system-builder. Consequently, multiple
historical perspectives are to be expected.

6

will be studied.

The primary connection between the two

different approaches to the problems of the crisis is found
in their focus on the deep level of historical inquiry.
Their.primary difference is found in the absence of a cognitional element

on the deep level for White and in the

presence of such an element for Lonergan.
difference will be shown to be crucial.

Gradually this
Nevertheless, our

agreement with Lonergan's inclusion of a cognittonal element in the deep level does not require that we disparage
White's analysis of' historical works.

There are barriers

in his analysis which hinder a satisfactory resolution of
the crisis.

These we will challenge.

But his analysts

of' the historjcal imagination provides insights which complement Lonergan's analysis.

A thesis yet to be estab-

lished is that Lonergan provides a higher viewpoint which
incorporates much of what White discovers about nineteenthcentury historiography.
Our position, then, is that Hayden White's Metahis-

tory is a significant study of the crisis of historicism.
His insightful summations of the problems of' the crisis
will be used in this dissertation to specify particular
issues and to focus our own inquiry.

That inquiry will

largely be given over to a study of' Lonergan's transcendental method.

Our transition from White's structuralist

analysis to Lonergan's transcendental method will be justified: (1) if our arguments in Chapter One are valid, namely, that White's attempted solution to the crisis is in fact

7
insufficient; and (2) if in
strate that Lonergan's

subsequen~

app~oach

chapters we demon-

yields ffiore successful

results.
Earlier we stated that the crisis of historjcism is
identified with a series of problems concerning historical
objectivity, the relation of history to science, and historical realism.

In most instances we will be considering

these problems as distinctively historical difficulties.
However, the problems have implications beyond the historical field, e.g., a denial of the possibility of historical
knowledge may be 1)art of a more t;eneral epistemoloe;ical
thesis of scepticism.

Therefore, our treatment of these

problems, while it will be cast in historical terms, will
also have implications for more Beneral epistemological
issues. 16
\.,'hen we seek to relate White's metahistorical inquiry

to Lonergan's, an initial difficulty presents itself in
defining what history is. 1 7 There are multiple types of
16 chapter J?i ve in particular will expand beyond the
issue of historical objectivity to consider a complex notion of objectivity applicable to many distinct fields of
inquiry.

1 7It is perhaps unnecessary to point out the arnbigui t;y of the Eng1ish word "history." It can refer both to
the past events which are studied and to the study of those
events. "Historiography" is sometimes used to distinguish
the latter from the former. However, the term is frequently
used to distinguish one's study of historians and their
works from the study of the past events referred to in
those enrlier works. Rather than further compounding these
ambiguities by adding yet more terms (e.g. historiology),
we will take care to ensure that the rneaning of "history"
is apparent from the context. Where some doubt may arise,

8

history:

Precritical accounts which mix fact and fable,

chronicles which assign dates to events without offering
to explain the latter, autobiographies and biographies
which focus on

indiv~dual

lives and de-emphasize the his-

tory of the group, and cri_ ttcal history which has developed
its m·m professional standards and scholarly community
since the nineteenth century.

Among these multiple types,

we will focus our attention on critical history.

Our sel-

cction is justified on two grounds: first, it is the type
of history which was expected to resolve the basic problems
characterizing the crisis of historicism; second, it is the
type of history which requires methodical inqui:cy and verifiable results.

That is, critical history is not a pri-

vate undertaking but an established discipline with its
own scholarly forums, university curricula, and separate
educational faculties.

Since the crisis of historicism

occurred within a professional community, the t;ype of history practiced by that community should be our primary
focus.
Even though one characterizes critical history as an
independent scholarly discipline, its definition requj_res
that one introduce the methodj_cal procedures settine; it
apart from other types.

We will not take up those proced-

ures in any detail until Chapter Four.

Consequently, we

we will use "historiography" to refer to the scholarly
practice of historians.

9
will only gradually introduce a meanin3 for critical history.

That meaning will depend upon hm·.r we understand his-

torjcal procedures.

In turn, our understanding of such

procedures rests upon our understanding of human knowing-its limits and specialized functions in regard to past
events.

3till, we can anticipate this later conclusion.

Crit~cal

history is a methodical inquiry into the past,

yielding interpreta t:i ons subj e~ t to the cri t:icism of a
0_1"on°J
~~u-~E~c
J!...r.L .,,, ... ) v
a~

1
0 v
b~
·~L.kl +or·~c~
.1
_,.,.,,......l..

c·om~un~+~y
.1.LJ.J,i.
.L.L '.I•
•

Our problen, then, is how to resolve the crisis of
historicism which occurred within the practice of critical
history.

Our purpose :is to investigate hm'l well Lonergan' s

transcendental method supplies both a critical bas:1-s for
that practice and satisfactory answers to the basic problems of the crisis.
Some explanation of how we intend to explore these
problems should be given here.

We have identified the

crisis of historicism with certain disputed questions about
historical objectivity, the relation of history to science,
and historical realism.

We will rely chiefly on Hayden

White's Metahistory to formulate the various aspects of
these disputed questions.

Other historians and philosophers

of history will be used to exemplify in historical practice
the various theses which White formulates.

Our strategy,

then, will be to show a way around the theoretical impasse
of the crisis by resolving the problems of historical

10

objectivity, of the relation between history and scjence,
and of historical realism.
These problems properly belong to a formal study in
epistemology.

Conditions for the possibility of historical

knowlodge are the general subject matter.

But, again, our

focus is narrowed by the specific issues formulated by Hayden \.jhi te.

Lonergan' s arguments and positions will be con-

sidered insofar as they are applicable to these specific
issues.
To anticipate how our envisioned strategy will develop in subsequent chapters, we can foresee four objectives.
First, adopting White's metaphor of surface and deep levels
in the historical text, we wjll search for a point of transition between them.

Chapter Two makes use of the notions

of relative and basic horizons to understand the connections between pre-critical preconceptions about history and
the surface procedures of the historian.

Once the link is

made between surface and deep levels, our second objective
is to clarify the cognitional element belonging to basic
horizons.

Chapter Three suggests that the cognitional

structure contained within basic horizons may provide the
metahistorical grounds for mediating the disputes of the
crisis period.

For the structure of cognitional perform-

ance is presupposed by all precritical and critical views
of historical knowing.
As a third. objective, we must work out the implica-

11

tions of this structure for historical procedures.

Chap-

ter :Four argc;_es, ar11onr; other points, that the formulated
expression of this structure can be considered part of the
"deep structure" of the histor1cal text.
expression is transcendental method.

This forJt.ulated

The claims advanced

on its behalf are three in number: transcendental method
(1) provides eritical r;rounds for evaluating components

of the deep 3tructure, (2) is a precondition to detachment
from bias in historical inquiry, and (3) sanctions the surface procedures of critical history.
'l'he fourth objective is pursued in Chapter Five: to
discover how adequate Lonergan's metahistorical method is
for resolving the aforementioned problems of the crisis
of historicism.

The claim is that transcendental method

allows for the elaboration of a universal viewpoint from
which to mediate among the conflicting theories and practices in history.

Convincing resolutions of these basic

problems could open a way beyond the theoretical impasse
of the crisis.
There is a need to state clearly the limitations
placed on these five chapters.

First, no attempt will be

made to single out a particular historjcal perspective as
the sole legitimate one.

The thesis of perspectivism de-

fended in Chapter Two implies that such a privileged perspective is not available.

Our later defense of this the-

sis will also imply the rejection of the ideal of a single

12
comprehensive historical interpretation.

More positively,

tJ.H:: thesis of" perspecti vism will im2)ly the acce1itance of

an irreducible diversity in historical perspectives and
18
prac +.
0:. ces.
A notable absence from this dissertatton is the issue

of value

judg~ents

in history.

The possibility of objec-

tive value judgments on historical achievements has received attention from nwnerouG historians and philosophers
of history.

Lonergan offers rather brief remarks on this

issue under the heading of moral convorsion. 1 9

As Hayden

White and other historians argue, aesthetic and moral values belong to the predeterminants of historical perspectives.

Yet the present study nust have some limits, and

epistemological concerns have been selected as our general
focus.

Consequently, aesthetic and moral problems in his-

torical inquiry will not receive any extensive considerati on.
18 we should note in advance that irreducible diversity does not necessarily entail incompatibility among historical viewpoints and procedureso As we will discuss
subsequentl;y, not all differences are -:incom:oatible or
dialectical differences.
l9r·Iethod in ·Theolorz:y, p. 217, and pp. 240-2L~3. A
.:>--~- .
-·"'--~~
recently---.
puo1ishea aoc~oral dissertation interrelates Lonergan' s views on three types of conversion: intellectual,
moral and rel~gious. Bernard 11yrrell, Bernard. Lonerf\an' s
J?hi1osophy of God (New York: He:cder and·-nerd.e:r·, """1973). In
"Gll:Is' diss'GrtU:-Gion we will be concerned only with the first
two types of conversion. For additional but briefer remarks on Lonergan's notion of conversion, see David Tracy's
'l'he Achiev?2'!ent of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and
Herder, lV/0 / •

13
At the

sa~e

time we cannot entirely overlook those

aesthetic and moral problems.

In the first place, the

intellectual perfornance of historians nanifests aesthetic and moral concerns.

Ha~lclen

White's analysj s of nine-

teenth-century hir;torians reveals the centrclity of aesthetic and moral preferences in the decisions guiding
historics.l perfor:r:iance.

In Chapter One we will be linking

these preferences to other components of historians' relative horizons.

Aesthetic concerns show· up in the selec-

tivity process necessary to every historical inquiry.
Chapters Two and Four will give special attention to this
process.

Moral concerns will receive a limited treatnent

in Chapters Four and Five when the problems of historical
bias and intellectual responsibility are considered.
Therefore, although our focus is on the intellectual side
of historical performance, we still will make some references to the concomitant but distinct moral and aesthetic
aspe~ts

of that perfornance.

Is it legitimate to allow only a subordinate role
to historical value judgments?

Are not these value judg-

ments inseparable from historical inquiries?

One can only

reply "Yes" to the latter question if one grants that
evaluation occurs in the selectivity process and if one
acknowledges the selectivity process as a requisite to
historical inquiry.

However, our defense of the secondary

place gi.vei1 in this dissertation to value judgments requires

a more

co~plex

reply to the first question.

ences in isolution from the cognitional

perfor~ance

of

In the second chapter we will argue that
a historian's views on his own intellectual/cognitional

abilities take their place alongside of and interact with
the moral and aesthetic convictions belonging to his historic3l perspective.

Tn the third chapter we will intro-

duce a metahistorical basis for criticizing precritical

elements of historical perspectives.

On this metahistor-

ical basis, the remaining two chapters will seek to answer
a distincti vel;y epistemological question: Is it possible
to elaborate a critical method which can mediate conflicts
concerning historical objectivity and historical realism?
Our answer to this questj_on will rest on a priori grounds
supplied by the structure of hum.an knowint;.

Given such

grounds, our answer will not owe its validity to subjective
prcferences--even if these preferences transcend themselves
in objective value judgments.

In other words, if an epis-

temological position has an a £r!ori basis in cognitional
performance, then, although valui.ng is part of that performa~~'

20

the structure of that performance will be

That is, the former preferences are predeterminants of epistemological positions belonging to the surface
elements of historical texts. The latter theoretical positions are determined by, but do not determine or require, modif1 cations in the formeI· elements of the deep
level. Cf. the Preface to •I"Ietahictory,
p. x.
1-

f
15
invo.rj_ant across specific differences in valuing.

There-

fore, one can elaborate an epistemological position without explicit reference to the content of specific value
judgments.
We can expand this conclusion to defend our exclusion of certain topics treated at length by Lonergan.

He

quite obviously can claim both the title of philosopher
and the title of theologian.

Is it possible to consider

his cognitional theory and epistenology without referring
to the religious topics which form a large part of his
work?

More directly, can this be done without damaging

the integrity of his thought?

Or are there moral and

religious positions presupposed by his cogniti.onal theory
and epistemology?
This last question requires a disti.nction between
the historical

1)reced~

to the development of a position

and the logical-evidential precedents to the validity of
that position.

The former type of precedent is exempli-

fied in Lonergan's article, "The Origins of Christian RealReligious positions gave impetus to the development of an epistemology consistent with them.

But ques-

tions about the validity of that epistemology (i.e. questions for reflection) are not answered by a genetic account- of its development (i.e. by a response to questions
for 5-ntellit;ence).

Rather, it must be weighed on its own

21 Regis College, Toronto, September 1961.
graphed).

(Mimeo-

r
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merits as a philosophically arguable position.
Similarly, in doing history one does not accept or
reject a previous historian's conclusions simply because
he belonged to one political party rather than another.
r11e conclusions must be defensible on the basj s of avail-

1

able evidence.

If they are found faulty, then a considera-

tion of the author's political affiliation may be relevan-t.
But "relevant" not to the truth or falsity of his conclusions but to the question for intelligence: \.Jhy did he
assert something without adequate proof?
With the preceding distinction in mind, 1ve can justifiably limit our study to cognitional and epistemological
positions in Lonergan' s thought.

Particularly si_nce our

general topic is historical methodology, we can exclude
issues which do not directly pertai_n to the validi.ty of
results reached in a methodical way.

Furthermore, trans-

cendental method is said to cut across cultural differences.

Prior to any theorizin(S about one's ability to

knm,r, and therefore _prior to any opinions formed under the
influence of personal moral or aesthetic beliefs, there is
said to be an invariant pattern in one's actual cognitional
performance.

This performance as it actually occurs is

the measure of all subsequent theories about human know-·
ing.

Thus, the ver·;f claim to provide a critical and

~

priori position based on this performance implies the possibility of abstracting from issues of an extra-epistemological sort.

Of course, this claim and others are yet
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to be established.

But what we are selecting as a limi-

ted focus for our study docs not appear at this point to
do daEage to the j_ntegri ty of Lonersan' s thought.
Finally, this dissertation is written from a philosophical viewpoint.

It is not immediately apparent that

this is a licitation.

However, sjnce our concern is for

methodological problems, it would be possible to expand
our discussion to methodological problems within the
social and physical sciences.

In fact, Chapters Four and

Five will briefly touch on such a wider range of issues.
But, in order to avoid lengthy digressions, we will maintain a narrowed focus on problems in historical method.
Our philosophical viewpoint (based on the cognitional performance presupposed by every discipline) will allow us
access to other methods.

However, our concern for those

other methods will be guided by what they contribute to
the clarity and effectiveness of historical procedures.
With this understanding of both our strategy and
limitations, we are now ready to explore more adequately
Hayden White's attempted solution to the crisis of historicism as well as Lonergan's alternate approach to the basic
problems of the crisis.

CHAPTER I
THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM
This dissertation investigates the claims made by
Bernard Lonergan to the effect that transcendental method
offers a critical basis for (1) understanding and evaluating the procedures used by the historian, (2) thematizing
and evaluating the historian's epistemological presuppositions, (3) locating the sources of conflicts within the
historical field which gave rise to the "crisis of historicism. 11
third.

The first two claims can be assimilated to the
The "crisis of historicism" consists in the recoe;-

nition that no adequate theoretical grounds are available
for choosing among the different ways of doing and of
viewing history. 1 What is lacking is a critical metahistorical basis for mediating both the disputes over historical procedures and the conflicting claims regarding what
constitutes historical "realism."

This dj_ssertation inves-

tigates the claim made by Bernard Lonergan to supply the
needed metahistorical basis.

An appraisal of his elabor-

ated arguments will be the central purpose of this work.
1 This formulation of the "crisis" is given by Hayden White in his l"Ietahistory, p. 432.
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Hayden White's Study of the Crisis of Historicism
By using the insights and method of structuralism,
Hayden White's 1'1etahistory: The Historical Imagination in
Nineteenth-Centurl Europe offers a contemporary analysis
of the crisis of historicism.

The problems which he out-

lines will be used in this dissertation to specify the
particular issues of the cr:i.sis.

It will be argued in

this introductory section that White's structuralist approach leaves the central problem of the crisis unresolved.
In subsequent chapters I will investigate Lonergan's claim
that transcendental method yields more successful results.
White's study of nineteenth-century historians and
their works documents the widespread success enjoyed by
plausible, but (in some cases) mutually exclusive, ways
of viewing history. 2 Significant advances in the technical areas of research seemed to promise an increasingly
accurate and definitive account of past events.

Yet the

great labors of nineteenth-century historians yielded profound, but often incompatible, systems of thought.

The

disunity within the historical field was a scandal to
those who expected consensus and collaboration.

Coinci-

dent with this disunity was a loss of confidence in the
possibility of achieving objectivity in history.3
2

Ibid., p. 41.

3As Nietzsche remarked in regard to the tradttional
metaphysics and Christian philosophy of the West, the scandal of disunity is t~e breeding ground of scepticism.

,.
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For the historiographer the problem

p~esented

by

the crisis is twofold: (1) to account for the recurrent
disunity in historical studies, and (2) to discover whether the obvious conflicts are reducible, i.e. whether
some basis for mediating the disputes is available.

Hay-

den White applies the insights and method of structuralism to both of these tasks.

He argues that conflicts in

the ways of doing and of viewing history are ultimately
traceable to differences in the moral or aesthetic aspir4
.
.
a t ions
o f h.is t or1ans.

Ultimately one adopts a perspec-

tive on history for moral or aesthetic reasons.

Consequent-

ly, the disunity in historical studies reflects a prior
diversity in the moral and aesthetic preferences of different historian9.
Are there grounds for mediati.ng the disputes which
originate in these variable preferences?

Such grounds

were sought by nineteenth-century historians.

It was ex-

pected that unequivocal answers could be given to the
questions: "What does it mean to think historically, and
what are the unique characteristics of a specifically
historical method of inquiry?"5

In fact, no consensus

Indeed the works of historians in the crisis period are
characterized by the ironic attitude with its inherent
scepticism and moral agnosticism. Ibid., p. 433.
4
Ibid.

-

5Ibid., p. 1.
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was reached in replying to these questions.

Instead, mul-

tiple claims were put forward as to the form historical
explanations should take.

Even prior to such claims, there

were disputes over what should count as historical data.
This disunity on the basic level of the content (data) of
the historical field and of the form which an explanation
of the content should take indicates that historical perspectj_ves are discontinuous.

That is, rather than gradu-

ally and cumulatively advancing toward a single definitive
account of the past, historians are engaged in different
and sometimes contradictory presentations of past events. 6
In White's terms, they are operating with different historical "paradigms."
In White's analysis the term "paradigm" has a single
general reference and multiple secondary references.

Most

generally the term refers to the historian's expectations
of what an explanation of historical events should be.
These expectations are said to be basically moral or aesthetic beliefs.

The secondary references of "paradigm"

further specify the strategies to be followed in meeting
6 That some historians were convinced of history's
gradual movement toward a comprehensive understanding of
the past, no matter how remote the completion date, is
evident in Lord Acton's remark: "'Ultimate history we
cannot have in this generation; but we can dispose of
conventional history, and show the point we have reached
on the road from one to the other, now that all information
is within reach, and every problem has become capable of
solution.'" Quoted in Edward Hallett Carr's What Is Histort? p. 3. A similar viewpoint is present in Fustel de
anges' Inaugural Address, in The Varieties of History,
p. 181.

22

these expectations, in concretely expressing one's moral
or aesthetic beliefs.

Thus, Hegel, who believed in the·

ultimate rationality and moral significance of historical
events, expressed his historical conception in terms reminiscent of Greek drama.

The tragedies which are undeniable

and which seem to require an absurdist view of historical
processes are incorporated by Hegel into a larger framework of advance-through-conflict.

The historical trage-

dies are not denied, but they are "data" which a higher
viewpoint, in retrospect, evaluates as steps in the progressive elevation of humanity.7
7For White's illuminating remarks on the implicit
structure of Hegel's philosophy of history, see Metahistolt' pp. 81-131. Hegel's critics have often ignored the
iple levels on which his philosophy operates. The
value of White's structuralist analysis is its ability to
penetrate beyond the surface features wh:i.ch critics find
objectionable, to the deep structure from which those surface features derive.
The paradigm theory implies two levels of historical
operations: The explicit research and theorizing of the
historian is guided by im£licit expectations and ideal
types. The historical work not only manifests (1) data
ordered by (2) theoretical concepts for explaining the
data and (3) a narrative structure for unifying the data
and theore·!iical concepts, it also contains a "deep structure."
Hayden White investigates this deep structure in an
attempt to find some element of unity in the midst of the
disunity of historical styles. Since documents and artifacts are not given in some unambiguous order, the historian must employ a model (or set of models) for organizing them. The choice among possible models is said to be
a poetic act which prefigures the historical field; i.e.
an act which formally anticipates what can be counted as
evidence and as acceptable modes of argumentation. The
formalization of this poetic act can take a variety of
forms, and White distinguishes them according to the four
traditional tropes of' poetic language: Metaphor, Metonymy,
Synecdoche, Irony. These tropes classify the deep
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White~s

thesis is that the operative paradigm (e.g.
-

Hegel's higher viewpoint) determines the outline of the
field of research and the form which is to be given to the
structural content of the historical imagination in the
nineteenth century. The explicit assumption behind White's
use of the four tropes is that, "in any field of study not
yet reduced (or elevated) to the status of a genuine science, thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode
in which it seeks to grasp the outline of objects j_nhabi ting its field of perception." (Preface to I"Ietahistory, p.
xi.) Thus a poetic act (based on moral or aesthetic
grounds) leads to the employment of one of the tropes as
the dominant mode of historical consciousness in an author's subsequent research and expression. The irreducible metahistorical basis of the historian's work will. be
(1) the grounds for choosing this dominant mode and (2) the
linguistic :form which the choice imposes on his subsequent
work. The particular moral or aesthetic grounds for the
choice and the adopted trope commit the author to a basic
perspective on history. This basic perspective, or paradigm, will be what he "expects" historical processes and
their explanations to be.
Secondary uses of the term "paradigm" will refer to
the particular strategies adopted for meeting his expectations. White distinguishes three levels of historical explanation: explanation by formal argument, by emplotment,
by ideological implication. On each of these levels, there
are at least four possible modes of articulating one's
Views of historical processes:
Emplotment:
Romantic, Tragic, Comic, Satirical;
Formal Argument: Formist, Mechanistic, Organicist,
Ideological
Contextualist;
Implication:
Anarchist, Radical, Conservative,
Liberal.
Every historical work will contain some mixture of modes
drawn :from the three levels. This mixture will be indicative of the author's expectations of what form historical
explanations and historical processes can be said to take.
The combination of the modes also yields the distinctive
style of the particular historian. Each mode employed
will, in the secondary sense, be a'~aradigm," i.e. a
model guiding his development of and expression of historical understanding. In both the general and secondary
senses, "paradigm" refers to a model setting out the form
of subsequent historical inquiry and narration.
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historian's insights.

Among nineteenth-century historians,

disputes over what constituted primary historical data and
what order they were to be given indicated that different
paradigms were being used.

In othe.r words, the field of

history was not unambiguously defined.

A plurality of

outlines of the field resulted, each outline being part of
a paradigm adopted on moral or aesthetic grounds.

One re-

sult was that, with a variance in historical paradigms,
there was also a variance in what counted as evidence.
One then was in a position of measuring the validity of a
historical work, not on the basis of its use of evidence,
but on the basis of the coherence and illuminative power
of the author's vision of the historical field. 8 Any theoretical concern for evidence will follow upon a prior
determination of the historical field and of explanatory
strategies for ordering the content of the field.

Any sub-

sequent appeal to newly discovered data will fall within
this prior determination.

As a consequence, the admission

of new evidence cannot provide grounds for radically modifying the prior model which had been previously governing
historical research and representation.
In accounting for the diversity of historical models
or paradigms, White emphasizes the role of language in
determining the outlines of the historical field.
linguistic study is based on a number of facts.
8 Metahistory, p. 4.

His
First,
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history suffers from conceptual anarchy, i.e. there is no
commonly accepted formal terminology for expressing historical insights.

Second, in the absence of a formal ter-

minology, the historian makes use of ordinary figurative
language with all its inherent ambiguities.

Third, since

historical documents and artifacts are not given in some
unambiguous order, the historian must antecedently organize them according to soI!le model.

Now the process of in-

terrelating historical materials will be dependent on how
one envisions the historical field and on what linguistic
.form one thinks apt for expressing those interrelations.
To envision the historical .field is termed a "poetic insight," and the .formalization of that insight will correspond to the adoption of one of the tropes of poetic language. 9

As opposed to formal terminologies in the

9What Hayden White means by "poetic insight" and by
its formalization can be elucidated by way of contrast.
Scientific systems employ formal terminologies in order to
denote their data. The adopted terminology is intended to
replace the figurative and ambiguous terms of ordinary language. For example, calculus is employed in discussing
physical reality. Its adoption as a formal mode of discourse limits the ways in which physical reality can be
designated. But while his scientific conclusions will be
expressed within the limits of formal discourse, the physicist's initial insights into the physical world will
often be figuratively expressed. His task then will be
to cast these insights in the mode of discourse adopted
by other physicists committed to a common formal terminology.
Now, for the historian, there is no common formal
terminology agreed upon within the profession. Thus his
insights into historical events are not limited to a single legitimate form of expression. Tnstead, his thoughts
will be cast in one of the modes of figurative-poetic discourse. Hayden White notes at least four possible modes
of .figurative discourse--the four tropes o.f poetic language:
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sciences, history utilizes the figurative speech of everyday living.IO

White finds that histories of the nineteenth

Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, Irony. Which one, or which
set, of the modes the historian adopts as dominant in his
work w5.ll be a formalization of his poetic insight which
itself is antecedently determined by moral or aesthetic
convictions. Thus, Hegel's convictions about the rationality and moral significance of historical events required,
first, that historical descriptions be cast in the mode of
~' and second, that historical explanations be cast in
~ode of synecdoche.
The ironic mode retained the factualness of historical disasters and sufferi.ngs. On the
level of individualizing description, human greed and violence paint an absurdist picture devoid of both reason and
virtue. However, the synecdochic mode integrates the part
into the whole, the individual into the larger historical
process. 1dhat is described as a tragic condition for the
individual becomes part of an explanatory scheme in which
tragedies serve to promote--at great human cost--the gradual elevation of humanity.
Prior to any analysis of the content of the historical
field, the historian will have "prefigured" the field by a
poetic act which seeks expression in one of the modes of
poetic discourse. Other historians will give predominance
to other tropes more in keeping with their moral and aesthetic aspirations. As a result, a diversity of historical
paradigms will characterize the work of historians. Conceptual anarchy within the historical profession will be
part of the price paid for the richness and diversity of
its artistic expression. For Hayden White's comments on
the above, see ibid., pp. 31-33, fn. 13. Examples of the
prefiguration o'ftne historical field by poetic-artistic
means are found in F. H. Cornford's Thucydides Mythistori~ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971),
pp. viii and 132.
10Hayden White conments that sixteenth-century natural
scientists were in the same situation as historians today;
they lacked a formal terminological system. At that ti_me
different conceptions of science reflected different conceptions of "reality" and different epistemologies based on
the latter. A linguistic uncertainty lay at the root of
that diversity. But the conceptual anarchy among sixteenthcentury natural scientists was largely resolved in the
seventeenth century through the adoption of a specific mode
of discourse--the technical language of mathematics. White
notes that paradigms in the physical sciences periodically
win wide acceptance. This indicates a general consensus

l
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century made use of ordinary forms of discourse which can
be grouped under the four tropes of poetic language.
This general linguistic classification constitutes the
unity of the historical imagi.nation in that period.

For

all their evident diversity, nineteenth-century historians
can be classified on a deep structural level according to
the linguistic modes in which they expressed their views
on history.
The preceding remarks were intended to summarize the
underlying positions of White's response to our earlier
question--"Are there grounds for mediating the historical
disputes which originate in moral and aesthetic preferences?"

Those underlying positions consist of the following

points.

First, prior to the interpretation of the content

of the historical field, the field itself must be prefigured as a definite realm with discernible content. 11 Second, the metahistorical element of every historical work
will be (1) the £Oetic act which constitutes the field and
selects the mode of expression suitable for analyzing the
content of the field, (2) the moral or aesthetic determin~

which are manifested in the choice of linguistic

forms, and (3) the subsequent strategies of explanation and
on what will count as a scientific problem, what form scientific explanations will take, and what types of evidence
will be scientifically acceptable. For historians, however, such consensus does not exist and never has. See
Metahistory, pp. 12-13.
11
Ibid.' p. 30.

28

types of articulation consistent with one's ·vision of the
historical field.
Further, White's structuralist analysis distinguishes
this metahistorical element (or deep structure) from the
surface structure of the historical work.

On

the surface,

or explicit, level of the text one finds data for analysis,
theoretical concepts for explaining the data, and a narrative style for presenting the data as an intelligible series of events. 12 White locates the epistemological position of the author on this surface level.

Likewise, the

theoretical operations by which one verifies interpretations
of historical data belong to the surface structure.

The

implication is that such operations and the epistemological
position receive an implicit, precritical sanction on the
deep leve1. 1 3 The metahistorical underpinnjngs of the surface dimensions (1) "analytically" precede the narrative
form incorporating the :interpreted data, and (2) sanction
the particular theories used to explain the data. 14 Given
the above positions, White's response to our inttial question is strongly supported.

The disputes among historians

derive from the adoption of fundamentally different historical perspectives.

In each instance the adoption of a

perspective derives from precritical, extra-epistenological
12Ibid.,

P• ix.

l3Ibid., P• x.
14Ibid., p.
xii.
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sources. 1 5

Consequently, there are no apodictic epistemo-

logical grounds for claiming that one historical perspective is more realistic than another. 16

The Unresolved Crisis: White's Proposed Solution to
Sceptical outcome

tg~

The problem of mediating conflicts among different
paradigms has been discussed by proponents of a paradigm
theory of science.

As opposed to an earlier scienti.fic

ideal of cumulative and progressive efforts toward a single definitive account of nature, they operate with an
ideal of science which is composed of multiple systems
individually coherent but discontinuous from each other. 1 7
l5Since epistemological considerations belong to the
surface structure of.the text, the choice among possible
historical perspectives will be made antecedently on nonepistemologic'11 grounds. ">·/hi te suggests the likely grounds
for such a ch5lce will be moral or aesthetic in nature,
definitely not epistemological. Ibid., pp. xii and 433.
16To exemplify this position, White recounts the
struggle during the nineteenth century for dominance among
secondary paradigms of historical explanation. Two paradigms, the Fornist and Contextualist, gained dominance as
models of explanation for historians. The Organicist and
Mechanistic paradigms were eventually treated as isolated
instances of an aberrant philosophy of history. The exclusion of them reflects, according to White, a decision
by historians not to allow integrations of data (e.g. those
integrations effected by Hegel and Marx) modelled on the
Organicist and Mechanistic paradigms. This decision rested on precritical opinions concerning the form which a
science of man and of society should assume. White points
out the ethical aspects of these precritical opinions in
ibid., pp. 20-21. (For the different meanings of Formist,
~o:r;textualist, Organicist, and Mechanistic paradigms, see
~.,pp. 14-18.J
.
1 7Patrick A. Heelan contrasts these two scientific

ideals in his "The Logic of Framework Transpositions,"
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For the historical methodologist, this interdisciplinary
problem can be phrased i.n distinctively historical terms:
Is it possible to have complementary histories instead of
mutually exclusive ones?

Historians are generally agreed

that no single individual can master all the details involved in complex historical topics.

Instead, muitiple

projects are undertaken, each one of which illuminates
specific features of the topic and hopefully contributes a
partial but complementary study to other projects concerned with the same complex whole.

Under the paradigm

theory of history, as envisioned by Hayden White, the complementarity of partial studies is limited.

That is,

complementary results are possible if the historians producing them share the same paradigm.

But, if there is no

co:rru::ion paradigm, differing historical interpretations are
likely to be contradictory.

And the possibility of reduc-

ing these contradictions to different but compatible positions will be slight.

The basic presuppositions of several

historians may be radically at odds and, so, antecedently
may rule out the possibility of mediating subsequent
Language, Truth and I'!eanin~, ed. by Philip Mcshane (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), pp. 93-94.
Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hanson, Sellars are mentioned as representative figures in the ongoing discussion of the different scientific ideals. Thomas s. Kuhn's The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, Second edition (Chicago: University of C'hicago Press, 1970), offers a stronD defense of
the paradigm theory of science. Israel Scheffler's work,
Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967),
provides a defense of the older standard ideal of science.
In Chapter Five, we will refer to both authors in discussing the problems of historical realism and of paradigmchanges.
l"'4'>
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conflicts.
Even

if

a mediation of "surface" conflicts appears

unlikely for works operating under different paradigms,
might·it yet be possible to settle them indirectly by a
critique of the paradigms themselves?

Such a critique--

if possible--would surely not be part of the surface
structure of any text.

White's thesis is that basic con-

flicts of interpretation among historical works have origins which analytically precede the assessment of historical data.

And, if at the level of origins there are dif-

ferent paradigms, one must ultimately seek to mediate the
conflicts there and not on a surface level, i.e. on the
level of organizing and explaining one's data.

But a cri-

tique of different paradigms requires a privileged standpoint, a truly scientific paradigm.

The problem White

sees in this requirement is that there is an irreducible
ethical

componen~grounding

one's choice of a paradigm and

\)

one's conception of historical knowledge, i.e. one's epistemology.

To attempt to supply epistemological grounds on

which to judge the cognitive adequacy of the different
paradigms will itself, according to White, represent only
another ethical choice. 18
In effect, White is arguing that no one conception
of history is more scientific than another because what
constitutes scientific history, or historical "realism,"
18Metahistory, p. 26.
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is determined by the paradigm one employs on the basis of
ethical or aesthetic considerations.

Given these precri-

tical grounds, one's claim of scientific realism for a
particular paradigm will seem gratuitous to those holding
other conceptions of historical processe.s and of historical
knowledge.

One will have merely stated a preference for

what a historical science "ought to be. 111 9

Consequently,

an epistemological critique of historical paradigms is required to escape its own relat5_ vi ty to personal preferences, 20 but such an escape is unlikely given the poetic
and precritical origins of every historical viewpoint.

As

a result, White concludes that each paradigm will continue
to present a seemingly exclusive conception of the historical field.
There is a second argument against the possibility
of arbitrating the disputes aoong historical paradigms.
The first argument summarized above pointed out the
l9Ibid.
20 rn this dissertation we will frequently use the
terms "preconception," "preference," and "bias." By "preconception" we mean some vaguely held opinion, usually
unthematized, which belongs to the deep level of historical inquiry. In most cases, preconceptions are "taken for
granted," they are.neither clarified nor defended. By
"preference" we mean an individual's choice of a definite
opinion or practice from among a number of opinions or
practices. His choice need not be biased, but in most
cases it is based on precritical grounds, i.e. the question
of whether or not the choice is biased has not been asked
or answered. By "bias" we mean a preconception or preference which--on critical grounds--is found to block the
spontaneous development of understanding. There are multiple types of bias. We will consider some of them in
Chapter Four.
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exclusivity of individual paradigms: their presuppositions
are basically precritical, extra-epistemological opinions.
Yet there are changes in paradigms; radical alterations in
the way historical events have been interpreted can and do
occur.

A history of the fluctuating interpretations of

the French Revolution or a history of works on the Puritan contribution to American thought would provide examples
of such paradigm-changes.

Is it possible that such vari-

ance in viewpoints is prompted by the discovery of new
data?

If so, may not historical data themselves be the

measure of the adequacy of paradigms and the:ir accompanying theories?
Hayden White takes up this particular possibility of
mediation.

He notes that theories of history have not won

wide acceptance solely on the basis of how adequately they
explained the data contatned in their narratives. 21 Aesthetic appeal and a coincidence between the theory and a
given public's view of its own history are elements to be
taken into account.

Furthermore, there must be some con-

sensus on what constitute the signif:i.cant data in need of
recounting.
brute givens.

White argues that historical data are not
There seems to be no way of pre-establish-

ing what will be acceptable, irrespective of a particular
audience, as a historical datum and as an adequate theory
to explain the datum.
21

A partial

of

----:::.

Metahisto~, p. 429.
I

I,.:_
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lies in the frequent disagreement

historians over
what should count as a specifically historical datum. 22
a~ong

Such disagreement reflects a prior disagreement over one
or several of the metahistorical elements previously discussed.

Agreement on what should count as a historical

datum and as a theory for explaining it, thus, requires
a prior consensus on a metatheory which distinguishes on
metahistorical grounds between natural phenomena and specifically historical phenomena. 2 3 In short, historical
22 understanding this disagreement requires a distinction between the content of the historical field and the
level of analysis most appropriate for explaining that content. A general consensus is likely on the historical data
assignable to the historical field. All the artifacts,
monuments, documents, art works created by men are candidates for inclusion. But the difficulties begin when one
seeks to account for the origins of these phenomena. The
problem of motivation is particularly troublesome. How far
should one push one's inquiry1 Psychological, biological,
physico-chemical processes all might be considered sources
of historical data. Which level of analysis is most legitimate? Does a psychological study have a greater claim
to historical relevance than, for example, a materialistic
analysis which reduces conscious intentions to biological
impulses? The issues raised in these questions indicate
that historical data are not easily distinguished from
natural phenomena. The French structural anthropologist,
Claude Levi-Strauss, notes this difficulty. "Ea.ch episode
in a revolution or a war resolves itself into a multitude
of individual psychic movements. Each of these movements
is the translation of unconscious development, and these
resolve themselves into cerebral, hormonal or nervous phenomena, which themselves have reference to the physical or
chemical order. Consequently, historical facts are no more
~iven than any other.
It is the historian, or the agent of
istory, who constitutes them by abstraction and as though
under the threat of an infinite regress." The Savage Mind
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 257.
2 3Metahistory, p. 429. In Chapter Five of this dissertation, we will propose metahistorical grounds for such
a distinction. Although consensus on the metatheory
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data are not the measure of the adequacy of paradigms.

Ra-

ther, they are subordinate to the metahistorical positions
which guide historical inquiry.
The above conclusion leaves us without an explanation
of the suggested paradigm-changes.

The discovery of new

data does not account for radical alterations in the way
historical events have been interpreted.

According to the

paradigm theory of history, such alterations do not provide conclusive proof of "progress" in historical understanding.

Each paradigm nay be manifested in works which

present profound and consistent insights into history.
These marks of consistency and profundity account for the
"greatness" of the particular work.

But they do not auto-

matically establish that work as a more scientific or
realistic work than others which operate under different
paradigms.

Each work may be part of an "effectively closed

system of thought, incommensurable with all the others appearing in contention with it. 1124 Ultimately its incommensurability can be traced to moral or aesthetic variables.

The result will be the introduction of discreteness

into the historiographical field, a discreteness which eliminates the concept of development-by-accumulation.

Multiple

(transcendental method) which supplies these grounds cannot be guaranteed, our basic argument is universal in
scope: every development of meaning, every theory about
"data," presupposes the occurrence of the component acts
of transcendental method.
24
Ibid., p. 432.

36
histories with basic differences replace the ideal of a
gradual approximation to a single definitive account of
the past.
Still there are paradigm-changes.

How and why they

occur is barely hinted at by White.
Placed before the alternative visions that history's interpreters offer for our consideration,
and without any apodictically provided theoretical
grounds for preferring one over another, we are
driven back to moral and aesthetic reasons for
the choice of one vision over another as the more
'realistic.' 25
He goes on to paraphrase Kant: just as we are free to.make
history, so we are free to conceive history as we please.
Thus, one freely changes paradigms on the basis of changes
in moral or aesthetic beliefs.
on the

lat~er

A new personal discovery

metahistorical level may be sufficiently

radical to require a change in one's basic view of historical processes and in one's position regarding historical knowledge.
There is additional evidence that this account of
paradigm-changes is White's own position.

He suggests

at the close of his work that one can overcome the prevailing contemporary mode of historical consciousness (a
mode resulting from the crisis of historicism) which is
that of Irony. 26 His study of nineteenth-century historians
2 5Ibid., p. 433·
26 Ibid. White offers the following descr:iption of
the IronICiiiode of historical consciousness. "The trope
of Irony, then, provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode
of thought which is radically self-critical with respect

p
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and philosophers of history has established that the Ironic
mode of conceiving history is but one of a number of possible modes.

Realizing this as well as the possjble legi-

timacy of other perspectives based 9n alternate moral or
aesthetic grounds,one is in a position to "relativize relativism."

That is, one can recognize that the Ironic per-

spective is not a necessary view of historical processes.
Instead, one is free to conceive history, determine its
content, and construct its meaning in accordance with the
paradigm most consistent with one's moral or aesthetic beliefs.

In short, one can will "to view history from another, anti-Tronic perspective. 112 7 This will to choose an

alternative to the sceptical stance of the ironic mind is
the author's program for revitalizing historical consciousness and for reestablishing its links with the golden age
of history in the nineteenth century.
The preceding pages have largely been an analysis of
Hayden White's elaborated position in Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.

This

not only to a given characterization of the world of experience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the
truth of things in language. It is, in short, a model of
the linguistic protocol in which skepticism in thought and
relativism in ethics are conventionally expressed." Ibid.,
pp. 37-38.
~
27rbid., p. 434. This will to believe in a historical
viewpoin'tCOnsistent with one's moral and aesthetic needs
has been discussed by, among others, Kant and Nietzsche.
'While White's position has had many contributors, Kant and
Nietzsche have apparently been central to \~1ite's attempted
solution to the crisis of historictsm. See ibid., p. 80
(for Kant) and p. 332 (for Nietzsche).
~
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analysis offers a not too lengthy introduction to the body
of the dissertation.

Its purpose has been to sketch prob-

lems which contemporary historical methodoiogy confronts.
More specifically, this introductory essay has narrowed the
focus of the dissertation to a number of theses advanced
by White.

The clarity with which White expresses these

positions is exceptional.

Often similar theses are present

but barely explicit in the works of historians and philosophers of history.

Therefore, White's arguments and con-

clusions are taken to be representative of a complex viewpoint shared, at least in part, by other less philosophically articulate historians. 28
28 Numerous historians have remarked on the aesthetic
presuppositions of their work. White cites Benedetto Croce
as one instance, in Metahistor~, p. 380. Carl Becker has
argued for both the aesthetic orm which sustains the historian's arguments and a preceding "climate of opinion"
which Becker describes in terms s~_milar to White's concept
of paradigm. In The Heavenl~ City of the Eighteenth-Century ?hilosophers (pp. 11-12 , Becker argues that climates
of opinion are effectively closed systems of thought, i.e.
no theoretical grounds are available for mediating conflicts between two opposed systems. In his Historical Inevitability (reprinted in part in The Philosophy of History
in our Time, pp. 249-271), Isaiah Berlin writes on the ethical and aesthetic preconceptions to historical analysis.
Morton ~hite points out the aesthetic and ~oral standards
which guide the historian's selection of data. He notes,
in Foundations of Historical Knowledge (pp. 252-254), that
such evaluative grounds may not be shared by another historian; thus, diversity in moral or aesthetic aspirations
will give rise to different organizations of historical
materials.
Positions similar to Hayden White's paradigm theory
of history are in evidence. G. G. Iggers, in The German
Conception of History (pp. 247-248), cites Walter Hofer
as a contemporary historian who argues for the priority of
a formulated conception of history over a study of materials. Arthur Dante argues for the priority of organizational schemes over one's research into the historical
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This complex viewpoint can be summarized in four
theses.
1.

The disunity in the field of history which marked the
"crisis of historicism" is traceable to the di versj_ty
of paradigms employed by nineteenth-century historians
and philosophers of history. The diversity of historical paradigms reflects a diversity in moral and aesthetic aspirations grounding the different paradigms.

2.

There are no adequate theoretical grounds for choosing
among the different ways of conceiving history.

3.

The theoretical concepts employed by the historian and
his epistemological position belong to the surface of
the historical text. The historian's decision to adopt
those concepts and that position rests on precritically
held opinions belonging to a deep structure where
theoretical procedures receive implicit, precritical
sanction.

4.

Each historical paradigm
tem of thought. Radical
not the discovery of new
one's moral or aesthetic

is an eff'ecti vely closed syschanges in paradigms reflect
evidence but a change in
preconceptions about history.

These four theses offer a clear focus for discussing
and criticizing Lonergan's insights into the problems of
historical methodology.

Below we will offer four alterna-

tive theses to White's positions in order to express Lonergan's claims for transcendental method and to focus the
argument that Lonergan has shown a way beyond the basic
problems of the crisis of historicism.

In addition, this

field. A thesis developed in his Analytical Philosophy of
Historx (p. 111), is that such unifying schemes· are predetermined by specifically human interests. D. H. Fischer
provides examples of explanatory historical paradigms, in
his Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Lo ic of Historical
Thoug , p. xv. In t e same wor
p.
, Fisc er no es
that the theoretical doctrines which White takes to be formulations of prior precritical determinants are metahistorical positions which are neither proved nor disproved
by appeal to historical data.

p
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paralleling of different theses is a convenient methodical
device for narrowing the number of issues to the basic
disagreements about the possibility of resolving the cri-

sis.

Preliminary Critique of White's Solution
Later sections of this dissertation will treat in
turn each of the four theses drawn from White's Metahistor;z.
In this introductory chapter we want only to argue that
his solution to the crisis is insufficient: first, in the
light of historical practice, and second, for what it inplies about historical discourse. 2 9
In the first place, the solution rests on the recognition of free variables at the root of historical paradj_gms; moral or aesthetic aspirations are the basis for
one 1 s choice among historical paradigms.

That such as-

pirations are integral parts of the doin3 of history need
not be denied.

But White goes on to argue that critical

or "scientific" history is but one of many types of history, all of which are rooted in variable preferences.
The implication is that critical history is no more plausible than other types.30

Each type reflects certain

2 9The arguments for this insufficiency occur here for
a purely strategic reason. Without them the impression
that White's solution is satisfactory could be given. In
that case, the extended treatment of Lonergan's thought
would be anticipated as at best a supplement, at worst a
mere postscript.
30White argues that "the demand for the scientization
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preferences, and none is epistemologically superior to the
rest.

But--one can object--a prevalent aspiration, or

preference, among historians is to do critical history as
opposed to mere propagandizing.

A compelling epistemolog-

ical justification of critical history may be lacking,
but the outlines of one may be known.

How else can one

detect abuses that are then labelled "propaganda"?

In

practice the normative guidelines for doing history already restrict the range of aspirations which one can fulfill and still be considered a historian.

Thus, when Marx-

ist historians of the Thirties and Forties expunged all
mention of Trotsky from accounts of the Bolshevist Revolution, they were fulfilling the aspirations of the Stalinist regime but were no longer entitled to the name "historians."
There is a second objection to be made.

White's

"will to choose" among modes of historical consciousness
would appear to require that historians modify the usual
form of their knowledge claims.

Their conclusions should

be prefaced by remarks about the preferential grounds of
historical assertions.

"T believe ••• " or "It seems to

me ••• 11 should be prefatory qualifications attending any
conclusions in historical works.

Again, the thesis is that

of history represents only the statement of a preference
.for a specific modality of historical conceptualization,
the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but
the epistemological justification of which still remains
to be established." Metahistor;z:, p. xii.
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the moral or aesthetic preferences manifested through a
particular paradigm qualify the subsequent selection of
data and use of explanatory strategies.

However, in most

instances, historians do not mar their works with such enfeebling qualfiers.

Could it be that they are suffering

from some form of Kant's transcendental illusion and feel
no need for such remarks?

In any case--one may still ob-

ject--White's thesis is not reconciliable wjth the usual
way in which historical assertions are made.
Furthermore, his solution to the crisis involves
historians in "pragmatic make-believe."

That is, they are

to assume the truth of their historical perspectives on
the basis of moral or aesthetic aspirations, what they
"will to believe."

But--one may object--this assu_rnption

or belief is self-contradictory.

'"A belief that believes

only in itself is no longer a belief.,. ,.3l

A historian

would not escape scepticism by pretending that his perspective on the past was true simply because it was consistent with his personal preferences.

But such pretence

may be unlikely; historical assertions are not usually
prefaced by disclai.mers that one is advancing claims of
only personal significance.
3lThe self-contradiction of pragmatic make-believe
is pointed out by .:2Jnil Fackenheim in his Metaphysi_cs and
Historictt~ (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961),
pp. 4-?.
he above quotation is taken from remarks of
Erich Frank as found in ibid., p. 5, footnote 3.
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If the preceding objections are sound, then White's
proposed solution is insufficient.

It may be helpful to

ask why White did not offer a more satisfactory solution.
There are at least three reasons.

~irst,

since White lo-

cates the historian's theoretical and epistemological exercises on a surface level, he is left with only precritical
grounds for adopting and evaluating a historical perspective.

The precritical metahistorical elements

of every

historical work are prior to and determinant of issues of
historical objectivity.

Consequently a critical justifi-

cation of one's view and practice of history is effectively subordinated to prior subjective variables.
Second, t.he demand for critic al history is said to
represent only the statement of a personal preference.
This is one step in White's argument that an epistemological mediation of the conflicts among paradigms is not
available.

His proposed solution to the crisis is not an

attempt at mediating such disputes.

Rather it is a sug-

gestion that they be tolerated as inevitable products of
conflicting but equally plausible viewpoints.
A third barrier to a more satisfactory solution is
present.

The historian's adopted paradigm determines

what will be acceptable as historical data.

Consequently,

judgments based on accumulated evidence will never force a
radical reappraisal of the adopted viewpoint.

The valid-

ity of his paradigm is established not by the content of

l
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the historical field but by precritical opinions and the
strategies suitable to them for elaborating a consistent
vision of the historical field.

As a result, any radical

paradigm-changes will occur because-of a basic shift in
the historian's precritical opinions.

Such changes are

not the product of discoveries of new evidence and an intelligent desire to conform his conceptual apparatus to
the new evidence.

Sketch of Lonergan's Alternate Solution
The test we envision for Lonergan's claims concerning transcendental method includes weighing his alternative positions against the three preceding "barriers."
The implication is that Lonergan's proposed solution to
the crisis will only be more satisfactory than TJhite's if
such obstacles are shown to be surmountable.

First, against

White's thesis that precritical elements of one's historical perspective are beyond the reach of any critical evaluation, there must be posed the thesis that critical
grounds are available for scrutinizing preconceptions
about history.

Second, against the thesis that the demand

for critical history is but the statement of a preference,
we must demonstrate that the normative procedures of critical history express more than personal preferences.
Third, against the thesis that no conclusive judgments are
possible regarding conflicting views and practices in
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history, there must be posed the thesis of a universal
viewpoint from which one can mediate the conflicts among
historical paradigms.
The counterproposals which must be proved if these
alternative positions are to be successfully held are the
following.3 2
1.

The counterproposal to White's first thesis is not
antithetical but supplementary. To the number of
determinants of historical perspectives noted by
White will be added elements uncovered by Lonergan's
"horizon analysis." The most important addition
will be the historian's awareness of his own intellectual abilities.

2.

The subject's differentiated basic horizon provides
adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the
cognitional elements of one's historical perspective.

3.

Transcendental method formulates the spontaneities
of human cognition. In so doing it is the a triori
basis for the possibility of detachment from j_as
and for critical sanctions of theoretical procedures
on the surface of the text.
·
·

4.

Transcendental method makes possible an elaboration
of a universal viewpoint from which to evaluate conflicting views and practices in history.
White's four theses and the four preceding counter-

proposals provide the format for this dissertation.

Again,

the central issue is that the crisis of historicism continues so long as there is available no metahistorical
basis for mediating the conflicts within the historical
field.

We have argued above that Hayden White fails to

32 rt should be noted that each of these counterpro-

posals corresponds in its respective order to the central
issue of each of the following chapters.
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supply the needed basis.

It remains to determine whether

or not Lonergan overcomes the barriers which hindered
White's attempted solution, and thereby offers a more
satisfactory methodological position.

CHAPTER II
HORIZONS AND THE THESIS OF PERSPECTIVISM
INTRODUCTION
This second chapter consists of four strategic steps.
By first discovering points of compatibility between
White's theory of paradigms and Lonergan's thesis of perspectivism, we will establish the possibility of supplementing White's position with insights drawn from Lonergan's work.

Then, in keeping with the metaphor of sur-

face and deep levels in the historical text, we can search
for Lonergan's view of how the two levels are connected.
His notions of relative and basic horizons clarify the
diverse connections between the historian's precritical
opinions about history and the latter's surface procedures.

Out of Lonergan's horizon analysis comes the thesis

of perspectivism--a thesis refuting attempts to promote a
single privileged viewpoint on the past.

Finally, in a

fourth step, we argue that White's first thesis is in
need of an important supplement.

A study is made of how

intellectual self-awareness conditions the historian's
choice among possible modes of historical consciousness.
While Chapter Three will further clarify the content
of basic horizons, this chapter will sufficiently prove the
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presence of a cognitional element among the other components of historical perspectives.

This conclusion is

important because it allows us to move beyond merely preferential variables as the determinants of histortcal perspecti ves--the first barrier to White's attempted solution
to the crisis of historicism.

If this new cognitional ele-

ment is later found to enter crucially into historical
views and practices, then their critical justification
may, after all, be more than a matter of prior subjective
variables.
Chapter Two takes as its starting point the first
thesis drawn from Hayden White's Metahistory.

Again, the

thesis is that the disunity in the field of history which
marked the crisis of historicism is traceable to the diversity of paradigms employed by nineteenth-century historians
and philosophers of history.

This diversity of paradigms

reflects a prior diversity in the moral or aesthetic aspirations which ground the different paradigms.
To this relatively unobjectionable thesis is proposed an alternate position which is supplementary rather
than antithetical.

There is evidence that more elements

than White notes are at work in grounding the choice of a
paradigm.

To moral and aesthetic aspirations will be

added: the works of other historians, the personal background of the individual historian, the assumptions of
his era, what passes for common sense in his day, and,

49
most significantly, his estimation of his own intellectual
abilities.
It is apparent that Lonergan does not share the paradigm theory of the natural sciences. 1 Yet one cannot simply say that he identifies with an earlier scientific ideal
of cumulative and progressive efforts toward a definitive
account of nature.

He remarks that the scientist's goal
is the complete explanation of natural phenomena. 2 But
this goal functions as an ideal limit of the scientist's
intending of natural phenomena rather than as some doctrine that the universe forms a single explanatory system.3
The ideal limit has two bases: the first in the finite
number of possible presentations of sensibility and the
second in the basic structure of the human mind.

The

1 At least two meanings were proposed in the preceding chapter for the term "paradigm." In a general sense,
a paradig~ is the linguistic form (i.e. one of the four
poetic tropes) in which historical narratives are cast.
In a more specific sense, a paradigm is the particular set
of explanatory strategies with their modes of articulation
which the historian adopts as effective means of expressicg
his moral or aesthetic aspirations. In both senses a paradigm is a model of what historical inquiry and expression
should be. In terms more appropriate for the natural sciences, paradigms are thought-systems or theoretical frameworks which are individually coherent but discontinuous
from each other. In the sequence of their occurrence,
there are incompatibilities which militate against the
earlier ideal of cumulative efforts toward a single account of natural phenomena.
211 rsomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in
Collection, pp. 149-150. Also see Lonergan's remarks in
11
Dimensions of Meaning," in ibid·., pp. 259-260; in Method
in Theology, p. 316; in Insign::r; p. 84.
3For a denial of this latter position and supporting reasons, see Insight, p. 345.
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latter basis will be considered in the remaining chapters.
The former basis involves the empirical canon of

selec~ion

which dictates that empirical science limit itself to theories involving sensible consequences. 4 If sensible presentations are finite, then theories which are applied to
them will be finite.

The sequence of more comprehensive

and coherent theories may not be predictable, but there is
no reason to think it endless.

Hence, the ideal goal, no

matter how renote and unattainable in fact, can be entertained.5
4 For a discussion of this canon of empirical method,
see ibid., pp. 71-72.
5Lonergan argues that the advance of science has a
lower limit in possible sensible presentations and an upper limit in cognitional structure. His arguments are
part of a position which affirms that empirical science
only approximates, though in an increasing way, to truth
and which denies that one must hold scientific progress
to be indefinite. Ibid., pp. 303-304. Patrick A. Heelan
has studied this position and concludes two things.
First, that Lonergan's position in Tnsight is consistent
with the view of the history of science which envisions
evolutionary sequences of complementary frameworks. Second, that this position in Insight is compatible with
views held by two representative figures of the paradigm
school of science, Kuhn and l!,eyerabend. "The Logic of
Framework Transpositions," in Lanro;uage, Truth and Vieaning,
pp. 109-110. I seriously doubt thiB second conclusion
since a controversial innovation of the paradigm school of
science has been the incommensurability of different scientific systems. There are not only different but complementary frameworks in the history of science, there are
also djscontinuous and contradictory ones. But again,
:for our purposes, this issue must be reformulated in distinctively historical terms.
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Now our point is not to defend one sci.entif'ic ideal
against another but to argue that there is a point of contact between White's paradigm theory of history and Lonergan's thesis of perspectivism.

Initially one might sus-

pect that, given this fundamental difference in regard to
scientific ideals, Lonergan's position on historical perspectives will not even touch upon issues raised by a paradigm theory of science or of history.

But, irrespective

of differences in scientific ideals, we can argue for
points of contact between the different positions in respect to histo!:l•

While Lonergan holds what may be termed

the standard ideal of science (i.e. one seeking a complete
explanation of nature), he distinguishes history from science at a number of points, one of which is the inevitability of historical perspectivism.

More will be said of per-

spectivism in the third section of this chapter.

For now

a general description will suffice.
The thesis of perspectivism draws support from a number of sources.

First, the complexity of the past defies

comprehensive interpretation.

Second, the finitude of the

historian requires that he be selective in his historical
inquiries.

Third, the involvement of the historian and of

the significance of past events in ongoing history will
obviate all claims to pronounce the final word on historical events.

The label of perspectivism is thus attached

to a theory of histor:i_cal knowledge which proposes that
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only partial and approximate knowledge of the past is possible.

Were the historian to ajm at a complete explanation

of past events, he would need more in.formation than is
available (those who left records were selecti_ ve in what
they recorded).

He would not be able to digest even the

limited but massive amounts of material which have been
preserved.

He would not be able to foresee the future

consequences of past events which might radically alter
the significance of those events.
For the above reasons, the study of history cannot
be pursued realistically with the ideal that Lonergan applies to scientific inquiry.

Lonergan substitutes a the-

ory of perspectivism which, it will be argued below, is
compatible with and supplements the paradigm theory presented by Hayden White.
There is an obvious point of agreement between the
paradigm theory and the theory of perspectivism.

Both

share the position that the historian can only achieve an
incomplete account of the past.

Implied in this posit-Lon

is the activjty termed "selectivity."

Given the sheer

magnitude of preserved materials and the finitude of the
historian, some selectivity is a prerequisite when he begins to explore the available materials.

A second point

of contact for the two theories is found among the prerequisites to the process of selectivity.

The activity

of selecting presupposes a process of evaluating.

As
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Croce argued, unless the historian evaluates, he cannot
know what fragments of the immense wealth of historical
materials are worth interpreting. 6 There are value
judgments to be made before the process of selectivity can
get underway.

White emphasizes the moral and aesthetic

nature of these preliminary decisions.

As will be noted

below, Lonergan expands the number of components operative
in such decisions.

::!"n both cases, such moments of evalua-

tion are metahistorical, i.e. they are based on fundaDental positions which analyt:tcally precede specific historical tasks.
Once we have initially considered the approximative
character of the historian's work, we can pass to a few
thoughts on the concept of horizon.

It is argued that

prior to research the historian must evaluate.

And cri-

teria guiding his evaluation will belong to his horizon.
Moral, aesthetic, cognitive positions provide some of the
criteria contained within one's horizon.

Lonergan offers

a general description of the content of horizons: "Horizons • • • are the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; they are the fertile source of further knowledge
and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit our
capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained. "7

A more laconic statement on horizons is

6 E. H. Carr paraphrases Croce's argument, in What
Is History? p. 22.
7nethod in Theology, p. 237.

p
available: "Literally, a horizon is a maximum field of
vision from a determinate standpoint. 118
The second section of this chapter will deal with
the concept of horizon and its usefulness in illuminating
the presuppositions with which the historian begins his
work.

There it will be argued that 'Jhite's parad:Lgm the-

ory and Lonergan's horizon analysis do not arrive at conflicting conclusions.

However, horizons include more than

the determinants of particular paradigms mentioned by
White.9

The implication, at this point, is that the

8 Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon," in
Collection, p. 213.
9For the sake of clarity, we can bring together and
compare in one place the different concepts of horizon,
perspective, and paradigm. There is no explicit statement
in Lonergan's work on the interrelations of these three
terms. However, what follows is compatible with separate
remarks which are found in various places in his works.
Of the three terms, "horizon" is the one having the
broadest meaning. It includes all that a subject knows or
cares about. In terms of one's personal life history,
several horizons may be developed. Lonergan labels such a
process of horizon development "specialization." It is a
process of broadening one's expertise to take in the specialized techniques and languages of dlstinct d i_sciplines.
For example, the COffiDon-sense interests of the adult may
be expanded to include the interests and pursuits of a
theoretical discipline such as contemporary physics. By
itself physics requires more than the expertise of ordfnary living and ordinary language; it demands familiarity
with the formal terminology and competence in the procedures of an autonomous professional community.
We relate "perspective" to "horizon" on the basis of
selectivity. Within any specialized horizon there are
likely to be further specializations, e.g. micro-biology
will be a subdivision of general biology. To specialize
is to narrow one's focus, to take a limited area as one's
field of inquiry. This limiting of one's area of concern
is the adoption of a specific perspective which antecedently determines the outlines of research. In a sense, a

55
insights of .horizon analysis will supplement the position
worked out in Metahistory.
An additional point of compatibility between the

paradigm theory and Lonergan's position can be briefly
noted.

There is agreement that the crisis of historicism

results proximately from the multiplying of conflicting
interpretations of the past and more radically from conflicting positions on the issue of historical objectivity.
This latter, epistemological issue is formulated in the
specialized horizon expands or contracts with the process
of selectivity. And the definite point to which it is expanded or contracted will be one's perspective. !n this
case, the components of one's horizons will be prior to
and influential in the forming of one's perspective. They
will remain implicit in one's perspective as resources for
the work carried on from that particular perspective.
We relate "paradigm" to "perspective 11 as synonymous
terms. Enough has already been written in Chapter One on
the meanj ng of paradigm in Hayden ·1./hi te' s work. The significant similarities between the two terms are, first,
that paradigms are formalizations of prefiguring insights.
In other words, they determine the outlines of the historian's field of research. Second, within the general field
of history, there will be subdi_visions such as military
history, economic history, and so on. At the same time as
the historian selects such a subdivision as a topic, he
also settles on strategies of explanation deemed suitable
for the selected area. The same strategies will not prove
equally useful in every area, so he is required to make a
selection among available strategies as part of his choice
. of a particular paradigm. Third, those metahistorical,
precri'tical elements which White terns predeterminates of
the historian's choice of a paradtgm remain implicit in
his paradie;:m. (or perspective) as resources for the work
carried on under its guidance.
A recent lecture given by Bernard Lonergan was the
source of some of the above remarks on horizons and specializations. "Aquinas Today: Tradition and .,..nnovation"
(lecture given at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, November 6, 1974).
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question, What constitutes historical realism?lO

If a

definite and compelling response to this question can be
given, one of the central problems of the crisis will be
resolved.

This possibility is merely noted here, but the

purpose of the dissertation will be to evaluate Lonergan's
arguments and conclusions for just such a response.
These ;ntroductory remarks to the second chapter
established some points of conpatibility between two seemingly opposed views of historical work.

Though the two

mentioned authors hold different scientific ideals, yet,
when it comes to the study of history, they hold some positions in comnon.

That only incomplete accounts of past

events are possible, that the inescapable process of selectivity presupposes a wide range of subjective variables,
that the crisis of historicisn can be treated as an epistemological issue--these are points where the two thinkers
meet.

Lonergan' s thesis of perspecti vism, thus, i611 not

be extraneous to the paradigm theory of history.

To under-

stand this thesis, we must now investigate Lonergan's horizon analysis.
lOHayden White's position has already been summarized.
The crisis was brought on by the multiplying of successful
but mutually exclusive historical works. The works themselves were produced under different models of historj_cal
explanation and expression. One of the features of such
models was a determination of what constituted historical
realism. Lonergan attributes his understanding of the
crisis in part to Karl Heussi's work, Die Krisis des Historismus (Tubingen: Mohr, 1932). For Lonergan 1 s remarks
on Heussi's work as well as his additions to the insights
of Heussi's position, see Method in Theology, pp. 214-21?.

,...
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HORIZONS
The concept of horizon appears in Lonergan's post1957 works.

Its emergence as a central category for his

thinking coincides with a shift in his thought, one which
emphasizes historical consciousness to an extent not found
in Insight or earlier works. 11 we will begin by offering
a description of the knowing process in which horizons
operate.

We will follow up by cataloging the general con-

tent of horizons.
Lonergan states that, even prior to the writing of
Insight, he was convinced that the knowing process consists in raising and answering questions • 12 :~uestioning
is an act of intending aimed at transforming something unknown into what is known.

The act of intending itself oc-

curs between ignorance and knowing.

It is not identjfied

with either, for we begin to question only when we recognize that there is an 'x' of which we are ignorant.

our

recognition of ignorance about the 'x' implies that we are
not totally in the dark, yet, at the same time, it implies
11 navid Tracy remarks on this shift, in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 9. Bernard Tyrrell similarly
takes note of this development, in "The New Context of the
Philosophy of God in Lonergan and Rahner," in Language,
Truth and Beaning, p. 285.
12 This biographical detail is found in Lonergan's
"Insight Revisited, 11 (lecture given at and published by
Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1972), pp.

2-3.
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we do not have knowledge of it, else we would not need to
ask questions. 1 3
A three-fold division is suggested by this analysis
of questioning.

First, there are all those questions which

I can raise and answer--this totality is labelled the
"known."

Second, there are all those questions which I

can raise and think meaningful but as yet cannot answer-this totality is labelled the "known unknown."

Third,

there are those questionswhich I do not ask because they
are not meaningful for me--this vague area is labelled the
"unknown unknown." 14 In the knowing process, my horizon
has its outer limit between the second and third divisions,
between what I am interested in knowing but do not yet
know and what :!" do not seek to know because the relevant
questions do not appear meaningful to me.

Thus, the child's·

horizon falls short of the questions which belong to the
horizon of the theoretical physicist.
The literal definition of "horizon" was already provided in the introductory section of this chapter.

A hor-

izon is a maximum field of vision from a determinate
1 3 11 .:r..very inquiry aims at transforming some unknown
into a known. Inquiry itself, then, is somethi.ng between
ignorance and knowledge. It is less than knowledge, else
there would be no need to inquire. It is more than sheer
ignorance, for it makes ignorance manifest and strives to
replace it with knowledge. This intermediary between ignorance and knowing is an intending, and what is intended
is an unknown that is to be known." Method in 'fheology,
p. 22.
14 navid Tracy presents a careful summary of these divisions, in his The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 9-10.
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standpoint.

The precedi_ng description of the process of

inquiry adds clarity to this definition.

For the maximum

.field of vision falls short of the unknown unknown, those
questions which lack significance for a particular subject.
The determinate standpoint of the subject is fi.nite; his
stage of development as a historical fact excludes a number of questions which could not presently be meaningful
to him.

He will most likely be unaware of the precise

limits of his present horizon, but by hindsight he can
mark boundaries passed in t;_me.

For example, questions

once alien to the child's world may through education become meaningful to the adult.

As part of one's personal

lj_fe history, one can mark the points at which one's horizon surpassed former limits.
Besides the subjective finitude involved in any horizon, there is also an objective finitude.

That is, be-

sides the questioner there is also that which is questioned.
In the first place, the questioner at a particular stage of
development will have access to only some "worlds of :r:ieaning. 1115

Other problems and concerns had by others will at

1 5navid Tracy defines a 11 world of meaning 11 as 11 that
totality of objects with which the subject in his present
intentjonal development can operate. 11 (Ibid., p. 14.) We
think this defjnition can be improved upon so as to include
some reference to the stage of development enjoyed by the
distinct discipline in which the subject strives to become
proficient. We can then speak of a world of meaning which
is open both to a particular subject at his present level
of development and to anyone at this particular time given
the state of the disci.pl:i_ne. 11 0bjecti.ve finitu<l.e" in horizons is, thus, distinguished from the "subjective finitude"
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present be foreign to him.

In the second place, when one

is dealing with dj.stinct special ties such as physics or
theology, the stage of development enjoyed by them will
not be fixed but will be part of an ongoing process.

His-

torically one can remark on the significant turning points
in a particular field, i.e. moments when new discoveries
expanded the concerns of a whole professional community.
At such moments, the objective limits of a shared horizon
are surpassed and, thus, an enlarged "world of meaning" is
opened to the subject.

In short, there are both subjec-

tive and objective limits to horizons.

Again, these boun-

daries are historically unstable; they nay expand or contract.

But both will be interrelated.

The growth of the

subject opens up new worlds of meaning for him; the expansion of the obj ec ti ve limits of a shared horj zon prorilpts
the subject to contjnue growing in order to keep up with
the questions which new discoveries raise.
This description of horizons obv-iously presumes that
horizon development does occur.
is easily available.

The proof for such growth

Physicists are not born; they emerge

from childhood horizons by valuing and pursuing questions
of no immediate concern to a child.

A child psychologist

does not base his claim to professional competence on the
fact that he was once a child.

Rather, he points to his

of one's horizon on the basis of the ~ersonal limits of
the latter and the public limits of t e former.

JP
61

success in handling the specialized procedures which are
part of a theoretical horizon.
does occur.

So horizon development

A special instance of such development is the

radical transformation of one's cognitional horizon which
Lonergan terms "intellectual conversion."

This type of

horizon development and the evidence for its possible occurrence will be taken up in Chapter Five.
In his more recent works, Lonergan has distinguished
between two types of horizons: relative and basic. 16 The
former can be considered the interiorized-personalized version of what has come to be called the "climate of opinion.1117

It is one's determinate standpoint arrived at

through personal, psychological, social and cultural development.

The objective aspect of such relative horizons

will be the level of development presently attained by
human sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology).18

These sciences make possj_ble a controlled

16 navid Tracy attributes this distinction to Lonergan's increasing faniliarity with contemporary discussions
in the human sciences and with the philosophical schools
of phenomenology and existentialism. Ibid., p. 19.
1 7This phrase has a long history. One author, who
popularized its use in this country, points out that the
phrase originally appeared in the seventeenth century and
was reintroduced in this century by \./hi tehead. Carl L.
Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosonhers, p. 5.
18 navid Tracy, The Achieve~ent of Bernard Lonergan,
p. 19. The reciprocal relation between the subjective and
objective poles of relative horizons is discussed at some
length in Lonergan's paper "The New Context of Theology,"
n.p., 1967, pp. 1-5 (mimeographed). Later published in
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articulation of the subject's own personal history to the
degree that (1) the subject is familiar with them, and (2)
the sciences themselves are sufficiently developed to express complex human experiences.
But, besides relative horizons, there is what Lonergan terms "basic horizon."

It is the standpoint of the

subject in relation to the presence or absence of various
types of conversion. 1 9 In Chapter Five we will take up the
issues of intellectual and moral conversion.

Suffice it

for now to say that, while one's relative horizon antedates
one's basic horizon, it may be possible to modify the contents of the former on the basis of the self-transformation
occurring in the latter.

The implication for the doing of

history is that it may be possible to eliminate or control
any bias which has attended the development of one's relative horizon.

For now this implication is merely noted.

In this section, we will limit ourselves to relative horizons, their content and role in the work of the historian.
Theology of Renewal I, edited by L. K. Shook (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 34-46.
l9we have already mentioned Bernard Tyrrell's work,
Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God, in which the types of
conversion aEe interr~latea. David Tracy provides a brief
description of these conversions in his com..11entary, The
Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 19-20. A generar-description of the role of conversion in the doing of theology
is offered in the Lonergan article cited in the preceding
footnote, "The New Context of Theology," pp. 5-7.

r
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The Content of Relative Horizons
A useful distinction can be made in cataloging the
contents of a relative hori.zon.
standpoint of the historiari

Part of the determinate

consist~

of his familiarity

with the works of both previous and contemporary historians.
This familiarity forms the objective aspect of the historian's relative horizon.

!n producing his own historical

works, he will not be able to acknowledge all that he owes
to other historians, but nonetheless he will be indebted
to others. 20 Besides this objective aspect, there is a
subjective aspect to relative horizons.

This is formed out

of the personal background of the historian.

For the pur-

poses of this chapter, we suggest a four-fold division in
this subjective aspect: the education and personal interests of the historian, the linguistic categories he employs,
the dominant concerns of his era, the public opinions ·which
pass for common sense in his day. 21
20 Marcel Proust has expressed this point much better:
"• •• a book is a huge cemetery in which on the majority
of totibs the names are effaced and can no longer be read."
The Past Reca7tured, trans. by Andreas Mayor (New York: Random House, 19 1), p. 158.
21 Again, those purposes require an expansion of the
number of elements involved in the predeterminat;on of
one's historical perspective. The crucial element missing
from Hayden 11'ihi te 's analysis will be basically a cognitional position. It is part, not of one's relative horizon, but of one's basic horizon. But that point will be
argued later. For now we propose to give a fuller account
of the subjective variables behind historical perspectives.
Our list of these variables presupposes those moral
and aesthetic (poetic-linguistic) variables studied by Hayden White. Moral variables would be exemplified in
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The innumerable records of past events, the diversity of values once affirmed, and the richness of experiences now past but remembered require that the historian
be competent to handle complex materials, be open to values other than his own, and be attentive to his own experience.

The more intelligent and cultivated he is the

greater will be his ability to understand past events. 22
Put simply, the broader his relative horizon the more
likely he is to write great history.

Clearly the histor-

ian's education and the range of his personal interests
will affect both the perspective he assumes on the past
and the quality of his subsequent work.
A second element of the historian's background is
the language he uses.

He inherits linguistic categories,

both ordinary and technical, from the society and professional community around him.

It is in terms of these cat-

egories that he conceives the field of his research, and
eventually it is through them that he expresses his results.
historical perspectives stressing alternately either a
politically active role for history (e.g. Mommsen's approach to historical writing) or a culturally isolated
role (e.g. Burckhardt's approach). Aesthetic variables
are manifested in the anecdotes chosen by a historian to
symbolize or to typify an entire period or intellectual
movement. There is a poetic element in the representative
scene which dramatizes, without fictionalizing, the complex motivations and conflicts of historical figures.
22
Henr1-Irenee Marrou, The Meaning of History, p.
247. Lonergan indicates his concurrence with this insight in r1ethod in Theology, p. 216.
0

I

I
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Since the language of most historians (the most ardent
devotees of quantified history may be excepted) is the
speech of everyday living, the historian will be employing
a precritical tool.

The positions to which ordinary lan-

guage commits him unawares are not easily uncovered.

Per-

haps it is the philosopher of historical method and not the
historian who is responsible for 'clarifying the problems
of historical language. 2 3 In any case, the linguistic
categories which the historian neither invents nor consciously appropriates·in their entirety are part of his
given horizon.
ordinary living.

In the first place, they are part of his
In the second, they are part of the pro-

fessional equipment which, at least in history, is never
i 1v1ng.
· .
24
.
f ar remove d f rom ord inary
The dominant concerns of an era, as internalizedpersonalized by the historian, belong to the predetermining
elements of his work.

No one would write Gibbon's history

of Rome today with the same polemical interests; the
2 3I'1orton White appears to suggest such a d;vis:ion of
labor. "Like the philosopher of natural science, the critical philosopher of history is theoretically oriented,
primarily interested in analyzing historical language and
achieving insight into history as a form of knowledge."
Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 2.
24Hayden White argues, along with other historians,
that the historian's use of ordinary language is evidence
of the proto-scientific status of history. Metahistory,
p. 429. Patrick Gardiner has studied the relation between
the language in which history is· written and the commonsense speech of ordinary living, in The Nature of Eistorical Explanation, pp. 6-7 and 63.
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secular-religious tension of today is no longer what.it was
in the eighteenth century.

Nor, to offer another exa11ple,

is it reasonable to fault Thucydides for failing to study
the economic causes of the ·Peloponnesian War.

Such mat-

ters were not part of his climate of opinion though they do
belong to ours.

Thus, today the Megarian Decrees come

center stage in any new accounts of the Greek conflict,
while the mythical forms which '.IbuJydides borrowed from
Greek tragedy are relegated to the periphery as items of
historical curiosity. 2 5 Lonergan provides examples of fundamental changes in the dominant concerns of an age, changes which modified man's image of himself, his world, and
his science. 26 · The upheavals and acts of resistance which
mark such transitions are evidence of the close bonds
forged between an :1.ndi vidual and the prevailing concerns
of his era.

The historian is no exception.

He writes not

for all times but for his time, and his license to do so
is his rootedness in his own time.
A fourth subdivision of the subjective side of rela-

tive horizons is labelled "common sense."

Clearly a per-

son is a man of common sense long before becomin:; a
2 5F. M. Cornford elaborates this point at some
length in his brilliant study of the mind of Thucydides.
Thucydides Hythistoricus, especially Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
26see Method in Theology, pp. 314-317. A study, to
which Lonergan refers, of basic changes in man's selfimage and in his views of science is Floyd w. I1atson's
The Broken Tmage (Garden City, Hew York: Doubleday and
Company, 1966).

,
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professional historian.

Vague collections of everyday

wisdom are put to use far in advance of every specialized
enterprise.

It should be noted that histcry, as distinct

from more abstruse disciplines, does not leave commonsense generalizations behind in its specialized procedures.

Rather, the comrion opinions of daily lj_ving provide
a valuable resource and starting point for the historian. 2 7

Lonergan offers a detailed description of common-sense
knowledge, its operations and limitations. 28 He compares
it to an adjustable tool whose purposes are numerous and
whose adjustment is relative to the specific task at hand. 29
2 7 11 Properly speaking, the historian does not proceed
by way of deduction or induction. The point of departure
must instead be the ord:i nary or com.r.'.lon knowledge which we
use in our daily life." (Henri-Iren~e Marrou, The .Me~ning
of Histo_rl, p. 89.) Hayden White concurs in tne opinion
that co~;:non-sense generalizations provide major premises
for historians. (Metahistory, pp. 11-12.) W. H. Walsh
cites as an example of such conm.on-sense starting points
the historian's initial un.derstanding of human nnture.
See his Philosophy of Hist9ry: An Introduct~on, p. 66.
Obviously, while common-sense opinions do for.::n part of the
beginning of historical inquiry, the responsibilities of
critical history require that the level of ordinary opinion not be the only level on which the historian operates.
:Marc Bloch sounds this warning in his unfinished classic,
The Historian's Craft, p. 80.
28see Chapter Six of Insight, especially pp. 173-182.
2 9Method in Theology, pp. 229-230. There are many
similarities between Lonergan's account of common-sense
knowledge and Claude Levi-Strauss' description of mythical
thought as a "science of the concrete." Especially relevant are the remarks made by the latter regarding the
analogy between activities of the "bricoleur" and the
functions of mythical thought. See The Savage Mind, pp.
16-22.
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For the historian, this multi-purposed tool lies ready-tohand as a familj_ar means to human ends.

It is there as

part of his horizon in advance of more critical intentions,
and it is never far off once such specialized intentions
begin to guide his efforts at understanding the past.

A

thesis, to which we will later return, is that historical
explanation emerges as a sophisticated extension of this
common-sense horizon.
The objective side and four subdivisions of the subjective side of relative horizons have now been accounted
for jn the precedtng ::paragraphs.

Taken as a whole, they

constitute the "historicity" or existential history of the
individual historian.

This is not the place to digress on

the scope of human histor:!.ci ty and the problems of freedom
and permanence which it involves.30

What has been attemp-

ted is a summation of the elements belonging to the relative horizon which precedes the historian's theoretical
work.

The developed state of his profession, his own edu-

cation, the language he spontaneously employs, the concerns he internalizes from his social milieu, the commonsense opinions he shares with his contemporaries--these
are preconreptions which the historian brings to his tasks.
30in the writer's opinion, Emil Fackenheim has offered a very lucid account of these issues in his concise
essay cited in the preceding chapter, Metaphysics and Historicity. Lonergan summarizes the theoretical premisses
of human historicity in Method in Theology, p. 325.
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What does this list of general preconceptions add
to Hayden White's account of metahistorical components of
the historian's work?

His analysis of the poetic act

which prefigures the historical field is a further specification of what has been generally described as the linguistic subdivision.

The remaining three subdivisions and

the objective side of relative horizons are significant
additions to White's analysis.3 1 Specifically they "socialize" a metatheory which, in concentrating on the linguistic preference of an individual, tends to neglect other debts which the historian owes both to his professional
predecessors and to his whole social group.

The role of

common-sense opinion in historical inquiry is a particularly important topic barely noted by

~.Jhite.

But, again,

the purpose of this second chapter is not to reject White's
first thesis but to supplement it.
3 1 Note should be made that 1.-Jhite's theory of the poetic-linguistic deep structure of historical narratives is
not inconpatible with these additional preconceptions.
But, insofar as he ignores them, for whatever reason, and
insofar as they are in fact metahistorical components of
the historian's work, these additions are corrective of a
metatheory which overemphasizes the role of language to the
detriment of other social aspects of historical inquiry.
In White's defense one can suggest that his central purpose
was not to account for all the classes of variables apparent in the historical field. His aim was narrower, namely,
to work out a typology for characterizing that field in
which there is so much diversity. However, insofar as
White fails to discover--in the deep structure--a basis for
critical criteria of historical practice, we add to his analysis Ehe cognitional discovery introduced in the fourth
section of this chapter. Once elaborated in subsequent
chapters, this addition will prove to be incompatible with
some of White's positions.

p
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Horizons and Presuppositionless Inquiry
The preceding remarks on horizons have prepared the
ground for a thesis which negatively holds that there is
no presuppositionless history and which

affir~atively

as-

serts that the preconceptions of the historian modify his
work.

This thesis has gained such wide currency today

that it is in danger of becoming a cliche.

With the dis-

appearance of the positivist school of historiography,
the polemical debates which once surrounded the thesis
have ceased.

But what no longer is questioned may soon

pass itself off as common sense, and in theorizing about
history this easy acceptance is dangerous.

So in the re-

maj_ning paragraphs of this section and in the follow5_ng
section, this thes1.s will be studj_ed and its limits discovered.
Lonergan terms the position which advocates doing
without presuppositions the "principle of the empty head. 11 3 2 The implication often left unstated is that

histor~r

the historian should proceed without all that he has
learned, internalized from his society and accepted as
ordinary good sense.

Jn effect, the principle asks him to

3211 To say that the historian should operate without
presuppositions is to assert the principle of the empty
head, to urge that the historian should be uneducated,
to claim that he should be exempted from the process variously named socialization and acculturation, to strip him
of historicity. For the historian's presuppositions are
not just his but also the living on in him of developments that human society and culture have slowly accumulated over the centuries.'' Method in Theology, p. 223.
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shed his historicity.

The improbable consequence of such

a hopeless venture would be a second infancy.33
There may be an alternative.

Perhaps the historian

does not arrive at presuppositionless history by discarding his horizon but by acknowledging it and by making explicit all that it contains.

If the preconceptions con-

tained in his complex background can be thematized, perhaps they can be rationally defended.

One can envision

this possibility of justifying the historian's horizon by
proofs.

But, for a number of reasons, this alternative

holds out only a false hope.

Since the historian employs

ordinary language, the proposed alternative't'Vould require
that, as a first step, he formulate a technical language
free of the ambiguities of ordinary speech.

Such a formal

apparatus is available in mathematics and in most forms of
33Lonergan projects the earnings of this methodological program, in his "Bernard Lonergan Responds," in J?ounda ti ons of Theolog;y:, edited by Philip McShane (Notre-Dame:
University of notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 228. !n another
place he cites the works of Carl Becker and R. G. Collingwood as offering arguments against the thesis of presuppositionless history. See Method in TheoloQ'.:_, pp. 203-205.
A logician who has contributed a valuable and exceptionally readable study of historical fictions and misdirected
controversies has termed the thesis the "Baconian fallacy."
He notes the thesis is deficient in two ways: "it comnits
a historian to the pursuit of an impossible object by an
impracticable method." The historian is expected to conduct an induction of historical parttculars without being
selective and, as a reward, to attain the whole truth
about something. (This recoIIll!lendation to wander blindly
amid a chaos of particulars perhaps deserves Lonergan's
more provocative label.) Cf. D.· H. Fischer, Historians'
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 4-8.
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logic.

But it is lacking in history and unlikely to be pro-

duced given the human content of the historical field.
Furthermore, the alternative fails because the content of the historian's relative horizon can never be completely explicated.

The historian sets to work on the

basis of all the common-sense opinions that he has learned
and spontaneously assimilated.

The wealth of experience at

his disposal, particularly his common sense, is not formulated as specific knowledge, nor is it ever available to
him in more than an incomplete state.

For example, faced

with a specific problem, the ind;_v;dual may, on the basis
of his common-sense resources, know how to act.
11

But this

knowing-how-to-act" requires an insight into the specific

problem and is not complete prior to that insight.

Thus,

on one occasion a counsel of caution may be appropriate,
on another occasion a counsel of haste.34

Consequently,

34 A more extended discussion of the necessary incompleteness of co.r:mon-sense knowledge is available in !nsight, pp. 175-176.
~
To admit that the historian cannot thematize all the
content of his relative horizon is not necessarily to admit that bias is uncontrollable. First, preconceptions are
not necessarily biased opinions. They oay in fact be biased, but what separates preconceptions from bias is the
occurrence of critical reflection which questions the validity of preconceptions in order to discover hidden bias.
Second, as we will note in more detail in Chapter Four,
there are public-professjonal checks on any aberrations in
the individual's scholarship. That is, if the individual
does not correct the effects of bias in his work, others
may; and they are likely to trace the effects back to the
causes--the individual's hidden biases.
However, even critics cannot uncover all the content of an individual's relative horizon. This is true
not only for histori.ans but i'or anyone engaged in scholarly

,
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some of the preconceptions of one's personal background
are only thematized in relation to specific contexts and
cannot be formulated in the absence of those variable situations.

In short, the historian's horizon will always

be more extensive than his explicit knowledge.

Within

that horizon there is a fund of implicit "know-how" upon
which he can draw to meet particular crises.

But, in

crisis-free periods, that "know-how" remains implicit and
incomplete.
If the content of the historian's horizon cannot be
fully explicated, does that force him to admit that bias
may well be inescapable?

"Bias" has many meanings and

must be carefully analyzed if one is not to become confused and, as some writers have done, conclude that the
mere presence of bias is an insurmountable obstacle to
historical objectivity.

But the topic of bias and of de-

tachment from it belongs to the fourth chapter.

For now

we limit ourselves to two objections against unrealistic
demands placed upon the historian.

First, he cannot be

required to pursue his inquirjes without the use of the
content of his relative horizon.

Otherwise what is deraan-

ded is that he become an ahistorical, unsocialized being;
or scientific studies. For research in every field begins with common sense and, no matter how far one moves
away from everyday speech and understanding, common sense
is repeatedly consulted in planning experiments and
strategies for convincing one's audience.
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and such a creature is not to be found.

Second, he cannot

be required to thematize all the preconceptions which he
brings to his study of the past.

In the first place, he

lacks the linguistic tools for clarifying all the ambiguities which attend his everyday reflections on his life.
In the second place, part of the content of his horizon
must remain incomplete.

Still, the historian usually dis-

tinguishes between competent work and the arbitrary assertions which proceed either from carelessness or from some
form of bias.

Just as he feels a responsibility to make

competent use of his resources, so he usually recognizes
an obligation to control his bias.

But in both cases his

efforts will be distinctively personal.

Even in remedying

the defects in his background, the historian will be drawing upon resources within that background.
The preceding comments were intended to articulate
the meaning of the thesis that the historian's preconceptions modify his work.
to this general thesis.

Some further specifics can be added
First, the historian's horizon

promotes neglect of what lies outside his previous interests and developed understanding.

Second, his horizon in-

clines him to choose some interpretations of events and to
discard others.
If the historian is not deluded by the principle of
the empty head, he will recognize in his actual performance the operation which we have termed "selectivity."
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This operation will be based in part on the preconceptions
which he brings to his research.

The four subjective vari-

ables described above have generally characterized the
preconceptions which may be involved.

The point previous-

ly established is that his relative horizon is an irreplaceable guide to his research.

Now to discover and to

investigate what is compatible with his horizon is not
too difficult.

But what lies outside his previous inter-

ests and his present understanding will only be seen with
difficulty.35

His horizon :i.s limited, and what lies beyond

it will not be investigated simply because it will not seem
significant.
matters.

This is to say, his horizon will exclude some

For example, Thucydides ignored evidence of the

economic origins of the .?eloponnesian War.

He did so, not

because he thought such evidence inconclusive, but because
it did not enter his mind that it was evidence.

His hori-

zon specified the relevant areas of information, and the
suggestion of relevancy never arose in regard to economic
conditions.
Given several different interpretations of the same
event, a historian's horizon will direct his choice of the
most plausible interpretation.
I

l
I•

Lonergan draws several

examples from Carl Becker's work in support of this statement.

Lonergan notes that extremes in early Christian

asceticism are anomalies to present-day adults.
35.Method in 'l'heology, pp. 246-2l.J-7.

The
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motives prompting such practices no longer belong to our
general experience.

When presented with such oddities, we

usually are quick to pronounce them pathological.

As a

further example, Lonergan cites Carl Becker's remarks on
the a priori exclusion of the possibility of miracles.

If

a person's horizon contains the presupposition that miracles are impossible, then no number of witnesses to the
contrary will shake this position.

Jnstead, it will be

far easier to categorize their testimony as mass hysteria
or willful dishonesty.3 6
In summary, the preceding study of Lonergan's horizon analysis has clarified some of the connections between
the historian's precritical preconceptions about history
and his surface procedures.

The multiple points of con-

tact were classified as either subjective or objective components of the historian's horizon.

As predeterminants of

the historian's surface procedures, these components offer
ample evidence to refute the thesis of presuppositionless
history.

However, the denial of this thesis did not

3 6 Ibid., pp. 221-223. The examples are drawn from
Carl BecFe'Frs Detachment and the Writing of ~Iistor;z, edited by Phil Snyder (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1958). It is the test of a good historian to overcome initial antipathies to beliefs and values not his own.
Whether he ends by sharing those beliefs and values is not
the issue.. What is important is that he understand them
and not reject them out of hand as repugnant abnormalities.
In addition, the historian's own horizon can be illuminated
and perhaps even corrected by encounterin~ the values and
beliefs of other ttmes and other people. A concise statement on this point is offered in Method in fheology, p.
247.
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guarantee a clear understanding of the antithesis, and so
we transformed the latter from a simple clich~ to a formula
with a specific meahing.

The antithetical position does

not automatically entail either scholarly research or arbitrary assertions.

The historian's complex horizon can be

the basis for competent research, but it can also promote
oversights of important evidence as well as a heavy-handed
rejection of plausible interpretations.

Given this possi-

bility of B.I!lbiguous results, the antithesis to presuppositionless history must be investigated in more detail.· We
will do this in the following section.

In turning to the

topic of perspectivism, we will be further specifying how
from different horjzons come different interpretations of
the same events.
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THESIS OB

?.:2HS?~CTIVISM

Lonergan uses the term "perspectivism" in a limited
sense.

He intends that it apply to different but not in-

compatible histories.37

He details three characteristics

of such hjstories: (1) They are not contradictory, (2)
they do not provide complete information or explanation,
(3) they are i_ncomplete and approxir.late accounts of very
complex realities.3 8 With the exception of some disputed
details, historical works shar.;_ng the same topic are usually compatible.

But contradictory histories do occur.

One need only explore the extensive bibliographjes on the
French Revolution or the works on the New England Puritans
to find examples.39

Differences in relative horizons

surely lie at the root of such irreconcilable historical
interpretations.

But, beyond such differences, there are

what Lonergan terms fundamental divergences, not in relative horizons, but in basic horizons.

These fundamental

conflicts in basic horizons will be treated in later
37Ibid., Method in ~heolog;z, p. 224, footnote 91.
For a broader use of the term, see W. H. Walsh, Philosoph;y:
of History: An Introduction, pp. 106-107.
38 Ibid., Method in Theolog;y, pp. 218-219.
39Jean Jaures took note of some of the divergent
interpretations of the French Revolution, in his Introduction to The Socialist Histor;r of the French Revolution,
reprinted in part in The ~arieties of History, pp. 158164. Peter Gay summarizes tfie c.onflicting appraisals
which American historians have offered of the Puritan contribution to American intellectual life, in A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America (Berkeley:
Univers:tty of California Press, 1966).

79
chapters.

For now we limit ourselves to a treatment of

compatible and not contradictory, historical perspectives.
In the introductory remarks to this chapter, the
point was made that the standard progressive ideal of science is not realistically applied to history.

The thesis

of perspectivism is a substitute for that ideal.

By re-

placing the former ideal, the thesis of perspectivism
makes sense of the ongoing revision of historical thought
and eliminates the scandal of the incompleteness of every
historical work.

The latter incompleteness results from

the fi_ni tude of the historian and from the consequent of
that finitude, the historian's selectivity.
The complexity of the past, the masses of records
preserved, the diversity of possible areas of historical
inquiry--these force the historian to recognize his own
limits.

He must proceed selectively and forego the hope

of producing the definitive account of some issue.

W. H.

Walsh draws a distinction within the process of selectivity.

First, the process is departmental, i.e. an area or

set of related areas forms the limited field of investigation.

Thus, a historian may select the economic aspects

of a particular crisis as his area of concentration while
leaving aside matters of religious or military import.
Second, the process of selectivity operates within the
departmental confines.

Not all the economic aspects are

deserving of equal emphasis; some of them may be ignored

jilf
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altogether. 40

Both areas of selectivity will bear the im-

print of the historian's relative horizon.

His education,

developed interests, common-sense beliefs will be called
upon in narrowing down the mountai_ns of potential evidence.
But, as noted above, the horizon cannot be fully articulated.
Consequently, the process of selectivity is at least partially rooted in sources which escape the control of the
critical historian. 41 There is no way of establishing
which records are worthy of every historian's interest and
close attention.

There are no criteria available for argu-

ing that it is better to write biographies instead of monographs.
The unavoidability of historical selection is a commonplace.

One historian speaks of a "necessary ignorance"

which the modern historian must nourish if he is to write
40 w. H. Walsh, ?hilosophy of History: An !ntroduction,
pp. 97-98. The author goes on to point out that the historian's choice among aspects to be included and to be emphasized is, in part, determined by the interests, beliefs
and values which he brings to the work at hand. Tn terms
of this dissertation: the historian's horizon directs the
process of selectivity. Similar remarks are made by Morton White in his .B'oundations of ::1istorical l~nowledge, pp.

252-253.

4111 The process of selecting has its main element in

a common-sense, spontaneous development of understanding
that can be objectified in its results but not in its actual occurrence. In turn, this process is conditioned by
the whole earlier process of the historian's development
and attainments; and this development is not an object of
complete information and complete explanation. In brief,
the process of selection is not subject~ objectified controls either in itself or in its initial conditions."
Method of Theology, p. 218.

81
.

history and not to succumb to antiquarianism.

42

But the

ensuing problem is whether, in opting for a partial (i.e.
an incomplete) narrative, the historian is condemned to
presenting a partial (i.e. a biased)· interpretation.

Ray-

mond Aron argues that incompleteness is a form of partiality or bias. 4 3 But this position has an unacceptable presupposition.

It presupposes that completeness alone is the

measure of unbiased historical narration.

But then, it is

requiring that the historian proceed as an unhistorical
being, i.e. as one who has no particular temporal standpoint and no personal life history.
In contrast, we have argued that the determinate
standpoint of the historian is the necessary condition for
his understanding the past.

He must be selective, and the

results he produces will be incomplete.

But the alternative

is the mindless and aimless attempt to say everything, the
result of which is to say nothing.
to understand

somethin~

So the historian seeks

of the past and his efforts presup-

pose a finite starting point.

But that presupposed starting

42 Edward Hallett Carr, What Ts History?, p. 14.

Even
outside the field of history, this opinion on historical
selectivity is held. "In so far as history aspires to meaning, it is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of men
and individuals in these groups and to make them stand out,
as discontinuous figures, against a continuity barely good
enough to be used as a backdrop. A truly total history
would cancel itself out--its product would be nought."
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mjnd, p. 257.
4
3Raymond Aron, Tntroduc ti on to the Philos opli;y of His~' translated by George J. Irwin (Boston: Beacon Press,
1961), p. 289. L~vi-Strauss argues the same point in The
Sava5e Mind, pp. 257-258.
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point cannot condemn him from the very beginning to bias
or to a lack of understanding if it itself is a precondition to understanding anything about the past.

Consequent-

ly, selectivity is not necessarily arbitrary, but it is
necessarily a part of the doing of history. 44 That a historian's choice of emphasis or that his decision on what to
exclude can distort his results is obvious, but such a distortion is laid at the door, not of selectivity, but of
one of the forms of bias. 4 5

Variables behind Different iiistories
The finitude of the historian and the resulting process of selectivity are two elements accounting
ent but compatible histories.

A third element

fo~

differ-

was briefly

4411 Any area of knowledge only becomes intelligible

through some principle of selection; the standpoint of the
investigator cannot be eliminated because it is the condi···
ti on of understanding. ·.rhat is not to say, however, that
it must lead to subjective or arbitrary assessments. To
find a meaning in a situation is not thereby to introduce
it from outside but rather to give coherence to what men
have found neaningful." Gordon Leff, History and Social
Theorr (University, Alabama: University of .c'i..laoama Press,
1969), p. 46. W. H. Walsh argues convincingly along the
same lines. "It ought, however, to be obvious that the
fact that history selects by no means implies that it is
subjective in any bad sense. If a narrative is condensed,
it is not necessarily biased: it may be liable to mislead
because of what is left out, but omission is not vicious
in itself so long as only the relatively trivial and unimportant are omitted." Philosophy of History: An Tntroduction, p. 178.
4
5rn Chapter Four we will ~iscuss Lonergan's position on the four forms of bias and on the possibility of
achieving detachment from them.
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noted, namely, the fact that the historian's horizon cannot be fully explicated.

This third element does not refer

to a static set of beliefs or values.

Its general reference

is to the historicity of the historian for whom situations
constantly change and from whom new responses are repeatedly required.

As a result, this historicity is itself some-

thing incomplete, and the limited understanding and selectivity which grow out of it will be undergoing change.

In

short, the elements which compose the thesis of perspectivism are not fixed but are in flux. 46 These are gener.al
variables at the origins of different historical perspectives which, in turn, yield different histories.
Additional variables are also found in the preliminary activity of historical questioning.

Noted above was

Lonergan's view that the knowing process is basically a
matter of raising and answering questions.

We can agree

with this view because, while understanding is sometimes
spontaneous, it usually requires effort, and the effort to
understand takes explicit form in questioning.

Since the

historian does not benefit from immediate intuition into
the past, he must raise his historical experience to his4
torical knowine; by asking questions. 7 Marc Bloch offers
46 Method in Theology, p. 218.
4 7one implication--there are others--of this view is
that history becomes not a story-tell:i.ng discipline but a
problem-solvin~ one.
D. H. Fischer argues this point in
his Historians' Fallac~_es: Toward a Logic of Historical
Thought, pp. xii, xv and 131, footnote 1.
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an example of the indispensable role which questioning plays
in gaining historical knowledge.
Before Boucher de Perthes, as in our own day,
there was plenty of flint artifacts in the alluvium of the Somme. However,· there was no one
to ask questions, and there was therefore no
prehistory. 48
Questioning, then, is a prerequisite to historical research.
If this is so, then the thesis of perspectivism implies
that variables will also be found in histor:i.cal questioning.
Such variables are evident in two areas: (1) in the
decisions on what questions to ask and (2) in the linguistic
categories used to formulate the questions.

The first area

belongs to the topic of selectivity which we treated above.
The historian begins to inquire not out of a vacuum but
on the basis of all that he has previously learned and valued.

!n other words, his horizon is the background for his

questioning.

On that basis he attempts to pass from the
known unknown to the known. 4 9 And if selectivity is the
48 The Historian's Craft, p. 64. Bloch goes on to add
these remarks: 11 • • • every historical research supposes
that the inquiry has a direction at the very first step.
In the beginning, there must be the guiding spirit. Mere
:passiYe observation, even supposi_ng such a thing were possible, has never contributed anything producti.ve to any
•
II
Tb"d
science.
~-,
p. 65 •
4 9David Tracy phrases this point concisely: "For
every authentic question involves a heuristic anticipation
of an unknown (the questionable) that is in some way already known (as questioned)." The Achieveoent of Bernard
Lonergan, p. 126. At a phenomenological level, one might
=falk of such heuristic anticipations as part of the "forestructure" of all interpretation. See Martin Heidegger's
Being and Ti.me, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 189-195.
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result of the finitude of the questioner, specific questions will be the form which this selectivity takes.

The

historian will not be asking the question which intends
sorn.e single meaning of history.

But·he will be asking a

series of questions aimed, not at knowing ever;y-thin5 about
everything, nor at knowing everything about something, but
at knowing something about something.50

His choice of that

"something" to be questioned will be, at least in part,
determined by the interests, opinions and values contained
in his horizon.

It is in this sense that we can say that

historical questioning proceeds from variable sources in
the different horizons of different

histo~ians.

Variables are also found in the linguistic categories which are used to formulate historical questions.
Noted above was the historian's use of ordinary language.

In order to ask questions, he must employ some terms, and
those most frequently chosen are the ones which lie nearest
at hand.

But the ambiguities attached to everyday speech

are the source of diverse meanings and the potential source
of subsequent misunderstandings.

The historian's critics

50David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward
a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 5. The author remarks
that those who ignore these limitations to questioning are
either guilty of the Baconian fallacy or have wandered into speculative philosophy of history. Henri Harrou offers
some pertinent comments on both the infinite number (practically speaking) of possible questions which could be
asked of one portion of the past and the variability of
concepts which could be used to formulate responses to the
questions. The Meaning of :Iistor;z:, p. 235.
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may mistake his basic intent and either disagree with a
position he never assumed or agree with a position he never thought of holding.

From such misunderstandings result

conflicting interpretations not only in history but also
in historiography.

And the ambiguities of ordinary lan-

guage are much to blame.

Hayden White emphasizes the role

language plays in historical disputes.

Poetic expressions

as well as ordinary language account in part for differing
interpretations of the same material.

Both White's study

and the preceding remarks on horizons indicate that one's
choice of linguistic categories with which to ask historical questions is a variable.51 And if the grounds for
choosing expressions can vary, then so can the expressions
themselves.
In summary, the variable base of the thesis of perspectivism was further specified by two insights.

First,

historians proceed by questioning, and the questions they
choose to ask will vary according to the horizons of the
different historians.

Second, the expression which they

give to their questions follows upon a choice of linguistic categories deemed adequate for their purposes.

But

those categories often are spontaneously drawn from everyday speech.

Therefore, the formulated questions are open

to all the ambiguities of ordinary language.

There is no

51For the sake of brevity, we omit examples and specific arguments for this conclusion. Hayden \~1ite has amply supplied both examples and arguments for it in his
Metahistory.
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agreed-upon technical language for the historian, and, as
a result, linguistic expressions of inquiry will vary from
historian to historian.
Finally, just as perspectivism was said to follow
from the rootedness of human finitude and of the process
of selectivity in history, so too the historian's questions
are affected by his ovm historicity.

The questions he

asks and the expression he gives them are never final.

To

paraphrase Collingwood, historical questioning is a river
into which none can step twice; upon returning to a previ-

" 52
ous questi_on, the historian may find that it has chan,:.ed.
It may now seem inadequate or its once unnoticed profundity may now surprise him.

In either case, the thesis of

perspectivism, which accounts for different histories from
different historians, may also cover instances of different
histories from the same historian.

Historical Revisions
All of the above elements of historical perspectivism
contribute to what is for sane a scandal anong historians,
namely, the rewriting of history by each new generation.
But those who find ongoing revision scandalous are likely
to have unrealistic views of what the historian does.
They overlook the variables noted above; and so, in effect,
expect the hjstorian to write from a position above his

52 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Histori, p. 248.
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own history.53

But the impossibility of attaining such a

trans-historical standpoint is not fatal to communication
among historians.

Though rooted in his own place and time,

the historian can still understand and appreciate the views
and values of other people in other t:i_mes and places.

If

such understanding and appreciation were not attatnable,
the historian would be in the paradoxical position of writing only of the present while in fact he intended to say
something of the past.

But the doing of history is proof

of such horizon-transcendence.54

Furthermore, historians

have been known to cooperate on projects.
so, they must be able to understand one

:n

order to do

a~other

from diverging to converging views on the past.

and to move
But there

is another irariable yet to be considered in explaining how
interpretations agreed on by the vast majority of historians can still be subject to revision.
This further variable is easily stated: the significance of the past changes with the present.

Again, the

53The classic example of this expectation is the
perhaps apochryphal story about Fustel de Coulanges. Upon
being applauded by his students for a lecture he gave, the
French historian is said to have remonstrated, "Do not applaud me. It is not I who speak to you, but history which
speaks through my mouth."
54What it means to do history will be a topic of
Chapters Four and Five. Historical procedures will be
treated at length in Chapter Four. 'What is asserted in
historical judgments (i.e. what from a present standpoint
is said of the past) will be considered under the heading
of ''historical realism" in Chapter :B~i ve.
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historian understands the past by questioning it, ·and the
questions asked will reflect the ongoing development of
the historian's horizon.

Therefore, as his interests in

the present change, so his questions chan,;e, and the answers
he finds significant may well be new.

In addition, rela-

tively recent events have yet to reveal their full import,
for their consequences may still be only partially understood.

Thus, the history of the Paris Commune nay be re-

written yet another time if the students and workers take
to the streets of Paris as they did in 1968.

In effect,

this is to say that our awareness of the significance of a
past event is limited by our ignorance of the future.55
Future events may and often do alter the meaning of the past
for us.

Consequently, revision is possible for even the

most widely accepted interpretations.
Of course, revision is not the result of an everchanging past but of variables in historians' horizons.
The past itself is fixed, but it is also enormously complex.
Because of the historian's finitude and all the variables
described above, this fixed but complex past can only be
known incompletely.5 6 And so we can expect future
55Arthur Danto uses this insight to argue effectively
against the possibility of a comprehensive history. Analytical Philosophy of History, pp. 14-16.
56 Lonergan phrases this point as follows: "The past
is fixed and its intelligible structures are unequivocal;
but the past that is so fixed and unequivocal is the enormously complex past that historians know only incompletely
and approximately. It is incomplete and approximate
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incomplete accounts which will revise present historical
works.

At the center of such efforts at revision will be

new projects, new interests, which reflect a different
present.57
This third section can be briefly summarized.
Lonergan adopts the term

11

perspectivism" to account for

different but compatible histories which are incomplete
accounts of complex events.

The basis of their incomplete-

ness consists of various elements: the finitude of the historian, the selectivity process entailed by this finitude,
the j_nvol vement of both in the ongoing history of the individual writer.

Additional variables which account for dif-

ferent historical perspectives were studied.

Questioning

appeared as a prerequisite to historical knowledge.

And

knowledge of the past that gives rise to perspectivism."
Method in I'heology, p. 220.
1

57Both Nietzsche and Heidegger have written at length
upon this topic, the forner speaking of a "monumental" sense
of history and the latter of "authentic historicity." A
person looks to the past, not primarily for an accurate
understanding of what has been (~ie es eigentlich gewesen),
but for insight into possibilities for contemporary living.
What can the past tell me about what it means to be human?
--this is the sort of question to be asked of history.
Nietzsche's comments are found in his I'he Use and Abuse of
Histoq, translated by Adrian Collins (New York: Bob'5s-Merrill Company, 1957), especially pp. 14-17. Heidegger's remarks occur in Being and Time, especially pp. 435-449. Obviously one can argue that critical history has grown out
of this prior sense of history and has established its independence through controlled inquiry. But the fact remains that new questions in the present can require a reappraisal of past interpretations. And there seens to be
no reason for excluding questions of human authenticity
from those questions which may legitimately require a new
critical effort to interpret the past.
1
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questioning involves at least three variables: the choice
of what question to ask, the linguistic frar::i.ing of the inquiry, the mutability of the question itself relat·ive to
the questioner's own historicity.
of perspectivism was treated.

Finally, a consequence

Historical revisions are the

result of the previous variables as well as of the changing
significance of the past for those who study it in the
present.

Our clarification of the variables involved in

the historian's work supplements the moral, aesthetic, and
linguistic variables listed by Hayden 1.fili te.

As elements

determining the historian's adoption of a paradigm or of
a perspective, these variables were :in need of clarification if an adequate account of the crisis of historicism
was to be given.

In the final section of this chapter, one

additional variable--a crucial one for the purpose of this
dissertation--will be added to those already mentioned.

,
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BASIC HORIZON
The main thesis of this fourth section is the following: the historian's awareness of his own intellectual abilities is fundamental to his historical perspective.

By

"historian" we do not mean the neophyte who ventures into
the profession eager to learn the techniques of his more
advanced colleagues.

Rather, we have in mind the profes-

sional historian whose years of study and of writing have
been occasionally marked by doubts regarding the results
of his efforts.58
The distinction made in section two between relative
and basic horizons is of importance here.

Section three

was devoted to specifying the content of relative horizons.
This content, when joined to the finitude of the historian,
provided a list of variables at the root of historical perspectives.

The "relativity" of relative horizons was ac-

counted for in terms of these variables.

But besides the

58 Lonergan is sounding a comnon refrain when he notes
that most historians have but a vague notion of what histor-ical knowledt;e is. "The precise object of historical inquiry and the precise nature of historical investigati0n are
matters of not a little obscurity. This is not because there
are no good historians. It is not because good historians
have not by and large learnt what to do. It is mainly because historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge, and
few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional
theory." Method in 'rheolog~, p. 175. The qualifications
which Lonergan puts on hisirst statement are an indication
that he is aware of the complaint that philosophers of history often seem to be telling the professional historian
what he ought to do. The recurrent controversies over historical knowledge offer sufficient evidence for Lonergan's
qualified assertion about historians and the estimations
which they form of their own intellectual abilities. John
Higham sketches the rhythm of these controversies among American historians. History (New York: Harper and How, 1973),
pp. 89-91.
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historian's psychological, social and cultural development, there is the estimate he makes regarding his own intellectual abilities.

Again, such an estimate may suffer

from obscurity, but the professional historian will have
some awareness of the different positions advanced in the
debates over historical objectivity, and he may even take
part in the ongoing controversy.

The opinion which he has

formulated, no matter hov1 inconclusively, will belong to
his basic horizon.59
Differences of opinion on the issues identified with
basic horizons are easily discovered.

Lonergan surveys

three handbooks on historical method and finds conflicting
opinions on the relationship between historical facts and
· in
· t e 11"1g1"b~ie in
· t erconnec t·ions. 60 Th ese h an db oo k·s
th eir
were published in the nineteenth century, but the same disputes are found in the twentieth.
I

Carl Becker, R. G. Col-

I

lingwood, Henri-Irenee Marrou are studied as representative
historians of the period which follows the so-called
59No attempt is made in this chapter to evaluate different relative or basic horizons. Our main purpose is to
account for the origins of the different historical perspectives. In this section, we limit ourselves to establishing
that what Lonergan terms "be.sic horizon" is a fundamental
aspect of the historian's perspective on the past. As such,
a variance in basic horizons may yield different histories
of the same events. The dj agram on the followi~ng paGe sketches the role of both relative and basic horizons in the
choice of historical perspectives and in subsequent surface
procedures.
60Method in '..I:heologz, pp. 198-201. The handbooks are
those by-Droysen, Bernneim, Langlois and Seignobos.
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DIAGRAM: HORIZONS AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVISM
The Unknown Unknown

(Unkn~

The Questioned

Known)

t
Use of Historical Procedures, Selection of
Potential Evidence, Narration

1'
The Adoption of Historical Perspectives

1'
The Questioner (Known !._(nown)
(existential history of the questioner)

"'

Relative Horizon
Subjective finitude

Objective finitude

moral and aesthetic
aspirations

works of other historians

use of ordinary
language

developed state of
the profession
(partial use of
technical terms
of other professions)

poetic insights
education
personal interests
received concerns of
the era
interiorized commonsense opinions

The Unknown Unknown

'\

Basic Horizon
Vie1·1 of historical knowing
historian's
est:imation
of his own
intellectual
abilities
(alternativP
estimates
based on
type of
horizon:
differentiated,
troubled,
undiff erentia ted)
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Copernican Revolution in historiography.
historian expected to passively allow the facts to "speak
.for themselves.

The critic al and construe ti ve activity

11

of the historian is now recognized as essential to the
writing of history. 61 But this revolution did not put an
end to disputes over basic issues of objectivity and histori.cal method.

Though simplistic notions of objectivity

belonging to the positivist school have been retired, there
are new controversies over the extent to which bias, relati ve beliefs, and subjective imagination :Lnfluence the
historical work. 62

Typ~~

of Conflict among.Jiistorical Perspectives
Again, a thesis of this section is that differences

in basic horizons yield conflicts among historical perspectives (or paradigms).

First, it should be noted that there

are several types of conflicts.

Two historians may hold

conflicting views simply because one of them does not have
all the information had by the other.

Such conflicts re-

quire further research in order to be settled, and they are
61 Ibid., p. 205. Lonergan is here summarizing the
view of ~Copernican Hevolution in historiography which
R. G. Collingwood presents in The Jdea of Histor~, p. 236
and p. 240.
62A collection of conflicting opinions on these issues has been assembled by Hans Meyerhoff in The Philosonhy
of History in Our Time. See especially the reprinted articles by Becker, Beard, Aron, Dewey, Walsh, and Morton
White.

96
not actually conflicts either of perspectives or on basic
issues of historical knowledge.

But there are also the

conflicts mentioned in the preceding section on perspectivism.

There conflicts of interpretation were traced

back to variables in relative horizons.

These variables

likewise accounted for differences in historical perspectives.

Lonergan distinguishes two types of perspectival
differences: complementary and genetic. 6 3 The former
type is exemplified by the departmental approach to research, i.e. the historian selectively studies economic,
military, political or religious aspects of a set of
events.

The product of such selective inquiry may supple-

ment other studies based on different aspects of the same
set of events.

But no single work will be comprehensive.

Given historical complexity, each study Will remain incomplete.

Thus, complementary differences can be attributed

to what was described above as the historian's finitude.
Genetic differences are more appropriately traced to
the historicity of the individual, i.e. to the ongoing
development of worlds of meaning into which he is capable
of entering. 64

Genetic differences mark varying points

63Method in Theolo5l, pp. 235-236.
64see footnote 15, section two of this chapter. Obviously the finitude and historicity of the individual are
intertwined, and we do not mean to separate them. But
they can be distinguished for our purposes. For example,
Macaulay's history of England is a more advanced form of
historical expression than Bede the Venerable's chronicle
because the objective pole of the former's relative horizon
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along a line of development in the objective and subjective
aspects of relative horizons.

For example, the history

written by Bede the Venerable is anterior to the history
of England produced by !'Iacaulay.

"Anterior 11 not simply

chronologically but also in the sense that the chronicle
antedates and is a less developed historical form than the
social narrative. 6 5 In short, genetic differences will be
present whenever two historians operate at different stages
of historical expression.

A variance in the development

of subjective aspects will be in evidence whenever a critical historian opposes the efforts of an author who seeks,
for political reasons, to revive the folk legends of an
earlier period. 66
Besides differences in relative horizons, there are
fundamental conflicts growing out of different basic horizons.

Such conflicts are neither complementary nor genetic,

but dialectical.

They are dialectical because they lead

to mutual repudiation on the part of those involved.

Lon-

ergan's description of the dialectical confrontation is
was more sophisticated. Both writers were obviously finite,
but their 11 worlds of meaning" were not the same.
6 5Lonergan sketches the stages of development for the
objective side of historiographical horizons, in Method in
Theolog;y, pp. 182-189.
66.Ex:amples are presented by Peter Gay. He criticizes
the regressive and uncritical positions of some German historians who advanced mythical heroes as historical figures.
Weimar Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 49-51.

98
concise.

"w'hat in one is found intelligible is in another

unintelligible.
false.

\./hat for one is true, for another is

What for one is good, for another is evil. 1167

He

cites two examples: astrology as unintelligible to some
people, genocide as evil to most. 68

These are positions

which, when publicized, reveal horizons which are dialectically opposed to those of at least part of the audience.
That both astrology and genocide have their proponents is
a fact.

But most listeners will find statements in de-

fense of genocide morally repugnant.

The most favorable

remark they can make is that such statements reflect moral
blindness and a naive acceptance of racial myths.

And

most listeners will ascribe the recurrent interest in astrology to ignorance and intellectual jmmaturity.

Can

rational arguments mediate these basic conflicts?

Perhaps

--but the usual response is either an outburst of moral
indignation or the devastating ridicule of silence.

That

is to say, mutual repudiation is the usual outcome of the
meeting of dialectically opposed horjzons. 6 9
Less dramatic conflicts originating from opposed basic
horizons occur in discussions of historical knowledge.
What exactly can the historian claim to know?

While it is

unlikely that any historian would label his own assertions

6 7:Method in :.Cheo~, p. 236.
68

Ibid., p. 237.

6 9Ibid., p. 247.
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about the past mere inventions of his creative imagination, 70 there are disagreements about historical knowledge
which come close to implying just such a conclusion.

The

positivist school of historiography j_n the last century
argued that historical facts were "givens. 11

In his study

of them, the historian was to be free of preconceptions.7 1
In a contrary position, historical facts were considered
to be primarily instruments for solving social problems
in the present.

Subjective convictions about past events

may lead to action in the present, and it was argued that
this allowed for a pragmatic test of the validity of those
convictions.7 2 Between these two positions lie numerous
less controversial opinions which recognize the construetive role of the historian without identifying that role
with an apologetics for current social programs.
If the persistence of such disputes is evident, does
that prove more than that historians have theoretical
70A possible exception may be the work of a philosopher of history who argues in various ways for historical
skepticism. J. W. l'Ieiland, Ske12ticis.o and Historical Knowledge (New York: Random House, I965).
7 1 Fustel de Coulanges is often cited as the classic
representative of this position. See his characteristic
remark quoted in D. H. B'ischer, Historians' J.i,allacies:
Toward a f..!_ogic of Historical Thought, p. 6.
72 Though he held a number of positions on historical
knowledge during his professional career, Carl Becker is
frequently mentioned as the leading proponent of this pragmatic theory of historical truth. See the discussion by
Robert Allen Skotheim, American Tntellectual Histories and
Historians (Princeton: Prjnceton University Press, 1970),
pp. 114-118.
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problems which defy easy solution?

Why should such prob-

lems be identjfied with a historian's basic horizon?
is so "basic" about them?

What

Hayden White locates epistemo-

logical issues on the surface level of the historical text.
More basic than epistemological issues is the deep structure in which opinions on objectivity and on facts receive
precritical sanction.73

Translated into Lonergan's term-

inology, this is to say: the historian's epistemological
opinions are first arrived at on the basis of his relative
horizon.

The varjability of relative horizons accounts in

part for disagreements on matters of method and factualness.
But this is not to say that theoretical advances cannot
later modify initial preconceptions about historical facts.
It really says no more than that relative horizons are
chronologically prior to the clarification of issues belonging to basic horizons.

Put more directly, the histor-

ian first amasses a wealth of common-sense positions before
he engages in theoretical work.74

Genetically Dist;_nct Levels of Meaning
In what sense is the historian's basic horizon more
fundamental than his relative horizon?

An answer will re-

quire a digression on genetically distinct levels of meaning.

Already granted is the temporal priority of the
73Metahistory, p. x.
74 Method in Theology, p.

85.
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individual's relative horizon to his basic horizon.

As

noted in section two, common-sense opinions are one element of this prior relative horizon.

A person is first

taken up with the practical concerns of living. and he
employs ordinary language to express everyday probleos and
their solutions.

But historically, needs other than those

met by common sense have arisen.

Lonergan cites Socrates'

search for definitions as an example of a need which common sense could not fulfill.

The Socratic questions on

virtue baffled the best common-sense opinions available.
Other examples can be adduced to reflect a historical differentiation of levels of meaning.75

The primary examples

will be drawn from the history of science.

\.Jhat they exem-

plify is the emergence of a realm of theoretical meanings
from the prior realm of common-sense meanings.

No longer

is everyday language sufficient for meeting the needs of
scientific thought.

New technical languages are forthcom-

ing which express in a distinctive way the theoretical
meanings of scientific disciplines.
What Lonergan carefully outlines is both a historical
process and a possible development for individual human
consciousness.

Historically the development of science by

the Greeks marked the differentiation of two modes of consciousness: common sense and theory.7 6 Individually it is
75Ibid., pp. 82-84.
7 6 The historical transition made by the Greeks between
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possible to become a scientist and thus to operate on both
levels of meaning.

But the distinction between these two

modes is not immediately clear.

Perhaps common sense is

nothing but primitive ignorance which science gradually
replaces.

Or perhaps science is only an elaborate but ab-

stract extension of everyday know-how which allows control
of the environment without providing knowledge of the world
itself.

\·/hat then is human knowing?

These issues raise

further questions, not about the world, but about the human subject who claims to understand something of the past.
And to meet these questions on their own ground requires a
consideration of the knowing

pr~cess

as it occurs in the

performance of the subject.

Inquiry into the knowing pro-

cess need not take the historian far fron his routine activities.

He does research, asks questions, makes discov-

eries, proposes conclusions.
he himself has been doing.

He can then reflect on what
In Lonergan's terminology, the

historian can carry on an inquiry into his own human interiority~

And there is the likelihood that such an inquiry

will lead to the discovery of his own intellectual activities, their potentialitjes and the structure of their occurrence. 77
these two modes of consciousness is recounted in a work to
which Lonergan frequently refers. Bruno Snell, The Discovery of th~_,Ylind (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). DavicrTracy provides a brief summary of the differences between
common sense and theory, in The Achieveraent of Bernard
Lonergan, pp. 114-115.
77Method in Theolog;y, p. 83.
developed in Cnapter Three.

These points will be
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We stop short of exploring Lonergan's central theme of
self-appropriation and the heightening of consciousness.
Other chapters will resume where tbis section leaves off.
A limited goal has already been reached.

Historically

human consciousness has been differentiated into at least
three modes: common sense, theory, human interiority.
These distinctions are a matter of historical record from
the emergence of science with the Greeks to the turn to
human subjectivity which was initially made by Descartes
and later elaborated by Kant.7 8
The preceding digression on genetically distinct levels of meaning was made in order to answer a question: In
what sense is the historian's basic horizon more fundamental than his relative horizon?

An answer is now possible.

The question of historical objectivity (to take but one
issue) cannot be answered adequately on the level of common
sense.79

And the question is not the direct concern of

theoretical consciousness which first attends to objects
and not to the attending and thinking process itself.

If

there is an answer to be found, it will be discovered by
78 Lonergan briefly sketches these transitions, in
ibid.' pp. 95-96.
79The writer offers in support of this claim the arguments put forward in Plato's dialogue Theaetetus. While
not directly concerned with historical knowledge Cindeed
Plato would say there is no such knowledge), the dialogue
offers ample proof that epistemological problems are not
settled within the realm of common sense.
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the subject's reflectjon on his own acts of intending which
are prerequisites to reaching any conclusions either on the
common-sense or on the theoretical levels.
As noted above, the historian may have only obscure
opinions on what it means to know.

His entrance into the

world of interiority may be half-hearted.

While aware of

scientific views which baffle his common-sense views, he
may locate such differences, not within the multiple modes
of human consciousness, but in the failings of ordinary
language. 80 Whatever his explanation of these differences,
there remains evidence of widespread confusion anong historians on the distinctions between common sense and theory. 81

Our present position, which will be elaborated in

Chapter Three, is that such confusion requires a study of
human interiority.

For now, the concern is for conflicts

in basic horizons.

Lonergan draws some

d~stinctions

throw light on the origins of these conflicts.

to

The ab-

sence of any awareness at all of differences amons common
sense, theory, and hum.an interior-tty is said to mark an
"undifferentiated" basic horizon.

A partial but inadequate

awareness of the three distinct levels of meaninc is said
80 Hayden W'hi te appears to take ,just such a position,
in Hetahistor~, p. xi, p. 12, pp. 428-429.
81 A prime example of this confusion occurs in many of
the contemporary discussions of "covering laws" and deductive models for historical explanation. Chapter Five will
have more to say on this misguided debate.
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to mark a "troubled" basic horizon.

An explicit under-

standing and affirmation of the distinct levels both in
theDselves and in their interrelations is said to mark a
"differentiated" basic horizon. 82
These distinctions can be used to classi_fy the varying positions regarding historical objectivity.

Our the-

sis is that tbe historian cannot get around holding some
opinions on the issue of objectivity.

The questions in-

volved may seem bothersome, even dangerous if he sees himself being drawn into a philosophical labyrinth.

He Il!ay

dismiss the questions by pleadjng ignorance of such philosophical issues.

He may try to get around the problems

of historical knowledge by strictly limittng his work to
the narrowest monographs.

But try as he may, he wtll still

be assuming a position on the issues, e.g.

11

An accurate

understanding of any complex historical topic is quite
rare."
history.

And such a position will be basic to his doing of
It will either limit or encourage him in the

projects which he is willing to undertake.

rt will be the

basis for his confidence in the conclusions which he makes
public.

It will be the standpoint from which he measures

the 8.1'.lbitions and works of his professional colleagues.
If his position is that of the relativist, then the claims
of other historians to provide true accounts of the past
will seem so much

self-deception~

On the other hand, if

82 These distinctions are found in Method in 'rheology,
p. 84.
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he is aware of the difference between common sense and theory, then some pragmati.c theories of historical knowledge
will seem basically misleading. 8 3 Whatever his stance,
the opinions which form his basic horizon will be crucial
to his work as a hjstorian.
In summary, this fourth section began with the statement of a thesis: the historian's awareness of his own
intellectual abilities is fundamental to his historical
perspective.

A corollary of this thesis is that differ-

ences in basic horizons yield conflicts in historical perspectives.

Note was taken of the issues of historical ob-

jectivity and of value judgments in history.

Though usu-

ally attended by obscurity, the opinions of a historian
on these issues belong to his basic horizon.

The fact

that there are conflicts over these issues was brjefly
exemplified.

But such conflicts on the level of basic

horizon had to be distinguished from other types of conflict.

Borrowing Lonergan's terminology, we described

three types: complementary, genetic, dialectical.

The

first two types derive from differences in relative horizons; the third type from differences in basic horizons.
Dialectical conflicts were characterized by the mutual
8 3He will find some pragmatic theories misleading because they hold that historical conclusions are measured
by their usefulness as instruments of soctal pla.nning and
not by what they accurately relate regarding the past.
But this is to hold that historical narratives are _onl;z
extensions of common-sense intelligence. what is overlooked is the part played by critical-theoretical consciousness.
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repudiation which follows upon disagreements over fundamental

issu~s

of knowing and valuing.

Given two types of horizons belonging to the same
subject, one can ask how they are related.

While relative

horizons are chronologically prior to the development of
basic horizons, the latter are more fundamental in that
they determine the scope of an author's historical work.
This conclusion was arrived at by means of a digression.
Three genetically distinct levels of meaning were studied:
common sense, theory, human interiori ty.

The j_ndi vi dual

may or may not understand these levels of meaning in their
distinctness and interrelations.

The different possibili-

ties for understanding them are classified accord:ing to
th:::-ee types of basic horizon: undifferentiated, troubled,
differentiated.

The level to which the historian's con-

sciousness of his own intellectual abilities has been developed can be characterized by one of these three types.
Whatever level he is at, he will proceed to do history
with at least vague opinions about what he can hope to
know and about what value judgments, if any, he can legitimately make.

If he confuses common sense and theory, his

work as a historian may suffer.

If he tackles the problec

of historical knowledge, he may find that the only adequate approach lies in distinguishing a third level of
meaning, human jnteriority.

Thus we come around to our

main thesis: the historian's awareness of his own
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intellectual abilities is basic to his hist6rical perspective.

SUMMARY OF CHA.PI'ER II
This chapter opened with a proposal to supplement
Hayden wnite's account of how diverse historical perspectives originate.

Specific variables filled out his account

of what lies behind developments in historical perspectives.

In almost every case, these new variables were

compatible with 1..!hite's position.

However, a crucial addi-

tion was proposed: the historian's consciousness of his
own intellectual abilities is a basic element of his historical perspective.

The type of basic horizon he has

will be decisive in his choice of projects, in his expectations of success, and in his appraisals of the works of
other historians.

In subsequent chapters we will further

clarify the content of basic horizons.

Later discoveries

about this cognitional aspect of every historical perspective promise to resolve basic problems of the crisis of
historicism.

Our central and most important discovery--

cognitional structure--is the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPI'ER III
DIFFERENTIATED HORIZON AND TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD
INTRODUCTION
This third chapter takes two strategic steps toward
reaching the goals of this dissertation.

It further de-

velops the "cognitional element" introduced in the previous chapter, thereby clarifying the content of a differentiated basic horizon.

It also introduces the metahistor-

ical grounds (i.e. cognitional structure) on which subsequent chapters will base responses to the fundamental
problems of the crisis of historicism.

If these responses

are to be convincing, they must have a non-preferential
grounding.

Such a grounding is not available within the

historical field.

But, in this chapter, our starting

point lies elsewhere--in human interiority.
tional theory which

~onergan

The cogni-

develops and defends on the

basis of human interiority will be supported by additional
arguments.

We will be particularly interested in discover-

ing how critical Lonergan's formal account of human knowing is.

His formal account is built upon an invariant

structure in human cognition.

Tµe critical transcenden-

tal method formulating the components and dynamic unity
109
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of this structure promises to effect a breakthrough in regard to the theoretical impasse of the crisis of historicism.

Subsequent chapters will exploit what for this

chapter is only initially advanced as promising such a
breakthrough.

Still, in a final section of Chapter Three,

we will apply transcendental method as a critical technique to presuppositions of a specific historical perspective.

Even in a preliminary way, this application of

transcendental method will prove that the crisis is not
entirely composed of insurmountable theoretical obstacles.
Hayden White argues convincingly that the crisis of
historicfsm resulted from the recognition that adequate
theoretical grounds were lacking for choosing among different historical perspectives. 1 Choices which were made
were based on personal preferences and had no compelling
force for other historians.

In short, historicism as a

theory worked out its implications in the crisis period,
and these were the basis for a radical subjectivism. 2
1 Metahistori, P~· 431-432.
2 G. G. Iggers notes the logj_cal outcome, i.e. subjectivism, to which historicism led, in his The German
Conception of Histor?, p. 243. Hayden White's proposal
to overcome the Ironic attitude in history by a new
choice based on anti-Ironic moral or aesthetic aspirations
does not escape this conclusion. In his work, moral and
aesthetic grounds for historical perspectives are treated
solely as variables. Likewise, the historian's poetic insight and subsequent prefigurati.on of the historical field
are said to be variables. The poetic insight can be cast
in any number of linguistic forms since no formal terminology has been agreed upon by professional historians.
Thus, the choice of a linguistic form of expression contributes to the uniquely personal style of the individual
historian.

,
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This conclusion is implicit in White's second thesis: There
are no adequate theoretical grounds for choosing among the
different ways of conceiving history.
·rn Chapter Two, note was taken of the various elements in a historian's relative horizon.

White's first

thesis on the moral and aesthetic grounds of historical
perspectives was accepted but with the qualification that
this thesis offered only a partial account of differences
in historical perspectives.

Among other needed additions

to his incomplete survey was the element termed "basio
horizon."

In this chapter, the counterproposal made to

White's second thesis further develops the previous discussion of basic horizons.
following:

The counterproposal is the

The subject's differentiated basic horizon pro-

vides adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the
cognitional elements of the historian's perspective.
The long-range strategy behind this counterproposal
can be briefly indicated.

Specifically, the process of

differentiating a basic horizon is said to reveal the a
priori form of all knowing.

This claim implies that it is

possible to uncover a cognitional performance which is
operative prior to all explicit theorizing about it and
which does not owe its validity to implicit or explicit
ethical or aesthetic concerns.3

Translated into

3The "priority" involved here is not temporal but
analytic. That is, the basic form of the knowing process
is a prerequisite to actual theorizing, yet the form is
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distinctiveJ,.y historical terms--it is possible to· attain
a metahistorical position from which to criticize and, if
necessary, to correct any precritical opinions about historical knowing which may belong to the historian's perspective.

Of course, there are other components besides

cognitional ones in the historian's perspective.

In

Chapter Four, the metahistorical position developed j_n
this chapter will be related to some of these other components.
The counterproposal speaks of "adequate" metahistorical grounds.

What measure of "adequacy" is available?

An answer to this question is part of the main task of
this chapter.

There are Kantian precedents to guide a

search for this answer.

What is sought are the a nriori

grounds for historical knowledge.

To anticipate our con-

clusions, the adequate metahistorical posi_tion envisioned
only actual when human thinking takes place. A qualification, which appeared in both of the preceding chapters,
must be immediately added. This cognitional performance
does not take place in the absence of ethical and aesthetic
variables. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapters Four
and Five, to recognize how cognitional performance does
take place will spontaneously lead beyond knowing to deciding, i.e. to the question of how one should proceed as
an intelligent and responsible knower. But, as will be
argued in a later section, a method which is based on this
performance will not owe its critical function or the validity of its formulation to a moral or aesthetic position.
For a brief remark by Lonergan which affirms that
his inquiry into human knowing proceeds from a moral decision, see his "Bernard Lonergan Responds," Language, Truth
and Meanin9, p. 310. But this is not an affirmation that
liis cognitional theory is determined by a moral expectation. The a priori basis of the theory in cognitional
structure rUles out such an interpretation of this remark.
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will be reached by elaborating the formal structure of
.
4
historical knowing.
Again, a qualification must be entered.

What is to be elaborated is not a single privi-

leged historical perspective or paradigm.

Our interest

lies in uncovering an a priori basis for all historical
perspectives.

This may prove to be the basis for modify-

ing some elements of different historical perspectives.
But we do not foresee any total reversal of particular
perspectives.

The arguments given in Chapter Two in sup-

port of the thesis of perspectivism preclude any

elim~na

tion of the diversity of historical perspectives.

4
.
The word "structure" suffers from overuse in contemporary philosophical speech. The third section of this
chapter will work out a precise meaning for the term.

,
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INTERIORITY AS THE STARTING POINT
Before attempting to locate a starting point for a
formal study of historical inquiry and theorizing, we need
to retrace some of the steps taken in Chapters One and Two.
Specifically one of White's arguments and our response to
it need recounting.

The argument was as follows:

The historian's adoption of a particular paradigm
is based ultimately on precritical, moral or aesthetic grounds. His epistemological/theoretical
positions have their prior determination in these
non-theoretical grounds. In effect, the former
belong to the surface of the historical text while
the latter are part of the deep structure of the
text. Consequently, any attempt to provide an
epistemological/theoretical justification of
one.'s adopted paradigm represents simply another
ethical choice. 5
Our response to this argument granted that precritical elements of the historian's relative horizon precede
the clarification of his basic horizon and direct his
choice among possible historical perspectives. 6 Yet it
is possible that the historian's developing awareness of
his own intellectual abilities will be the occasion for
modifying his previous perspective.

Such a modification

reflects a cognitional development and basic horizon

5Metahistory, p. 26.
6 This admission derives in part from the recognition
that the historian's starting point is generally not a set
of postulates or a widely accepted theory but his own
unique mixture of common-sense beliefs. Lonergan's remarks
on this point are found in Method in TheolofiY, p. 216.
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development

(i.e~

at least a partial differentiation of

levels of consciousness) and not simply another ethical
choice.?

But this is to say contra White that epistemolog-

ical/theoretical positions need not.· remain on the surface
of the text.

They may be expli.citly involved in the refor-

mulation of historical perspectives and, hence, may be
operative at the level of predeterminations to historical
narratives.
Though in the last section of Chapter Two we gave
examples of how expl:l.cit cognitional discoveries were applied to precritical elements of relative horizons, we did
not argue, on the basis of a formal theory of historical
knowing, that prior preconceptions about knowing could be
critically measured by a criterion derived from that formal cognitional theory.

Such a criterion would allow us

?This counter-argument is perhaps stating the obvious. Most historians quickly learn that common-sense pos~
tions are not adequate for all the tasks they undertake.
Certainly scientists discover this inadequacy even sooner.
In any case, while common-sense opinions provide a major
resource for directi_ng investigations, the complexity of
the field of inquiry, whether historical or scient-i_fic,
will soon require the use of more technical resources. A
broadening of the adopted perspective is required by the
needs of theoretical inquiry and not solely by specifically
ethical aspirations. :Marc Bloch provides examples of the
limits reached by common sense and of the subsequent need
for rearranging some of the historian's preconceptions.
(The Historian's Craft, pp. 80-81.) However, to recognize
tlie need for changing earlier opinions does not guarantee
that one will change them. What is required is that a new
discovery about cognitional performance be implemented in
subsequent performance. Thus, a decision must be made to
conform one's doing to one's knowing. Such a decision is
discussed under the headings of intellectual responsibility and moral conversion. These topics will be treated in
Chapters Four and Five.
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to note any differences between what a historian says about
his professional procedures in reaching conclusions and
what actually occurs when he attempts to reach those conclusions.

In other words, it uncov_ers differences between

the historian's cognitional opinions and his actual performance.8

This issue of a critical cognitional position

involves the foundational questions of a transcendental
critique of historical knowledge.9
Where does one begin such a critique?

The starting

point will not be found in some newly discovered historical
data for two reasons.

First, a transcendental critique is

not concerned directly with what is known but with how one
knows. 10 Thus, the data which are of interest to the
8 Lonergan offers examples of differences discovered
between cognitional theories and actual performance, in
Ins~ht, p. 389, and in 11ethod in Theologl, p. 21.
Philip
Mes ne further elaborates the significance of these examples, in his Randomness Statistics and Erner ence (Notre
Dame: University of Ho re Dame Press,
, p.
4. Morton White takes note of the differences between Charles
Beard's theory of historical knowledge and his actual performance as a historian. Morton White, "Can History Be Objective?" The Philosophy of History in Our Time, pp. 200-202.
9Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to provide such a critique
but left his work unfinished. An excellent study of Dilthey' s project as well as a brief exercise in comparing
Lonergan and Dilthey is contajned in a lengthy article by
Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey' s Critique of Histori_cal
Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language,
Truth and Meaning, pp. 115-166.
lOAccordingly, the phrase "transcendental critique"
is used in a Kantian sense. Note Kant's remark: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not
so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of
objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." Critique of Pure Reason, translated by
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historian

a~e

methodologist.

not the immediate concern of the historical
Second, as will be argued in a later chap-

ter, historical data are not given prior to or independent
of a particular historical perspective.

The historian's

perspective provides an antecedent framework which regulates what is acceptable as potential evidence. 11 If the
needed starting point were identified with certain historical data, we would be presupposing the privileged status
of the historical perspective which included those data.
But this would be unacceptable for two reasons: (1) the
starting point would then be uncritically accepted; (2)
our adoption of the antecedent perspective of the starting
point would be uncritical.

The consequence would be to

eliminate any basis for mediating the disputes of the crisis of historicism.

Again, those disputes occur among his-

torical perspectives, and to attribute primacy to one perspective over the rest is not the way to settle the longstanding disputes.
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. .Mart;_n' s Press, 1965),
p.

59.

11 Hayden White's position on antecedent paradigms
and on their determination of what will count as historical
- data is the source of these remarks. See Metahistory, p.
430. Morton White argues to a similar conclusion, i.n his
Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 254. Note must be
made that our acceptance of Hayden White's conclusion does
not extend to his theory of paradigms as effectively closed
systems of thought. The problen of closed frameworks will
be treated later. The suggestion will then be made that
antecedent frameworks are heuristic structures which are
open to criticism and, if necessary, to correction.
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Although historical data cannot provide the needed
starting point, that is not to.say that the starting point
must be non-empirical.

Besides the data of sense, there

are the data of consciousness.

It is the latter which Lon-

ergan proposes as his starting point.

The beginning, then,

lies not in the realm of common sense nor in the realm of
theory but in that which Lonergan terms "human interiori ty."

Though we must prove that such a starting point is

critical, the suggestion is made that the data of consciousness are not bound by the same restrictions which were mentioned above in relation to historical data and particular
historical perspectives.

They are not so bound because

they do not belong to the surface of the text.

At this

point one can surmise that the data of consciousness may
offer a way beyond the theoretical impasse which is called
12
. . o f h.is t or1c1sm.
. .
th e crisis
Already in Chapter Two we made note of three genetically distinct levels of meaning: common sense, theory, human interiority.

The third level can become explicit

through the attempt to understand the problematic relation
between the first two levels. 1 3

And the thesis advanced

1 2 11uch is being antic:tpated here, and it will only be

in the next section that arguments are presented to back up
these preliminary remarks. Matthew Lamb's article briefly
hints at the possibility of advancing Dilthey's historical
project through the adoption of just such a starting point
in human interiority. "Wilhelm .Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology,"
Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 145-146 and 158.
l3The disputes in modern philosophy over primary and
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at this point is.that in interiority we will find the
starting point for a formal theory of historical knowledge.
Moreover, the claim made by Lonergan is that this will be
a "privileged" starting point in tha:t the data of consciousness supply empirical grounds for judging all claj_ms to
knowledge. 14 The arguments for these assertions will
occupy the rest of this chapter.

secondary qualities exemplify this problematic relation.
See Insight, pp. 84-85, and 130-131. Additional examples
are provided in Method in Theology, pp. 84 and 258.
14Bernard Lonergan, "Response," The Nature of Philosophical Inguir~. Proceedings of the ACPA, edited by
George F. McLean, O.H.I. and Valerie Voorhies, vol. XLI
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1967),
p. 256. An element of continuity in the history of modern
philosophy has been precisely this search for a pr~vileged
starting point. With Descartes there begins an ongoinc
effort to establish the foundations of science, not in
theory, but in human consciousness itself. Kant, Hegel,
Husserl, among others, can be interpreted as further developing the insight that consciousness must supply the
grounds for all forms of knowledge.
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COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE
The second chapter advanced the thesis that the historian does not come empty-headed to his task.

Much space

was devoted to clarifying the general subdivisions of the
historian's relative horizon.

Only in the final section

was any emphasis given to what the historian knows about
himself.

The topic of self-knowledge is

this section.

re-in~roduced

in

What does the historian know about himself?

More specifically, what does he know of his own procedures
as a curious, intelligent, and responsible interpreter of
past events?

FNery historian claims to know somethine; of

the past, but what does he know of the process which leads
to that knowledge?

If Collingwood and others are correct

in claiming that historical knowledge is only secured in
its foundations by the self-scrutiny of the historian,
then inquiry into cognitional operations has priority over
the writing of history. 1 5

l5"Self-knowledge is desirable and important to man,
not only for its own sake, but as a condition without
which no other knowledge can be critically justified and
securely based." R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History,
p. 205. The inquiry into cognitional operations is not
undertaken before the historian begins his work. But,
for the experienced historian, the problems of his field
will eventually require some reflection on matters of
human knowing. The "priority" mentioned above is consequently one of theoretical justification of what the historian finds himself already doing. Lonergan recarks on
the priority of this task, in his Introduction to Insieht,
p. xxix.
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The Problem of Introspection
There is an ongoing debate over the possibility and
mode of attaining self-knowledge.
introspection.
knowledge?

This is the problem of

How does the human subject gain self-

For our purposes--how does he come to know

about his own acts of cognition?

In the first place,

the subject is already seeing, touching, understanding,
and evaluating prior to any reflection upon these personal
acts.

The acts themselves are transitive in the psychol-

ogical sense that in them the subject is aware of objects,
i.e. he intends objects.

By the act of seeing he intends

the seen, by evaluating he intends the valued , and so on.
In the second place, there is the subject who acts consciously, who in seeing is present to himself as seeing,
and so on.

Hence, besides making present intended objects,

conscious acts of the subject make the acting subject
present to himself • 16
The presence of intended objects to the conscious
subject and the presence of the subject to himself are distingujshable.

The spatial metaphor of external and inter-

nal experience is frequently used to distinguish these two

16Method in Theolog~, pp.

7-8.
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modes of in~entional presence. 1 7

Objects are present to

the subject· as seen, as attended to, as reflected upon.

A

subject is present to himself in the seeing, in the attending, and in the reflecting.

This second mode of presence

is simply the subject experiencing himself in intentional
acts.

In being conscious he is present to himself, not as

an object which vies for attention with intended objects,
but as that which is intending objects.

Thus, the subject

can be conscious as seeing and yet give all his attention
to the object seen. 18
The problem of introspection arises when the subject
attempts to discover his own subjectivity.

The problem is

twofold: (1) as regards what is intended, (2) as regards
the mode of intending.

To catch the subject in its "being

the subject" is a hopeless quest.

To turn back, as it

were, on the subject discovers not the subject as subject
but the subject as object.

The elusive subject discovers
but is not discovered as subject. 1 9

l7Lonergan uses and defends the use of this spatial
metaphor, in "Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 226.
18 Method in Theology, p. 8. In his description of
the two modes of _presence to consciousness, Lonergan presents an interesting example to put across his point that
objects are present to the subject because the subject is
present to himself. "As the parade of objects marches by,
spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become
present to themselves; they have to be present to themselves for anything to be present to them; and they are
present to themselves by the sam.e watching that, as it
were, at its other pole makes the parade present to them."
"Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 226.
l9ill2:,., "Cognitional Structure," pp. 226-227.
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As regards.the mode of intending, the term "introspection" gives rise to certain problems.

Often the term

is used to denote a type of inward inspection, a "glance
within."

We can disregard ·the spatial metaphor and con-

centrate on the analogy to ocular vision.
that inward inspection is a myth.

Lonergan argues

His point of attack is

the implicit assumption that knowing is a matter of taking
a look. 20 Later in this section of Chapter Three, we will
give more consideration to this assumption.

If the assump-

tion can be shown to be fallacious, then introspection cannot be described as a type of inward looking.
Thus, the twofold problem of introspection is not
solved by attempting the impossible: to intend the subject
as subject.

Nor is it helpful to imagine that the subject

is a thing which may be "seen" in some vague internal way.
Lonergan suggests an alternate approach to the problem.
The term "introspect:i,.on" may be used to refer not to the
intending of the subject as subject but to the intending
Sartre has argued this point at some length in his Bein~
and Nothingness, translated by Hazel B. Barnes (New Yor :
Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 89-96. The elusive
subject discovers objects but is not himself discovered as
subject. For example, in trying to discover himself as
subject within the act of seejng, or intending an object
visually, the subject turns himself into an object. He
does not discover himself as subject but as that which was
seeing.
20More will be said about this assumption in subsequent chapters. It was this sense of the term "introspection" to which Dilthey objected when he wrote, "'Man knows
himself only through history, not through introspection.'"
Quoted in Howard Nelson Tuttle, Wilhelm Dilthe;y's Philosophy of Historical Understandi.ng (Leiden, Netherlands: E.
J. Brill, 1969), p. 25.
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of what the subject consciously does.

Tn that case the

subject intends the data of his own consciousness, e.g.
his questioning, his searching for evidence, his recognition of a clue to a puzzle.
apprehended.

Such acts can be reflectively

But this is not an "inward look;" rather, it

requires purposeful attention to what the subject has been
doing spontaneously.

If he begins to understand what oc-

curs in questioning and how he searches for clues, then
he may be able to make clear statements about his own cognitional acts.
To consider reflectively these acts and to formulate
a tentative understanding of them is a step in the objectification of the contents of the subject's own consciousness.

That is, the subject raises to the level of self-

consciousness those acts which occur spontaneously as the
subject's presence to himself. 21 What is heightened is
the subject's level of activity, for he is now self-consciously attending to his everyday acts of sensing, imagining, understanding, and so on.

The curious thing about

this is that, in attend;ng to his acts, the subject is
duplicating them, e.g. he is then attempting to understand
2111 Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 227. It
should be noted that we are limiting our discussion of
self-knowledge to cognitional self-awareness. Obviously
there is much more to know about ourselves than this.
Lonergan remarks on this point, -"In the main it is not by
introspection but by reflecting on our living in common
with others that we come to know ourselves." Ibid., p.
238.
-
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his acts of .understanding. 22

This duplicating maneuver is

introspective in that it seeks self-knowledge through an
intending of the objectifiable acts of the subject.

Cognitional Acts
Self-knowledge can then be sought through purposeful
reflection on the data of consciousness.

Again, these

data are the acts of the subject, e.g. his hearjng, questioning, understanding, judging, valuing, deciding.
of these acts occurs as part of our experience.

Each

Adver-

tence to one or several of them is motivated in both the
scholar and layman by the injunction "Know Thyself."

As

noted above, the injunction may take the form of a problem:
how are common sense and theory related?

But in this case

the subject's advertence is not random but is specifically
guided by the traditional issues of the problem of knowledge.

what does it mean to know?

Which of the data of

consciousness, which activity or activities, is to be identified with human

k~owing?

The history of philosophy presents numerous conflicting responses to these questions.

To those who suggest

that perceiving, hearing or tasting can be considered acts
of knowing, others point out that perceiving without understanding can only be an indeterminate gaping, a type of
'

22

~·' p. 224.
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blindness. 2 3

Of. those who hold an identity between under-

standing and knowing, others quickly ask, What is it that
is understood?

Without content supplied by the senses,

the latter charge, understanding

wo~ld

have nothing to

understand, and so the act of understanding would not occur. 24

But if sensing and understanding cannot be indi-

vidually identified with knowing, perhaps when taken together they can be.

Lonergan argues persuasively that acts

of judging cannot be ignored.

It is precisely those acts

which distinguish fact from fantasy, history from legend,
astronomy from astrology. 2 5 But then judging cannot stand
alone as accounting for human knowing.

"To pass judgment

on what one doe.s not understand is, not human knowing, but
human arrogance.

To pass judgment independently of all experience- is to set fact aside. 1126
Lonergan's conclusion is that none of these acts

apart from others is sufficient for human knowing.

He

2 3This objection has been made in varying ways from
the time of Plato (see his Theaetetus) to the present day
(see Heidegger's Being and Time, pp. 190-192).
24

.

"Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 222-223.
To both of the preceding controversies Kant's famous observation is apropos: "ThoughiB without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." Critique of Pure Rea~' p.

93.

2 5Ibid., ''Cognitional Structure," p. 223. Collingwood use"Stlie same form of argumentation to dispel the myth
of an intuition of the real' "for j_ntui ti on' just because
it is intuition and not thought, knows nothing of any distinction between the real and the imaginary~" The Idea of
History, p. 193.
26 rbid., "Cognitional Structure."

12?
distinguishes between elementary and compound

kno~j_ng.

The

former is knowing in a loose or generic sense; the latter
is knowing in a strict or specific sense. 2 7 Elementary
acts

o:f

knowing are the di:fferent cognitional activities

as distinct from one another.

Compound acts of knowing

are the conjunction of several elementary acts of knowing
into a single knowing. 28 Elementary cognitional acts,
when taken separately, are not identi:fied with human knowing.
acts.

But surely knowing is not something other than these
We make assertions about what we experience, and our

assertions formulate our understanding of that experience.
If pressed for proof, we back up our assertions by making
explicit the evidence which tacitly ratified our assertion
to our own satisfaction.

Our claims to knowledge appear

to unite seyeral distinct components into some kind of
whole.

In Lonergan's terns, acts of knowing are not single operations, but wholes whose parts are operations. 2 9
Put another way, human knowing is a compound act which is
reached by a series of elementary acts.

To say more of

this, we must discuss the structure of human cognition.
2 7Ibid., p. 224.
28 nethod in Theolo¥e, p. 12. In other places Lonergan emphasizes that singEi cognitional acts are not properly termed human knowing. See Insight, p. 432; "Cognitional
Structure," Collection, pp. 222-223. His position is that
elementary acts of knowing are components which prior to
an act o:f judgment are not complete as human knowing. Insight, p. 489.
2 9 11 Cognitional Structure," Collect:lon, p. 223.
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By "s-,:;ructure" Lonergan means a whole the parts of
which are functionally interdependent.

In its internal

relations the whole is complete and in no need of addition.
Should one part be removed, the whole would be destroyed.30
But there are different types of structures.

Inanimate

and animate, natural and artistic, macrocosmic and microcosmic are terns which describe distinct types.

Lonergan

concentrates on dynamic structures, i.e. wholes the parts
of which are activities.

He distinguishes materially dynam-

ic and formally dynamic structures.

A dance as a pattern

of bodily movements and a melody as a pattern of sounds
exemplify the former.

Here the emphasis is on the content

of the structure, on the parts which are patterned activities.

Formally dynamic structures are exemplified by the

growing organism which produces its own organs and lives
through them.3 1 Here the emphasis is on, not the parts,
but the whole which is self-assembling and self-constituting.

Formally dynamic structures assemble themselves, they

summon the appropriate activities in their proper order
until the whole process is complete.3 2
30"Each part is what it is in virtue of its functional relations to other parts; there is no part that is not
determined by the exigencies of other parts; and the whole
possesses a certain inevitability in its unity, so that the
removal of any part would destroy the whole, and the addition of any further part would be ludicrous. Such a whole
is a structure." ~·, p. 222 •.
31 Method in Theology, p. 13.

32 Ibid.
p. 222. -

See also "Cognitional Structure," Collectjon,
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Lonergan applies the preceding distinction
knowing.

~o

human

It is materially dynamic because activities are

its components.

It is formally dynamic because the know-

ing process is self-constituting.

To prove his point,

Lonergan asks his reader to reflect upon his own experience.

Arguments, some of which occur above, are available

for proving that knowi.ng is not a single cognitional act
but a series of them.

However, the strongest and most

direct proof lies in the introspective operation of objectifying the data of the reader's own consciousness.33_ Are
there or are there not activities of seeing, hearing, conceiving, evaluating with which I am familiar?

Have J not

referred to.them as means of gaining knowledge?

As a tea-

cher, have T not structured lectures and explanations around these different activities in the hope that students
would pass from inattention to careful listening and eventually to a clear understanding of my point?

If so, then

the knowing process is at least materially dynamic.
Arguments are also available to establish that this
materially dynamic process is also self-constituting, i.e.
is a formally dynamic structure.

But, again, the path of

self-reflection offers the strongest proof.
zled over something I observed?

Have I puz-

Did the puzzlement leave

me inert or did T begin to make guesses?

On some

33we have already discussed this process of objectification. The subject can "heighten" his presence-to-self
by intending those cognitional acts which are themselves
conscious acts of intentionality.
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occasions have I not made "lucky guesses" and felt satisfied at solving the puzzle?

If pressed to translate my

lucky· guess into action or to publicize it as a correct
way of solving a problem, have I not gone back to check it
out?

Has this rechecking gone on indefinitely or have I

finally concluded something about the validity of my former guesswork?

Specific details could fill out these rhe-

torical questions, but the important point is to grasp the
sequence of operations which these questions describe.

In

functionally interrelated steps T have moved toward knowledge of what was first observed with puzzlement, then intelligently grasped, and finally judged to be the case.
Intermediate steps may have occurred, e.g. choosing a method of investigation, inventing imaginative hypotheses,
discarding first one guess and then another.

But, for now,

the important feature of this process is its spontaneity •
.Experience spontaneously provides unforeseen difficulties.

Not everyone stays out of harm's way, and so some

thought must be given to overcomin<; diffi.cul ties.

Scien-

tific intelligence seeks an eventual control over the difficulties which endanger human welfare.

Methodical in-

quiry into diseases which threaten men yields insights
which can be formulated as preventive measures.

But these

measures are not adopted without further testing lest the
cure be worse than the disease.

Only after much care has

been expended will the nod of assent be given to tte
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application of laboratory results on human subjects.

And

that nod presupposes a reflective appraisal of the safety
and of the probable benefits of the well-tested measures.
Our point in the above example is that the knowing
process begins spontaneously and only comes to term in the
reflective moment of assent.

But that moment has come at

some time for everyone, and so it is likely that the series of operations which led up to that moment can be retrieved.

In this possibility of retrieval lies the possi-

bility of recognizing the formally dynamic structure of
human cognition.

What is retrievable are the first moments

of puzzlement

the hints of a possible solution, then

~nd

the sudden awareness of the dimensions of the actual solution, and finally the affirmation of the way out of the
puzzle.

Analysis of what is retrieved yields a growing

awareness of how spontaneous acts on the part of the subject intelligently moved toward the point where he could
assert, "I have the answer."

Through such spontaneous acts

human cognition constitutes itself, i.e. brings itself to
completion through a series of elementary acts which occur
in an orderly sequence.
In sUI!lIIlary, arguments were advanced that knowing cannot be identified with any single act of human intentionality.

To singleness was counterposed the unity of a ser-

ies of cognitional acts.

This formally dynamic unity is

retrievable through an intending of the subject's own

132
conscious acts.

Therein lies the possibility of recogniz-

ing the functionally interrelated steps which he has spontaneously followed in coming to know.

To understand these

steps in their distinctness· and in their interconnections
is an exercise in objectifying the subject's intentional
acts and formulating a clear understanding of them.

Even-

tually the question will arise, Is that understanding correct?

What is called for is the reflective nod of assent

or a return to renewed inquiry.
But, if assent is given, what is it that is affirmed?
Lonergan schematizes the elements of the affirmation under
three headings.

In the first place, the subject affirms

his own sensitivity on the basis (1) of experiencing the
intended acts .of seeing, heartng, and so on, and (2) of
understanding them as distinct intentional acts on his part.
The subject goes on to affirm his own intelligence on the
basis of his experiencing and understanding of his own efforts at asking questions of, conceiving possible solutions
to problem9, and so on.

A similar process takes place re-

garding the subject's rationality.

Has the subject had

experiences of reflecting on the soundness of his work, of
testing his hypotheses, of affirming the strength of some
conclusions and the weakness of others?

Then those exper-

iences along with an understanding of them are the basis
for affirming the subject's own rationality.34

3 411 co~nitional Structure," Collection, pp. 225-226.
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The preceding schematization requires that the subject recognize qualitative differences in his experience
of coming to know.

That is, when the subject asks ques-

tions, he recognizes that more than·perceiving is involved,
and at the same time he recognizes that the first plausible answers may not be the ones he fi.nally accepts.

The

above schematization is of different levels of intentional
operation.

There is the sensitive (or empirical) level of

sensing, imagining, feeling.

There is the intellectual

level of questioning, forming hypotheses, coming to understand,1 expressing new insights.

There is the rati.onal

level of reflecting, weighing evidence, judging the truth
or falsity of conclusions.35

For the sake of brevity, Lon-

ergan denotes the multiple operations of the three levels
by the principal occurrence on each level.

Thus, the

35l"lethod in Theolo~y, p. 9. To these three distinct
levels of operations weave yet to add the level of responsibility on which what we understand and affirm becomes the basis for decisions and actions. While some mention of this fourth level will be made later, our concentration on epistemological issues will preclude an elaborate treatment of this fourth level. What we will develop is how the subject's spontaneous curiosity does not usually halt once it has reached answers to its intellectual
questions; it often goes on to ask what changes should be
made in past works and what new steps should be taken to
avoid repeated mistakes. Our later thesis will be that
intellectual responsibility is found among the spontaneities of human consciousness. Thus, the fourth level of
intentional operat~ons is a concomitant aspect of the spontaneous performance studied in this chapter. A detailed
schema of the basic levels of human interiority is presented at the end of Matthew Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," in Language, Truth and Meaning,
p. 164.
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operations

~re

ing, judging.3 6

termed in general: experiencing, understandAgain, these distinct acts are conscious

operations and therefore can be intended.

But if they are

distinct acts, then the subject's intending of them will
turn up qualitative differences among them.

Consequently,

the subject will not assert that knowing is an undifferentiated intuitive process.
This section of the third chapter began with the thesis that self-knowledge is a precondition to securing the
foundations of historical knowledge.

The work of the· sec-

ond chapter provided the broad outlines of the preconceptions with which the historian operates.

However, to out-

line the general features of relative horizons is not a
substitute for the efforts to thematize the specific content of my own relative horizon.

These efforts are osten-

sibly aimed at increasing self-knowledge.

But given the

preceding descriptions of the knowing process, J can expect
these efforts to occur in a certain sequence.
initial interest in my preconceptions,
tigation of them.37
ing of them.

T

From an

move to an inves-

Gradually T may move to an understand-

Perhaps I will be recognizing and formulating

3 6 Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 14 and Tnsi5ht, pp.

272-275.~

37This investigation usually moves forward by means
of contrast. For example, ! read someone else's view on
what I take to be an important issue of the day. If I find
we disagree, r may seek out the origins of our disagreement. On occasion this will lead me to reflect on what I
must be tacitly assuming in order to hold my position.
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some preconceptions for the first time.

As argued in Chap-

ter Two, J cannot expect to explicate all of them, but
there will be some preconceptions which J can elaborate.
I can check their implications and then either accept or
reject them.

But this is to say that my efforts toward

self-knowledge will be carried out on those baste levels
of intentionality which were outlined above.

Consequently,

in order to know about my preconceptions, I must engage
in the intentional operations of cognitional structure.
The formal pattern of cognitional acts will be the precondition to knowing any of my preconceptions.

The import of

all this is that the demands for self-knowledge can be redirected away from the specifics of my relative horizon to
the antecedent form of my basic horizon.
Mention has already been made of three points which
are relevant to grasping the form of basic horizons.
First, acts of human intentionality are conscious.
wha~

is conscious can be intended.

knowi_ng
knowing.

is

Second,

Th:ird, to know what

requires a duplication of the structure of human
Put another way, the subject objectifies his con-

scious cognitional acts by attending to his intending, by
understanding the diverse acts which it involves, and by
judging his understanding of the acts to be correct.
These three points are

pr~paratory

between consciousness and self-knowledge.

to a distinction
We have already

made use of the distinction in saying that intentional acts
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are conscious and can be intended.

Yet usually the subject

pays attention to the objects he intends in those acts,
and only a special act of retrieval turns his attention
back on what he himself has been doing.

Consciousness,

then, is a component of self-knowledge, but by itself it
lacks the completeness which is reached by the subject's
compound process of knowing that he is knowing.

The proof

of this lies in asking someone what seeing is or what understanding is.

Both types of intending lie within a per-

son's experience; they are part of his consciousness._ Yet
even if he gives a satisfactory account of seeing, he is
unlikely to articulate an equally coherent account of understanding.

The reason for this is that he has not given

much prior thought to the matter.

But in that case, there
will be conscious acts which are not reflectively known.3 8
The main purpose of this section has been to uncover
the structure of human cognition and, by doing so, to move

3811 cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 225.

It
should be pointed out that language plays a key role in the
concretization of the subject's knowledge of his intellectual abilities. Self-knowledge requires more than attentiveness to the data of consciousness, more than a correct
and affirmed understanding of them. It requires that the
subject carefully express the intentional content of his
consciousness and thereby stabilize his basic horizon.
This function of language is noted by two theorists in the
sociology of knowledge. "This capacity of language to
crystallize and stabilize for me my own subjectivity is
retained (albeit with modifications) as language is detached from the face-to-face situation. This very important characteristic of language ·is well caught in the saying that men must talk about themselves until they know
themselves." Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The
Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, 196?), p. 38.
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through the.first stage of a formal and critical account
of human knowing.

OUr

starting point was no historical

datum but, rather, the data of consciousness.

Two ques-

tions which have been implicit in preceding paragraphs
can now be explicitly asked and answered.
fact data of consciousness?

Are there in

Ts there in fact a basic pat-

tern to their occurrence?
Arguments

a~e

not difficult to find for the actual

occurrence of cognitional acts, i.e. for the reality of
the data of consciousness.

What subject would deny that

he has ever experienced sensations or ever had feelings?
Has he ever conversed with others while at the sane time
maintaining that understanding what another person says is
an impossibility?

Has he ever addressed an audience only

to remark that he has not pre-considered whether what he
is to say is true or false?

Curiosities, indeed, would be

those subjects who denied that they had ever felt, understood or defended a position.39
Is there a pattern to the occurrence of these acts?
The distinction made above between consciousness and selfknowledge comes into play.

Prior to intending our intend-

ing, we are caught up in everyday tasks which demand our
full attention, our practical know-how and quick reactions.
In these hurried moments we do not recognize the acts of
cognition as distinct from one another.
39Method in fheology, p. 17.

The relations
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among them go unnoticed.

What we experience is tne undiffer-

entiated unity of consciousness.

But this is to affirm

again an earlier thesis: relative horizons precede the
clarification of a basic horizon.
The world of interiority opens up to us only when we
respond to certain problems.

Then it is possible to set

to work analyzing the functioning unity of cognitional
process.

The acts themselves may be distinguished from

one another and the:tr interconnections may be worked out.
We will then be in a position to recognize that both the
acts themselves and the pattern of their occurrence have
40
been implicit in our conscious living.
The spontaneous
efforts to move from puzzlement to understanding and to
test the proposed solution are recognized as movements
which have occurred prior to any attempts on our part to
formulate the stages in which they occur.

But, after mak-

ing explicit these stages of cognitional process, we w111
discover ourselves to be multi-levelled subjects.

The

acts we now reflect on are recognized as what constitutes
our sensitivity, intelligence, and rationality.

The

proof of this lies in occasional lapses from intelligence
4 o"But the point to the statement that the pattern
itself is conscious is that, once the relations are formulated, they are not found to express surprising novelties but simpiy prove to be objectifications of the routines of our conscious living and doing. Before inquiry
brings the pattern to light, before the methodologist
issues his precepts, the pattern is already conscious and
operative." ~·, p. 18.
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and rationality.

For in not bothering to understand, we

must plead ignorance and remairi puzzled; in not bothering
to weigh evidence, we leave ourselves open to the charge
of intellectual irresponsibility.

On occasion we may even

feel uncomfortable with the awareness that we have not
taken the trouble to separate rumor or fantasy from fact.
Such a feeling can be considered evidence both of the formally dynamic unity of the knowing process (which does not
of its own accord remain incomplete) and of the usually
irresistible development from curiosity to plausible answers ground;ng future inquiries and decisions.
other hand,

On the

to terrainate the cognitional process short of

fact and to substitute rumor is a common failing.

But ru-

mors can be tracked down and either conf;rraed or disconfirmed.

To do just that or to ignore theLl entirely will

characterize the actions of an intellectually responsible
person.
The preceding arguments establish (1) that there are
data of consciousness, and (2) that such data occur as components of a formally dynamic structure.

These two conclu-

sions mark the attainment of the first goal of this chapter,
namely, to provid'e a formal theory of human knowing.

It

remains to establish that this is a critical theory.

This

we will do in the next section by reviewing Lonergan's
transcendental method.
In summary, this third section has been an exercise
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in self-knowledge--that self-knowledge which is a
tion to critical history.

pr~condi

The problem of introspection

rises up to confront anyone who attempts to explain how he
knows about himself.

The p·roblem is compounded if one con-

ceives introspection to be some type of inward look.

How-

ever, in contrast to the myth of inward self-inspection,
there is the subject's intending of his own conscious acts.
And, studied closely, this intending reveals a series of
distinct acts compounding themselves -tnto single acts of
knowing.

The notion of a formally dynamic structure ex-

presses how this series of cogn:ttional acts develops toward
its term in the complete act of knowing.
Now an important discovery lies in the recognition
of the data of consciousness and of the pattern of their
occurrence.

Those data, or cognitional acts, were present

prior to our recognition of them.

They were spontaneously

assembling themselves prior to our exercise in self-knowledge.

So, what we were preyiously conscious of but did

not reflect upon or know was a cognitional structure operating independently of any methodological interest in it.
But, then, this is to say that we have uncovered the a
Eriori form which specific acts of knowing take.

The im-

plications of this discovery for critical history will begin to manifest themselves in the next section when this
discovery is conceived as transcendental method.
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TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD
The task of this fourth section is twofold: (1) to
establish the critical function of the a priori form, or
structure, of human knowing·; (2) to.argue that a r.ietahistorical method based on this structure can criticize and,
if necessary, correct cognitional elements in one's historical perspective.

Both of these goals require a study of

transcendental method.

The initial claim is that transcen-

dental method allows the methodologist to discover any
conflicts between a mistaken cognitional theory and the
prior performance of the mistaken theorist. 41 The implication is that a metahistorical standpoint is possible
from which to modify preconceptions about historical procedures and historical knowing.
Lonergan introduces his transcendental method in a
series of steps.

We have taken one of those steps already

in the preceding work on cognitional structure.

Another

step is to indicate what method is and why it is needed.
A method is a normative pattern of recurrent
and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. There is a method, then, where
there are disttnct operations, where each operation
is related to the others, where the set of relations forms a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where
operations tn accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the fruits of such
repet1tion are, not repetitious, but cumulative
and progressive. 42
41 Ibid., p. 21.

42~.' p. 4.
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Lonergan bases this description on method in the
natural sciences.

He points out the recurrent operations

in the natural sciences: inquiries, observations, descriptions, discoveries, hypotheses, deductions, experimentation.

Next he notes how these operations are interrelated.

Everyday experj_encing can become scientific observation
through specialized inquiry; description can stabilize
what is observed; what is stabilized for one scientist may
be problematic for another, and the problem will be settled only by new discoveries; hypotheses are tentative
formulations of such discoveries; the implications deduced
from the hypotheses are subject to experimentation.

These

distinct activities are related; their occurrence is not
haphazard but forms a pattern which is the accepted mode
of conducting scientjfic projects. 4 3
4 3rbid., pp. 4-5. The preceding description of method also mentioned cumulative and progressive results. The
scientist finds that his experiments turn up new data, observations, descriptions which may or may not support his
guiding hypothesis. He then must either gather further
evidence in support of his hypothesis or he must modify it
on the basis of disconfirming evidence. With a modified
hypothesis, he will again construct experiments which may
yield a new round of discoveries. Lonergan concludes that
method gains its cumulative character from this broadening
of the field of observed data, from the addition of new
discoveries to previous ones, from the facility with which
new hypotheses and theories express new insights as well as
incorporate those valid insights contained in what the new
positions replace. From these accumulations springs the
conviction that progress is being made toward the scientific goal of a complete explanation of all natural phenomena.
(Ibid., p. 5.)
~We took note in Chapters One and Two of Lonergan's
acceptance of the standard-progressive ideal of science,
i.e. the comprehensive and definitive account of nature.
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Two observations of some importance to the historian
are made regarding the above description of method.

First,

the mentioned operations are not exclusively logical ones
in which the investigator aims at coherence among basic
terms and consistency in developed propositions.

Logical

operations are not lacking (e.g. formulating hypotheses and
deducing implications), but there are also operations of a
non-logical type (e.g. observing, inquiring, choosing experiments).

The recurrent and related operations of method

are nether exclusively logical nor exclusively non-logiccal.

The second observation is that the conjunction of

these two types of operations allows an open process of
inquiry, discovery, hypothesizing, experimenting, verifying.44

In other words, the investigator is not wholly

bound by a set of prior rules which direct his work and
Also noted were the works of some contemporary philosophers of science who challenge this ideal and substitute
for it a paradigm theory of science. It was ar5ued in the
opening pages of Chapter Two that Lonergan's view and the
paradigm theory are not incompatible when they are applied
to history. The thesis of perspectivism is held in common
by both sides in the disputes over historical models. However, this compatibility does not appear in their different
ideals for the natural sciences. Still, we can suggest
that, when taken in a limited sense, Lonergan's description
of scientific method with its cumulative and progressive
aspects is compatible with the parad1gm theory of science,
that is, when the description of method is limited to procedures of scientists who share the same paradigm. In this
case, their efforts may yield an increasingly coherent and
comprehensive account.
44
Ibid., p. 6. Lonergan contrasts this view of method wtth ~"static fixity" which characterized Aristotle's
search for necessary and imnutable laws. He also contrasts
it to the closed system w4thin which the Hegelian dialectic operates. (~.)
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limit the scope of his insights.
These observations on scientific method are pertinent
to the historian's work, (1) because his own procedures
are not formalized in any c·omplete iogical manner, (2) because the fact of historical revision and the fact of diverse perspectives on the past imply that history is an
ongoing occupation which defies completion.

Thus, scien-

tific method, despite all its differences, is not something
totally foreign to historical method.
will be studied in Chapter Five.

Their differences

For now, it suffices to

note that a complete separation of the two methods would
overlook not only the presence of non-logical operations
in both but also their resulting openness to future developments.
In what sense can both history and the natural sciences be termed methodical?

First, they are not methods

for collecting random pieces of information.

Rather, they

both involve formal principles and non-logical operati_ons
which are aimed at systematically exploiting a selected
field. 4 5 The label of "antiquarianism" is attached to the
contrary aim of assembling bits· of data on all the events
.of a given era.

But the historian does not realistically

entertain this ambition.

Jn the first place, such a total

collection is impossible; in the second, the lack of any

45 W. H. Walsh discusses this point of commonality, in
his Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 35-38.
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principle of relevancy results in a flat landscape of
equally undistinguished

events~

A diplomat's sneeze would

appear as important as his signature on a treaty.
But there are other reasons, beyond the

avo~dance

of

antiquarianism, for the historian's methodical approach.
With the proliferation of historical studies in the nineteenth century, problems of cultural, historical, and religious relativity appeared.

While men had always been mak-

ing history, it was only the rapid development of historical consciousness which brought to the foreground the problems associated with human historicity. 46 But such problems are not adequately handled by the spontaneous and sometimes unmethodical measures of common sense.

The histor-

ian, instead, needs to explore and to criticize methodically the sources and products of human historicity.

Prob-

lems posed by bias, ideology, and cultural pluralism will
be met by a historical profession which ideally has settled on common norms for investigating disputed issues.
Examples of such norms will occur in the next chapter.
Although the need for a comnon method and norms was
quickly recognized, their attainment did not follow with
equal rapidity.
vestigating.

The reasons for the delay are worth in-

Lonergan describes two stages in the develop-

ment of most methods.

The first stage is imitative.

4 6Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan' s i1eta-methodology,"
Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 148-149.
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Method is learned by following the example of a master.
So, in the historical seminar, the student learns both
from the achievements of his teacher and from the latter's
criticism of the student's performance.

But the insights

and procedures gained in this way are usually limited to a
single school of thought.

Conflicts among different schools

over basic mathodoloBical issues remain.
is hierarchical.

The second stage

An estimate of particular norms and pro-

cedures is made in relation to the dominant science of the
age.

If the investigator's discipline is not this particu-

lar science, then he proposes an analogy of science in
which he attempts to conform his procedures to the successful approach employed in that science. 4 7 Descartes' use
of a geometrical model for his metaphysical system and
Hume's adherence to Newtonian precedents in his moral phil- ·
osophy are examples of such attempts at conformity.

Today

we find the natural sciences, physics in particular, resting at the top of the heap.

History, when not dosnatically

excluded £rom the hierarchy of scientific disciplines, lies
some distance from the top.
Lonergan points out flaws in both approaches to method.

In the first case, a discipline which is struggling

for recognition from the scientific community will, because of its youth, lack masters to imltate.

Tn the sec-

ond case, an analogy of science leaves the less successful
4 7Method in Theology, p. 3.
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discipline at a low spot in the hierarchical order. 48

It

struggles along with borrowed preconceptions and procedures; it lives an ersatz existence which may be not at all
suited to its particular subject-matter.

Dilthey fought

against the tyranny which a positivistic model forced on
the historical thought of his day.

His efforts to provide

a distinct method for history followed upon a basic distinction which he made between the natural and the human
sciences.

T.f his Verstehen method did not win over the

historical profession, still his distinction freed histor4
ians to develop their own method. 9
If today the imitative stage has been outgrown and
the hierarchical stage has been challenged, it does not
follow that historians are at peace among themselves on
methodological issues.50

Contemporary disputes over the

role of bias and its possible elimination, over the role
of value judgments and their li_abili ty to ethnocentrici ty,
and over the form of historical expression and explanation
are evidence that the problems which first indicated a
48

Ibid., p. 4.

4 9For Lonergan's estimation of Dilthey's work, its
strengths and weaknesses, see ibid., pp. 210-212.
50one writer observes that many historians treat such
issues with suspicion and even with hostility. Perhaps
they foresee themselves being trapped in a philosophical
labyrinth by the attempt to wor~ out a basic justification
of their procedures. David Hackett Fischer, Historians'
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. ix.
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need for historical methods have yet to be answered.
Lonergan attempts a third approach which is more
sophisticated than imitative ones.

It is an approach more

cognizant of the differences between history and natural
sciences than were those approaches of historians who held
that history was a science--nothing more and not~ing less.51
This third approach is based on the operations of the human
mind.

We have prepared for its introduction (1) by detail-

ing the data of consciousness and the basic pattern of
their occurrence, and (2) by presenting a general description of method which Lonergan derives from procedures in
the natural sciences.

A method based on the operations of

human intentionality is both more general and more fundamental than methods employed in the natural sciences.52
Such a method is concerned with the basic pattern of operations employed in every field of inquiry, sc:i enti_fic or
otherwise.

It thereby takes up issues which regi_onal or

particular disciplines must presuppose, namely, the activities of human consciousness.

Because it lacks the partic-

ularity of regional disciplines, it is a more general
method.

Because it investigates what they all presuppose,

it is a more fundanental method.

·rhis th:i_rd, more general

51J. B. Bury is usually cited as representative of
this group of historians. See his :inaugural lecture, "The
Science of History," reprinted in The Varieties of Histor;y,
p. 210.

52 Lonergan makes this claim in Method in Theology,
p. 4.
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and more basic approach is transcendental method.
What precisely does Lonergan mean by transcendental
method?

He identifies it with the basic pattern of oper-

ations which occurs in every cogni t_ional task. 53

It is

termed "transcendental" because those operations are the
intending, not solely of determinate objects, but of all
that can be understood, known, and valued.54

These two

53Ibid. There is a need to distinguish transcendental methO'd'?rom the cognitional theory elaborated in the
preceding section. The center-piece of the cognitional
theory is the invariant structure of human knowi_ng. Transcendental method is the methodical exploitation of the content of human i.nteri_ority, i.e. it is the transcendental
procedure which works out the implications of the basic
pattern formulated in the former theory. Tn a sense, this
distinction between the structure of knowing and knowledge
of the structure of knowing is no distinction at all. For
transcendental method is the reflective appropriation of
what has belon~ed to cognitional performance all along.
However, the inquiry into human interi orj_ ty can be distinguished from the result of the inquiry (i.e. the appropriation of critical consciousness) because the latter brings
out into the open that which previously was only implicit.
And what is brought into the open now requires a continued
critical reflection on one's actual performance. Thus,
transcendental method becomes an explicit technique for
present and future inquiries. At the same time, it was the
implicit guide to previous intelligent inquiry and reasonable affirmation. 11ore important, it was implicitly used
to discover and to prove the former cognitional theory
stnce that discovery and proof were marked by intelligent
questions and reasonable arguments.
54"It is a transcendental· method, for the results
envisaced are not confined categorically to some particular field or subject, but regard any result that could be
intended by the completely open transcendental notions."
Ibid. , p. 14. The distinction between categorical and
transcendental in-..;end;_ng is discussed by Lonergan in
ibid., pp. 11-12.
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statements can be joined to yield a definition.

Transcen-

dental method is the dynamic structure of human intending
which has as its field of inquiry all that man can ask
about.55
Before working out the implications of this definition, let us relate it to some positions which have already
been established.

First, it was argued that the basic

operations of cognition develop spontaneously in consciousness.

The subject spontaneously desires to know, asks

questions, learns, and attempts to verify some of his opinions.

Second, the pattern of these acts is present in

consciousness prior to any explicit understanding or formulation of it.

Third, by following through these activities,

the subject establishes his own intelligence and
j

ty.

rat~onal-

By short-circuiting them, he es ta bl ishes hi.mself as

stupid and intellectually irresponsible.
Given the preced:tng positions, if transcendental
method is the bas;c pattern of cognitional acts, then it
develops spontaneously in human consctousness.

Prior to

the subject's explicit formulation of it, i.e. prior to
55"Finally, while it is, of course, true that human
knowing is limited, still the transcendental notions are
not a matter of knowing but of intending; they ;ntended
all that each of us has managed to learn, and they now
intend all that as yet remains unknown. In other words,
the transcendental field is defined not by what man knows,
not by what he can know, but by what he can ask about;
and it is only because we can ask more questions than we
can answer that we know about the limitations of our knowledge." !bid., pp. 23-24.

l~

bis

objecti~ication

of the content of bis own consciousness,

transcendental method is active as a routine of daily living.

Tnsofar as the subject is attentive, intelligent, and

reasonable, he is following transcendental method.

Insofar

as he is inattentive, close-minded, and stubbornly resistant to arguments, he is rejecting his own development as
a sensitive, intelligent, and reasonable person.
We can now return to the definition offered above:
transcendental method is the dynamic structure of human
intending which has as its field of inquiry all that man
can ask about.

This is the structure which develops spon-

taneously in consciousness, which is operative prjor to
any explicit formulation of it, which differentiates attentiveness from inattentiveness, intelligence from stupidity,
reasonableness from unreasonableness.
Now, if the alternative to being attentive, intelligent, and reasonable is a state of unintelligent gaping and

.

uncritical acceptance of the latest curiosity, then transcendental· method has a normative function.

That is, the

subject either develops as a sensitive, intelligent, and
rational subject or he stifles this spontaneous development for the sake of something else.

But, in the latter

case, he cannot avoid the need to ignore inopportune data,
to suppress unpleasant inquiries, and to descend to sophistry in order to buttress a weak position.

Continued long

enough, these exercises in obscurantism will corrode his
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sense of what intellectual curiosity and evaluation are.5 6
An ideology may be developed in order to justify his sup-

pression of evidence and his intolerance of the free exchange of ideas.57

But bef.ore an ideology is worked out,

there are those conscious acts which implicitly assert that
the subject should be attentjve, intelligent, and reasonable.

He first learns by living spontaneously according

to these acts.

To discard this way of living later re-

quires a special effort to block their continuing occurrence.
But the fact that a special effort is required wi_ tnesses
to the normative function of transcendental method.
Lonergan formulates what he calls transcendental precepts to explicate this normat5.ve function: Be attentive,
56 The result of such flights from transcendental
method is termed "scotosis" by Lonergan. He analyzes the
origins, defenses, and psychic distu~bances of such flights
from human intelligence, in :rnsight, pp. 191-203 •
.57rn Insight, Lonergan discusses ideology in terns
of the forms of human bias; see pp. 191-206 and 218-232.
In Method of Theology, he explicitly refers to ideology
as the self-justification of the subject who refuses selftranscendence; see pp. 357-359. This refusal is the mark
of the alienated man, for his spontaneous development
toward intellectual, moral, or religious conversion is
blocked and, hence, he settles for something less than
openness to future personal growth. 'l'he negative nuance
usually attached to the term "ideology" is justified by
an ethical judgment: the intellectual self-transcendence
of the subject must be matched by a desire to make his
doing consistent with his knowing. Tn Chapter Five, we
will offer arguments in support of this ethical judgnent.
For now, we are interested in showing that what comes
first is the spontaneous movement from curiosity and understandi_ng to renewed inquiry in keeping with what has been
learned. Obstacles to this movement may occur secondarily,
and then they put the intellectually responsible subject
to the test.
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Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be respon~ible.58

But the

thesis is that, even prior to the formulation of these
general norms, they are tacitly presumed by the subject
who spontaneously wonders, ·j_ntelligently seeks answers,
and rationally ponders alternative solutions.

The proof

of their tacit presence lies in those occasions when a
person lapses into an indifference which asks no questions,
values all opinions equally (that is to say, values none),
and asks only not to be disturbed.

If prolonged, this in-

tellectual lethargy becomes self-destructive.

The indj_f-

ferent person must still cope with everyday problems.
must be shrewd· in protectj_ng his isolation.

He

Therefore,

his indifference is not complete; when his personal interests are at stake, he will be most attentive and careful
to choose the course of action best suited to his ends.
Consequently, despite his flight from the turmoil of publie

liv~ng,

he still will not cease to follow transcenden-

tal method even if it is only allowed to operate within a
narrow area of his life.

58 Method in Theology, p. 20.

There is a need to relate these precepts ~o transcendental method. As noted above, the formulated precepts express the normative function of transcendental method. Now, just as this method
is implicit in all critical thinking, so too the norms, or
precepts, are implicitly at work guiding inquiry and affirmation. However, transcendental method, once made explicit,
introduces a difference into cognitional performance: one
is now concerned with continually reflectint; on this performance in order to avoid bias and failures to understand
correctly. Likewise, once the transcendental precepts are
formulated, one is more aware of and more responsible for
how one carries out inquiries. In other words, the norcative function of transcendental method becomes a recognized standard of both critical thinking and critical practice.
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The Problem of Formalism
But a serious objection arises both to these precepts

and to transcendental method.
formalistic imperatives?

Are they anything more than

Do these precepts not suffer from

that generality which Hegel charged to Kant's categorical
imperative?59

That is, are the precepts--Be attentive, Be

intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible--empty of content
and capable of receiving any content?
objection can be made in two parts.

A response to this
First, the precepts

and transcendental method presuppose that there is a difference between attention and inattention, intelligence and
stupidity, reasonableness and unreasonableness. 60 In any
person who has been inquisitive, proud of hj_s d:i scovery yet
careful not to publ; sh it without further checki_nc;, there
has been at least a vague awareness of the difference.

Con..:

sequently, he will consciously undertake some activities
and reject others because they either advance his work or
59Hegel' s charge is succinctly put: ''[Kant's] duty as
such is form void of all content and capable of any." The
Phenomenology of .Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New-York: Barper and Row, 1967), p. 672. The complaint has
been voiced frequently. The categorical imperative determines only the form one's maxims ought to take; it does
not prescribe specific actions. Consequently, some critics have concluded that Kant's categorical imperative is
completely devoid of specificity and indifferent to all
particular actions, wlaether moral or immoral. Space does
not permit a counter-argument to this conclus;on. But
the grounds for a counter-argument lie in the fact that
Kant offered several formulations of the categorical imperatj_ve and, by doing so, placed limits on which actions
could conform indirectly through maxims to the categor5-cal
imperative.
6011ethod in 'fheology, p. 20.
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guarantee his failure.

But this is to say that the trans-

cendental precepts, even prior to their formulation, are
the basis for rejecting some acts, i.e. "content."

There-

fore, the second part of the charge.·of formalism, nru.ctely,
the indifference of the precepts to content, falls.
The first part of the objection states that the transcendental precepts are so general as to be empty of specific content.
charge.

Two responses are made to this part of the

First, it is through acts of observation, discov-

ery, and verification that a subject constitutes himself
in fact as a sensitive, intelligent, and rational person.
The defective indi vi.dual who suffers nearly total sensory
deprivation will not become such a person because the constitutive acts are beyond his very limited abtlities.
it is

f~om

But

a study of the constitutive acts that Lonergan

derives the transcendental precepts.

In effect, he is ar-

guing that their content will be all that a subject has
previously learned through being attentive, intelligent,
reasonable, and responsible.
An im.oediate objection will be that this concluston
relativizes the precepts themselves.

If their content be-

longs to the personal history of the indi vi.dual, then what
they prescribe will vary from individual to individual.
But this is the point in formulating them as formal transcendental precepts.

What an individual learns through

being attentive and intelligent and reasonable is not

156

limited to what he has intended in those acts.

He also

learns through repetition how to be more attentive, how to
control his inquiry, how to structure his experiments.

In

other words, he builds up a competence that improves upon
what was initially spontaneous.

What originally was only

a vague awareness of the difference between being attentive and inattentive, intelligent and stupid, reasonable
and unreasonable can in time become a developed facility
in careful observation, rapid grasp of solutions, and diligent pursuit of oversights.

In short, the precepts will

be a working part of the specialized know-how of the subject.

And t'.-,_is specialized know-how does not remain pri-

vate, but becomes social in the recommended procedures and
canons of a professional community.

The differences be-

tween intelligence and stupidity, between intellectual
responsibility and reprehensible dishonesty, are not left
entirely to the individual to discover.

Rather, they are

concretized in the advice given in graduate courses and
in methodological publications.
The second response to the charge of formalism argues that the generality of the precepts is not in fact
separable from all specificity.

The individual consti-

tutes himself as an intelligent subject by specific acts
of intelligent inquiry.

For example, the child develops

routines of behavior which allow him to master his narrow
world.

But there are larger environments in which these
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routines will prove inadequate.

If challenged by_ problems

which require theoretical solutions, the adult puts aside
his daily routines and takes up the technical tools of his
profession.

Among such tools will be the method appropri-

ate to his theoretical task.
ties which solve problems.

His method guides the activiBut his success in the present

is not guaranteed by simply following a prescribed series
of operations.

He must also ask the right questions, hit

upon the suitable experiment, and be wary of accepting his
first results as conclusive.

These operations belong-to

the non-logical elements of method which were mentioned
above.

They require an attentiveness, an intelligence,

and a critical sense which, in a much less sophisticated
way, were first used in solving the

proble~s

of the child.

Therefore, whatever the specific problem to be solved may
be, the required operations will be specifications of the
transcendental precepts. 61 The normative generality of
the latter is found to be presupposed by the operations of
specific methods.

For the above reasons the charge of pure

formalism does not warrant acceptance.
61 "All special methods consist in making specific the
transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be
reasonable, Be responsible. But before they are ever formulated in concepts and expressed in words, those precepts
have a prior existence and reality in the spontaneous,
structural dynamism of human consciousness. Moreover,
just as the transcendental precepts rest simply on a study
of the operations themselves, so specific categorial precepts rest on a study of the mind operating in a given
field." Ibid.
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The Critical Function of Transcendental Method
In the final section of Chapter Two, we argued for
the possibility of applying explicit cognitional positions
to the precritical content of relative horizons and, thereby, of modifying those horizons for theoretical and not
ethical reasons.

However, we did not argue that this appli-

cation was critical.

Our argument had to await the intro-

duction of transcendental method.

rt is the latter which

has a critical function to perform.

That is, it provides

a basis for discovering whatever contradictions there.may
be between what a person asserts about his acts of knowing
and what actually occurs when he knows. 62 We have argued
that, prior to any formulation of the basic structure of
human knowing, prior to any preconceptions about acts of
knowing, there is a dynamic self-constituting process already at work in the intentional acts of the subject.

Now,

if through his study of human interiority Lonergan has thematized the normative a priori pattern of that process, is
he not in possession of a critical basis for evaluattng
assertions about human knowing?

For our own purposes, do

we not have a viewpoint now which allows us to neasure
against knowing as it actually occurs every explicit

C06-

nitional theory and every preconception about human knowing?
The groundwork has already been laid for answering
these questions.

First, epistemological positions need

62!!?.!£., pp. 20-21.
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not be limited to the surface of the historian's text, i.e.
they need not owe their validity to prior moral and/or aesthetic preferences.

The process of differentiating the

subject's basic horizon can lead to·a modification of preconceptions for distinctively theoretical reasons. 6 3 Second, through a study of human interiority and a differentiation of basic horj_zons, there is uncovered the a priori
structure of human knowing.

This a priori. pattern is oper-

ative in intentional acts prior to all theorizing about it.
Third, this formal schema of cognitional process is a normative precondition to intelligent preconceptions about
history.

Poetic insights into the field of hi.story or

moral expectations about the meaningfulness of past events
belong, not to the somnambulist, but to the inquisitive
and intelligent histor:i.an.
From the three components of the groundwork, we conclude the following.

The basic structure of cogni t:i.onal

6 3rt should be pointed out that the discovery and
proof of cognitionah structure is a task that properly is
located within the world of interiority and not the world
of theory. Recall that the issue which prompted the consideration of human interior:tty was the conflict between
common sense and theory over disputed claims to furnish
knowledge. A theoretical solution would only settle the
conflict to the satisfaction of those who were on the side
of theory from the beg]nning. Consequently, an acceptable
solution must be distinguishable from both parties in the
original conflict. However, if the solution is found in
interiority, still the arguments derived from that solution can be properly labelled "theoretical reasons." Cognitional theory rests on the structure of human 5.nteriori ty, but the theory itself contains positions which elaborate the implications of that structure.
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operations, having a validity independent of all

~thical

or theoretical preconceptions, can provide the critical
metahistorical basis for judging all accounts of human
knowing.

The claim to provide a basis for judging all

accounts of human knowing is an aspect of thi.s conclusion
which deserves a more explicit treatment.

Specifically

the aspect of universality will be open to a number of
objections.
A relativist would quickly challenge this claim to

universality.

!n effect, is not this cognitional pattern

merely a set of theoretical propositions which express an
incomplete and, therefore, conditional understanding of
human knowing? 64 May not others in coming to self-knowledge
find a different pattern in their cognitional acts?

If so,

then there is nothing univeral about Lonergan's formulation of the pattern.

What he has discovered is not some-

thing unconditional in the human subject but a series of
activities which may well vary from individual to individual and almost certainly will vary from one culture to the
next. 6 5
64 Note that this question has been constructed in order to bring out a frequently overlooked presupposition:
for sometbing to be known unconditionally it must be known
completely. A partial understanding is relative to the
knower and may in fact be mistaken. Chapter ~°'i ve will consider this presuppositiot! in more detail.
6 5This charge is consistent wi_th Dilthey's conclusion that nothing unconditional is discovered in the human
subject. Hay this not be one reason for the ~nconpleteness
of his lifelong project? "The question whether the subordination to somet "dng uncondi.tional, which, after all, is
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The response to this challenge both grants a portion
of it and denies a portion.

It grants that human self-

knowledge is in process and so is incomplete.

What we

have said about cognitional structure, which is only a
part of that self-knowledge, can surely be revised and improved.

But this is not to grant the possibility of find-

ing a different pattern in cognitional acts.

A distinction

must be made between the pattern im.:nanent in these acts
and the expression which formulates our understanding of
it.

The latter, as a matter of linguistic expression, is
obviously open to revision. 66 Has not the basic pattern

already been described j_n several different ways in this
chapter?
But is the pattern itself open to drastic revision?

Could someone else discover a radically different

a historical fact, can be traced back with logical conclusiveness to a universal, not temporally limited, condition
in I:lan, or must be viewed as a product of history, leads
ultimately to the profundities of transcendental philosophy
which lie beyond the empirical sphere of history and from
which even the philosopher cannot extract a certain answer."
Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and .Meanin in History, edited by
H. P. Rickman (New or : I arper an .Low, l. _,
, p. 165.
66 "A distinction must be drawn between the normative
pattern i.m.nanent in our conscious and intentional operations and, on the other hand, objectifications of that pattern in concepts, propositions, words. Obviously, revision
can affect nothing but objectifications. It cannot change
the dynamic structure of human consciousness. All it can
do is bring about a more adequate account of that structure." .Method in Theolo~;r, pp. 18-19. For Lonergan's
views on the instrumenta1ty of ljnguistic expressions
which in themselves are neither true nor false, but merely
adequate or inadequate, see Insight, p. 556.
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pattern in cognitional activities?

To discover

s~ch

a dif-

ference, he would have to come across data of conscjousness which previously were ignored or misapprehended.

Then

he would have to offer a more adequate explanation of both
the new and the old data.

Finally, to prove his point, he

would have to offer evidence and argue the greater probability of his account.

But, in that case, the reviser will

have followed that very pattern of activities which he is
attempting to alter. 6 7 Thus, a revision of the basic structure of cognition is limited to the expression which is used
to formulate it.

And even in such attempts at revision,

6 7This is a brief summary of Lonergan's argument as
found i.n Method in ;l'heolo~, p. 19. A lengthier treatment
of the same position is available in Insi~ht, pp. 335-336.
Dilthey may have been aware of the streng h of a similar
position which places limits on revision. Matthew Lamb
points out that Dilthey was aware that, even if all theories are relative and hypothetical, still the recurrent
activities which form, correct, and expand those theories
are not open to radical revision. See Lamb's article,
11
Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan Is Meta-methodology' II Language' rl'ruth and
Meaning, p. 323, footnote 36. Lonergan makes much tEe same
point in Insight, pp. 276-277.
It seems ~hat Lonergan's argument on the limits of
revision has an acceptable presupposition, namely, the
intellectual responsibilj ty of the person atter.1pting to
alter radically the basic pattern of cognitional acts.
The argument does not apply to any attempt to assert arbitrarilt a counter-argument as part of some polemic. ~
then w at is gratuitously asserted can be gratuitously
denied. And it is likely that what is so denied will be
lo.belled "intellectually irresponsible." Such censure is
earned because we automatically suppose that what one knows
should guide how one speaks and acts. This assumption will
turn up in Chapter Five as part of our analysis of the
moral conversion which is neede~ to effect the changes
required by intellectual conversion.
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care must be taken to distinguish and to interrelate the
empirical,

intellectu~l,

and rational levels of operation.

To do otherwise would be to overlook the very steps
through which the process of revi.sion itself goes forward.
The counter-argument of the relativist is correct to
the extent that it argues that cognitional theories can
always be clar-5.fied.

But, given our preceding remarks, if

such efforts to clarjfy are to succeed, they must follow
the pattern of spontaneous cognitional acts.

Otherwise,

in failing to be attentive, or to ask intelligent

que~tions,

or to entertain critjcal doubts, the proponent of a new
cognitional theory will be left with a deficient and not
an i.mproved theory of human knowing.

But this is to say

that the pattern, once explicated, is the universal measure
of accounts of human cognition.

This is its critical func-

tion--that every exact theory of cognition will be confirmed and every inaccurate theory of cogniti.on will be
refuted. 68 The first part of our twofold task is thus completed: The a priori structure of human cogni t~_on is a
cri t:i.cal basis for judg:ing all accounts of human knowing.

The Metahistori.cal Grounds Provided by Transcendental Method
The second half of the task remains: to establish
that a metahistorical method based upon this

norm~tive

structure can criticize and, if riecessary, correct
68 Ibid., Method in 'l'heology, p. 20.
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cognitional .elements in a historical perspective •. Already
we have argued that the differentiation of the subject's

basic horizon reveals genetically distinct levels of meaning.

Among them is human interiority.

An investigation

of it reveals the a priori pattern of human cognition.
Transcendental method formulates the distinct but interrelated components of this pattern.

Thus, transcendental

method is a metahistorical method provided by a dif ferentiation of the subject's basic horizon.

The issue is

whether this method contains adequate metahistorical grounds
for criticizing the cognitional elements of the historian's
perspective.
Lonergan suggests that the needed measure of "adequacy" is not necessity but matter-of-fact.

The spontanei-

ties of human knowing supply the factual basis for evaluating the cognitional elements of historical perspectives.
When an individual begins a study of hunan interiori t;y,
he already has a personal history of asking questions,
grasping possible answers, and working toward the correct
ones.

This is the human subject in his unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness. 6 9 This is the

ultimate basis of human knowing.

In any attempt to find

an even deeper foundation, the subject must make use of
that same cognitional process which he already spontaneously
employs.

Consequently, any "deeper" foundation would
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presuppose and not justify that cognitional process.

Now

this foundation provided by the unobjectified activities
of the subject is established by his spontaneous living
and intending.

Both are a matter-of-fact, not a necessity.

The fact is undeniable as soon as one inquires, begins to
understand , and struggles to get things right. 70
This argument indicates that Lonergan is not unmindful of charges made against Kant's transcendental approach,
namely, that Kant attempted to justify critically the results of human cognitional process all the while using
that process to perform his critique.

For Lonergan the

issue to be met directly is one of objectifying the factual routines of that process.

The result, as was argued

above, is a basic pattern of operations with a normative
function.

Transcendental method themat:i.zes in formal

70"Self-aff:i.rmation has been considered as a concrete judgment of fact. The contradiction of self-negation
has been indicated. Behind that contradiction there have
been discerned natural inevitabilities and spontaneities
that constitute the possibility of knowin(;, not by der:10nstrating that one can know, but pragmatically by engae;ing
one in the process. Nor in the last resort c~n one reach
a deeper foundation than that pragmatic engagement. Even
to s~ek it involves a vicious circle; for if one seeks such
a foundation, one employs one's cognitional process; and
the foundation to be reached w:i.11 be no more secure or solid than the inquiry utilized to reach it. As I might not
be, as I might be other than ! am, so my knowing mit;ht not
be and it might be other than it is. The ultimate basis of
our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the
fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing,
but simultaneously with it. The sceptic, then, is not involved in a conflict with.absolute necessity. He might not
be; he might not be a knower. Contradiction arises when he
utilj_zes cognitional process to deny it." Insight, p. 332.
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precepts the general operations which yield human

knowled~e.

Negatively, it implies that neglect of those operations
condemns the subject to ignorance and sophistry.
Now, if the historian- is concerned with securing the
foundations of his historical perspective, he will know in
advance that clarity in his assumptions and strength in
his arguments are assets.
cognitional theory.

His inquiry will extend beyond

He must bring to light much of the

content of his relative horizon.

He must clarify the moral

and aesthetic expectations which he brings to his research.
The linguistic-poetic framework for his historical narrating may be investigated.

But throughout his inquiry into

this implicit content, the historian will either be following transcendental method or he will be thwart:i.ng his am.bi ti on to explicate his presuppositions and to establish
their worth.

Again, he most likely will not have formu-

lated transcendental method.

But, inasmuch as he is fe.mil-

iar with the differences between attention and inattention,
intelligence and stupidity, reasonableness and arbitrary
conclusions, professional responsibility and intellectual
dishonesty, he will be following the transcendental precepts.

Consequently, the attempt to secure the perspective

which he finds himself already possessing presupposes that
the historian will make use of transcendental method.

Con-

comitantly, if he discovers an error or an unacceptable
implication in his prior perspective, the removal of it and

,
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replacement by some other position will be a matter of
improving his understanding of the issue involved, of arguing the superiority of the new position over the old, and
of responsibly implenenting.changes-in earlier works.
In short, our argument is that inquiry into a particular historical perspective, while infrequent, is not
impossible.

But the success of such an inquiry depends

upon the historian's at least implicit adherence to transcendental method in clarifying, checking, and perhaps even
revising elements of his historical perspective.

The

bas~s

for this conclusion is proximately Lonergan's cognitional
theory which formulates the invariant structure of human
knowing.

Ultimately the basis for this conclusion lies in

the factual spontaneities of human consciousness which are
not complete until what is discovered and verified becones
the guide for intelligent decisions (e.g. decisions to revise earlier works).

The cognitional theory which expl'es-

ses the universal form of these intentional routines supplies a metahistorical position for evaluating attempts to
clarify historical perspectives.71 The cognitional theory
?lThat is, it suppiies a roetahj_storical position
which has a normative function to perform in regard tc how
the historian should proceed in intelligently exploring the
content of historical perspectives. How he proceeds will,
on the surface, be a matter of implementing rules for evidence and of doinG competent exegesis. But, on a deeper
level, he will be followine; the transcendental precepts
which implicitly guide the actual use of such rules and
the labor of exegesis.
As perspectives are clarified and their implicit
assumptions are detected and criticized, the historian's
self-understanding develops. But, reciprocalJy, his
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which expresses the invariant pattern of intent5.onal acts
supplies a critical basis for clarifying and, if necessary,
for correcting cognitional elements j_n historical perspectives~

This conclusion completes the two-fold task assigned
at the beginning of this section.

The arguments leading

to the preceding conclusion cari be faulted for lacking
specific examples.

The fifth section of this cha]!ter will

offer examples of presuppositions in a historical perspective.

On the basis of Lonergan's cognitional theory,.recom-

mended changes in the cited presuppositions will be defended.
Before we SU1lli11arize the ground covered in this fourth
section, a few remarks will be entered about what h:..;.s not
been accomplished.

First, we have described the l)rocess of

differentiating the subject's basic hor5zon.

But

this description has been of an anonymous mind.

~rimarily

This wr:L ter

has had to work through much of this process for hi:nself.
But the presentation has rarely been in the first person,
so the anonymous subject remains.
tion and as a warning.

It remains as an invita-

There is the invitation to continue

increased self-understanding requires that his preconceptions be fu~ther clarified, their implications worked out,
and the whole matter subjected anew to critical reflection.
What remains fixed in this reciprocal process are the recurrent operations which establish, test, and advance the
historian's understandtng of history and of himself. Lonergan :phrases tiis ::nore generally: '"l'horoughly understand
what it is to understand, and not only will you understand
the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also
you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understand i.ng." Ibid. ,
p. 748.
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reflecting on cognitional acts.

There is the warning: no

one can carry out this exercise in self-knmvledge for
another person.

Lortergan's writings enttce one to the

effort but are no substitute for it.

So the work of this

fourth section is not to be identified with the actual
event of self-appropriation, but it has been preparatory
to and descriptive of the content of that event.
Second, this fourth section has not provided a transfinite perspective on history.

No single perspective on
the past has been singled out for exclusive adoption.7 2

Nor has an a uriori historical method been detailed.

Trans-

cendental reethod offers a formal account of how the historian operates as an intelligent, rational, and responsible
subject.

But the specific rules he follows and the ques-

tions he asks as a historian will vary with the task at
hand.

The hypotheses which he employs, the evaluation of

72 I1atthew Lamb sounds a strong warning aga:tnst any
attempt to argue that transcendental method is the hs.s:is
for discovering the I!leaning of hi story. "The i nvi ta ti on
to a self~appropriation of this baste horizon :is not to
reach above or behind history nor autocratically to inpose
some pattern on it, but to discover in one's self the open
and dynanic structures of one's own constituting of history
and, through collaboration with others, gradually to articulate the complicattons, concretisations, amplifications
and differentiations of this baste horizon in the historical process itself. To appropriate the enpirical, intelligent, critical and existential structures of conscious intentionality is the exact opposite of boasting an Archimedean lever that would permit one iIDIJediately to pry into all
problems. For such an attitude would be an inattentive,
unintelligent, uncritical and irresponsible forgetfulness
or one's radical historical finitude and so evince the absence of self-a.ppropriation." "Wilhelm Dilthey' s Critique
of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Heta-methodology." Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 125.
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sources which he makes derive from personal decisions which
cannot be made a priori.73

Both the finitude of the his-

torian and the non-logical character of his questioning
are left intact by the conclusions of this section.

As a

result, the diversity of historical perspectives and the
thesis of perspectivism which accounts for this diversity
are also left intact.74
In summary, the task of this fourth section was twofold: (1) to establish the critical function of the a nriori structure of human knowing; (2) to argue that a metahistorical method based on this structure can criticize
and, if necessary, correct cognitional elements in historical perspectives.
The first part of this twofold task required the introduction of Lonergan's transcendental method.
troduction was carried out in a number of steps.

·i'his inThoPe

worth recalling here were (1) the discovery of both logj_cal
73Henri Marrou discusses the dependency of method on
the questions asked by the historian, in The Meaning of
History, pp. 65-66.
74 The invariant form of cognitional process is a dynamic pattern, o+ structure, which allows for diversity in
the content of specific acts o.f historical knowing. Arthur
Danto uses an interesting example to show how what is invariant is compatible with what is variable." "One does
not find sonnets less interesting or beautiful upon being
told that all sonnets hn.ve an invariant form. If anything
our admiration for poetic creativity increases upon learning that so many distinctly individual and dissimilar works
should all have been produced in conformity \·1ith the most
rigid and invariant set of rules!" Analytical .?hilosophy
of History, p. 256.
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and non-logical operations in methodical inquiry, _and (2)
the importance of method for historical inquiry and for
the handling of certain theoretical problems which first
presented themselves with the development of historical
consciousness in the nineteenth century.

But, because

method can develop in a number of ways, a commonly accepted set of norms for handling these problems has not been
available.

Lonergan proposes that transcendental method

supplies both a more general and a more fundamental approach
than any of the previous attempts.

As such, it offers the

possibility of resolving some of the historical problems
and of being the basis for a consensus on historical norms.
Consensus is possible because transcendental method
formulates spontaneities of living, i.e. it fornalizes the
routines of human intentionality with which every historian
operates in wri ti.ng history.

Since these routines occur

in an invariant pattern and since the patterned performance of the subject can be formulated in transcendental
method, there is available a fixed base from which to
judge cognitional theories.

Errors and omissions contained

in the latter will turn up when the latter are measured
against the actual pattern of the subject's co[;nitional
performance.

Transcendental method, therefore, has a cri-

tical function to perform in relation to all accounts of
human knowing.
The second half of the twofold task translated the
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arguments

a~d

positions of the first part into distinctive-

ly historical terms.

Cognitional structure is a precondi-

tion to (1) the subject's adoption of intelligent opinions
about his own work as a historian, and (2) his study, evaluation, and possible revision of historical perspectives.
The method which formulates that structure will be presupposed by the historian in his efforts to clarify, check,
and even replace elements in his own historical perspective.
He may not recognize this implicit method.

But, if he

does, his explicit understanding of transcendental method
will provide him with a metahistorical basis for criticizing the cognitional elements of other historical perspectives.

In the final section of this chapter, we will

offer an example of just such an application of transcendental method.
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TR.ANSCZNDENTAL METHOD APPLIED
A promise was made toward the end of the preceding
section to supply examples of presuppositions in historical perspectives.

The purpose of these examples is to in-

dicate how the critical application of transcendental method can bring about needed changes in historical perspectives.
A problem irn.oediately arises.

·ro criticize presuppo-

sitions, one usually must first thematize them; but not
all

presuppositio~s

can be explicated.

ly true for the historian.

This is particular-

His starting point is not a set

of axioms or even a set of insights which could be explicitly formulated in an unambiguous way.75

In Chapter Two, the

analysis of relative horizons listed some of the components
of the historian's starting point.

His personal life

history and received common-sense opinions were but two of
the components listed.
plete elucidation.

And these components defy a com-

However, even though all of his presup-

positions and preconceptions cannot be thematized, still
some of them can be.

Only a person who insisted that, un-

til one knows all there is to be known, one knows nothing
at all--a presupposition in itself--only such a person
would deny that he can know some presuppositions.

But the

75Lonergan remarks on these points and on the impossibility of systematically objectifying the historian's
development in understand i ne; the past, in Viethod in T'heology, p. 216.
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goal of comprehensive knowledge has already been shown to
be foreign to the historian's work.
Some presuppositions and preconceptions renain inplicit; self-consciousness does not pervade all of the historian's past.

But this is not to deny the possibility of

knowing some presupposi ti.ons.

However, a second -oroblem

confronts even this limited possibility.

Granted one can

bring to light and formulate some preconceptions, still the
statements expressing them fall within the boundaries of a
particular perspective.

In other words, the meaning of

the statements belongs to the perspective within which the
subject works.

The statements do not prove the validity of
his perspective, they presuppose it.76 Consequently, if
they are to be criticized, thematic presuppositions require
a new franework which is r;iore fundamental than tte franework which first justified them.

Otherwise a critique of

these positions will be based on grounds which

ori~~nally

validated the positions.
The-solution to this problem has already been found.
Transcendental method is not based upon

part~cular

opinions

or upon the variables of a personal life history; it is not
the

priv~leged

possession of a certatn theoretical or his-

torical perspective.

Rather, it is the formulation of the

pre-systematic and dynamic operations which give rise both
7 6 Lonergan makes a particular application of this
point, in "betaphysics as Horizon, 11 Collect.ion, p. 214.
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to intellige.nt preconceptions about history and to developed historical theories.

It has already been argued that

transcendental method does not owe its validity to any
ethical variable.

Its precepts are a priori in respect to

every historical theory and are the measure of all accounts
of historical knowing.

Thus, transcendental method commits

the historian to no single historical perspective; instead,
it makes possible both his knowledge of and his critique
of preconceptions about history.

Again, it is the critical

base upon which to build an account of historical knowing
whose only debt is to the factual spontaneities of human
consciousness.77
Havin6 cleared away the two preceding problem9, we
can begin to discuss specific examples of presuppositi_ons
and needed

chan~~es

in historical perspectives.

In his fa.m-

ous study of the French Enlightenment, Carl Becker argues
that the preconceptions of one's age, or the

preva~.11-ng

"cl:iJTI.ate of opinion," close one off from other ages and
prevent one from passing judgment on the argur:ients and ccnclusions of thinkers of an earlier time.

Those argUI.:J.ents

and conclusions are sustained by a climate of opinion in
which we no longer share.

Consequently, for us they are
neither true nor false, but only irrelevant.7 8
77The brevity of this argument will be compensated
for in the following study of Carl Becker's work.
7 8 Becker cites two instances of "climates o~ opinion"
which are effectively closed to contemporary critical
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Becker's position is not an isolated one.

Hayden

White's theory of paradjgms as effectively closed systems
of thought is comparable.

The bugbear of ethnocentricity

among many anthropologists arises from a similar notion of
the exclusivity of cultures and values.79

What these po-

sitions have in common is the assertion that the critic
is not competent to judge the beliefs, values, and
reflection: the theological works of the thirteenth century and tee political thought of the eighteenth century.
"The one thing we cannot do with the Sunna of St. Thomas
is to meet its arguments on their own ground. We can.neither assent to them nor refute them. It does not even occur to us to make the effort, since we instinctively feel
that in the climate of opinion which sustains such arguments
we could only gasp for breath. Its conclusions seea to us
neither true nor false, but only irrelevant; and they seem
irrelevant because the world pattern into which the;y are so
dexterously woven is no longer capable of eliciting from us
either an emotional or an aesthet:tc response." (A provocative thesis, indeed, for the author of the Verbu.~ articles.)
Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Ei.gnt;eenth-Centur;y
Ph.ilosonhers, pp. 11-12.
Becker continues in his second example: "I have chosen to say something about the political and social tr.ought
of the eighteenth century, somethine; about the ?hjlosonh.es.
If I could stand on high and pronounc·e judgment on -i:;nem,
estimate authoritatively the value of their philoso_phy,
tell wherein it is true, wherein false--if I could only do
all this it would be grand. But this, unfortunately, is
not possible. Living in the twentieth. century, ! a~ limited by the preconceptions of my age." ill_£., p. 28.
79Garrett Barden has some critical reraarks to make on
the ambiguity of many critiques of ethnocentricity. He
faults anthropologists for accepti_ng a too easy relativism
in place of working out the details of critical consciousness. In effect, they dodge two difficult tasks: (1) discoverin~ the source of any errors in what they are studying; (2) becoming critical subjects themselves by analyzing
their oun viewpoints. See his arti.cle, "'Ehe Intention of
Truth in Mythic Consciousness," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 18-21.
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explanatory theories of a culture or school of thought or·
which he is not a member.

He can describe those beliefs

and values and understand those theories, but any attempt
to evaluate them will be unavoidably tainted by cultural
prejudice.

Therefore, di verse his tori.cal paradigms, or

perspectives, are presented in a formal study by Hayden
White, but he intends to avoid any judgment of their validity. BO

In effect, he consciously adopts an ironic per-

spective which conceals an inherent scepticism behind a
purely formalistic and purportedly value-neutral study.Bl
BOMetahistory, pp. 3-4. In this writer's opinion,
al though Hayden ·-.Jhi te intends to avoid any critic ism of
historical paradigms and of their philosophical implications, he does leave behind his value-neutral analysis in
the sections on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. See ibid.,
pp. 237-243 (for Schopenhauer) , and pp. 371-374 (for Nietzsche).
In Chapt~r Four we will discuss this question of valueneutral inquiry. For now, we merely note an interesting
(ironic?) paradox in White's purportedly value-neutral study. He begins with a claim to value-neutrality, but in the
end he reco:tm:lends that h:i.storians adopt whatever value systems fit their various moral and aesthetic aspira ti.ens.
In other words, value-neutrality gives way to a free choice
of partisan positions. !s there an arbitrary ele~ent here?
In a purely preliminary way, we can suggest that the ..t'ourth
transcendental precept expresses an iramanent restraint on
arbitrariness. The subject chooses positions in t!1e light
of what he knows and believes. More detail will be given
to this i:mnanent restraint in Chapter Five.
Blibid., p. 434. As noted before, White's thesis is
that this ironic attitude can be laid aside at the conclusion of his study. By then the ironic perspective appears as only one of many possj_ ble perspectives on the
past. The historian is free to adopt from amonG them a
perspective consistent with his moral and/or aesthetic
aspirations. The weaknesses of this "soluti_on" to the
crisis of historicism have already been pointed out in
Chapter One.
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What presuppositions
al relativism?

lie at the base of this cultur-

A lengthy study cannot be undertaken here,

but some presuppositions, their implications, and possible
modification can be supplied.

First, the differences among

climates of opinion are presumed to be fundamental.

One

cannot investigate the sources of these differences; they-the differences--are simply given.

Second, what is not

given is a standpoint from which to grasp the origins of
the differences.

Rather, every standpoint is intrinsically

related to a particular climate of opinion and, hence, is
bound by the prevailing beliefs, values, and theories.
What these two positions imply is that the subject is imprisoned in a closed world of meaning-- the climate of op inion into wh~ch he happened to be born. 82 Furthermore, the
positions imply that efforts to understand oneself, to
attai_n self-knowledge, fall exclusively within the boundaries of the inherited worldview.

There is no question of

finding in the subject a trans-cultural and invariant base
upon which to develop critical consciousness.
Perhaps a critique of different perspectives is possible if the historian attempts to do presuppositionless
history.

' !

If he can cancel the subtle influences of his

82 carl Becker allows mailing privileges to those in
confinement: We may not be able to evaluate the arguments
of the Summa, but--"'1./e can. • • understand what is therein
recorded well enough to translate it clumsily into modern
terms."' The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, p. 11.
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own personal background, then his critical remarks_ on other
viewpoints may be considered objective.

This, at least,

seens to be the ideal of objectivity which is inplicit in
Becker's position.

But, of course, he recognizes that the

ideal is unattainable.

'Whether we must conclude that his-

torical objectivity is therefore impossible is a topic reserved to Chapter Five.

For now, the possibility of criti-

cizing the previously mentioned presuppositions and their
:i_mplications will not depend on the possibility of doing
presuppositionless history.

That would be to invoke the

principle of the empty head which was challenged in Chapter
Two.

Becker and others are correct in arguing that state-

ments made within one "climate of opinion" owe their Eeaning to that prior perspective.
But it does 'not follow that differences in clinates
of opinion are absolutely fundamen-tal, i.e. th8..t the sources
of such differences cannot be located and criticized.

It

does not follow if the starting point of the investigator
is, not a set of statements

intrins~cally

related to a par-

ticular perspective, but the performance of the
subject.

in~elligent

An inquiry can be made into the incentional acts

which elaborate historical perspectjves and which nanifest
the historian's assumptions.

The latter perspectives and

assumptions presuppose these acts.

~·lhether

or not a parti c-

ular perspective and its subordinate theories give a mistaken account of this prior performance does not chance the

II
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fact that intentional acts occur and can be objectified. 8 3
It is the human subject who constitutes diverse meanings,
develops theories which exploit and defend them, and takes
a stand on certain values t6 the exclusion of others.

His

performance is logically prior to the finished product
whether it be a series of statements, a partially thematized perspective, or a vague set of assumptions.
We have already argued that this performance

c~n

be

object5_fied, that objectification reveals an invariant
pattern which is present prior to all cognitional theorizing, and that, hence, a position which formulates this a
priori pattern is not dependent on the subjective variables
of a particular perspective.

\le have also argued ti-iat the

normative function of transcendental method can be expressed
in transcendental precepts, of which specialized modes of
argumentation are particular applications.
we warned that transcendental
historical perspective.

met~od

!n addition,

is not a privileged

Rather, it is an affirm8d posi-

tion on human knowing which opens out onto all developments
of understanding.
Now our argument, whicl} concludes to a r:iodifica ti on
of the preceding positions held by Becker and others, can
be simply put.

If the critic begins with the actual perfor-

mance of the subject, then he can "get behind" the diverse
meanings of varyint; climates of opinion to the sub,jects
8 3 11 Metaphysics as Horizon," Collection, pp. 214-215.

lB:i
who constitute those meanings.

In this case, the .differ-

ences among perspectives are not absolutely fundamental.
(Thus, the first presupposition is denied.)

Hext, if the

objectification of the subject's performance yields an invariant pattern of intentional acts, then the critic can
formulate a position which cuts across the diverse beliefs,
values, and theories of different cultures.

If this formu-

lated position is normative and regulative of all specific
modes of inquiry and argumentation, then the critic can
identify sources of dialectical differences anong historical perspectives.
nied.)

(Thus, the second presupposition is de-

Finally, if transcendental nethod opens out onto

all developments of understanding, then the critic who appropriates his own cognitional structure is not con.fined to
a single perspective.

He not only can understand the be-

liefs of 'other cultural groups, he can also learn from them
and take note of their mistakes.
tions are rejected.)

(Thus, the two implica-

The thesis of closed worlds of mean-

ing, or climates of opinion, is replaced by discovering in
the subject an invariant pattern of acts of meaning.

Cog-

nitional structure supplies the universal standpoint which
embraces all intelligible theories, beliefs, assertions,
and their supportive frameworks. 84
84 chapter Five will unpack· this final statement to
get at the hermeneutical tasks which can be carried out
from this standpoint.
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The preceding arguments apply to more than
cognitional aspects of Becker's position.

~ust

the

There is also a

moral and aesthetic content in his thesis of divergent
climates of opinion.

He states that the conclusions of

an alien climate of opinion are neither true nor false,
but only irrelevant.

And the reason they are irrelevant

is that the perspective to which they belong is no longer
capable of eliciting an emotional or aesthetic response
from contemporary men. 8 5 No response is forthcoming because the dominant concerns and problems addressed by.
those conclusions no longer hold our attention.

The moral

aspect of this viewpoint is derived from Becker's opinion
on the functional purpose of historical inquiry.

"'His-

torical thinking is • • • a social instrument, helpful in
getting the world's work more effectively done. 11186
Now, just as we argued that the differences among
8 5carl-Becker, The Heavenly City of the EighteenthCentury Philosophers, p. 12.
86carl Becker quoted in Robert Allen Skotheim, Amer-

ican Intellectual Histories and Historians, p. 112. ~er
was one of the leading members of the Progressive Tradition in American historiography. That school envisioned
history, not as a refuge from the troubles of the day, but
as a discipline capable of contributing to social progress.
Far from being the neutral ground inhabited by antiquarians, history was rather a storehouse of ideas, projects,
values which could be of use to the present. Unfortunately an overemphasis on the pragmatic value of history developed in this school of thought. However, after the Second
World War, Becker modified the theoretical relativism
which had been part of his pragmatic view of history.
Both Skotheim (in ibid., pp. 121-122) and Lonergan comment
on this change. See-i:iethod in Theology, p. 232.
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perspectives are not fundamental, so we can add tbat diversity in problems and in their solutions is not fundamental.
Admittedly, some of the problems which confronted thirteenth-century theologians and eighteenth-century philosophers are no longer of central importance today.

Still,

the critical subject can learn from the intellectual performance of those historical figures.

He can admire the

intellectual passi.on which prompted the:i.r jnquiries, and
he can imitate the standards for honesty which they imposed
on their own thinking.

He can take note of where individu-

als fell short of these standards and of the resulting errors in judgment.

The moral and aesthetic ideals of his

predecessors may be formulated in antiquated terms, but
the critical subject does not begin his research with only
a set of propositions.

His ability to understand and to

estimate the moral decisions and aesthetic ideals of other
ages is based on more than the prevailing opinions of his
day.

The distance between two ages can be crossed because

the same invariant structure which governed the performance
of his predecessors has been appropriated by the critical
subject. 8 7 Consequently, the irrelevancy of past conclusions
8 7This invariant structure is not the basis for eliminating the relativity of specific cultural values. Again,
transcendental method does not raise the critical subject
above his own historicity. However, transcendental method
does allow the subject to form a judgment about how well
earlier subjects expressed what was known about the reciprocal responsibility between the individual and the group.
Presupposed here is a transcultural moral imperative: One's
doing should be consistent with one's knowing. Since
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to

contempo~ary

problems is no absolute barrier to under-

standing and to reflective criticism of those conclusions
as products of human intelligence and rationality.
In summary, this final section was to apply transcendental method to the presuppositions of a historical
perspective.

Two obstacles to this application were con-

sidered: not all presuppositions can be thematized, and a
critique of presuppositions which itself remains within the
supporting perspective of those presuppositions presumes
their validity from the start.

After clearing away these

obstacles, we drew examples of presuppositions and of their
implications from the work of Carl Becker.

First, different

climates of opinion were said to be mutually exclusive.
Second, there is no standpoint from which to locate and to
criticize the sources of differences among climates of opinion.

The implications were, first, that the subject is

bound to his own climate of opinion, and, second, that his
development of self-knowledge will not turn up any transcultural base for critical consciousness.

In contrast, we

argued that transcendental method provides the needed
knowledge both advances and declines, an element of relativity characterizes specific value statements and the
acts which they describe. Still, the precept, Be responsible, expresses a transcultural aspect of value judgments,
namely, the subject's responsibility to value what he
knows to be good. To offer more than these preliminary
remarks would take us too far afield. !n Chapter Five,
we will return to defend the transcultural element involved in the fourth level of intentional operations.
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standpoint for a critical evaluation of the sources of
differences among climates of opinion.

Finally, the thesis

of closed worlds of meaning was undercut by finding in the
subject's cognitional performance an invariant pattern
which has a normative function in respect to every elaboration of an intelligible perspective.

Summary of Chapter !II
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the
validity of our second counterproposal: The subject's differentiated basic horizon provides adequate metahistorical
grounds

fo~

criticizing the cognitional elements of the

historian's perspective.
Section two outlined the primary requisite to reaching this goal, namely, a formal theory of the preconditions of historical knowing.

Chapter Two had already sup-

plied some of these preconditions, but a transcendental
starting point was still missing.

Section three discovered

the needed starting point in the data of consciousness.

Ar-

guments followed to the effect that intentional acts occur
in an a priori pattern which is the basic structure of all
knowing.
The fourth section accomplished a twofold task.

It

established the critical function of the a priori structure
of human knowing.

Next, it indicated that, through the

objectification of his intentional horizon, the subject
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can attain an adequate metahistorical position for evaluating the cognitional elements of historical perspectives.
Finally, section five applied transcendental method as a
critical tool to certain presuppositions in a selected
historical perspective.

However, throughout these sections,

we have stopped short of raising the issue of bias.

In

any of its many forms, bias may be at work both on the
level of historical preconceptions and on the level of historical procedures.

The obstacles it raises to the appli-

cation of transcendental method will be the topic of the
following chapter.

CHAP.rER IV

DETACHMENT AND THE 'WRITING OF HISTORY
INTRODUCTION

Chapter Four takes up Hayden White's third thesis
and the counterproposal to it.

In this introductory sec-

tion, both positions are outlined, their respective problems noted, and the proposed solutions sketched.

The ·sec-

ond section of this chapter offers a summary of historical
procedures--those procedures occurring on a surface level
which, White argues, are determined by precritical opinions
belonging to a deep level of the historical text.

Finally,

the third section presents arguments for the possibility of
detachment (or freedom from bias) in the writing of history.
These arguments will be derived from an analysis of how
transcendental method sanctions the specialized procedures
which were previously summarized in the second section.
White's third thesis is the following: the historian's theoretical concepts and his epistemological position
belong to the surface of the historical text.

The histor-

ian's decision to adopt this set of concepts and this particular epistemological position rests on precritically
held opinions.

These opinions belong to a deep structure

18?
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where theoretical procedures receive an implicit, precritical sanctfon. 1
To this thesis the following counterproposal is made:
Transcendental method is the basis for a detached attitude
and can provide a critical, non-biased sanction of theoretical procedures. 2
Before expanding on the preceding counterproposal,
we will review the background to 'White's third thesis.

He

sets himself the task of analyzing the deep structure of
the historical imagination.

The classics of nineteenth-

century European history provide a focus for his analysis.
1Metahistory, p. x.
2 To anticipate remarks which are to follow later in
this chapter--we grant that precritical opinions are part
of the relative horizon of every historian. It is likely
that some form of bias will also be present. However, an
inquiry into human interiority may lead to the development
of critical consciousness. The latter, coming to expression
in transcendental method, has normative and critical functions which are able to modify and, if necessary, to correct precritical opinions contained in relative horizons.
Bias may, therefore, not be an irreducible aspect of every
historical work.
For the sake of clarity, we should repeat the distinctions made earlier among preconceptions, bias, and
preferences. We understand preconceptions to be precritical opinions which may or may not be biased. What distinguishes them from bias is the absence of critical reflection which seeks to discover any hidden bias in them. Bias
we take to be a distortion of the subject's spontaneous
intellectual uevelopment. It sets up barriers which prematurely halt the process of understanding. Preferences
are expressed choices among varying and sometimes conflicting opinions. They are basically a matter of individual
partiality even though a large group may favor the same
opinions. In any case, ?Either the individual nor the group
justifies its preferences on compelling theoretical grounds.
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What emerges as the content of the deep structure is a set
of precritically accepted paradigms which dictate the plausible forms for historical explanations.

These paradigms

are the metahistorical element of the historian's work.

A

spatial metaphor expresses the distinction between this
element and other dimensions of his work.

Surface proced-

ures are preceded by operations on a deep level which are
basically preconceptual and poetic.

On the surface, or

manifest, level there are obvious differences in how history is conceived.

One author stresses the diachronic ele-

ments of the past while another emphasizes the synchronic.
One historian reconstructs in

impress~onistic

fashion the

"spirit of the age 11 while another penetrates to the "laws"
which guided the course of events.

One author argues the

relevancy of history for solVing contemporary problems
while another underlines the basic differences between past
and present and, thus, d:i.scourages the presentist concerns
of his counterpart.3
These manifest differences are said to reflect more
fundamental disagreements over the form which historical
explanations ought to take.

Hayden White cites the case

3Metahistory, p. 4. White cites Michelet and Ranke
as historians who produced diachronic narratives; Tocqueville and Burckhardt as historians who produced synchronic
narratives (ibid., p. 10). Ye have already noted the presentism of Carl Becker. His counterpart might well be
Hegel. See the latter's remarks in the Introduction to
The Philoso
of Histor , translated by J. Sibree (New
ork: Dover .Pu ica ions, 1956), p. 6.
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history of Organicist and Mechanistic modes of explanation
to exemplify how surface differences originate in deep
structural conflicts.

These two paradigms of historical

explanation have been excluded from contemporary professional circles in favor of the more "empirical" paradigms
of Formism and Contextualism.

The professional historical

community is fairly unanimous in its avoidance of the philosophies of history practiced by Hegel (Organicist type)
and Marx (Mechanistic type).

But (1) inasmuch as the ex-

cluded paradigms provide insights into the past which·are
unachievable through other paradigms, and (2) inasmuch as
history is not a rigorous science committed to a single
terminological system, the decision to exclude some paradigms in favor of others must rest on precritical opinions
about the way past events should be recounted.

These opin-

ions, according to White, manifest a preference for one or
more sets of explanation over others.

Insofar as the pref-

erence is precritical, it is likely to be no more than the
bias of those who express a choice among paradigms.

At

least it may appear so to anyone making an alternate choice
among historical paradigms. 4
White's preceding conclusions are part of his more
general thesis: when the historian chooses among alternate
perspectives on history, the likely grounds for his choice
4

See ibid., Metahistory, pp. 20-21, for an expanded
discussion Ofthe points made in thts paragraph.
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will be mora.l or aesthetic preferences. 5

Nineteenth-cen-

tury historians attempted to justify their choices on epistemological grounds, arguing that their modes of explanation
were more scientific or "realistic" than others.

However,

all these theoretical arguments belong to the surface of
the historical texts.

They reflect ethical or aesthetic

commitments which lie on a deeper level.

It is these com-

mitments which sanction theories used both to explain historical data and to justify the selection of narrative forms.
There are numerous problems entailed by Hayden \.lhite's
third thesis.
in Chapter One.

We have already taken note of some of them
In the first place, if both the histor-

ian's choice of a paradigm and his subsequent attempts to
justify that choice are based on precritical grounds, then,
to those not sharing this paradigm, his choice and defense
will seem gratuitous.

His arguments Will seem so many ex-

pressions of personal temperament.
We apprehend the past and the whole spectacle of
history-in-general in terms of felt needs and aspirations that are ultimately personal, having
to do with the ways we view our own positions in
the ongoing social establishment, our hopes and
fears for the future, and the image of the kind
of humanity we would like to believe we represent. 6

5Ibid., p. 433.
6 Ibid., p. 283. White's remarks emphasize personal
needs or-a5'pirations. But one can ask, Are there not general
human needs which cut across individual differences as part
of communally adopted aspirations? Such needs might assure
the historian of a certain type of public objectivity if
his work were based on a widely accepted set of values.
White does not speak of this possibility. He does mention
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One implication of this position is that the writing of
history is not so much an account of past events as it is
a self-revelation on the part of the writer.?
Other implications can be drawn from White's thesis.
First, if each historian works under the guidance of a precritically accepted paradigm and if that antecedent framework predetermines his use of evidence and modes of argumentation, then his work is above criticism from those who
adopt other historical perspectives.

Their precritical

choices will not contain grounds for criticizing the work
of others who make different choices.

In effect, we are

back to the previous position studied in Chapter Three.
That is, differences among systems of thought are final;
there is no access to the source of these different systems, the intelligent human subject.

Second, if historical

procedures are justified only on the basis of individual
preferences, then conflicting historical interpretations
cannot be mediated.

What strikes one historian as a biased

that conflicting paradigms win supportive audiences, but
he locates the link between historian and audience on a
pretheoretical, and specifically linguistic, level of consciousness. (Metahistor~, p. 429.) In view of how he attempts to resolve the crisis of historicism, the possibility of universal needs or values would seem to be out of
the question. Such needs or values, if they were discovered, would themselves present a challenge to the ironic
mode of consciousness implicit in White's formalistic study.
?w. H. Walsh discusses this type of paradoxical implication, in his Philosophy of History: An rntroduction,
p. 109.
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use of evidence may seem quite appropriate to another.

What

is condemned as bias by one school of thought may be praised
as moral conviction by another.

The implication is that

any bias in a historical work is irreducible; there are
no grounds for critically establishing that it is in fact
bias. 8
What these implications reflect is a series of obstacles preventing any resolution of the crisis of historicism. 9

Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to

estimate the strength of Lonergan's claims for transcendental method, these obstacles must be related to that method.
8 Room is left by this conclusion for understanding
what other historians talk about. But what is lacking is
a set of criteria for evaluating what one has understood.
This situation sums up the extreme individuality of nineteenth-century histor:tcism. Friedr:i.ch I1einecke aptly described its outcome: "'It understood everything and forgave
everything, and so (to quote Dilthey's words) ended up in
"an anarchy of convictions."'" Friedrich Meinecke quoted
in the Tntroduction by Carl Hinrichs to Meinecke's Historism, translated by J. E. Anderson (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1972), p. xlviii.
9Hayden White's limited solution (outlined in Chapter
One) fails to overcome these obstacles. He is correct in
locating theoretical procedures on the surface of the text.
However, when he limits the deep-structural content to
precritical opinions and poetic insights, he is effectively
excluding critical grounds for judgments which mediate the
disputes of the crisis. The grounds he does offer are moral convictions and aesthetic preferences. But, for him,
these are variables which leave intact the incompatible
differences of historical paradigms.
The variables (e.g. moral convictions about what social relationships should be) might be shared by a wide
audience. Then it is possible for a limited number of paradigms to dominate the historical field. However, White
takes for granted that such convictions and their dependent
paradigms have not been justified on any compelling theoretical grounds. No matter how large a plurality is won by
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This fourth chapter argues that theoretical operations on
the surface of the historical text can be critically sanctioned.

The basis for this critical sanction cannot be

merely another set of ethical or aesthetic preferences.
Nor can the basis be part of the surface structure.

That

transcendental method is correctly termed part of the deep
structure of historical works can be argued in the following way.

It is not based on an appeal to historical data,

nor on a theory of history, nor on a preferred mode of
historical narration.

The latter are surface elements.

But transcendental method is the a priori condition to
meaningful arrangements of historical data, to convincing
theories, and to intelligible narratives. 10 It, therefore,
precedes and conditions all subsequent operations on the
manifest level of historical works.
Finally, the critical sanction envisioned by this
one party, there are always other parties with alternate
convictions and their dependent perspectives. And what
the crisis of historicism means is that subsequent disputes
over convictions and perspectives lead to no satisfactory
conclusion. That is, the perspectives are fundamentally
different, their grounds are variable, and it is up to the
indiVidual to choose sides.
10ve distinguish here between a priori and a posteriori conditions of historical knowledge. To the former belongs the inquisitive and rational subject through whose
efforts critical history is produced. To the latter belong
the materials which may become evidence to support an interpretation of past events. Transcendental method which formulates the intelligent and rational operations of the historian interrelates these conditions. Human intelligence
is an a priori condition to historical works, but that intelligence is constituted through acts of inquiry which
take up the materials of research as empirical evidence.
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chapter implies the possibility of detachment from bias.
It must be possible, first, to discover bias
second, to offer an alternative to it.

~

bias, and

A detachment which

has an a priori foundation in critical consciousness supplies an alternative to the "anarchy of convictions" which
prevails in the crisis period.
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· HISTORICAL PROCEDURES

The counterproposal of this chapter can be divided
(1) into the issue of a critical sanction of theoretical
operations, and (2) into the issue of detachment from bias.
The first issue will be our initial concern.

Put negative-

ly, this part of the counterproposal denies that in every
instance theoretical operations must be based on subjective preferences.

A review of the conclusions reached in

Chapter Three will indicate how far we have come in proving
this part of the counterproposal.
Ye argued that the subject can enter the realm of
interiority and, through the occurrence of particular questions, can begin to differentiate the multiple levels of
his own consciousness.

This differentiation of a basic

horizon reveals the a priori form of all knowing.

The dis-

covery of the basic structure of human knowing gives us
access to a performance that is prior to any theorizing
about it.

Once this performance is formulated in a cogni-

tional theory, we have available a metahistorical position
upon which to base a critique of precritical elements in
historical perspectives.

!n add.ition, we argued that trans-

cendental method which is part of this formulated performance has a normative function in relation to all special
methods and theoretical procedures.
Two of the conclusions can be rephrased in terms of
the problems taken up in this chapter.

First, the
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metahistorical cognitional position provides the basis for
criticizing.the precritical opinions which sanction, at
least initially, the theoretical operations proper to the
adopted paradigm.

Second, transcendental method allows

access to the subject's performance "under" the manifest
level of the historical text.

This method formulates a

cognitional pattern which is presumed by every theoretical
operation.

Now if this method has a normative relation to

every surface procedure, and if prior opinions affecting
historical procedures can be measured against a critically
based cognitional theory, then precritical differences
among historical paradigms are not "too deep" for criticism.

That is, both they and their consequent differences

on the manifest level are not absolutely fundamental.

In

the first place, different paradigms have a common deeper
origin in the performance of the subject--and that performance can be formulated.

In the second place, conflicting

historical interpretatjons which ultimately derive from
different presuppositions can be checked by procedures
which conform to the deeper transcendental method.
Of these last two s·tatements, we take the first to
be already proved.

This section of Chapter Four takes

some initial steps toward a proof of the second statement
by outlining the intelligent and rational procedures of the

historian.

rn other words, it summarizes specific opera-

tions which form the surface level of the historical text.
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The third section of the chapter will show the

po~sible

conformity of these operations to transcendental method
and, thereby, will reveal an unbiased basis for a mediation of historical conflicts.

Formation of Contexts
We begin our survey of historical procedures by presuming two things: (1) that our hypothetical historian knows
how to do research, and (2) that, aware of the pitfalls of
exegesis, he therefore proceeds with caution.

OUr survey

presumes rather than investigates these two points because
of the numerous variables which are involved.

For example,

medieval charters are not subject to the same tests as contemporary dispatches between embassies.

In this country,

the student of history is initiated into these variables
largely through the professional exempla offered in the
graduate seminar.

Likewise, we presume that arguments in

Chapter Three established that knowing is a compound act.
Thus, historical procedures leading to historical knowledge
can be generally subdivided among historical experience,
historical understanding, historical judging.
There are two inseparable dimensions to historical
experience: ind1vidual becoming and social becoming.

The

individual experiences his own growing out of a past and
into a future.

This experience is not of a succession of

instants but of a flow of intertwined intentions and

r
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activities.

At this level of individual experience, the

subject lives the temporal unity of past and future.

This

unity of intention and act is a distinctively historical
process.

:rt accounts for our histor-ical being, for we are

what we are becoming and have become.

Human being is ac-

cordingly translated into action-terms; it is self-making
process. 11 However, what has been constituted by the subject as his own historical be;ng is not isolated from the
historical experi.ence of the group.

What the individual

remembers of the past is usually conveyed to him by the
anecdotes and narratives, the rules and institutions of
his community.

This community owes its identity to the com-

mon traditions it preserves and to the institutions which
predecessors saw fit to establish and maintain.

A sudden

collapse of social traditions will produce a loss of identity in the group.

Then the individual reverts to an ear-

lier stage of development and, along with others, must
again build up the traditions and institutions which weld
a group together as a historical community.
Both the individual's personal experience and the
shared maintenance of customs and institutions are materials for a rudimentary history.

Written histories may

11For Lonergan's remarks on this point, see both
Method in Theology, (p. 181), and his essay, The Sub~ect,
(MilwaUkee: Marquette University Press, 1968), pp. I -29.
An expanded discussion of human historicity is found in
Emil Fackenheim's careful study, Metaphysics and Historicity, pp. 27-48.
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incorporate them.

Mythical exploits and legends of heroes

are mixed 1n to inspire the community and to educate it by
examples from the past. 12

But, in fact, historians have

made the transitions from rudimentary history to ever more
complex forms of history.

Lonergan sketches the develop-

ing sophistication of history from early rudimentary forms
to the distinct specialty of history which is the concern
of a separate professional community.

Autobiography and

biography are intermediate forms which concentrate on individual lives.

Accordi.ng to Lonergan, the specialty .of

history concentrates on the "times" and, thereby, includes
the content of biographies within an expanded treatment of
social development or decline. 1 3
Throughout the more developed forms of historical
writing, a common set of procedures occurs.

The historian

investigates materials assembled by prior research.

From

among them he selects the apparently significant details
of the life and/or times which he chooses to study.
abbreviates the routine and omits the commonplace.

He
This

12

~., Method in Theology, p. 182.

l3For a more extensive treatment of autobiography,
biography, and history proper, see ibid., pp. 182-184.
Lonergan•s claim that history proper is more than a series
of biographies is argued on the basjs of the inco.mmensurability between individual deeds and social processes. Institutions and communal values are more than the sum of
individual lives; they provide part of the context in which
such lives are first lived and later recounted. This claim
and its arguments are similar to the position taken by
Maurice Mandelbaum in his article, "Societal Facts," reprinted in Theories of History, pp. 476-488.
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process of
ter Two.

~electivity

has already been discussed ·in Chap-

Next, by inquiry and gradual discovery, the his-

torian pulls together the details into an imaginative sequence of events.

He surmises how events might have oc-

curred and then proceeds to search for confirming or disconfirming evidence of his imaginative scene.
rences may be readily verified, others may not.

Some occurWith what

is verified the historian will proceed to organize a series of limited contexts in which issues are ranked according to importance. 14
Lonergan's notion of context is worth some special
attention.

He notes a heuristic meaning in which "context"

refers to the framework in which an issue is raised.

For

example, a study of Boswell's Life of Johnson has as its
context the author's other works, his own life and times
which he shared with Dr. Johnson, and the values and aims
of the author.

The literary commentator places his selec-

ted issue in this broad context and relates it to other
issues falling within the same boundaries.

The result is

a skeletal framework, or heuristic structure, for a subsequent literary study.
14The importance of historjcal issues is Janus-faced.
The historian is concerned with th~ir importance to those
who lived the events and the significance of their outcome
for those who came later. It is in the latter case that
one can say that the significance of the events of 1789 is
still an open question. Gordon Leff points out that the
central dialectic of historical knowledge is to reconcile
events as they happened with their outcome. See his History and Social Theory, p. 24.
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But there is another meaning of "context."

In this

second sense, "context" is the interconnection of questions
and answers in limited groups. 1 5 The historian begins his
inquiry by isolating the significant issues for his chosen
topic.

By asking and answering questions, he builds up a

series of positions which complement or challenge one another on the significant issues.

Through repeated efforts

to understand, his grasp of a complex topic may improve,
mistaken surmises may be eliminated, and what remains may
be organized into a coherent whole.

Now this interweaving

of limited positions into a coherent whole is the raising
of particular contexts to a higher unity in which parts are
interrelated and the overall view assigns each part its
place in the general scheme. 16
To illustrate how limited contexts develop to an
overview of a complex topic, let us set up a hypothetical
instance of historical inquiry.

Suppose a historian decides

to study the economic conditions of the American cotton
trade between 1840 and 1860.
initially chronological.

The limits of his topic are

Shipping manifests, bills of

trade, market quotations supply data for his study.

Out

of this jumble of dates and numbers, the historian selects
materials which represent a cross-section of the transactions carried out within the specified period.

l

1 5tiethod in Theolosz, p. 163.
16Ibid., pp. 164-165.

-

Then he
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searches for patterns in these representative materials.
A.re there trends to be noted, recurrent fluctuations in
cotton pr:S.ces, noticeable differences between prices at
one port and those at another?

Such questions may uncover

significant patterns in tradtng over a number of years.
But answering these questions will give rise to £urther
ones.

Why this sudden drop in prices in 1850?

Did foreign

competition depress the market or was the overproduction
of cotton in new areas west of the Mississippi to blame?
Such questions will recur, but, given a limited topic,- they
will not be endless.

Gradually the historian will build

up an understanding of two and three-year periods of cotton
trading.

Exceptional market conditions will be disting-

uished from the normal flow of business.

The good years

as well as the bad will be arranged in an overview of twenty

years.

Then the historian may be in a position to grasp

the long-range prospects of the cotton trade during those
two decades.
ity?

Were there signs of decline or of prosper-

To answer this question, he must pay attention to

more than the limited context of a two or three-year period.

He must interconnect all the contexts set up by the

preceding inquiry and so round out his view of the full
twenty years.

Trends may be established which suggest that,

with some exceptions in particular locales and in years of
drought or heavy rainfall, the cotton market was extremely
healthy during this age and gave many indications of
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continued expansion.
Now the purpose of this b.Ypothetical example was to
illustrate what Lonergan means by limited contexts which
can be organized to form an overview of a complex topic.
The historian begins with a general issue: The economic
condition of the cotton trade between 1840 and 1860.

Mul-

tiple questions turn up related but less general problems.
Solution of the lesser problems is a step toward discovery
of the components of the more general topic.

An arrange-

ment of these component answers into a larger pattern ·requires that the historian recheck his solutions, eliminate

any errors, and strive to move from the economic trends of
a few years to the broader perspective of twenty-year
trends.

When the component trends have been arranged in a

general scheme, when problems have been settled to the historian's satisfaction or the remaining ones are of doubtful relevancy, then he can say what was going forward dur-

ing the twenty years.

And his assertion can be backed up

with the converging evidence supplied in limited contexts
of two or three-year periods. 1 ?
l?Ibid., p. 164. Lonergan distinguishes the task
of the historian from that of the exegete. The latter
aims at understanding what his subject meant, but the former goes beyond this accomplishment. "He wants to grasp
what was going forward in particular groups at particular
places and times. By 'going forward' I mean to exclude the
mere repetition of a routine. I.mean the change that originated the routine and its dissemination. I mean process
and development but, no less, decline and collapse." Ibid.,
PP• 178-1?9.
~
This description of the historian's task obviously
1
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An additional purpose is served by the preceding
example.

The historian• s proce.dure aims at winning an un-

derstanding of a complex topic.

He solves problems, an-

swers specific questions, and tries to interrelate his
answers.

Now this procedure comes to a provisional end

when the relevant questions have been answered and the
intelligible connections drawn.

Then a historical judg-

ment is possible on the topic previously investigated and
illuminated .from many sides.

Recall that historical know-

ing has been accepted as a compound act.

The study of

materials, the understanding of limited contexts in their
particularity and interrelatedness and the reasonings linking them come to term in a judgment on the overall interpretation built up out of these many components.
historian think his task complete?

Does the

The answer depends on

whether other significant problems remain, whether .further
relevant questions occur to him.

Without the impetus sup-

plied by .further problems and questions, the historian will
does not iimit him to· a study o.f the intentions of his subjects. "What was going .forward" at some time was largely
unknown to those who participated in the process. For the
details of Lonergan's argument on this point, see ibid., p.
179• We can take this argument as a challenge to UOI'Iingwood' s thesis o.f historical intentions which are to be reenacted by the historian. The challenge is specifically
to the exclusive ~laim to identify such re-enactment with
the task o.f the historian. See The Idea of Histori, pp.
176-177. Gordon Leff states the challenge to Collingwood's
thesis in a paraphrase o.f .Marx: '.'The historian owes his
role to the fact that though men make their history they
do so without knowing how they do so." History and Social
Theory, p. 48.
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seek no further insights into his topic.

And without ad-

ditional insights, there will be no new discoveries

~his

part which will complement, revise, or correct the interpretation he has made. 18 In effect, he will be satisfied
with his interpretation and feel assured of its high degree
of probability.
There is an obvious ambigUity in the statement,
"Judgment rests on the absence of further relevant question. 1119

Does the statement mean that there are in fact

no additional relevant questions, or does it mean that the
questioner is unaware of any more?

Questtons occur to

individuals who are seeking to understand some point or
other.

If an individual considers his present understand-

ing of some issue sufficient and believes that any remaining obscure points are only minor matters which cannot re-

vise his understanding of the issue, then he will judge
his understanding to be correct.

Yet, needless to say,

the remaining points of obscurity may involve major problems.

Were they to be investigated, the individual might

have to alter radically his understanding of the issue.
The actual absence of further relevant questions implies

an end to the search for insights into a particular issue.
In turn, this precludes the possibility of new discoveries,
and so the achieved understanding of the issue will in fact
18Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 163-164.
l9Ibid., p. 166.
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be correct •. But, if only to the best

or

his knowledge

there are no further relevant questions, then the individual may say that his understanding is probably correct. 20
We began this subsection by discusstng how the historian isolates and develops limited contexts.

Our purpose

was to offer insights into the gradual process of organizing the elements o:f a complex historical topic.

By inter-

connecting questions and answers, the historian builds up
a series of complementarr but partial viewpoints.

As con-

cretized in our example of the pre-Civil War cotton trade,
an overview of the partial viewpoints may eventually be
reached.

Then a judgment on the complex topic becomes pos-

sible because the parts of the complex whole have been understood in themselves and in their interrelationships.
Complexity is thus mastered in historical inquiry.

In what

:follows, we will be detailing how such mastery is won in a
methodical way.

Five Aspects o:f Historical Procedures
A :fuller treatment of historical judgments will occur
20Ibid., p. 191. The thesis of perspectivism accepted by Lonergan implies that the "relevancy" of further
questions is, at least in part, dependent on the horizoncontent of the individual historian. Hence, the historian
can aim at a high degree of probability for his interpretations of complex topics, but certainty will elude him.
Still, in regard to fairly simple issues and in regard to
negative conclusions (i.e. how something could not have
happened), certitude in historical judgments is likely.
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in Chapter Five when we take up the issue of historical
objectivity.

At this point our interest is in clarifying

the procedures which lead the historian to make claims of
objective knowledge.
every type of history.

These procedures are not the same for
In fact, objectivity is not sought

in every historical inquiry.

Consider the exception pre-

sented by rudimentary histories of folk heroes.

Clear in-

sights and correct judgments give way to other purposes in
such accounts.

Since, in this chapter we are concerned

with the relation between historical procedures and transcendental method, we must distinguish between precritical
forms of history and the methodical operations of a professional historical community.
Among several features differentiating precritical
from critical history, Lonergan emphasizes the practical
function of the precritical.

The latter seeks to streng-

then the identity of the group and to foster devotion to
its institutions.

This practical aim translates into an

educational task: to communicate a strong appreciation of
the group's heritage and a concern for its advancement.

On the other hand, critical history replaces this practical aim with a concern for settling matters-of-fact.

Lon-

ergan reiterates Ranke's famous maxim to characterize this
interest in what actually happened.
in support of this distinction.

An argument is offered

If the work of critical

history is not pursued apart from political or apologetic
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aims, the historian is likely to find himself serving two
masters.

Records will be twisted to read as he wants them
to be read for the sake of some ulterior goal. 21 The argu-

ment can be expanded.

If there is a difference between

propaganda and history, then, no matter how many failures
occur, the historian will still strive to detach himself
from the apologetic concerns of precritical history.

The

alternative is an unscholarly submission to the vagaries
of popular causes and a willingness to hold in check his
critical abilities.

Tn such a situation, attentive selec-

tivity would be foresworn.

In addition, any attempt to

justify such submission would stumble over an obvious question: How would a historian know that he is able to produce
only propaganda if he djd not first know of an alternate
way of doing history?
Further, if critical history is primarily concerned
with judging matters-of-fact and if history proper involves
an inquiry into what was "going forward" in the group at a
particular time, then critical history is more than a compilation of chronicles.

It is not only attentive, it is

also intelligently selective of events.

On the other hand,

chronicles work within the limits of historical experience;
events are arranged in temporal sequence as their contemporaries experienced them.

But a serial listing of exper-

iences does not suffice to make sense out of historical
21 Ibid., p. 185.
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processes.

It is simply not intelligently selective or

discriminating in regard to significant events.

Again,

contemporaries of the events often did not foresee the
outcome of their actions; thus, they were unaware of the
full significance of the events.

It is up to the historian

to work his way from isolated events to an understanding
of the larger context.

The road to understand:i.ng both the

events and their consequences will be marked by a series of
discoveries.

As previously noted, the process of histori-

cal discovery begins with the selective question which is
directed toward a specific issue.

For Lonergan, the begin-

ning of a critical study lies with a question for historical intelligence: What was going forward in this situation
at this time? 22
This questioning is not without its presuppositions.
The question for historical intelligence is framed according to the inquirer's previous historical knowledge.

With-

out some prior acquaintance with the selected topic, he
would not know what was problematic and needed further inquiry.

So questioning begins with an incomplete under-

standing of some issue ("incomplete" because otherwise
there would be no reason to seek to know more about the
2 2 Ibid., p. 187. D. H. Fischer concurs that the historian moves from curiosity to controlled inquiry by means
of questioning. See Historians' Fallacies: Toward
of Historical Thought, p. •
• G. Co ingwood m es he
same point regarding the historian's collection of evidence.
See The Idea of History, p. 281.
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issue).

The more familiar the historian is with the issue,

then the more materials he will be able to use and the more
questions he will be able to ask and the greater his appreciation will be of the complexities.~! the issue. 2 3 In a
word--the more intelligently selective he will be.

To

return briefly to Chapter Two, the historian's questioning
occurs between an unknown known and a known known.

The

former is what he intends, the latter is what he brings
to his intending.

The wider his background, the better his

chance of selecting the right questions and of intelligently directing his inquiry toward satisfactory results.
In searching for a more complete understanding of the
selected issue, the 'historian engages in what was previously termed an imaginative and tentative reconstruction
of events as they have happened.

There is a second aspect

to this procedure: the heuristic. Henri Marrou has analyzed it. 24 Upon asking a question, the historian may
23Ibid., Method in Theolo~y, p. 18? and p. 216. See
also Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 247. Our discussion in Chapter Five of the hermeneutical circle will elaborate this idea of historical fore-knowledge.
24

Henri-Iren~e Marrou, The Meanin~ of History, pp.
65-66. D. H. Fischer also argues !or t e heuristic function of what he terms "operational questions." (Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Lo ic of Historical Thou ht, pp.
•
or onergan s remar s on
e use of euris ic
devices in methodical inquiry, see Method in Theolo~, p.
22. An extended discussion of ideal types and of teories
of history as heuristic devices is found in ibid., pp. 227229. Patrick Gardiner similarly locates the-va:Iue of theories of history in their suggestive powers, their ability
to illuminate histor;_cal fields. See his The Nature of
Historical Explanati.on, p. 112.
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immediately .formulate one or more possible answers.

The

question takes the form of a hypothesis which is yet to be
verified: "Could it be the case that ••

..

?ti

With this

type of question, the historian will be specifying the
possibilities to be investigated; he will be giving direction to his historical inquiry.

The heuristic function

of hypothetical questions aims at a precision which is
far from the random collection of data and the "pure seeing" of past events.
require verification.

Eventually such hypothetical probes
But the whole purpose in making

them specific is to anticipate the gathering of relevant
eVidence.
This may be the best place to enter an aside on the
term "evidence" as it affects the select:i.ve, heuristic
questioning of the historian.

Collingwood makes the point

that nothing is evidence except in relation to a definite
question. 2 5 The historian does not attempt to embrace at
once all the materials relevant to his topic.

Tnstead,

he proceeds by isolating key issues, figures, events; then,
by gradually interconnecting them, he builds up an overview of the myriad details.

The questions-hypotheses which

give direction to his work require verification.

Thus,

just as knowing is a compound act and just as the process
of interconnecting limited contexts is a gradual achievement, so too the determination of evidence is a step-by-

J

2 5The Idea of History, p. 281.
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step process.

First, the historian determines potential

evidence, i.e. materials which are available to him and
which may or may not be relevant to his inquiry.

Second,

he determines f'ormal evidence, i.e. ·materials which he
actually uses to ask and to answer his questions.

These

are the materials, or data, which he determines to be relevant to his initial hypotheses.

Third, he determines

actual evidence, i.e. materials which are not only relevant to his topic but are used to support a judgment either f'or or against a historical conclusion. 26
These distinctions in the determination of' evidence
are parallel to the pattern of' cognitional activities.

Po-

tential evidence is data as available here and now f'or the
historian's use.

Formal evidence is data as available and

understood in relation to some broader context.

Actual

eVidence is data as both available and understood and, then,
as ref'lectively adopted f'or warranting some historical
judgment.

Arguments can reinf'orce not only these distinc-

tions but also this paralleling of' evidence and cognitional
acts.

First, research turns up more materials than will

be relevant to a specif'ic inquiry.

Selectivity intervenes

to save the historian from entanglement in countless details of' only potential worth.
starts in every type of inquiry.

Second, there are false
A heuristic insight may

2 6z.rethod in Theology, p. 186. On the basis of our
epistemological arguments in the next chapter, we will
place restrictions on the notion of potential historical
evidence.
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initially seem pertinent to the matter at hand only later
to be discarded as misleading.

The investigator may have

understood correctly; it is just that the understood evidence is better used elsewhere.

Third, just as inquiry

grows more specific as a study advances, so too the evidence is narrowed down.

Some of the original materials

have been discarded, some of the insights into the remaining materials have been limited to remarks in footnotes;
but other materials have been used to bolster arguments in
the text.

The historian has a reasoned interpretation to

propose, and it will rest on the intelligently assembled
eVidence which he thinks appropriate and convincing.
The precedtng remarks were a digression from the heuristic aspect of historical inquiry even though evidence is
anticipated by selective questions-hypotheses which probe
for solutions to historical problems.

But, just as evi-

dence is no simple historical "given," so too particular
formulations of questions are not inviolable.

They may be

so altered during the process of investigation

tha~

they

scarcely resemble the original questions with which the
historian began.

Such changes occur when the original

questions do not lead to satisfactory results.

If in-

sights are slow in coming, then new questions will be
formed.

Gradually the historian may clarify his selected

issues.

At some point he will attempt a surmise or provi-

sional descr1ption of what he is studying.

This requires
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that he pull together the fragmentary insights into some
kind of unity.

What is involved is an interrelation of

tentative insights.

This process is the constructive as-

pect of the historian's procedures. ·
PreViously we spoke of the imaginative reconstruction of events by the historian.

A creative effort on his

part is called for if coherence is to be made of multiple
insights.

Complex issues do not unravel themselves, data

do not simply fall into historical forms ready for publication.

What is required is the use of hypotheses (the heur-

istic aspect) and the interconnection of several of them to
form a tentative account of the chosen topic (the constructive aspect).
Tm.mediately the problem of idealism arises.

Does the

historian create or reconstruct something other than what
actually happened?

This question cannot be settled in

advance of the historian's presentation of evidence.

The

use of constructed hypotheses and organizational schemes
does not preclude the possibtlity of a verifiable interpretation. 2?

By themselves hypotheses are neither valid nor

2 7Arthur Danto cites Charles Beard as one historian
who mistakenly distinguished history and natural science
on the basis of the historian's use of constructed hypotheses. Beard thought the procedures of natural science did
not include the use of hypotheses. The historian made use
of them but to the detriment of his discipline. Beard was
mistaken on two counts: (1) that scientists do not use hypotheses; (2) that hypotheses somehow hinder the discovery
of verifiable interpretations. See Danto's Analytical
Philosophy of History, pp. 99-102.
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invalid, they are heuristic means :for reaching de.finite
results which can then be tested.

Only if there is con-

firming evidence will the historian argue that his creative
e:ffort is headed in the right direction.

But there is an

intermediate stage where tentative descriptions persist
or fail.

I:f they lead to further related insights and i:f

the :formed opinions coincide with the evidence as more and
more of it is assembled, then the tentative descriptions
will persist and develop.

But i:f :further questions and in-

sights are not :forthcoming, then the historian must drop
the proposed descriptions and try another approach.

Fur-

thermore, even if more questions and insights occur on the
basis of the original hypothesis, still he must be attaining more than new sets of hypotheses.

If only a series

of surmises is being gained, the historian may be on the
wrong track and so be in need o:f a new starting point. 28
In short, the constructive aspect offers no guarantee that
hypotheses and tentative.descriptions will prove accurate,
but neither does it necessitate that the historian fictionalize the past.
A :fourth aspect o:f the historian's procedure rein:forces the statecent that historical :fictions can be avoided.
"Ecstatic" is the somewhat unusual name which Lonergan
gives to this aspect.

The label refers to the outcome of

the historical inquiry which we have already outlined.
28 Method in Theolo&, p. 187.

21?
From prior historical knowledge and researched materials
·to selective questions, to the formation of hypotheses, to
further understanding, to converging evidence--this is a
cumulative process.

Lonergan notes ·that, as the histor-

ian's insights increase and he recognizes that his initial
guesses were not wide of the mark, a shift occurs in the
way the historian asks questions.

Originally his hypothe-

ses were largely a matter of guesswork though prior historical knowledge did lend them some focus.

But the grad-

ual accumulation of insights and ·the isolation of specific
problems yet to be solved are the basis for additional
questions which are less dependent on guesswork and more
directly connected with the materials under study.

There

may be a movement away from the assumptions and viewpoint
with which the historian began.

Increasingly he will be

aware of what positions and viewpoints are pertinent to
the issues themselves.

He will leave behind previous opin-

ions regarding issues which his cumulative inquiry has now
cast in a clearer light.

To the extent that new discov-

eries are corrective of former opinions, the historian is,
figuratively speaking, taken out of himselr. 2 9 Hence,
the term "ecstatic" conveys an idea of both developing
understanding and, if required, self-correction.
Up to this po:tnt four aspects of the historian's procedures have been described: selectivity in materials;
2 9Tbid., pp. 18?-188.
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heuristic devices which promote possible answers to ques· tions; constructive schemes which elaborate initial discoveries; the ecstatic discovery of the questions and
viewpoints best suited to the issues under study.

A fifth

aspect is termed the "critical" or discriminating aspect.30
In any lengthy inquiry the historian will recognize
that some of his insights are superfluous.

To return to a

previous example, a study of the cotton trade between 1840
and 1860 will involve materials from many sources.

Under

the rubric of selectivity, not all the materials will ·be
given equal weight.

But what happens in the case of potential

30we have already used the term "critical" in reference to the relation between transcendental method, which
formulates the performance of the subject, and cognitional
theories about that performance. The term also occurred
in the distinction between precritical and critical history.
Much as in the case of "structure" and "ideology," the word
"critical" suffers from overuse and a consequent vagueness.
It has a general meaning in philosophical thought: critical
thinking is doubting, questioning. The "critical spirit"
is philosophical intelligence committed to question everything. Ideally the philosopher hopes to take nothing for
granted.
Lonergan's use of transcendental method is critical
in this latter sense. He begtns his project, not with a
statement, but with a performance, namely, the act of questioning. To attempt to doubt questioning requires a question: Do questions occur? There.fore, his starting point
is a commonly experienced, indubitable act. (See rnsight,
p. 330.) Lonergan shares this "critical" starting point
.with Emerich Coreth and other members of the rather loosely allied school of Transcendental Thomism. While their
positions develop along different lines, they are in agreement that human performance, and not some theory about
that performance, should be the .foundation. Lonergan analyzes Coreth's starting point, in "I1etaphysics as Horizon,"
in Collection, pp. 214-215.
Since some confusion could result from these multiple meanings of the term "critical," we will use the term
"discriminating" to characterize the fifth aspect of historical procedures.
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evidence will recur in regard to formal evidence. - !nsights
based on certain materials may at first seem relevant, but
continued study may show them to be otherwise.

For exam-

ple, the historian may at first suspect that a depressed
cotton market in 1850 resulted from overproduction in the
newly planted areas west of the Mississippi.

Further in-

vestigation, however, may determine that levels of production were steady in these areas a number of years prior to
1850, and no increase in production was recorded in that
year.

The assembled materials and accumulated insights on

these areas and their productivity may be of use in another study, but they contri_bute nothing posit;_ ve to an
understanding of the depressed market.

In short, the his-

torian will discriminate between insights suitable to his
topic and those which are not.

Here one notices the self-

correcting process of historical-learning.
Lonergan is more specific in regard to this discriminating function.
verse instghts.31

He distinguishes between direct and inThe former involve an understanding of

how multiple details fit together; the latter occur when
the inquirer recognizes that the details being worked with
do not fit the matter under study.
light on the problem to be solved.3 2

That is, they throw no
In our previous

31 For an extended discussion of inverse insights as

well as examples of them, see Tnsight, pp. 19-25.
32 Method in Theolog~, p. 188. Inverse insights do
occur. Anyone who has, a ter much labor, discovered that
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example,

th~

discoveries about cotton production in newly

cultivated areas did not account for the depressed state
of the market in 1850.

Those discoveries may be of some

use in other studies, but it will take a direct insight
into their applicability before they will be put to use.
In other words, inverse insights can be followed by direct
insights which grasp the suitability for a new context of
what did not fit into an earlier context.
In summary, five aspects of the historian's process
of developing understanding have been noted.

The process

is selective, for not all the available materials can be
used and not all are of equal importance.

It is heuristic

because the historian anticipates the unknown by precise
questions.

It is constructive in that he synthesizes

fragmentary insights in a tentative description which focusses future inquiry.

It is ecstatic because the historian

he has been on the wrong track will recognize what is meant
by the above description. But there is a problem which
should not be overlooked. How is the historian to determine "what fits" or "what does not fit" in regard to an explanation? He may in fact conscript some materials as evidence which do not prove the specific argument he is making. D. H. ~'ischer labels such a mistake the "fallacy of
the irrelevant proof'." (Historians' Fallacies: Toward a
Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 45-47.) Similarly the
historian may omit as irrelevant those details which, if
entertained, would seriously challenge his present interpretation. Decisions on the relevancy of materials may be
influenced by bias--witnessed either in an overeagerness
to shore up one's shaky po§ition with irrelevant proofs or
in the bli~ders which conveniently excl~de damaging evidence. The critical, or "discriminating,'~- aspect of the
historian's procedure is in need of another critical function, namely, the one formalized in the transcendental precepts. Section Three will elaborate this second form of
critique.
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gradually

c~mes

to depend less on initial hunches -and more

on the viewpoints suggested by the materials which he is
beginning to understand.

Finally, the process is discrim-

inating, for he distinguishes between insights which are
appropriate to his task and those which have nothing to
contribute through a self-correcting process.33
33Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 188-189. Lonergan
remarks t1iat a aistinctive characteristic of critical history is the double occurrence of these five aspects. First,
the historian must understand his sources, their authors,
social contexts, purposes. Second, he must employ his understanding of the sources in order to learn about his
selected topic. !n the former instance, he concentrates
on understanding the intentions of authors, their projects,
and how they carr~ed them out. !n the latter instance, he
uses what he has learned from the sources to understand the
events which are referred to in them. There is a reciprocal aspect to this duplication of the process of historical
understanding. Insight into original sources casts light
on the events under study. A developing understanding of
the events may lead to new insights into and uses for the
original source materials. In both instances the historiian will be selective in his use of materials, creative in
putting questions to them, discriminating in respect to an
author's strengths and weaknesses, and concerned with applying a proper grasp of someone else's perspective to the
events under investigation. See i~id., p. 189.
On these issues Lonergan is speaking from his own
experience. His works on Aquinas' various notions of grace
and of the act of judgment provided him with a practical
understanding of historical method. Cf. Verbu.m: word and
Idea in Aquinas, edited by David B. Burrell (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1970); and Grace and Freedom (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). The different
schools of thought surrounding Aquinas' various theories
had to be related to what Aquinas himself wrote. This
work with both primary and secondary sources required a
discriminating use of secondary sources as well as a constructive approach to the different positions as Aquinas
developed them over a period of years.
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A Sixth Aspect: The Reflective-Judicial

Our discussion of five aspects of historical procedures pointed out the primacy of the question for historical
intelligence: "What was the long-term economic condition ••• ?"

After much labor the historian may in fact suc-

ceed in isolating the relevant materials, in forming them
into a provisional web of interconnected insights, in grasping solutions to multiple secondary problems, in attaining
and overview of the whole topic.

If that is the case, then

a new question arises: "Is my grasp of the materials, ·of
their interconnections, and of the selected topic accurate?"

This is a question for reflection.34

It is answered

in the affirmative or the negative, or the historian begs
off for a time with an "I do not know."

But, whatever his

answer, he makes a judgment about his understanding of the
topic: That it is accurate, erroneous, or insufficient at
the present tj_me.

This aspect of the historian's procedure

is named the reflective or judicial aspect.
Given a limited topic and the competence to handle
complex issues, the historian is likely to bring his inquiry to a close.

To reach that end, he must answer ques-

tions, interrelate answers to form a coherent whole, and
support his interpretations with evidence.
may not proceed smoothly.

This process

He may have to retrace his steps

34The distinction between questions for intelligence
and questions for reflection is treated in Insight, pp.
271-274.
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because new .discoveries require a correction of previous
positions.

Points previously thought crucial may be de-

moted to footnotes; obscure materials may eventually be
the central pillars of his historical thesis.35
process is unlikely to go on indefinitely.

But the

Eventually the

historian covers what are to him all the relevant issues;
he asks the seemingly important questions and makes discoveries which clarify the complex issues.

How does he

recognize his proximity to the end of an investigation?
Lonergan suggests that the cessation of further relevant
questions is a sign of such proximity.
convincing.

His argument is

As noted in an earlier part of this section,

an understanding of some issue can be corrected, complemented, or revised only if further discoveries pertaining
to the issue are

po~sible.

The condition for this possi-

bility is the occurrence of further relevant questions.
If, in fact, all the relevant questions have been asked
and answered, then an understanding cannot be significantly
altered.

Hence, the historian can affirm the validity of
his interpretation.3 6
A qualifying statement must be entered immediately.

The judicial aspect is part of the intelligent and rational
work of fallible individuals.

The absence of further rele-

vant questions may be a sign that an individual's under35Method in Theology, pp. 190-191.
3Gibid., p. 191.

r
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standing is sufficient.

If in

~

there are no more ques-

tions, then his understanding is correct.

But in history

it is more likely that complex issues are never closed issues.

The historian's knowledge is admittedly limited;

so, when he experiences the cessation of his own questions,
he simultaneously should note the possibility of new questions from his professional colleagues.

For him there may

be no problems left unresolved, but the limits of his
knowledge require a caveat about claims to offer the definitive account.

As far as he knows, the issues have been

thoroughly explored, but another historian may uncover evidence which demands startling revisions.

And besides the

discovery of new evidence, there is the previously mentioned dialectic of historical knowledge.

To reconcile the

historical event with its outcome is in many cases an unfinished task.

Recent events or events of long-range sig-

nificance (e.g. the colonization of Africa by European nations) continue to have consequences for groups which were
not contemporaries of the original events.

The signifi-

cance of such past events may be tied to events in the
future.

Consequently, no final word is possible on their

role in hjstorical developments.37
37rbid., pp. 191-192. At this same place, Lonergan
points o~hat both the discovery of new sources of information and the as-yet-indeterminate meaning of recent
events do not invalidate the results of competent historical work. The massive evidence and the arguments which
support previous interpretations must be taken into account
by later historians. Some interpretations may be refuted,
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In short, given the fallibility of the historian and
the two sources of possible revisions, historical judgments are usually only probaole.38 We say "usually" because negative judgments are often likely to warrant claims
of certitude.

The historian can be certain that a charter

attributed to Charlemagne is a forgery if it mentions individuals or events of a later period.

But to discover whose

work the charter actually was is a more difficult task.
The inferential work of the historical detective may establish with certainty who was not at the scene of the
cr:i.me: but to find the guilty party may depend on purely
circumstantial evidence.
The reflective or judicial aspect of historical procedure occurs a second time in the commentary and criticism
of the professional historical community.

Evaluations pub-

lished in journals and delivered in papers at conventions
provide an institutional check on the research and conclusions of the individual historian.

!n order to understand

the work of a fellow-historian, others will follow the
procedure previously outlined.

The discriminating aspect

others de-emphasized, and still others filled out. But
well-argued historical positions rarely cease to be of
further use to later scholars.
3811 But as in natural science, so too in critical
history the positive content of judgment aspires to be no
more than the best available opinion." Ibid., p. 191.
For a brief statement of the change in scientific ideals
from certitude to probability, see Lonergan's "Dimensions
of Meaning," in Collection, p. 259.
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will be part of their evaluations.

Just as the individual

historian discriminated between insights which were relevant to his topic and those which were not, so his successors, who perhaps have a-broader understanding of his
topic, will discriminate between his valuable insights
and conclusions and those which in time prove faulty.39
Lonergan remarks that this discriminating function
of the professional historical community provides historical knowledge which historians presuppose when they begin
their inquiries. 40 The cumulative work of past historians
is a reservoir upon which a historian may draw in framing
hypotheses, locating evidence, and avoiding faulty arguments.

By discriminating between the strengths and weak-

nesses of past works, other historians will avoid uncritical homage to their predecessors and may learn how those
earlier scholars made breakthroughs in the development of
critical history.

Procedures followed in the present are

owed to the efforts of those predecessors--both efforts
which succeeded and those which failed.
In summary, this second section of Chapter Four has
outlined the intelligent and rational procedures which,
in the absence of bias or intellectual deficiency, lead to
39Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 193.
4

~ention was made of this point in Chapter Two

when we discussed the objective (i.e. public) aspects of
the historian's relative horizon.

22?

historical knowledge. 41

These procedures (e.g. the use of

hypotheses, the interconnection of limited contexts, the
tentative formulation of an overview) belong to the surface
operations which, Hayden White argues, are ultimately determined by subjective preferences.

Now the purpose of

this chapter is to establish critical grounds for sanctioning theoretical operations on the surface of the historical
text.

Consequently, the third section of the chapter will

argue that the previously outlined procedures can conform
to transcendental method and, hence, be free of subjective
bias.

41 A possible objection to this remark is made by
those who claim that bias is precisely what is never absent
from historical procedures. But all that we have asserted
is that these procedures are means to historical knowledge.
(Chapter Eight of Method in Theology is written within the
same limits; see pp. 195 and 196.) Something may interfere
with attempts to do critical history. One of the forms of
bias may misdirect or limit these procedures. But that
possibility does not negate the worth of the procedures;
it only establishes the need to thematize the basic cognitional acts which support the procedures and to apply reflectively one's newly acquired self-knowing to any obstacles presented by bias.
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THE POSSTBILITY OF DETACHMENT
This third section forwards the project of Chapter
Four by linking the procedures outlined in the preceding
section to transcendental method.

It will be argued that

the conformity of these procedures to transcendental method is the criterion of detachment from subjective bias.
In Chapter Three we argued that cognitional structure provides a critical basis for a subsequent evaluation of precritical elements in a historian's perspective.

Among

such precritical elements are subjective variables
antecedently sanction surface procedures.

whi~h

Hayden White

has brilliantly explicated and categorized some of these
variables.

But we have supplemented his list with the

content of the historian's basic horizon.

This addition

gives us some access to the sources of h1.storical conflicts.·
By formulating the cognitional structure which is implicit
in every basic horizon, we can criticize diverse preconceptions which both produce historical conflicts and condition the historian's surface procedures.
Furthermore, we have argued that, insofar as transcendental method formulates the a priori structure of human
knowing, it can be considered part of the "deep structure"
of historical works.

Consequently, the manifest procedures

will presuppose the pattern of conscious acts formulated
in transcendental method.

Now some preconceptions and

forms of bias may block the spontaneous sequence of

229

cognitional
ures.

~cts,

and they may misdirect historical proced-

But if transcendental method permits a critique of

historical preconceptions, and if it has a normative function in regard to historical procedures, then these obstacles to understanding can be located and alternate ways
of proceeding can be suggested.
A major implication of the preceding argument is
that bias is not an irreducible component of every historical work.

On the one hand, there is an invariant basis

for a critique of bias which is already established in a
historical perspective.

On the other hand, the normative

function of transcendental method is a counterweight to
new forms of bias.

Both the argument and its implications

must be further analyzed.
in two parts.

The analysis will be carried out

First, the relation between transcendental

method and specific canons governing theoretical procedures
will be sketched.

Our purpose is to exemplify the norma-

tive function of transcendental method in regard to special
methods. ·Second, the issue of detachment must be closely
studied.

Types of bias which hinder the development of

understanding and which interfere with the mentioned procedures will be contrastea to a limited detachment.
The second section of this chapter outlined procedures which, in the absence of any interfering bias, lead
to historical knowledge.

In general terms, "bias" is a

distortion of spontaneous intellectual development.

It
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sets up

obs~acles

which bring the process of understanding

to a premature conclusion.

The multiple ways in which

understanding may be blocked will be treated below.

The Six Aspects in Relation to Transcendental Method
At this point our task is to relate historical procedures to transcendental method.

The process of attain-

ing historical knowledge was analyzed under six distinct
aspects.

The first aspect--that of selectivity--presumes

that historical materials, or data, are not brute givens
which the historian passively receives.

Rather, they are

materials for his project, i.e. pieces of evidence in
which he is interested on the basis of their possible
relevance to his chosen task.

Historical materials thus

belong to a context defined by the interests and competence
of the historian.

On the one hand, not all materials are

pertinent to a limited topic; on the other, the finite
historian usually cannot handle all the materials which
his predecessors have accumulated.

And of what is avail-

able and within his reach he will want to make a discriminating use.

But this need to select and to exclude gives

an opening to bias.

The historian's decisions may be based

on factional or party interests.

Then his attentiveness

will be divided between the materials and the predetermined
position which they are to support.

His partisan attitude

will narrow his attentive selectivity so as to exclude those
materials which appear to threaten the party line.

They
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must be ignored or else molded to fit the desired ·conclusion.
In contrast, it is possible that a detached historian will not allow his attention to be narrowed in such a
way.

He can do this by subordinating the practical aims

of precritical history to the more developed techniques
and aims of critical history.

!n other words, the his-

torian's social and cultural values are not eliminated,
but they can take second place to the spontaneous desire
to understand the materials and, through the latter, to
settle matters-of-fact.

He is not substituting passive

indifference for an active interest in getting the record
straight.

Repeated efforts to subord.;_nate all other con-

cerns to the desire to understand require a personal dedication that is alien to the passive spectator. 42 His
efforts are directed toward a change in priority from the
interests of the propagandizer to the interests of the
ideally impartial historian.
This ideal is not easily attained, but the effort
4 2Friedrich Meinecke comments on the personal dedication evidenced by Ranke. He held an exaggerated view of the
historian's detachment which was in contrast to the mark of
personal genius stamped on what he himself produced. "Ranke
was always anxious to show 'what things had really been
like'. Jn order to let the centuries come through with all
their mighty power, he would have liked as it were to efface his own personality. This, as has often been rightly
pointed out, was a wish that could not be fulfilled. And
yet, however paradoxical this may sound, he needed this desire to inspire him to produce the highest of which he was
capable." Friedrich Meinecke, "Leopold von Ranke," (Memorial Address to the .Prussian Academy of Sciences, January
23, 1936), reprinted in Historism, p. 498.

232
need not be wholly individual.

The historian has been

trained in his discipline; a professional community watches
over his work, and his failures to make an honest use of
historical materials will not go forever unnoticed.

But

both the stewardship of that community and the individual's
effort to subordinate other interests to his desire to make
competent use of available materials will be incarnations

of the transcendental precept, Be attentive.

How else

could that stewardship be exercised and those efforts be
made if this preliminary norm of the knowing process did
not implicitly guide attempts to know through attentive
selectivity?
A second aspect of the historian's procedure, the
heuristic, was located between historical curiosity and
professional research.

Curiosity becomes controlled in-

quiry by taking the form of a precise question.

A ques-

tion is an act of intending which occurs between the asyet-unknown and the known.

As such it anticipates what is

to be known, and that anticipation is guided by prior know'

ledge.

rn controlled inquiry the anticipations which take

the form of questions or hypotheses are usually guided by
rules or canons. 4 3 In historical studies such canons are
often adopted from other disciplines though they may be restated in ordinary language terms.

D. H.

~ ischer
1

recommends

4 3Lonergan gives a detailed description of canons of
empirical method in Chapter Three of Tnsight, pp. 70-102.
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seven canons or, as he calls them, "seven rules of thumb,"
which in controlling historical inquiry may guide the historian past some of ·the pitfalls in historical research. 44
As guides to historical practice, these rules work against
indeliberate factual errors in research.

Since historical

ignorance is dispelled by answering questions, it is important to avoid answers which only appear to satisfy the original inquiry.

And if that avoidance is not guaranteed

in advance, some guides to controlled inquiry are warranted.
Now questions which originate in spontaneous curiosity require a good deal of intelligence if they are to be
part of a professional investigation.

Direction

must be

given to them; they must be formulated so as to serve the
needs of a $elected topic.

But these requirements are ano-

ther way of saying that the historian must be intelligent.
Again, this is no surprising discovery but merely the explication of an implicit routine.

Similarly the canons which

guide historical inquiry are developed in response to an
44Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 62-63. Two of these "seven rules of thumb"
can be briefly summarized. Historians recognize that not
all the evidence pertinent to a problem is of equal worth.
A canon of immediacy requ:i.res that the best relevant evidence be selected. Usually this canon dictates that priority be given to evidence most immediate to the events
under study. A second canon--a canon of affirmation--requires that evidence always be affirmative. A lack of
evidence for the occurrence of an event does not prove
that the event did not take place. Rather, affirmative
evidence alone can prove that an event never took place.
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inner imperative.

The immanent requirement is that the

spontaneous desire to know be allowed to develop, and the
canons of a particular method are developed to forward
that process.

Tn fact, the road from a sometimes whimsical

curios:tty to a methodical investigation is long.

Fields of

inquiry must be d:tfferentiated, their limits set, and proper tools assembled.

Once in hand these tools or methods

are themselves heuristic devices which guide intelligent
inquiry and discourage unintelligent conclusions.

They

mark the difference between controlled inquiry and the
random question of the child because they restrict the
excusable errors of competent sc:holars and show the proper
way of amending faulty positions.
The third aspect of the historian's procedure was
derived from his use of constructed sets of hypotheses,
e.g. the division of history in to peri_ ods and in to geographical areas. 4 5 Both divisions and constructed sets of
hypotheses are employed to focus the inquiry.

What they

proVide is an antecedent framework which ideally situates
4 5"The division of history into perjods is not a
fact, but a necessary hypothesis or tool of thought, valid
in so far as it is illuminating, and dependent for its validity on interpretation. Historians who differ on the
question of when the ~iddle Ages ended differ in their interpretation of certain events. The questton is not a
question of fact; but it is also not meaningless. The division of history into geographical sectors is equally not
a fact, but a hypothesis: to speak of European history may
be a valid and fruitful hypothesis in some contexts, mislead~ng and mischievous in others."
Edward Hallett Carr,
What Is History?, pp. ?6-??.
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the details of a selected topic.

One historian has collec-

ted common hypotheses about the preconditions to civil
wars. 46 Some twenty-one hypotheses gathered under five
different headings exemplify both the narrowing function
of the hypothesis and its usefulness as an antecedent framework.

For example, under the heading of social precondi-

tions to civil wars, there is the hypothesis that a lack
of social mobility breeds frustration which in turn may
foster revolutionary actions.

This constructive sugges-

tion adds an intelligent direction to the desire to understand how civil wars originate.

In order to test this hypo-

thesis, the historian must apply it to the records of revolutionary movements.

Such a process of verification is

described by the remaining three aspects of historical
procedures.
The critical or discriminating aspect consists of
decisions which separate useful insights from those which
distract the historian from his chosen topic.

The process

of understanding a complex issue will frequently turn up
inverse insights, those "dead ends" which make no positive
contribution to a specified issue.

Tn putting these in-

sights aside, the historian makes use of a canon of relevance.

In history more than accuracy in one's facts is

required.

The historian must also get the "right facts

46Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars,"
Studies in. the Philosophy of History, pp. 127-128.
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right. n 4 ?

I.t does no ·good to prove that a man was a sun-

shine patriot if the issue at stake is his possible collaboration with an enemy occupying his country.
The discriminating aspect also applies to the use of
constructed hypotheses.

Just as hunches may lead the his-

torian astray, so formulated guesses in the form of precise hypotheses may carry him down a blind alley.

Even-

tually he may recognize that he is headed away from his
selected topic.
the basis for

Then a new beginning must be made.

And

turn in his thinking will be the inverse
insight that a prev:tous strategy was wayward. 48 The purth~s

suit of understanding thus may be on the wrong track for a
time, but human intelligence can be self-correcting.

The

primary need tb be intelligent can require a change in
'
4 ?,.A historian
must not merely get the facts right.
He must get the right facts right. From this a simple
rule of relevance may be deduced: historical evidence must
be a direct answer to the question asked and not to some
other question." D. H. Fischer, Htstorians' Fallacies:
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 62. For a liumorous incident in which this rule was violated, see ibid.,
pp. 46-47. Lonergan describes a canon of relevance-wliich
is part of empirical method in Insight, pp. 76-78.
48 To recognize that inverse insights occur is to recognize the fallibility of applied tnsights. That is, when
applied to a concrete situation, insights may be irrelevant--a supposed solution may be no more than wishi"ul thinking. But insights do not mark the end of the knowing process; they must be verified and critically appraised. The
obviousness of this plus the frequency with which Lonergan
points it out make it hard to understand how one commentator could charge that Lonergan overlooked the possibility
of self-deception in applying insights to concrete problems.
See J\,ndrew J. Reck, "Bernard Lonergan's Theory of Tnquiry
vis-a-vis American Thought," in The Nature of Philosophical
Inquiry, p. 24~. For Lonergan's reply to this commentator,
see "Response, in~., p. 256.
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1

How else can one account for the occur-

basic strategies.

rence of inverse insights and the changes in strategy
which follow?

This self-correct;_ng procedure is an intel-

ligent alternative to any stubborn maintenance of positions
which, after the battle has been lost, survive only through
rear-guard actions.

The desire to understand can, through

trai.ning, become wary of such total investments in attractive hypotheses.

After all, the constructs of the histor-

ian are intended to illuminate the past and not to dictate
automatically what must have been.
The self-correcting function of human intelligence
has been located under the critical or discriminating aspect of historical understanding, but its results are best
placed under the ecstatic aspect.

For if a historian's

initial guesswork proves misleading and if he corrects
those early missteps, he will be
ment of human intelligence.

exper~enc:tng

the detach-

Not to cling to his first sur-

mises but to outdistance them as his understanding broadens
and demands revisions will be the occasion both for an experience and an understanding of his own intelligent unbiased transcendence of developed systems and symbolic constructs.
The historian may not advert to his own critical
consciousness, but the experience of learning through the
sometimes slow, sometimes fast, accumulation of insights
will provide some sign of his self-correcti.ng transcendence

238

of particular theories and perspectives.

He may succeed

in subordinating his ambition (e.g. his ambition to preserve
a position won at hard labor) to his desire for further
understanding.

In this case, he will probably recognize

the meaning of the word "ecstatic" when it is applied to
the process of historical understanding.

On the other

hand, he is also acqua1nted with the feeling of reluctance
which often opposes new discoveries when they are in conflict with personally accepted interpretations.

But he

may also recall his experience of and response to a desire
for more adequate interpretations.

Not an external stimu-

lus but an immanent desire to know will push him beyond
old stances to the renewed efforts of inquiry.
As noted previously under the heuristic aspect, hypotheses require verification.

The historian may have omit-

1

ted irrelevant insights and materials and he may have assumed a perspective proper to his topic, but the activity
of weighing evidence and of rechecking the interconnected
pieces of the historical puzzle remains.

Here one encoun-

ters the validating reflective aspect of historical procedures, the sixth aspect.
There is a long-standing controversy over the role
of judgment in history because various types and levels
of judgment have been confused.

Usually the issue centers

on moral verdicts passed on those no longer able to def end
themselves and on actions which cannot be altered no matter
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what the verdict. 4 9

This part of the controversy cannot
-

be treated here, for it would require a lengthy digression
into moral philosophY and it is not to our purpose.

But

there is another part of the controversy which must be discussed.

That is the question of value-free judgmental

studies in history.
In the first place, critical history is distinguished
from its less developed predecessors by the primacy accorded to judgments of fact.

But the controversial issue of

value-free analysis is not limited to the obvious duty.of
the historian to separate fact and legend.

Rather, the

issue is one of value judgments which assert, not necessarily what was good or bad (in a moral sense), but what
counted as significant events for groups both in the past
and in the .present.50
cant events

o~

!n precritical history the signifi-

.

legends are those which stir an audience to

patriotic fervor.

To the extent that critical history ab-

stains from this criterion of historical significance, it
may be free of the more unsophisticated value judgments
4 9Hans Meyerhoff presents a respectable selection of
some of the major articles written on this issue. See his
The Philosophy of History in Our Time, for articles by
Geoffrey Barraclough, Herbert Butterfield, Sir Isaiah Berlin, Jacob Burckhardt, Reinhold Niebuhr.

50The selection of "significant" events is a valuecharged operation, and its inevitability for the historian
has been the basis for multiple denials of the possibility
of historical objectivity. For a survey of the controversial issues involved, see William H. Dray, Philosothy of
History (.Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ha 1,
1964), pp. 21-39.
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which are manifestly a part of propaganda.

Also, .in empha-

sizing the need to settle matters-of-fact, critical history
is free of a wide range of pragmatic values.

Facts require

a prior interconnection of evidentiary materials.

But

pragmatic value judgments in history have often settled
for much less; namely, that what is asserted be capable
of educating an audience in the "wisdom" of the past.51
Their appeal to evidence will forego an empirical base for
one which conforms to the ideological needs of the writer.
However, there is a sense in which history is always
judgmentally value-laden.

The process of selectivity re-

quires that the historian determine what is worth recounting.

If he does 'not evaluate, he will be left with an in-

discriminate heap of materials.
events might

a~oid

A straight chronology of

value judgments, but then the chronicle

is not critical history.

So the historian must evaluate

in order to form interpretations of the past.

Again, if

his primary aim is to settle matters-of-fact, then value
judgments; particularly those which advance any ethical
position of the author, will play subordinate roles.

But

it is perhaps only in the monograph or the archival report
that this subordination can be safely assumed.5 2 Even in
51Method in Theolog;r, p. 232.
52Hayden White allows these two exceptions to his
formal theory of historical works. See his Preface to
Metahistory, p. ix. For more comprehensive studies, W'hite
insists that value judgments are unavoidable and that they
manifest prior subjective opinions. Now unless one is
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these works of very limited scope, a historian will be selective, and so evaluation will not be entirely absent.
The preceding remarks have not been a digression
from our attempts to relate the judicial aspect to transcendental method.

Historical procedures which gain direc-

tion through selective value judgments gradually yield
partial accounts which isolate and clarify subordinate issues in a more general topic.

Then partial contexts have

to be brought together to form a coherent account of the
whole.

If, after constructing this larger context, the

historian has answered what to him were the sj_gnificant
questions, he is ready to make another type of judgment.
This time the judgment refers not to the parts but to the
whole work.

He does not require additional evidence if

his questions for :intelligence have all been answered.
There will only remain the question for reflection, "Is
it the case that • • • ?"

And this question requires a

review question, "Does the evidence prove that • • • ?"
The reflective judgment of the whole then follows upon this
review of the total deposit of evidence.

In asking the

question for reflection and in reviewing the evidence, the
judger experiences the transcendental precept: Be reasonable.
willing to hold that all value judgments are biased, the
discovery of personal evaluation in historical works is
not automatically grounds for historical skepticism.
There is at least the possibility of objective valuing.
Chapter Five will give a limited consideration to this
possibility.

242

Previously we noted how the absence of further relevant questions for intelligence had to be qualified.
also remarked on two· sources of possible revision.

We
New

information may require a change in prior historical interpretations; new consequences of a past event may modify
the meaning originally ascribed to it.

But then there

will be other historians and new projects to handle the
new information.

What these later inquiries will say of

an outdated work will vary.

But if an earlier author

was intellectually competent and made use of the evidence
available to him, his successors will not charge that he
was unreasonable or dishonest.

His conclusions may have

been the best available opinion of his day.

However, new

insights are possible today which go beyond the scope of
his work.

Consequently, his labors will be judged inade-

quate, but they will not be dismissed simply as a collection of errors.

Tn short, the inadequacies of his work

will be challenged, but any strong points will be built
upon by succeeding generations.
A precondition to this cumulative historical effort
is a recognition of previous authors as intelligent in
their procedures and as honest in their judgments of fact.
-And if later historians are to recognize these strong
points, they in turn must be familiar with the judicial
aspect of their own procedures.

This familiarity is evi-

denced in statements to the effect that one can understand
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how another historian could base a reasonable judgment on
evidence which to present writers is no longer sui'ficient.
A common imperative; most probably unexpressed, is the basis for such a sympathetic understanding.

Those later his-

torians will understand the immanent imperative to be reasonable, and they will have noted the efforts of a predecessor to conform to that common imperative.
The theme throughout the precedi_ng paragraphs has
been that historical procedures and canons are developments
of critical consciousness.

An individual is born to whim-

sical curiosity, and eventually he may enter the world of
scholarship and science in which that curiosity becomes
methodical.

Through the example of other historians and

through training in several fields, the individual historian becomes a master of his profession.

In addition, he

may become an expert in numismatics so as to relate more
thoroughly the economic decline of the Roman Empire.

He

may study contemporary physics so as to relate the history
of science in the twentieth century.

In most instances,

he will find himself drawing upon discoveries and methods
which have a wider application outside the historical
field.53

Our theme has been that these procedures have a

common origin in the spontaneous desire to know which
53Historical adaptations o~ psychoanalytic concepts,
of statistical patterns. of carbon-datjng techniques come
to mind as examples of borrowed tools which historians
turn to their own purposes.
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first expresses itself in the child's curiosity.

But this

desire is only an anticipation of knowledge and not knowledge itself.

A process of intellectual development must

supervene, so that differentiated techniques can be formulated.

In turn, these techniques will be the distinguish-

ing marks of competent inquiries in science, mathematics,
history, philosophy.54

The techniques themselves are an-

ticipations of knowledge, but now curiosity is controlled
inquiry.

And, more significantly, what is controlled are

also those interests, feelings, and spontaneous opinions
which belong to daily living.
Our conclusion is that the procedures of historical
(

understanding originate in the spontaneities of human intelligence and rationality.

Since the procedures are prod-

ucts of a spontaneous desire to know, a critical method
which formulates the patterned development of that desire
will have a normative function in regard to its products.
Transcendental method is such a formulation.

Since it is

based on the universal and invariant structure of human
knowing, it will be a general controlling method (or criterion) of all those derivative procedures and specialized
54"Finally intellectual development has its roots
in the detached and disinterested desire to know; but the
mere desire is not knowledge of anything; it will lead to
highly differentiated structures that are masteries of
logic, mathematics, natural science, common sense, philosophy, and human science; but these intelligible differentiations are yet to come, and they come only in and through
the process of development." Insight, p. 453.
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methods.

And since it is based on a performance which is

prior to all theorizing, it supplies a priori grounds for
criticizing all theoretical procedures irrespective of an.y
subjective preferences.

The intelligibility and reason-

ableness of such procedures is not left to individual variables.

In short, transcendental method independently of

subjective preferences can sanction the procedures which
occur on the surface of the historical text.
Yet it is a fact that one and the same subject can
be dedicated to scholarly work and still experience the
pull of ambition which counsels haste over careful research.
Periodically a scandal will occur in some scientific group
because experimental results were falsified for the sake of
public acclaim.
cally.

Such falsification is condemned unequivo-

More than the reputation of the profession is at

stake; there is a prior commitment to intellectual honesty.
!n terms that we have been using--there is a prior commitment to intelligence and reasonableness, a prior trust is
placed in-the spontaneous development of the desire to know.
We have argued that certain procedures forward this
spontaneous development, and that, in the absence of bias,
they do lead to historical knowledge.

We have also argued

that transcendental method can sanction these procedures
irrespective of subjective preferences.
are incomplete.

But our arguments

A direct response must be made to the

relativist who claims that bias is what can never be absent
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from the finished historical product.

Even though we will

postpone a discussion of moral conversion until the next
chapter, we will be able to give a direct response to the
relativist in this chapter.

So far we have established a

criterion for that detachment which, when accompanied by
the controlling techniques of a discipline, promises results untainted by bias.

That criterion is the repeated

advertence to the immanent imperative of one's own critical
consciousness, it is the continual advertence to the spontaneous desire to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable,
and responsible.

It remains to show that such detachment

is in fact possible.

TyJ>es of Bias
First, we must consider the obstacles to that possibility.

There are multiple barriers to detachment; there

are multiple forms of bias.

Bias can be generally described

as a distortion of the subject's spontaneous intellectual
development.

In Insight, Lonergan analyzes four forms of

bias which distort and interfere with the process of coming to know.55

They are dramatic bias, individual bias,

group bias, and general bias.
Dramatic bias is located in the subject's preconscious refusal to admit certain ideas about hjmself and
55The major sections given over to an analysis of the
forms of bias are, in Insight, pp. 191-206 and 218-238.
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his

behavio~.

If his rejection of self-understanding is

carried on for very long, the intersubjective checks on
individual behavioral aberrations will be excluded.

Then

the subject withdraws into a closed world of fantasy which
yields little understanding of other people's actions and
which aggravates the subject's own isolated condition by
condoning behavior which will be misunderstood both by the
subject himself and by others.
Usually one can expect that, if dramatic bias goes
unchecked, it will gradually infect the healthy parts ·or
the subject's life.

If the subject is a scholar, his work

will eventually suffer.

Isolated failures to understand

himself and to act reasonably may affect how well he interprets the lives of other people.

For the historian writ-

ing a biography, those discoveries which he rejects in regard to his own life, he may also avoid in regard to the
life he is studying.

In Chapter Two, we proposed a thesis

about relative horizons: the richer the historian's own experience and the more comprehensive his self-understanding,
the more likely he is to write competently about complex
matters.

But dramatic bias may lessen his attentiveness

to certain subtleties in the historical career he is investigating.

JPcplanations of the historical figure's

behavior may not occur to the historian simply because
they too closely resemble explanations which he has been
avoiding about his own behavior.

So, in the absence of
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certain self-discoveries, his relative horizon remains contracted, and that contraction may weaken his scholarly
thoroughness.
The cure for this bias consists in the occurrence
of acts of understanding which previously were blocked.
But rarely can the individual effect a cure for himself.
Armed with the techniques and common-sense strategies of
psychoanalysis, the analyst may be able to reach the troubled subject.

He may be able to shed light on the origins

and self-destructive nature of those barriers with which
the subject cannot cope in a detached way.

Together ana-

lyst and analysand may break through those habitual ways
of acting which had only increased the analysand's confusion and insecurity.

But initially the analyst bears the

responsibility for proceeding in his therapy with the techniques provid·ed by his formal training and by his common
sense know-how.

His own intelligent use of these resources

may overcome the resistance of the analysand and thereby
prepare both of them for the discovery of the guarded
source of the subject's troubles.

!n successfully conclud-

ing the therapeutic procedure, the analyst may also establish himself as a counter-example to the analysand's prior
condition of isolation and avoidance of self-understanding.
The second type of bias is termed individual bias.
It is not simply identified with egoism and contrasted with
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al truism. 56

But it is identified with an egoism t_hat is

incomplete in its development. ·The subject is concerned
in an intelligent way with solving his own problems.

With

a great deal of care and intelligent planning, he labors
"to get ahead."

He is even capable of a certain degree of

detachment; for, desires and fears of a lesser sort are
subordinated to his desire for workable solutions to problems which hinder his advance.

But this form of egoism is

labelled faulty or biased because the subject refuses to
entertain questions about how his actions affect the social
group so long as their effects have no bear4ng on his own
aspirations.

Time is spent studying the social group so

as to learn how he can earn the group's rewards without
sacrificing anything personal of great worth.

!n short,

the subject uses his intelligence where his own interests
are at stake, but he rejects the use of that intelligence
in measuring how compatible his aims and actions are with
the existing social order.

Thus, his spontaneous desire

to know is encouraged where his own interests are concerned,
but it is stifled when the interests of the group seem to
restrain his self-advancement.
Just as dramatic bias contracts the subject's relative horizon, so too individual bias narrows the subject's
self-awareness.

Particularly absent will be reflection

56Lonergan makes use of Aristotle's position in the
Ethics on self-love to argue that egoism has a legitimate
role in social living. See Tnsight, pp. 219-220.
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on human relationships and the reciprocal responsibilities
entailed by living in society.

For the historian suffer-

ing from individual bias, there may be a subtle undermining
of professional standards.

Those norms and organs of

criticism common to the professional co:nll!lunity may be seen,
not as aids to competent scholarship, but as regrettable
hindrances to quick self-advancement.

Instead of being

responsible to his colleagues, he may view them as rivals
whose favor is to be sought and whose criticism must be
turned aside at all costs.

Alternately obsequious and

obstreperous, the biased historian will be ill-suited to
the cooperative tasks of a professional community.
Group bias is the third type to be studied.

Quite

simply this is the bias evident in any social group which
places its own political/economic interests above the welfare of society as a whole.

The group will weigh prospec-

tive social changes according to the single criterion of
its own preservation and advancement.

Now what is specific-

ally biased about this narrow opportunism is the arbitrary
way in which new social plans are rejected.

Groups not in

power will propose programs and responses to crises, but,
if these new insi.ghts do not serve the interests of the empowered group, they will be rejected.
bias and individual bias there

i~

Just as in dramatic

resistance to an under-

standing of existing problems, so too in group bias there
is a guarded blind spot regarding needed changes which
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might lessen the group's power.5?

If social problems are

serious enough and if they are neglected long enough because
the needed solutions are too costly to the empowered, then
there will be the makings of a revolutionary party.

What

the dominant group rejected, oppressed groups will champion.

Eventually the latter may seize control and imple-

ment the envisioned changes.

But then they too will be

liable to group bias, for their tenuous hold on power may
breed a reactionary stance which takes its turn in suppressing the voice of intelligent criticism.
Group bias has been evidenced by historians.

Differ-

ent schools have favored historical interpretations which
justified, even glorified, the gradual accumulation of
wealth and power by certa-ln groups in society.

.Alternately

some historians have identified with those outsiders whose
history had not been written by professionals occupying
endowed seats in major universities.

Historians of the

"New Left" present radical criticism of laws and institutions--criticism which is usually labelled "iconoclastic"
by the pooh bahs of the professional community.
Each party may be guilty of factionalism or group
bias.

Each may argue that history is on the side or one

segment of society.

But then there will be inattentiveness

to how soci.eities advance or decline depending on the
presence or absence of social cooperation.
5?~., Insight, p. 223.

The contributions

252
of minority groups may be misunderstood, perhaps entirely
overlooked.

As a result, the historian knows less about

the past which he investigates.

He feels no responsibility

to account for contributions made by those outside his
narrowed focus.

His inattentiveness may lead him to over-

look crucial pieces of evidence; his lessened sense of
responsibility may make him unsympathetic to the viewpoints
expressed by historical figures who were in their own day
"outsiders."

Consequently, his thoroughness in inquiry

and in explanation will be lessened.

The limited contexts

which he builds into overviews of complex issues will be
marked by partisanship.

And if his judgments on the parts

are tainted with bias, his conclusion about the whole may
also be biased.
General bias, the fourth type of bias, is not li.mited to the i..ndividual or to specific groups.
liable to it.

All men are

To varying degrees all men recognize the

competence of common sense to satisfy their curiosity about
concrete daily matters.

In contrast, the world of theory

is entered with difficulty; the world of interiority is
even more

re~ote.

Few in number are those who are willing

to inquire into all the levels of consciousness.

What is

near at hand are the routines of thought and action which
are usually labelled "common sense."

And these routines

repeatedly prove their worth by producing immediate concrete results.

Tn contrast, the interests of the

253
theoretical mind appear abstract and remote.

The.training

required seems wasteful in terms of time and less than
expeditious in terms of concrete results.

On the other

hand, common-sense routines yield immediate results and,
for the most part, are indifferent to the long-term considerations which consume the time and energy of theorists.
Now if the subject's concern for issues that have an illltlediate bearing on his life is allowed to domj_nate other issues of a theoretical nature, then he has succumbed to
general bias.
Lonergan works out the implications of this type of
bias for the group which values expediency over careful
planning and long-range reflection.58 In general terms,
the community suffers from a lack of understanding.

In

the name of a no-nonsense practicality, barriers are set
up against theoretical inquiry into the long-range effects
of present policies.

Individual members of the group

rationalize their avoidance of intellectual development
by means of the same slogan.

But eventually stop-gap mea-

sures and hasty responses to unforeseen crises cannot prevent deterioration of the community.

Just as the person

who suffers from dramatic bias sinks deeper into his fantasy world, so a community afflicted with general bias
loses control of its own life.

Political debates become

more strident and erupt into street brawls.
~ Ibid.,

pp. 228-232.

More and more
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of the population grows receptive to myth-makers and political charlatans.

Eventually the only intelligibility

expected of political affairs is found in the latest newsclippings on attempts to balance national powers and to
equalize economic pressures.59
Moreover, efforts to criticize the current turmoil
and to offer remedies to the spreading confusion are
viewed as soft-headed idealism.

Long before 'the si tua-

tion has deteriorated this far, human intelligence and
critical thought have been assigned academic posts far
from the political arena in which they are thought to be
of no use.

In short, the belief spreads that human intel-

ligence and reason are unable to control historical events.
The detached critic has nothing to offer a society which
must hasten to respond to one crisis after another.
The historian may be one of those exiled to an academic island in the midst of turbulent

social crises.

But he also may be caught up in the slogans and catchphrases of the day.

Then he will be less able to inves-

tigate and to criticize the preconceptions of his own relative horizon.

He may extend his facile :indifference to

the basic assumptions guiding public policy.

He may view

historical events as uncontrollable, or at best, as something alien
decisions.

to his own critical abilities and responsible
What happens in the community at large is no

59!bid., p. 229.
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concern of the academic world.
General bias can also infect his continuing education
as a scholar.

New techniques which require time and care-

ful study to master may be ignored.

Questions which seem

pertinent to a problem in hand may never be followed up
because they would cause delays in immediate results.
New sources of evidence may be left unexploited for the
same reason.

As a result, the historian's hypotheses and

imaginative reconstructions may be short-sighted.

His

eventual conclusions will then have a less adequate base
in both supporting evidence and comprehensive understanding.
Is there an alternative to this dismal scene?

To find one,

we will have to turn to the question of detachment, i.e.
to the question of whether these premature closures of
historical inquiry are inevitable.

A Limited Detachment
We began the

preced~ng

paragraphs on bias with a

general description: bias is a distortion of spontaneous
intellectual development.

The implication is that detach-

ment involves a challenge to such distortions.

The de-

tached attitude is identified with a willingness to allow
criticism of every issue.

But the central question re-

mains--Is detachment in fact possible?

We approached

this question by way of contrast, i.e. by sketching obstacles which in fact suppress critical thinking.

Therefore,
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our question becomes more specific: Are these obstacles in
fact surmountable?

We must also approach this question by

way of contrast; for detachment has been conceived in different ways, and not all of these ways are acceptable.
How an individual conceives the struggle for detachment depends on his theory of knowledge and of morals. 60
Lonergan's own ethical theory has not been discussed because of its complexity and because at this point the cognitional theory already outlined is adequate for our purpose, namely, to establish the conditions for the possibility of a limited detacbment. 61
In the first place, we cannot conceive detachment as
a process of excluding from one's inquiry everything that
is subjective.

Any ideal of detachment as pure passivity

is likely to rest on a cognitional theory which understands
human knowing to be a matter solely of receptivity to empirical facts. 62 But we have already argued that knowing
60Method in Theology, p. 231.
61 rn the following chapter our neglect of Lonergan's
ethical theory will be partially remedied by a consideration of moral conversion. His theory of cognition has, of
course, been introduced in Chapter Three. Chapter Five
will contain an extensive treatment of the epistemology
which is based on that cognitional theory.
For the basic distinctions which Lonergan makes among
cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, see
ibid., pp. 25 and 316.
62That is, if one is to knpw, then one must be attentive to the given facts and careful not to add anything
which was not found in the initial observations. Criticism
of this view of knowing takes many forms. Lonergan•s remarks usually contain some mention of the "principle of
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is a compoW?-d act which is irreducible to any single component.

Furthermore, the impulse to inquire arises spontan-

eously in the subject.

It is the intelligently controlled

curiosity of the historian which promotes the use of heuristic devices and of critical techniques for handling
available materials.

Finally, it is up to him to evaluate

carefully the strength of his interpretation.

Far from

being a side-line spectator, the historian only understands and solves problems by much labor and personal dedication to his profession.

If he retains some variant.on

the passive ideal of knowing, then some of his procedures
will be either overlooked or considered detrimental to the
objectivity of his work.

In the latter case, his expecta-

tions both about detachment and about objectivity cannot be
fulfilled, and so he argues that history involves an irreducible measure of subjective bias.

But if the historian

began his work without the expectation of passive receptivity, then the occurrence of value-laden selectivity and
of the reconstruction of the past by imaginative schemes
would not be a personal scandal.

On

the contrary, he might

the empty head" which was treated in Chapter Two. Even
though this understanding of human cognition is attacked
from many sides, some writers continue to expect that objective knowledge should be this product of pure receptivity. They may recognize that this expectation cannot be
fulfilled, but then they turn this discovery into an argument for relativism rather than returning with renewed
interest to a study of the cognitional performance which
precedes theoretical expectations about human knowing.
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even find it scandalous that any historian ever conceived
detachment as the passive receptivity of the automaton. 6 3
What we have in mind is a limited detachment which
is an ongoing effort rather than a fixed achievement.

The

historian may be devoted to social and cultural goals which
he intends his scholarship to forward.

He obviously does

not dispense with the content of his relative horizon in
writing history.

But there is such a thing as "intellec-

tual passion" of which Michael Polanyi has written at
length. 64 Then, for the sake of correctly understanding
a chosen topic, the scholar may subordinate social and
cultural goals to his desire to solve historical problems
and to answer accurately historical questi.ons.

He will

draw on past experiences and education to pose direct
questions, but he w111 be willing to admit that past events
were different from present events and must be accorded
some measure of uniqueness.

And the historian will not

be alone in this effort to remove any interfering opinions
6 3Hannah Arendt, in a paraphrase of Noam Chomsky, has
expressed such a reaction. "Absence of emotions neither
causes nor promotes rationality. 'Detachment and equanimity' in view of 'unbearable tragedy' can indeed be 'terrifying,' namely, when they are not the result of control
but an evident manifestation of incomprehension. In order
to respond reasonably one must first of all be 'moved,' and
the opposite of emotional is not 'rational,' whatever that
may mean, but either the inability to be moved, usually a
pathological phenomenon, or sentimentality, which is a perversion of feeling." On Violence (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1970), p. 64.
64Personal Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), see especially Chapter Six.
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from his

st~dy

of the past.

While not so fully objecti-

fied as in the natural sciences, historical techniques
and canons are available to guide his inquiry.

In addi-

tion, there are other historians capable of examining the
same evidence and of using it to check the individual's
arguments.

Moreover, the historian will be communicating

his results to an educated public which eventually becomes wary of mere assertions and demands proof.

In

short, there are public arenas in which subjective bias
becomes glaringly obvious and in which failures to transcend parochialism are regretted.
From the preceding remarks we conclude (1) there are
techniques and canons developed to help the historian
avoid bias in his work; (2) there is a bar of professj_onal
peers and public scrutiny which exposes bias and passes
judgment on the work of the individual historian; (3) the
historical profession explicitly recognizes that the preoccupations of the present must be transcended if the historian is to understand the problems which confronted his
predecessors. 6 5 But will the h:istor:ian make use of those
techniques?
his peers?

Will he submit his work to the judgment of
Will he recognize that past groups had ends of

their own distinct from his?

Answers to these questions

6 5Arthur O. Lovejoy states.this common theme: selftranscendence is a requisite to a successful study of the
past. "Present Standpoints and Past History," The Philosophy of History in ~ Time, p. 180.
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can only be given by the individual historian.

A.willing-

ness to allow his intelligent and rational activities to
develop unimpeded by personal bias cannot be imposed.
Otherwise one could not speak o:f the historian's intellectual responsibility.
ingness to

pe~sist

But the alternatives are (l) a will-

in ignorance and to invest more heavily

in a personal obscurantism, and (2) a willingness to battle with critics despite all costs to professional standards and intellectual honesty.
The test, then, of detachment from bias and willful
obscurantism is the subject's willingness to allow spontaneous inquiry and reflection to carr:y him beyond the
limits of his relative horizon and beyond any impeding bias
contained therein.

Just as childhood cur:iosity originated

with a spontaneous desire to know and just as theoretical
inquiry is a controlled formulation of that same desire,
so the

fu~ther

questions which disturb his familiar ways

and firm convictions will stem from that same source.
Now such troubling questions may be suppressed by the
subject's fears for his own security which he identifies
with certain limited positions.

Self-protecting screens

may be thrown up to exclude difficulties and doubts over
long-standing positions.

But the problem is that these

questions have not an entirely external origin.

Of course,

spectfic questions may be suggested by what someone else
said or did, but the fa1nt hint that perhaps the other
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person's words or deeds pose a valid challenge to.the subject's position is the product of the subject's own intelligence.

The desire to know may take on the form of a nag-

ging doubt about his previous self-assurance.

This is to

say that difficulties or doubts suggested by something external are interiorized.

In effect, the desire to know

becomes an immanent source of further questions which may
require a change in familiar opinions or ways of acting.
What we have sketched in the preceding paragraph is
a psychological function of transcendental method. 66 .That
method formulates the spontaneous exigencies of critical
consciousness.

rn a subject committed to scholarly pur-

suits, there will likely be conflicts between these exigencies and lesser ones which demand the avoidance of deeply
troubling questions.

Tension results; for, on the one hand,

a radical openness to new ideas and reasonable proposals is
required, and, on the other, retention of the established,
security-giving positions is desired.

Whether

this ten-

sion is successfully resolved (we do not say "eliminated")
is a matter of intellectual conversion.

More will be said

66 navid Tracy offers some brief comments on this function, in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 144. We
might add that this function is specialized in psychoanalytic techniques. Barriers to self-understand5ng and resistance to needed changes in behavior are sometimes so deeply
rooted that the subject's own conscious efforts to overcome
them will not be adequate. The therapeutic counsel of the
analyst may strengthen these conscious efforts, but in the
end there is no substitute for the subject's willingness
to accept help and to be open to troubling new thoughts.
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of intellectual conversion in the next chapter.

~or

our

present purposes, a brief comment will suffice.
Intellectual conversion is one of the three types of
conversion analyzed in Method in Theology.

The basic conditions for its occurrence are treated in Tnsight. 6? Repeatedly the point is made that the act of self-appropriation which carries out this conversion is an act of personal discovery.

But though the act of discovery is an

achievement of the individual, still the content of the
act, what is discovered, is another matter.

What is dis-

covered and made explicit is the threefold process of human
knowing.

And the universal and invariant structure of

this process has implications beyond the personal discovery that one is in fact a knower.

The major implication

is that the desire to know cannot be restricted in advance
by bias.

We first are curious, and the only barriers to

that curiosity which can be said to exist in advance are
the limits to our questioning.

That is, the only prior re-

strictions are not what we do not want to know but what we
do not ask about because the relevant questions do not
strike us as meaningful.

Bias comes later when the sweep

of our questions has touched on areas that begin to trouble us, and so we restrict our inquiries.
decide not to know.

In effect, we

But such a decision cannot be made in

advance of the spontaneous desire to know, and it must be
6 ?see Chapter Eleven, pp. 319-347.

263

repeatedly made if that prior desire is to be kept in
check. 68
Again, the issue of this chapter is the possibility
of a limited detachment.

"Limited" in the sense that eval-

uation and subjective construction are unavoidable, indeed
necessary, conditions for historical knowledge.

This issue

of detachment has been tied to the possibility of intellectual conversion.

Since the latter possibility will not be

treated at length until the next chapter, it would seem
that the goal of this chapter could not be reached.

How-

ever, enough steps have been taken to present an argument
for the possibility of detachment.

Chapter Five will add

to those steps without requiring any major shift in our
argument.
We began this chapter with the thesis that bias is
an irreducible component of every historical work.

In the

first part of this third section, we argued that transcendental method offers a sanction of historical procedures
irrespective of subjective bias.

However, in the second

part, we recognized that the possibility of actually employing these critical grounds was yet to be established.
Specifically, the relativist may accede to the presence
68A possible topic for another paper would be the
long-term effects of this suppression of the desire to
lmow. Is intellectual "death" possible? Is there some
point beyond which the spontaneities of human consciousness could not recover from the repeated efforts to stifle
them?

r
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of the desire to know in the human subject.

But he will

quite legitimately also point to those other desires and
interests which conflict with this basic intellectual passion.

He will argue at length that these other interests

cannot be successfully subord-tnated to the desire to know,
and hence, bias will be an irreducible element in every
historical work.
Preparation for a response to this thesis was made
in three steps.

First, how we conceive the possibtlity of

overcoming bias (i.e. the possibility of detachment) will
depend on our cognitional theory.

Against the ideal of

passivity before historical facts, we posed the constructive activity of the intelligent and rational subject.
Consequently, only a limited or quali.fied detachment was
envisioned.
Second, the desire to know which is the basis for
both the child's questions and the scientist's sophisticated hypotheses is also the origin of further questions
which carry the subject beyond his accepted positions. 69
Conflicts may occur between this desire and lesser interests, but the resulting tension is a product, in part, of
the immanent desire to know.

Hence it cannot be avoided;

a willtngness to persist in ignorance and to engage in
sophistry will, at least initially, increase the tension
69see the previous co:rranents in section two and in
this third section on the ecstatic aspect of the historian's procedures.

rather than eliminate it.
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The issue of detachment is thus

located within the subject's own consciousness and is not
primarily a matter of external pressures.?O

The secondary

external pressures will be public controls on the perpetuation of biased historical accounts.

Accepted canons of

research and common modes of argumentation, the critical
review of the historical profession, and the opinion of
an educated public are public checks on historical bias.
Third, whether the historian respects these external
controls and, more important, whether he

subord~nates·les-

ser interests to his desire-to-know cannot be determined
in advance.

Nor, for that matter, can a choice of obscur-

antism be necessitated in advance.

There is only a ques-

tion mark placed over his willingness to make an immanent
desire-to-know the primary motive of his historical inquiries.
On the basis cf the preceding points, the following
reply can be made to the thesis that subjective bias is
unavoidable and intellectual detachment is factually impossible.

First, the possibility of detachment lies not

in the affirmation of some theory but in the appropriation
by the subject of his own intelligent and rational performance.

And this act of appropriation yields knowledge of

an invariant structure in that performance.

As formulated

in transcendental method, this metahistorical position
? 0 rnsight, pp. 473-475·
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excludes no .interpretations a priori and accepts none a posteriori until reasonably convincing evidence is forthcoming.
Second, both prior to and after the act of appropriation, the subject finds himself already holding opinions
which are mixtures of good sense, bias, and the cliches
' of
the day.

Such opinions will be influencing his historical

procedures.

!n

previous chapters we argued that transcen-

dental method (1) is the basis for a critical evaluation
of preconceptions about history, and (2) has a normative
function in respect to all specialized methods and procedures.

Consequently, the subject's prior opinions of mixed

origin can be investigated and an estimate formed of their
influence on historical procedures.
Third, the actual use of transcendental method to
criticize preconceptions and procedures depends on the
Willingness o.f the individual historian to bring his prior
opinions and procedures into conformity with what he now
knows about human knowing.?l
imposed.

This willingness cannot be

But just as the desire to know led him to develop

a cognitional position consistent with his spontaneous performance, so it can lead him to a willingness to check
?lour line of argumentation presupposes that what
the subject knows about human cognition (the result of
intellectual conversion) demands. of him a corresponding
willingness to make his doing consistent with his knowing
(the result of moral conversion). Chapter ffive will have
more to say on this point.
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repeatedly his historical procedures against that new
awareness.72 This desire prompts further questions which
may turn up lapses in critical thinking.

If these lapses

are rooted in long-standing· bias, much effort will be required to remedy them.

There may well be a struggle be-

tween what the subject knows his historical performance
should be and those alien interests which make that performance something less.

But if he has appropriated his

own critical consciousness, then he can recognize the distorting

effects of bias on his procedures and conclusions.

And to recognize bias for what it is (a distortion of intellectual development), while not guaranteeing that the
subject will try to eliminate it, is at least to recognize
an alternative to bias.

Hence, because there is a recog-

nized alternative, bias is not unavoidable.

Moreover, bias

that is already present is not irreducible because a way
is seen beyond the distortive screens, i.e. the subject
knows what his performance should be.

It remains for him

to modify any faulty preconceptions or practices and to be
7 2 "The immanent source of transcendence in man is
his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.
As it is the origin of all his questions, it is the origin
of the radical, further questions which take him beyond
the defined limits of particular issues. Nor is it solely
the operator of his cognitional development. For its detachment and dis~nterestedness set it in opposit5on to his
attached and interested sensitivity and intersubjectivity;
and the knowledge it yields demands of his will the endeavour to develop in willingness and so make his doing consistent with his knowing." Tnsight, p. 636.
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on guard against equally biased replacements·.
This lengthy argument concludes the second part of
this third section.

In summary, the section undertook to

argue two positions.

First, transcendental method has a

normative function in regard to the historical procedures
outlined in section two.

Second, conformity to transcen-

dental method in one's theoretical procedures is a criterion of detachment from subjective bias.

The major impli-

cation of these two conclusions is that bias is not an
unavoidable or irreducible component of every historical
work.

Summary of Chapter IV
Both the thesis and the counterproposal of this chapter were concerned with a single major problem: If subjective bias is an irreducible component of every historical
work, then the crisis of historicism cannot be resolved.
Wb.ite's fourth thesis implies that this will be the case
since historical procedures which might eliminate bias
are themselves grounded in variable preferences.

But our

counterproposal argued that transcendental method can be
reflectively applied to these procedures so as to reveal
distortions arising from antecedent preferences.
The second section of the chapter argued that transcendental method could reach beyond the manifest level of
the text in order to carry out a critique of precritical
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opinions belonging to the implicit level.

Tn keeping with

our application of transcendental method to both levels
of historical works, we then turned to the study of surface procedures.

These procedures were first classified

in relation to historical experiencing, Un.derstandtng, and
judging.

They were then analyzed under six distinct head-

ings, thereby clarifying stages in the methodical process
of attaining historical knowledge.
But this process may be disrupted by the distorting
influence of bias.

As a counterwieght to such interfer-

ence, we proposed the reflective application of transcendental method to the previously outlined stages of historical method.

Methodical procedures and historical canons

were said to be part of a controlled inquiry which specializes the spontaneities of critical consciousness.

Since

transcendental method formulates the basic structure of
these spontaneities, it will have a normative function in
regard to the developed procedures and canons.

But then,

as opposed to White's thesis, there is a metahistorical
basis for a critical sanctton of surface procedures.
Will this critical sanction be applied or will precritical opinions be left to determine how the historian
conducts his inquiry?

This question cannot be answered

in advance of a decision which the historian himself must
make.

At stake will be his own detachment from bias.

if he has formulated the basic exigencies of his own

But
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critical thinking, he will know what his
formance should be.

historic~l

per-

Moreover, ·he will recognize failures

to allow that performance to develop unhindered by one of
the forms of bias.
Our concluding argument was that to recognize these
failures as lapses in critical thinking is already to
recognize an alternate way of proceeding.

This recogni-

tion by itself does not guarantee the elimination of bias
and the ongoing maintenance of critical detachment.

But

it does indicate that there is an alternative to bias.
Hence, bias is not of necessity the lot of every historical
inquiry.

We thus have removed the barrier implied in

\.lhite's thesis to any resolution of the crisis of historicism and have established the possibility of resolving
the crisis.

Jn the following chapter, arguments will be

advanced in support of a recommended strategy for moving
from this possibility to an actual resolution of the
crisis.

C~ER

V
.

.

HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY
INTRODUCTION
A central issue has been repeatedly formulated in the
preceding chapters.

Jn the absence of a critical metahis-

torical basis for mediating conflicts within the historical field, the crisis of historicism remains unresolved.
Ve have already argued in a number of places that Hayden
White fails to supply the needed basis.

His structural

analysis of historical works achieves significant results
in classifying the types of historical conflicts and in
locating variables at the root of the historical conflicts.
But obstacles remain to prevent a transition from his
descriptive study to an explanatory position which both
accounts for historical differences and contains the
grounds for a critical evaluation of the basic differences.
The preceding chapters have been building up to a determination of whether or not Lonergan's methodological proposals can surmount these obstacles and thereby succeed
in advancing beyond the limits of \.lhite's work.
By raising the question of historical objectivity,
this fifth chapter becomes an explicit study in epistemology.

Our previous analysis of Lonergan's cognitional
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theory will be the basis for this

study~

is the issue of historical "realism."

What is .at stake

This is the issue

on which there was no consensus among nineteenth-century
historians.

Their disagreements took the form of diverse

and often conflicting modes of historical consciousness.
The implications of these disagreements are formulated by
Hayden White in a series of theses.

This chapter takes

up his fourth thesis: Ea.ch historical paradigm is an effectively closed system of thought; radical changes in paradigms reflect not the discovery of new evidence but a
basic change in one's ethical Viewpoint.

Consequently,

any attempt to offer an epistemological justification of
one's paradigm represents only a prior ethical choice. 1
The counterproposal to this thesis agrees with it in
part.

Lonergan's horizon-analysis turns up results which

are compatible with the thesis that paradigms are prior to
eVidence, i.e. that they are frameworks which predetermine
1 "In my view, there are no extra-ideological grounds
on which to arbitrate among the conflicting conceptions of
the historical process and of historical knowledge appealed
to by the different ideologies. For, since these conceptions have their origins in ethical considerations, the
assumption of a given epistemological position by which to
judge their cognitive adequacy would itself represent only
another ethical choice. I cannot claim that one of the
conceptions of historical knowledge favored by a given
ideology is more 'realistic' than the others, for it is
precisely over the matter of what constitutes an adequate
criterion of 'realism' that they disagree. Nor can I claim
that one conception of historical knowledge is more 'scientific' than another without prejudging the problem of
what a specifically historical or social science ought to
be." Metahistory, p. 26.
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what will be acceptable as historical data.

With a

~ari

ance in prior frameworks, there will be a consequent variance in what counts as historical evidence.

So, by it-

self, evidence cannot require the radical modification of
its prior framework.
can be challenged.

But part of White's fourth thesis
The assertion that paradigms are closed

systems of thought raises problems which the contemporary
discussions of the hermeneutical circle have addressed.
Lonergan's analysis of the self-correcting process of learning is a valuable addition to these contemporary debates.
In conjunction with this analysis, there are complex notions
of evidence and of objectivity which can be opposed to some
of the conceptions of historical knowledge held by historians.

If the epistemology which supports these complex

notions can be proved to have a privileged claim to "realism," then paradigms which support alternate notions may be
open to modifications for other than ethical reasons.
In order to elaborate and to defend the counterproposal, two goals must be reached.

First, arguments must

establish that crttical consciousness which develops systems of meaning can also transcend the inherent limits of
its thought-products.

Second, in contrast to White's posi-

tion on the preferential basis for every historical theory,
it must be possible to offer an epistemological justification of some historical theories over others.

Both of

these aims are steps in the elaboration of a universal
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viewpoint from which to criticize different historical
perspectives.

It was the previous absence of just such a

metahistorical viewpoint which hindered any solution to
.

.

the historical conflicts of the crisis period.
The preceding chapters have prepared for the introduction of this universal viewpoint.

In Chapter Two, the

predeterminants of historical perspectives were expanded to
include the historian's basic horizon.

Thus, a cognitional

element was identified as part of the deep structure of
the historical text.

In Chapter Three, this cognitional

element was further analyzed; its structure and formulation
in transcendental method were outlined.

Taking an example

from Carl Becker's work, we applied the developed cognitional position to certain viewpoints in that author's basic
horizon.

This application specified the previous conclu-

sion that a differentiated basic horizon provides metahistorical grounds for criticizing precritical elements of
historical perspectives.

Finally, in Chapter Four, we took

up the question of whether a critical, non-biased evaluation of historical perspectives and practices was in fact
possible.

On the basis of previous arguments, transcenden-

tal method was shown to be in the unique position of mediating differences on both the deep and surface levels of
historical works.

It can be both the basis for detachment

from precritical, biased opinions about history and also
the norm for procedures guided by those prior opinions.
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Consequently, bias which may be part of historical paradigms is not necessarily a permanent aspect of historical
work done under the guidance of those paradigms.
The fifth chapter will build on earlier chapters in
an attempt to supply an epistemological criterion of historical realism.

If this criterion does not represent sim-

ply another set of preferences, then the differences among
historical paradigms may be criticized on grounds other
than the subjective variables allowed by White.
The work of this chapter will be carried out in four
sections.

This introductory section has already stated

the thesis and counterproposal.

Before concluding this

section, we will review aspects of Hayden White's thesis
as well as problems entailed by it.

In the second part of

Chapter Five, the topics of historical models and of the
hermeneutical circle will introduce specific problems which
confront all claims to historical objectiVity.

fhe third

section advances beyond the second by proposing and defending a complex notion of objectiVity.

This proposal is part

of an analysis of Lonergan's epistemology, and we will borrow from his theory key insights into historical realism.
Finally, the fourth section pulls together the preceding
conclusions on paradigms, objectivity, and historical realism in order to answer the difficult question: Can conflicts
over historical realism be mediated?
The obstacles to be surmounted in this chapter are
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apparent in .White's arguments as they terminate in his
fourth thesis.

Again, his thesis is that any attempt to

offer an epistemological justification of certain paradigms will represent only a prior ethical preference.
This thesis is first defended against an alternate suggestion that paradigms be measured against historical evidence, i.e. a convincing historical position will be one
which adequately comprehends the available data.

To this

suggestion White replies that what has not been settled
is precisely what counts as a historical datum and as ·a
theory for explaining what the data mean. 2
In the absence of a metahistorical solution to this
problem, the historical theorist can only point to the
diverse viewpoints which conceive historical data differently. 3

He has no grounds outside of personal preferences

for adopting one viewpoint rather than another.

Further-

more, as "surface" elements of the text, historical data
fall within the predetermining boundaries of the chosen
model.

Therefore, the prior model cannot be disproven by

the discovery of new data, for data will only be admitted
2 Ibid., p. 429.

3In his structuralist approach, White traces these
different conceptions of historical data to prior poetic
insights and variable preferences. His classification of
the latter tacit elements in historical works does not answer the question of which conceptions of historical data
are to be preferred. The diversity of different and even
incompatible paradigms remains irreducible.
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as evidence i£ they conform to antecedent expectations. 4
The major implication

0£ this conclusion is that

historiography will continue to witness mutually exclusive
interpretations 0£ the same events, each 0£ which may, with
equal legitimacy, claim to be "realistic. 11 5

While the au-

thors of these interpretations may argue from their accumulated evidence, White's analysis indicates that the validity 0£ the interpretations is ultimately rooted elsewhere.
The consistency, coherence, and illuminative power of the
overarching vision 0£ historical processes are the measure
0£ validity. 6 The injunction appears to be: Maintain consistency within your basic historical perspective.

An at-

tempted justification of your perspective will merely reflect prior ethical decisions; it will not be compelling
for anyone not sharing your initial assumptions.
From the preceding conclusions there emerge problems
which this chapter must treat in some detail.

First, there

is the problem of discrete incommensurable systems of
thought.

The thesis of perspectivism takes account of an

irreducible diversity in the historical field, but here
we are talking about incompatible differences which supposedly cannot be mediated.

Only a formalistic comparison is

4 Metahistory, pp. 4 and 430. White applies this conclusion to the conflicts over Marxist interpretations of
historical processes, in ibid., p. 284.
5Ibid., p. 428.
6 Ibid., p. 4.
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allowed, e.g. a linguistic theory of tropes applied to narrative forms.

The problem to be faced is whether some

standpoint can be taken "beyond" these differences which
will allow for a critical mediation·of them.?
A second problem involves the depreciation of an
.

.

epistemological concern for evidence.

If historical evi-

dence is subordinated to the adopted paradigms, and if the
paradigms are subordinated to precritical preferences, is
it possible to retain any notion of objectivity?
seem that White answers in the negative.

It would

Among the differ-

ent conceptions of historical knowledge proposed by nineteenth-century historians, no one of them proved to be
more "scienttfic" than the others. 8 The meaning of "objectivity" stands in need of clarification as does the relationship between science and history.

This clarification

will be part of the following sections.

To anticipate how

those sections will handle the two preceding problems: first,
our notion of objectivity will not be based on theoretical
?In a work prior to his Metahistory, White noted that
a failure to find such a standpoint was one of the reasons
for the crisis of historicism. In his words, the problem
is one of fjnding grounds within history for distinguishing
between realism and a purely imaginative vision of history.
See his translator's introduction, "On History and Historicisms," in From History to Sociology, p. xv.
8Metahistory, p. 26. The question of whether history
is or can be or even ought to be a science has been treated
by numerous commentators. The fourth section of this chapter will clarify the similarities as well as the differences
between history and science. Then our question will be, not
which of the many paradigms is more "scientific" than the
others, but which of them can be considered appropriate devices for anticipating historical knowledge.
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norms but will be derived from the structured activities
which constitute the world of human interiority.

Thus,

the measure of objectivity is neither wholly logical nor
wholly scientific.9

Second~ the problem of incommensur-

able systems of thought will be contrasted (1) with the
heuristic and ecstatic aspects of human intelligence, and
(2) with an epistemological position derived from the prior
analysis of cognitional structure.

On

the one hand, changes

in paradigms may reflect a development in understanding as
well as basic changes in ethical values.

On the other, con-

flicts over what constitutes historical realism may be settled in a preliminary way by first settling what historical
"objects" are and what objective knowledge of them might be.
The following section will undertake the first of
these two contrasts, namely, the contrast between closed
systems of thought and the heuristic and ecstatic aspects
of human intelligence.

These introductory remarks have in-

dicated that the contrast is qualified by some areas of
agreement between White's position and the work of previous
chapters.

In the first place, historical evidence is not

some "pure given" but is dependent upon the questions,
9rt is not wholly logical because the methodical procedures of critical consciousness involve non-logical operations. It is not wholly scientific because the standard
is primarily identified with a personal appropriation of
one's own structured interiority. This act will allow a
return to the world of theory/science in a methodical manner. See Matthew Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," in Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 158.
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interests,

~nd

his task.

Second, evidence is understood in terms of the

variables which the historian brings to

models, hypotheses, ·constructs which guide historical inquiry.

These heuristic frameworks predetermine what will

be acceptable as evidence; and, so, evidence by itself will
not require any radical changes in the prior frameworks.
But a contrast is still possible because there are areas
of disagreement.

To closed systems of historical thought

will be opposed the self-correcting process of learning.
To the thesis that paradigm changes reflect only shifts in
basic ethical beliefs, there will be contrasted changes
which are required by an epistemological argument.
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PROBLE1S OF OBJECTIVITY
In Die Krisis des Historismus, Karl Heussi argues
that a simplistic notion of objectivity entertained by
historians was the occasion for the crisis of historicism. 10
Expectations about the fixity of the past and about the
ability of historians to give definitive accounts of it
were brought low in the crisis period.

In this section

we will take up aspects of the problem of historical objectivity which receive the attention of contemporary writers.
While the relevant issues will be treated as specifically
historical problems, in section three the developed notion of objectivity will have a wider application.

Again,

one of our aims is to supply an epistemological basis for
countering the inherent relativism of the crisis period.
But that basis will have a more general application to
the problem of relativism wherever it occurs.

Historical Data
Perhaps the most frequently mentioned difficulty encountered by claims to historical objectivity is the determination of historical data.

Some consensus is evident in-

sofar as documents, art works, and tools are concerned.
These are products of distinctly human origin.

But how is

lODie Krisis des Historism~s, pp. 37 and 103. Lonergan takes note of Heussi 1 s position, in Method in Theology,
p. 214.
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one to disco.ver the motives and intentions behind-these
human creations?

Human consciousness has multiple threads

woven through it which form a fabric of psychological,
biological, physico-chemical patterns.

Should the histor-

ian limit his inquiries to the conscious intentions of historical figures?

Or should he view the latter as surface

manifestations of more basic neurological impulses?

He

may even treat individual creations as the products of
more general social forces such as class consciousness or
the "spirit of the age. 1111
These difficulties provide two arguments for asserting that historical data are not simply "given."

!n the

first place, there are ongoing debates over just where historical data are to be found.

If one accepts an art work

by Leonardo da Vinci as an expression of historical significance, can one study it solely as an art historian would,
or must one proceed in the manner of Freud to probe that
creative expression for signs of the artist's own psyche?
Second, as we have argued before, historical data only
1111 Much depends on how far one wants to pursue the in-

quiry into motive and intention. One can try to penetrate
to the interior of consciousness, where motives and intentions merge first with psychological, then with biological,
and ultimately with physico-chemical processes in the
depths of human being. But this would expose thought to
the threat of an infinite regress. The decision of a conventional historian to take the statements of conscious
intention of historical agents at face value is neither
more nor less legitimate than the decision of the Materialistic Determinist to reduce conscious intention to the
status of an effect of a more basic, psycho-physical cause,
or that of the Idealist to interpret it as a function of a
more general 'spirit of the age.'" Metahistory, p. 430.
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become

spec~fied

as "historical " in relation to some task

which anticipates their potential worth to an understanding of the past.

Ari.d the prior evaluation of their poten-

tial worth has its own preconditions.

The data will be

noticed only if the historian's previous understanding is
sufficiently developed to be able to include them.

That

is, his scholarly competence must be a match for the intricacies of research, otherwise potential materials will
be overlooked. 12
Both these preconditions and the uncertainty of ·where
specifically historical data leave off and the data of other
disciplines take over are the basis for a denial of readymade historical data. 1 3 The meaning of a historical
12An additional precondition involves the linguistic
sophistication of the researcher. He must have an understanding of categories and distinctions commonly used in
his profession. Otherwise he will lump together complex
realities which an advanced discipline already has analyzed
into significant parts. For example, a study of class
structure in France circa 1850 will be aided by Marx's concept of the lumpenproletariat. But if a researcher were
to be ignorant of that special classification, he might
misconstrue the support of the Parisian mobs for Louis
Bonaparte as an initial revolt of the working classes. All
of which is a way of saying that, if the words are absent,
the data cannot be referred to directly and are likely to
be left unanalyzed. Method in Theology, pp. 347-348.
l3In other words, historical materials do not enjoy
a fixed meaning which exists in advance of the historia:o.'s
questions. Otherwise those variable questions would eventually converge on a single interpretation of the same events. But, as argued in the thesis of perspectivi.sm, an
irreducible diversity in historical interpretations is to
be expected. This diversity need not include incompatible
differences, but diversity itself will be unavoidable if
historical materials can have multiple meanings depending
on what questions are asked of them. This potential for
multiple meanings is, I think, the basis for Collingwood's
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document doe.a not leap out at the reader but must .be discovered by competent research.

All that appears to be

given are the ink marks on pieces of paper.
marks are not by themselves historical data.

But these
In order to

become historical materials, the critical techniques of
the exegete, the questions of the historian, and the interest of a professional community must be turned in their
direction.

Then these ink marks begin to convey a message

but only because an intelligent subject who perceives them
is both interested in and able to understand them historically .14
Let us grant that historical data are such because
of a relationship they have to the historical interests of
inquiring subjects.

Those interests may vary; for example,

the critical interests of the professional historian can
be distinguished from the interest which produced the minstrel's song of chivalrous knights.

And if the interests

vary, then the relationship of historical data to the inquiring subjects will vary. 1 5 But the point which we want
provocative thesis that in history there are properly speaking no data. See The Idea of History, p. 243.
14An example of this last statement would be the various rock strata which Indian tribes often perceived in canyon walls. For these to become measures of geological/
historical time, perception was not enough; a link had to
be made between these remains and processes of stratification and erosion. And such a link was only made when historical interests prompted the relevant investigations.
l50ur previous remarks in Chapter Two on pragmatic
views of history exemplify this conclusion. Historical
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to make

her~

is that historical data are relative-to the

intentions and goals of those who take an interest in them.
This is a simple enough proposition, but the implications
for certain controversies in the philosophy of history are
significant.
There is the controversy over what types of entities
can be classified as historical materials.

From what his-

torians usually write about, one can conclude that human
intentions and motives are readily accepted as historical
entities.

No difficulty is encountered in expanding this

ciass to include the human creations which externalize
these intentions, e.g. laws, monuments, documents.

But

doubts arise when unconscious drives and psycho-physical
impulses are said to be matters for historical inquiry.
An infinite regress threatens historical work from two

directions.

The external record of human achievement has

innumerable components, so much so that it is a record
which could never be compiled.

The internal landscape is

like a Chinese box w:i.th conscious intentions giving way to
unconscious instincts which in turn have biological recesses
behind them.

The catch-phrase nihil humanum alienum does

not dispel the threat.

The thesis of perspectivism only

data may also be the means for an approximate account of
what took place and why. On the one hand, they are tools
for constructing social bonds. On the other, they are
means for answering questions and advancing historical
understanding.
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points out

t~at

multiple interests or equal legiti-macy

will continue to prompt historical inquiries which borrow
from anthropology, psychology, biology.

It appears that

there is no standard way or thinking about the subject
matter or history, i.e. no consensus on what limited range
of objects should stand in a particularly historical relation to inquiring subjects. 16
Does the work of previous chapters offer any help in
these difficulties?

In a tentative way we can argue that

primacy can be accorded to a certain region of historical
entities.

Chapter Three presented arguments for the for-

mally dynamic structure of conscious acts.

The unity of

conscious intentions which is self-constituting allows us
to distinguish the patterned development of conscious
acts from the physical, chemical, and neural activities
which are not conscious activities. 1? When the historian
considers actions in relation to the intentions of
16The absence of such a standard is noted by W. H.
Walsh in Philosophy of History: An Tntroduction, p. 116.
The problem is not without ramifications. If the field
of historical objects is not clearly delineated, the canons of interpretation for investigating that field will
also not be a matter of general consensus. The obvious
outcome will be a repetition of the slogan of some nineteenth-century historians: hverything can be treated in
terms of its historical development. But the optimism
which once accompanied that slogan may now be absent.
Anything can be treated historically, which is another way
of saying, history is not precisely focused on something.
l?Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dflthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology,"
Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 150.
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historical figures, he can attempt to recapitulate the experience which was a background for those actions, the intelligibility which the actors thought they were expressing, and the probable defense they would have or perhaps
even did give for their decisions.
Except when he suspects that a historical figure was
suffering from a neurosis or psychosis, the historian presumes that the conscious side of human thinking, deciding,
and acting was in control.

And in the actor's conscious

flow of intentions and decisions, there is a pattern or
sequence of distinct acts which the historian can provisionally reconstruct.

The clues which guide this reconstruc-

tion are the actor's preserved words, the recollections
of contemporaries, and the shrewd estimate of human behavior upon which a competent historian relies.

The latter

is familiar with human ambition; he knows how skilled some
men are in directing others toward certain goals.

He has

experienced the ease with which rationalization covers over
both tainted success and disappointing failure.

So his

inquiries need not be naive; statements of conscious motives
are initial clues and not immediately decisive in questions
of motivation.

But more than individual motives and ac-

tions are his concern.

What he seeks in the assembled

clues is more than the historical agent's purpose and meaning.

He seeks to unravel the puzzle of how individual

thoughts guiding decisions lead to actions altering for
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better or worse the condition of a particular group. 18

In

other words, he seeks to learn how and why human subjects
made history in a particular way.
Now we began this discussion of the subject matter
of history with the suggestion that some limited range of
historical entities could be given primacy over others.
Comments in the preceding paragraphs mention intentional
acts which can be distinguished from biological and chemical functions.

They also mention the actions which follow

upon conscious intentions.

However, the statement is added

that the historian is concerned with more than the :individual's intentions and actions.

This "something more" is

the mutually constitutive relations which obtain, first,
between a conscious subject and his actions, and second,
between a historical agent and his community.
objectify the man to himself and to others. 1 9

The deeds
The commun-

ity is constituted by the deeds of the many and reciprocally constitutes individuals by what it accepts from and
18The implicit reference here is to the task of critical history, namely, to discover what was "going forward"
in the group at a particular time and place. Thus, the
reconstruction of motives is only part of the more complex
issues of societal development or decline. Historical biographies, of course, may occasionally avoid this broader
issue, but usually their subjects were public figures who
influenced the institutions of their day. Consequently,
some reference of the individual to the group will be necessary simply to write an adequate biography.
l9we include under the heading of "deeds" the spoken
word. The word externalizes and stabilizes the subjectivity of the individual just as the words of others mediate
their complex beings to him~
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gives to the.m in return.
Our tentative thesis, then, is that the primary ob.

jects of history are constitutive relationships..

Motives

and actions stand in such a relationship to each other.
Actions of individuals which (1) are more than routine and
(2) influence the course of social growth or decltne, stand
in such a relationship to the community.

Examples of these

relationships are not difficult to find.

Tn Chapter Three

we pointed out that the subject constitutes himself as an
intelligent and rational being by acts of inquiry and-of
reflection.

Tnstitutions are only founded and maintained

by acts of loyal citizens who f:lnd them preferable to the
vacuum of anarchy.

In turn, institutions have a constitu-

tive relatton to the subject, e.g. the law prescribes what
the subject is to become. 20 The human family is more than
a product of nature; it is an organization of relationships,
or meanings, which determine basic obligations as well as
the initial opportunities for human growth.
20

If the

L~nergan analyzes the constitutive function of meaning, in Method in '£heolo~y, pp. 178-1?9. He makes special
note of the institutiona carriers of meaning which have
meanings as intrinsic components. (Ibid., p. 78~ In relation to the above thesis on the primary objects of history,
Lonergan remarks that the constitutive role of meaning in
the controlling side of human conscious action grounds the
"peculiarity" of the historical field. (Ibid., p. 178.)
That is, historical events are distinguis~from natural
events on the basis of acts of meaning which not only mold
the natural to human ends (the efficient function of meaning),
but also change man himself. (Ibid., pp. 77-78.) For example, the road building of the Romans altered the natural
landscape and also made a centralized government a feature
of human living.
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constitutive relations change, then the institution changes as witnessed in the weakening of the extended family
in industrialized, mobile societies. 21
Now human intentions and decisions, human actions
and social constructs are distinguishable from both the
chemical/neural events which occur outside consciousness
and. the events in nature which have no direct human cause.

The distinguishing mark will be the constitutive relationships which exist among the former historical entities. 22
Such entities are constituted by acts of meaning and of
valuing, and so they bear a human stamp.

It is human self-

making which ultimately grounds the distinction between
historical and natural events.

And the products of this

self-making are to be accorded primacy as historical objects. 23
We began the preceding discussion of historical objects because one of the problems of historical objectivity
is the uncertainty over just what can be counted as a
21 Bernard Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento,"
Collection, p. 244.
22A more extensive discussion of the difference between natural objects and historical objects will occupy
our attention in the fourth section of this chapter.
2 3we have only argued that constitutive relations
are the primary components of the historical field. We do
not mean to exclude totally those other entities and events
which by themselves are of a nat'1I'al origin. For example,
Napoleon's stomach cancer is not a historical entity, but
it will be mentioned by biographers because they think it
affected his historical decisions and actions.
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historical datum.

Already we have argued that,

w~atever

data or materials are accepted,· they will not be simply
given.

Rather, they are relative to the intentions and

goals ·of those who take an interest in them.

In making

the point that constitutive relationships are the prjmary
objects of the historical field, we have been clarifying
this relativity.

For the historian constitutes himself

as a competent scholar by closely attending to his selected materials and by subordinating all lesser interests
to the desire to understand a certain sequence of events.
Moreover, as a member of a community, he helps to constitute that community's intellectual life by his own scholarly works.

Thus, the thesis of the relatiVity of data to

inquiring subjects is not an admission of arbitrariness
in historical research.

Instead, it is the recognition

.

that historical data are bound to historical processes and,
more specifically, to the beings which make history.

Con-

sequently, there can be a history of history (or historiography) because what the historian does stands in a constitutive relation both to himself and to his community.
However, there are other aspects to this relation
which have not yet been clarified.

In the absence of a

convincing argument for solipsism, we must admit that historical data initially have a potential relation to historical consciousness.

The medieval manuscript which is

discovered buried in some ruins has a potential for
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enlightening the historian who stumbles across

it~

More

to the point, the researcher may have overlooked a key
passage in some text and may only by chance come across it
in a later reading of the text.

According to our earlier

remarks on selectivity, historians have to cultivate a
selective inattention if they are not to be buried by
countless details.

What they exclude from their initial

investigations may be later attended to; and, once attended to, these formerly potential data will prompt further
inquiry. 24
Historical data cannot be said to be simply given if
their constitution as historical data depends at least in
part on the interests and competence of the historian.
For example, the markings on a Babylonian tablet become
24The issue of selectiVity, of what materials will
be attended to, was treated in Chapters Two and Four. History, as distinct from the natural sciences, usually involves a prior evaluation of what is worth recounting.
And the basis for this prior estimation will be the historian's relative horizon as well as any opinions he has
formed about human knowing, e.g. opinions on the limits
of his ability to reconstruct past events. The crucial
issue here is whether his selectivity will be entirely a
matter of preference. We accept Collingwood's position
that historical evidence only becomes such in relation to
some historical question. (See The Tdea of History, p.
281.) And historical questions belong to the non-logical
operations of historical method. Consequently, there is
no way to dictate in advance either what questions should
be asked or what data should be considered. But the potential relativity of data to as-yet-undetermined questions
belongs to uninitiated projects for settling historical
problems. If the problems are not arbitrary, then the
questions may not be, and the resulting selection of data
may also not be arbitrary or solely a matter of personal
preference.
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items for

h~storical

curiosity because there are scholars

who are interested in and can decipher them. By themselves the markings communicate nothing. 2 5 They can be
said to be meaningful only because scholars recognize the
human imprint of marks on stone and can understand the relationships between marks and human intentions.

That is,

they can understand the meaning which these signs were
intended to convey.

So, historical data stand in relation

to two human contexts: that of the past and that of some
historian's present.

In critical history this is espe-

cially true; for the statements and traces from the past
are not simply accepted in the present without question. 26
They must be investigated and checked.

And ultimately the

critical criterion for this process is the historian himself.
2 50ne might argue that this example contains grounds
for arguing that there are "raw" historical data. If a
scholar finds a tablet on which there are marks from a language he does not know, is he not confronting some simple
givens of a historical nature? But how does he know that
these marks are signs of human meaning and not the haphazard
scratches of weather and natural decay? And if they are
signs, then they are more than the marks, for signs refer
to something other than themselves--in this case, they refer to a past which is not "given" but must be discovered
on the basis of the traces which the historian cannot immediately decipher.
26Lonergan refers to the position which holds historical materials to be verified simply in their irmnediate
givenness as the fallacious "ideal of the cinema and soundtrack." (Insight, pp • .582-583.) We have gone beyond his
stated position in arguing that historical data are constituted by their relation to an.inquiring subject. He
limits himself to the constitution of histortcal facts by
such a relation. The distinction between data and facts
is discussed in subsequent paragraphs. The differences
in our positions will show up there.
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The responsibility is his for being more than a "mirror"
of the traces; he must analyze and pass judgment both on
the authenticity of received materials and on the accuracy
of past reports.

But even prior to· ·this process of veri-

fication, our argument is that historical data, precisely
as historical, have undergone an interpretative process.
The implications of this argument will become clear when
we take up the issue of the hermeneutical circle.

From Data to Facts
In keeping with the conclusions of Chapter Four, we
can assert that the historian can be attentive to historical data while under the freely chosen control of a detached attitude.

Again, that attitude is not to be iden-

tified with a pure seeing of some uninterpreted given.
Rather, it is a repeatedly affirmed decision to concentrate his efforts on understanding what actually happened.
The interference of bias is always possible; but, on the
strength of the arguments of the preceding chapter, it can
be held that this interference is not inescapable.

If the

historian substitutes ideological and polemical interests
for critical detachment, he may not argue that the substitution was necessary and unavoidable.

Prior to any attemp-

ted rationalization of scholarly failings, he has a desire
to know.

And what that desire spontaneously aims for is

a translation of historical data into historical facts.
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The distinction between historical data and historical facts can be maintained if human knowing is a compound
activity.

A conclusion of the third chapter was that hu-

man knowing is such a compound activity.

Our study of

historical procedures in Chapter Four further strengthened
this conclusiop. by specifying the formal components of
historical knowing.

Thus, historical data must be selec-

ted, arranged in tentative orders, and used in a discriminating fashion.

But even these first steps of a histori-

cal investigation involve more than the attentiveness -of
the investigator.

His acts of understanding lay out the

initial arrangements of historical materials; they separate promising arrangements from those which appear less
than advantageous.

So historical data belong to a process

which begins with curiosity and heads for a goal that is
satisfying to that curiosity.
ledge.

The goal is historical know-

And facts are distinguished from data in being the

content of this goal.
Between data and facts intervene the cr5tical and
interpretative procedures of historical method. 2 7 These
2 7 11 rt is enough to accept as a prerequisite of all
historical study that the letters on a stone or a piece of
parchment or the remains of a medieval village or a treatise by a schoolman, do not of themselves provide more than
the data on which the historian sets to work; and in order
to make them into historical facts--i.e. what he assumes
to have been the case--he has to employ a full critical and
interpretative apparatus of selection, evaluation, interpolation and rejection •••• " Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory, pp. 22-23.
Recognizin5 the multiple steps from data to facts,
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procedures

~nd

the intellectual effort they

cede the emergence of historical facts.

requi~e

pre-

In critical his-

·

..

tory the procedures and the transition from data to facts
are employed twice.

Those preserved materials in which the

historian initially takes an interest are not immediately
accepted as reliable and useful reports on past events.
They must first be sifted and tested both for their accuracy and their place on a scale of primary and secondary
sources.

Once this work with the sources is underway, in-

formation of varying degrees of reliability begins to·
emerge.

For the exegete or the editor of manuscripts,

reliable information will be labelled historical facts.
But since the historian's task is not just to criticize
sources but to interpret the events to which they refer,
this reliable information is not the goal of historical
facts or historical knowledge.

The historian's goal is

an overview of the limited contexts which exegesis may
tablish.

es~

Consequently, the exegete supplies data for the

discovery of historical facts.

Between the data and the

facts intervenes the interpretative reconstruction which
in fact is shown to be supported by the assembled evidence. 28
we can understand Raymond Aron's denial of the existence of
any elementary or atomistic historical facts. "Historical
facts are historical to the extent to which they are connected with collective things." Raymond Aron, Introduction
to the Philosophy of History, p •. 143.
2811 rt follows that the facts ascertained in the cri-

tical process are, not historical facts, but just data for
the discovery of historical facts. The critical process
has to be followed by an interpretative process, in which

29?
The different points of the preceding paragraph im-

ply a distinction between establishing the meaning of historical materials and determining what was going forward
in a particular group at some time. 2 9 If the meaning of
some Babylonian inscription can be discovered, then, by
relating it to other available records, the historian may
be able to reconstruct the historical process to which the
inscription bears witness.

In keeping with our previous

discussion of constitutive relationships as the primary objects in the historical field, historical facts, properly
speaking, must be more than knowledge of past events, i.e.
knowledge of what happened.30

So the meaning of the

the historian pieces together the fragments of information
that he has gathered and critically evaluated. Only when
this interpretative process of reconstruction is terminated
do there emerge what may properly be called the historical
facts." Method in Theolog~, p. 203. Lonergan applies this
distinction between exegesis and history to both the work
of the historian and the work of the scientist. See ibid.,
pp. 348-349.
~
2 9In Chapter Four we argued that this latter task
was specifically a part of critical history. The main argument is that what a group records for posterity is limited to what the group knows about its own history. But,
in many cases, the group misjudges or is unconcerned with
the long-range consequences of its actions. Only a later
historian can fit their partial self-estimate into a larger context.
30we are disagree5_ng with Lonergan when he simply
states that historical facts are known events. (See Method in Theology, p. 202.) This disagreement is not crucial
to the purposes of this dissertation. It may in fact not
be a serious disagreement at all since, in various places,
Lonergan argues that (1) historical procedures come to
term in historical knowledge, i.e. historical facts; and
(2) for critical history, these facts pertain to the question of what was "going forward" in the past, i.e. what

~··
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Babylonian inscription and the events to whiqh it refers
become historical facts through the historian's successfUl efforts to interrelate the known details.

He synthe-

sizes them in an overview which reconstructs the intelligible sequence of actions and consequences.31 Quite simply, historical facts emerge when known events are related
among themselves so as to disclose the mutual constitution
of act-consequence-historical advance or decline.

The act

effects a change in the group; the change in the group determines the historical meaning of the act.

Heuristic Frameworks
What we have been doing in the preceding paragraphs
course the known events were taking. Consequently, his
position appears to be that historical facts, properly
speaking, are more than the known events.
3l0ur thesis that historical facts are more than
known events draws support from two commentators on history--Henri Marrou and Gordon Leff. Marrou writes: "History attains intelligibility only to the extent that it
shows itself able to establish and to disclose the relations that join each new stage of human progress to the
past and to its consequences." (The Meaning of Hjstory,
p. 186.) Of course, we should add that stages of human
decline cannot be overlooked. Marrou does not overlook
the hiatuses which limit the thoroughness of historical
reconstructions. That is, not all events are linked, and
so some intelligible relations may be unavailable to the
historian.
Gordon Leff remarks in a similar vein: "The study of
history--of whatever branch--is to discover how what happened did happen; knowledge of an event alone is not history but merely its raw material: in the degree to which
it can be related to other events it becomes an intelligible reconstruction of the past which is the object of history." History and Social Theory, p. 53.

r

t:

•
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.

is to

clari~y

the relations between historical data and

facts, between historical materials and the inquiring historian.

A further clarification can now be made.

There

is the relation of historical materials to the heuristic
frameworks which anticipate a historical intelligibility
in the materials.

The use of heuristic frameworks was

discussed in Chapters Two and Four.

There we argued that

such anticipatory constructs are not necessarily detrimental to critical history.

Usually the contrary view con-

tains the implicit assumption that critical history should
begin without presuppositions.

Historical knowing is a

matter of "observing" the given facts, and so any prior
hypotheses will only interfere with this direct grasp of
historical facts.3 2
The myth of the observational historical given is
seriously challenged by Hayden White's theory of poetic
prefiguration.

The objects of the historical field are

not invariant throughout changes in basic paradigms.

Ra-

ther, with a change in paradigms, the data for historical
analysis will change.

Now we take White's theor-J to be an

elaboration of that "Copernican Revolution" in history
which Collingwood identifies with the critical and
3 2 Previously we noted Arthur Danto•s critique of
Charles Beard's position on the use of historical hypotheses. The critique is also aimed.at Beard's misleading
metaphor that the historian can "see" the past through the
medium of documents. Hypotheses should be unnecessary if
this were the case. See Danto's Analytical Philosophy of
History, pp. 95-99.
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constructive aspects of historical method.33

The belief in

invariant historical givens is the basis for what Collingwood labels "scissors-and-paste" history.34
.

This type of

.

historical narration was in practice surpassed by nineteenth-century historians, but many of the expectations
about historical method lagged behind this change.

The re-

sult was a simplistic notion of historical procedures which
was out of touch with what historians actually were doing.
Our own analysis of relative and basic horizons further
spe~ifies

how historical materials are not simply observa-

tional givens, but are related to the selective, constructive, and critical operations of the intelligent historian.
His use of precise questions presupposes historical knowledge and is an anticipation of what answers are likely.
The latter anticipation is reflected in the precise question which takes the form of a hypothesis.
Now the reaction of those who hold to some invariant
historical givens is predictable.

Are the preceding remarks

not an admission that the historian's use of materials is
arbitrary?

Those remarks indicate that some type of des-

criptive framework is antecedent to the gathertng of historical materials.

Whatever is "given" in historical ex-

perience is given in terms of the antecedent framework

33R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 240.
34Ibid., pp. 257-263.
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which formulates the expectations of the historian.

Conse-

quently, there is no immediate grasp of historical facts.
And, if there is no·such grasp, then there are no priVileged historical facts which every historian must recognize. 35
We accept the conclusion that there are no privileged
historical facts which are given independently of a particular perspective.

Arguments in Chapter Two for the thesis

of perspectiVism require this conclusion.

It is apparent

that we do not share the expectation that historical facts
are immediately intuited.

But it does not follow that, in

the absence of a body of unassailable historical facts, the
historian's use of materials must be arbitrary.
plaint actually is twofold.

The com-

Since there is no single pri-

Vileged historical perspective, the perspective which is
35This conclusion is not too different from Collingwood' s following remark. "All that the historian means,
when he describes certain historical facts as data, is
that for the purpose of a particular piece of work there
are certain historical problems relevant to that work which
for the present he proposes to treat as settled; though,
if they are settled, it is only because historical thinking has settled them in the past, and they remain settled
only until he or some one else decides to reopen them."
Ibid., p. 244.
---- W. H. Walsh comments on the absence of unassailable
historical facts. The conflicts among historical perspectives are sometimes thought to be resolvable by an appeal
to independent historical facts. But this expectation has
not been fulfilled because no consensus has been reached
on either a fixed body of evidence which all historians
recognize or on a standard mode of historical consciousness. See walsh's Philosophy of History: An Introduction,
pp. 114-115.
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adopted will be marred by personal preferences.

And since

£

the adopted perspective determines what counts as historical data, the handling of materials will be influenced by
the variable preferences which ground the antecedent perspective.
Admittedly there are preferential variables involved
in the choice of a historical perspective.

But much of

the work of the preceding chapters has been concerned with
finding some limit to these variables.

Thus, we have ar-

gued that there are theoretical grounds for criticizing
elements in one's historical perspective.

We have argued

that these grounds are decidedly non-arbitrary, but are
invariant across changes in moral and aesthetic viewpoints.
r1oreover, in regard to the second part of the complaint,
the previous chapter argued for a critical sanction of historical procedures.

The histor1an's use of materials is

conditioned by his preferences, his prior expectations
about historical processes, his specific hypotheses.
his use

o~

But

materials can also be subord}.na ted to a reflec-

tive analysis which checks his procedures against an appropriated cognitional performance.
These previous arguments have recognized the constructive aspect of the historian's work as well as the
possibility of an interfering bias.

But what they, and

particularly the final section of Chapter Four, have gone
on to show is that the historian's constructs can be
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products of .a detached intelligence which recognizes the
difference between bias and critical thinking.

\./hen these

constructs are the hypotheses which focus inquiry without
concluding what the answers must be, then the historian's
experience is likely to be a self-correcting process.36
He sets up plausible constructs, modifies them as his work
progresses, and perhaps even abandons constructs which his
discriminating intelligence finds to be misdirected.

There

are at least three effective limits to any arbitrary constructs: the historian's own intelligence, the public controls of a critical professional community and an educated
audience, and the accumulating evidence which either reinforces or undermines a tentative thesis.

In advance of

these controls, there are no privileged historical facts
and no single privileged perspective on the past.
We are agreeing with Hayden White that historical
models are needed for organizing a field of research.

He

36 The proof of this statement lies in the recognition that hypothetical constructs are not ends in themselves but means to historical knowledge. They launch a
process of verification which may or may not confirm the
initial guesswork of the historian. Thus, the unavoidable
use of historical constructs is not a basis for historical
idealism. What is advanced hypothetically is a product of
both the historian's intelligence and his prior knowledge
of some topic. Furthermore, that hypothesis and its presupposed knowledge may be altered by a new encounter with
evidence which is acceptable to the historian's perspective without being totally coherent with prior opinions
belonging to that perspective. On the problem of constructs and idealism in history, see Henri-Trenee Marrou,
The Meaning of History, pp. 65-66.
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notes that documentary records do not immediately present
an ordered and unambiguous image of past events.37

A

heuristic framework which provides a plausible order for
events is a requisite for a· methodical study of the records.
Examples of such frameworks abound.

The most obvious is

simple chronology which differentiates history into periods
thereby offering a point of reference for individual
events.38 More complex examples occur when the historian
seeks a model for explaining the relations among events.
Occasionally a scientific model is adapted to historical
purposes, e.g. Darwinian biology and scientific mechanisms
have been prevailing models for some historians.39

These

models may be elaborated into speculative philosophies or
theories of history.

There appears to be some consensus

on the heuristic worth of such grand schemes for ordering
events. 40 While, as Hayden White proves, there is no
3?Metahistory, p. 30.
38 we have already remarked on E. H. Carr's observation that the periodization of history is a necessary tool
for historians. (See What Ts History?, p. ?6.) Claude L4viStrauss provides insights into the functions of historical
dating, in The Savage I1ind, pp. 258-261.
39such models may be employed without much awareness
on the part of those employing them. Cultural differences
offer some help in explicating one's own preconceptions
about historical processes. Our contemporary preconceptions differ greatly from the Greek view of hlstory, and a
study of the latter may help us to recognize what we have
taken for granted and left unstudied. Cornford's Thucydides :Mythistoricus provides just such an opportunity.
4 °For examples, see Bruce Mazlish, The Riddle of His~' pp. 428 and 447; also Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of
H!St"orical :Explanation, p. 112; similarly, Henri-Ir~nee
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consensus on which theory or set of theories is actually
proper to history, there is agreement that illuminating
models can forward historical understanding.
A problem which must be considered is the "givenness"
of historical models.

PreViously we have qualified the

statement that historical data are "given."
data they have already been classified.

As historical

That is, they be-

long to a class of materials having some relation to historical interests.

Both these interests and the intended

materials are the components of variable historical consciousness.

The variability of this consciousness shows

up in the antecedent frameworks which both guide the historian's questions and set the boundaries within which
data can be found.

Now these frameworks or models may be

so much a part of the historian's cultural heritage that
he does not recognize them as models.

Instead, he takes

for granted that they are the actual image of historical
processes. 41 Let us use the familiar phrase "climate of
Marrou, The Meaning of History, pp. 167-169, and pp. 196197; also David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies:
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. xv. Lonergan's
discussion of theories of history as ideal types and as
heuristic devices occurs in Method in Theology, pp. 227-

229.
41 we have in mind Corn.ford's remark: "It is impossible for us to tell how pervasively our own view of the
world is coloured by Darwinian biology and by the categories of mechanical and physical science." In the Preface
to Thucydides 1'1ythistoricus, p. Viii.
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opinion" to refer to such a set of accepted but unstudied
historical models.

Our problem, then, is no longer the

givenness of data but the givenness of understanding.
These climates of opinion are the antecedent ways in
which observations are made.

They supply the classifica-

tions which allow an observation of data to be specifically historical.

As such, they raise anew the problem of
closed systems of thought. 42
The latter problem was formulated at the close of
We specified the dimensions of the problem
.
by working out the presuppositions and implications of
Chapter Three.

.

Carl Becker's position on climates of opinion.

Again,

that position was that the preconceptions of one's own age
close one off from the thought of other ages.

No valid

judgments of truth or falsity pass between different climates of opinion.

Two presuppositions of this position

were (1) differences among climates of opinion are fundamental givens, and (2) what is not given is a basis on
which to build a critique of both the differences and their
sources.

Two implications of the position were (1) the

historian's search for self-knowledge occurs within the

42Recall that one purpose of this chapter is to determine how human intelligence is related to these antecedent models or thought-systems. Is the relation one of
subordination such that the "given" climate of opinion incorporates all our possible questions? Or is it possible
to develop increasingly complex thought-models as our experience and understanding outstrip original ways of thinking?

30?
boundaries of his antecedent thought-system, and (2) he
will not discover within these boundaries an:y basis for
judging works operating under a different set of preconceptions.
Becker's thesis of the ultimacy of cultural differences stands if one begins with statements about cultural
values or historical knowledge. 4 3 But we have argued the
possibility of beginning with the prior performance of the
subject, i.e. starting with those cognitional acts which
give rise to both statements and their formulated cultural
contexts.

This performance can be objectified, and its

inherent structure is the a priori condition for all developments of meaning.

Consequently, a discovery is made

of something which is not owed to the particular framework
.· 44
or climate of opinion of the discoverer.
Given this
discovery, it is possible to reach "behind" both the given
climates of opinion and their differences to the subjects
4 3To repeat the argument for this conclusion--the
climate of opinion is prior to the meaning of statements.
The latter do not validate their climate of opinion; rather, it is to their prior context that they owe their
meaningfulness.
44 This statement must be qualified. Cognitional
structure is a priori both in the sense that it is a precondition to developments of meaning and in the sense that
it precludes none of them in advance. However, the structure is discovered only by investigating the subject's acts
of intentionality. These acts will be carried on within a
context of prior knowledge, preconceptions, values, and so
on. Consequently, there is an a posteriori aspect to the
structure of knowing, i.e. the discovery of cognitional
structure takes place within the particular climate of
opinion of the discoverer.
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who constituted them.

This is to say that the two presup-

positions associated with Becker's work must be corrected.
First, any "given" differences among perspectives or frame.

.

works or theories presuppose the prior performance of their
originators.

The understanding of historical processes

which they express is not simply a factual given, the origins of which must be left in obscurity.

Second, transcen-

dental method which formulates the operations of critical
consciousness is a basis for criticizing the differences
among perspectives because it can note omissions or confusions which occurred at the source of those differences. 4 5
The implication of our response to Becker's position
is that any "given" historical model or climate of opinion
can be measured against the spontaneous performance of the
critical subject.

Are there questions, problems which the

model overlooks or dismisses out of hand?

How well does

it account for the available materials which a professional historical community accepts as in need of explanation?
4 5we need to distinguish here between differences
which, accordi.ng to Becker and others, cannot be made to reveal their sources and differences which the thesis of perspecti vism declares to be irreducible. The latter differences are not matters of truth or falsity in jistorical
works, but are products of varying interests and relative
horizons. Such differences can be investigated but not eliminated. Indeed, no purpose is served in trying to level
them. But incompatible differences among historical perspectives usually can be traced to omissions or confusions
in their underlying cognitional theories. Thes~ are the
differences which cari be criticized once transcendental
method is applied to them.
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In the use of evidence which the model itself allows, are
there arbitrary assessments, convenient omissions, or lapses in consistency?

In the arguments of historians who

employ the given model, are there fallacies which can be
traced to basic assumptions in the model itself?
The preceding questions are both too general and too
specific.

They are too general in that actual cases of

historical criticism would involve more concrete examples.
They are too specific in that our purpose is to show how

..

questions about the intelligibility and reasonableness of
historical models can be connected to critical consciousness.

The formal precepts of critical consciousness (i.e.

the transcendental precepts) are not openly manifest in
the preceding questions.

But they are at least implicit

as the guiding assumption that one can tell the difference
between an intelligent use of materials and a prejudiced
use, between a reasonable transition from evidence to
.
cone 1 us1on
and a non segu1•tur. 46

Our.first question--Are there questions, problems,
which the given model overlooks or dismisses out of hand?-is of special importance when considering the relation of
transcendental method to historical models.

It is the type

of question which reveals the possibility of a cross
46 This implicit presence we take to be established
on the basis of arguoents in Chapter Four. There our conclusion was that transcendental method and, hence, its formal precepts have a normative function in regard to historical procedures.
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comparison between different historical framework$. 4 ?

More

is at stake than the historian's accuracy in his work;
there is also the question of his ability and willingness
to consider new ideas and the probable opinions of those
who do not share his framework. 48 The precepts of attentiveness and intelligence require that the historian broaden his vision to include the work of other schools of historical thought.

What can he learn from them?

divergent views challenge his own position?

Do their

Do historical

models other than his own provide insights which he suspects can be verified?

If his suspicions turn out to be

correct, is he willing to make the needed changes in his
perspective?
4 ?This cross comparison is called for by Haskell Fain
in his Between Philoso)hy and History (Pr:inceton: Princeton
University Press, 1970 , p. 244. He inquires after criteria for such a comparison but settles on nothing definitive.
Our position is that the formulated performance of the subject, without be5ng identified with strictly logical criteria, provides the needed basis for a critical comparison.
48 E. H. Carr notes the limits which a concern for the
historian's accuracy involves. "To praise a historian for
his accuracy is like praising an architect for using wellseasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building.
It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function." \./hat Is History?, p. 8. There is also the
narrative style which the historian will want to make attractive to a potential audience. Similarly he may be concerned
with coordinattng his research with the work of his colleagues, so as to advance the exploration of a topic important for his era. Even more important, he may be concerned
with giving his work the broadest possible research basis,
and this requires that he listen. to and evaluate the opinions of historians from different schools of thought.
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Now our argument is that, if such questions.are in
fact possible, then the historian can understand other systems of thought; he can learn from them both what his errors may be and what theirs may be.

But this is to say

that human intelligence can transcend climates of opinion
or systems of thought or historical frameworks which are
initially guiding its acts of inquiry and discovery.

It

is never without such frameworks, but our point is that
critical consciousness which develops contexts of meaning
can also move beyond the inherent limits of its own products.49

The key to such a possibility is the occurrence

of questions which presuppose a given standpoint but which
intend the content of other standpoints.

That is, ques-

tioning which is not prejudiced in advance can carry the
questioner beyond his initial preconceptions to an understanding which modifies and improves upon his starting
point.5°

The Hermeneutical Circle
In a preliminary way we have reached the first goal
4 9This conclusion was listed in the introductory section of this chapter as the first of two goals which had to
be reached if the fourth counterproposal was to be successfully defended. The problem of the hermeneutical circle-considered in subsequent paragraphs--must be treated before
this conclusion is definitely accepted.
50see the remarks in Chapter Four, section three, on
the ecstatic aspect of historical procedures. we noted
there the self-correcting process which gradually replaces
initial guesswork with questions suggested by the topic
under study.
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of this

cha~ter:

to establish that human intelli;ence can

transcend the antecendent frameworks it employs.

There

remain the various counter-arguments to this conclusion.
They come under the general heading of the problem of the
hermeneutical circle.51

In the first place, the historian

seeks to understand something about past human events.
But since his efforts to understand are not a matter of
"pure seeing," he brings to that task a prior understanding
of how human beings act, the motives which prompt decisions,
and other general information about human living.

This pre-

supposed understanding in some way already understands
those past human events.

Consequently, what is to be

learned about those events is not independent of the standpoint of the historian.

If he is trying to prove something

about1hose events, he will already be presupposing much of
what he aims to prove.

If he uses documents to interpret

some events, he must first know that they are appl1cable;
but the condition for knowing that they are appl:i.cable is
to already know how those documents forward the interpretation of the events themselves.52
The circularity here is apparent.

The problem is

5lThe problem of the hermeneutical circle is concisely stated by Richard E. Palmer: "How can a text be understood, when the condition for its understanding is already
to have understood what it is about?" Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 25.
5211 In defiance of the rules of traditional logic,
circular arguments are the normal method of producing
documentary evidence.
"An historian who consults his documents in order to
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whether it is a "Vicious" or closed circle in which one
does not advance beyond the initial standpoint but merely
unfolds what it implicitly contains.

In order to handle

this problem, we take a clue from Heidegger's analysis of
the hermeneutical circle.

The ideal of presuppositionless

analysis has been repeatedly proposed as a model for scientific demonstration.

However, those who have proposed this

ideal have usually argued for the possibility of "pure seeing."

That is, any prior understanding of what is analyzed

is to be discarded lest one's observation be guided by some
prior theory and not by what is there-to-be-seen.

But the

recommended procedure is actually an exercise in non-understanding.

One is to stare and nothing more.53

Our preVi-

ous study of both Lonergan's horizon-analysis and of the
actual procedures of historians indicates that such an
exercise in non-understanding has nothing to do with intelligent historical inquiry.54
interpret some political event can judge the value of these
documents only if he knows their place within the very same
course of events about which he consults them." Edgar
Wind, "Some Points of Contact between History and NR-tural
Science," in Philosothy and History, edited by R. Klibansky and H. J. FatonNew York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 256.
53"When we merely stare at something, our just-havingi t-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it
more. This grasping which is free of the 1 as 1 , is a
privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 190. The
sarcasm of the "merelf' is justified on the supposition
that inquiry is an in elligent way to seek understanding.

an:

54It also has nothing to do with scientific inquiry
if one is to believe those contemporary philosophers of
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The

H~ideggerian

clue, then, is that interpretations

proceed from prior understanding.

This prior understand-

ing, or forehaving," is one of the essential conditions
for interpretations.

Hence, the apparent circularity of

historical understanding cannot be labelled "vicious" because what makes understanding possible in the first place
cannot be the basis for arguments that understanding does
not occur or does not develop.55
Besides the question of a "vicious circle," there is
also the question of precontainment: Is understanding.limited to the unfolding of what is already implicit in the
standpoint of the inquirer?

An affirmative response is

likely to proceed from a confusion of deduction with the
process of understanding which is termed "insight."

A de-

duction occurs among concepts and propositions when a transition is made from a general formula or premiss to some
science who argue that all observation is theory-laden.
Patrick A. Heelan summarizes some of the fundamental issues
which belong to this contemporary debate, in "The Logic of
Framework Transpositions," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp.
93-96. Heidegger's position apparently is that both scientific and historiographical interpretations operate from a
prior understanding of their data and topics. Hence, the
ideal of presuppositionless inquiry is alien to both the
natural and human sciences. For the source of this comment
and for Heidegger's warning about misunderstanding the "circularity" of human understanding, see Being and Time, pp.

194-195.

55"But if we see this clrcle as a vicious one and
look out for wa s of avoidin it even if we ·ust •sense•
is an inevita le imperfection, t en he act of understandin has been misunderstood from the
Narn Heidegger, Being and rime, p.
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implication.56

But historical understanding develops in a

circuit from prior historical understanding and selected
materials to inquiry, from inquiry to tentative schemes and
discoveries, from limited contexts to an overview which
must be verified first in its parts and then as a coherent
whole.

Along the way new discoveries are made which chal-

lenge earlier hypotheses.
duced.

Revisions are therefore intro-

And the basis for these revisions is the occurrence

of a sudden insight which grasps in a new way how partial
discoveries fit into the broader context.

Thus, in our

example of the pre-Civil War cotton trade, the conclusion
about twenty-year trends of healthy market conditions was
not deduced from any general statement about economic laws.
Our hypothetical example envisioned a gradual learning process in which initial hunches could be revised as the inquiry advanced.

As two and three-year periods were isolated

and understood, they could be related to other segments of
the larger twenty-year period.

Gradually an overview was

built up out of our understanding of the segments.
Now logically this process is a circle.

The over-

view is reached only by understanding the parts.

But at

the same ttme the significance of the two and three-year
periods was revealed by actually reaching an overview of
56Lonergan contrasts deduction and scientific insights. The latter account for those "leaps" which leave
behind what is insufficient in old positions and introduce
more satisfactory posittons thereby marking a scientific
advance. See Insight, p. 166.

~
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the twenty-year period.

However, the achievement-of under-

standing was not a logical deduction.

Prior historical

understanding allowed the historian to frame intelligent
hypotheses about cotton trading in the antebellum South,
but the conclusion was not necessarily grasped in those
initial hypotheses.

They onlyJaunched and guided a pro-

cess of discovery which hypothetically could have turned
up unexpected results.

So, to learn about that trade and

its economic health was a matter of understanding each
segment of the period.

Then one used that understanding

to correct or to fill out the understanding of other segments as well as the prior historical understanding with
which one began the inquiry.5?

The learning process breaks

out of any hermeneutical circle which is construed as a
closed system confining the subject
to what he already
..
~

implicitly knows.
Before closing this second section of the chapter,
we need to consider a special case of the hermeneutical
circle.

This special case is linguistic in nature.

are meaningful within the context of a language.

Words

One un-

derstands them by knowing how to use the language to which
they belong.

But obviously one only knows a language in-

sofar as one knows the words and the rules governing their
use--hence another circle presents itself.

Given Hayden

White's emphasis on the linguistic structure of historical
5?Method in Theology, p. 159.
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works and gi.ven his thesis that historical paradigms are
effectively closed systems of thought,58 this special case
is worth consideration.
First, the problem is twofold.

If methodical inquiry

is limited to linguistic formulations, then the language
employed in the inquiry will be a closed context, and discoveries will be limited by what that linguistic context
allows to be spoken.59

The second aspect of the problem

involves the historian's use of ordinary language.

He bor-

rows his terms from a public context that has settled ·on
the meaning of the terms.

Consequently, the meanings which

he is capable of expressing will be derived from that public context of meaningfulness.
Both aspects of this problem are referred to in Lonergan' s discussion of ordinary and original meaningfulness. 60
Ordinary meaningfulness is the public consensus on wordmeaning evident in a group's common use of everyday
58Metahistory, p. 432.

59w~ have in mind here a variant on epistemological
conceptualism. The historian, through a poetic choice,
adopts a linguistic framework for his subsequent inquiries.
Other historians use different linguistic frameworks (i.e.
one of the other tropes of poetic speech), so that subsequent narratives will be formulated in diverse and sometimes conflicting modes of speech. Given a linguistic
position which denies the possibility of a preconceptual
insight havtng critical implications, these differences
will be .fundamental. There will be no way of criticizing
them since whoever attempts such-a critique will already
presuppose the privileged status of his own linguistic
framework.
60Method in Theology, pp. 255-25?.
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language.

Individuals acquire knowledge of the

~oup's

language by learning how it is used on an everyday basis.
But original meaningfulness is apparent when new uses are
found for existing words or when new words are developed
and communicated to a wide audience. 61 Eventually a public
may grasp the meaning of new ways of speaking and may adopt
them as a part of ordinary language.
Now both a precondition to the preceding distinction
and the basis for a solution to the twofold problem we are
considering is the occurrence of mental acts which precede
linguistic formulations.

If one denies that mental acts

occur or if one labels them "occult entities" which distract philosophers with pseudo-problems, then the preceding distinction will be overlooked. 62 Similarly, a denial
of mental acts will leave one with only linguistic formulations.
~istic

And these formulations are relative to the lincontext in which they occur.

Other formulations

occurring in different linguistic contexts may be incommensurable with each other even though they supposedly refer
to the same set of events.
However, the work of the third chapter focused on
61 The ongoing rev1sion of dictionaries is proof
enough that original meaningfulness can be distinguished
from ordinary meaningfulness.
62 Method in Theology, pp. 256-257· Apparently Lonergan is making an oblique reference to ordinary language
philosophers who consider all philosophic problems to be
linguistic problems and who limit basic philosophic discourse to the usage of ordinary language.
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cognitional acts and established the pattern of their occurrence.

Our analysis was not of "occult entities" but of

empirical events, the data of consciouness.
do occur.

So mental acts

Their occurrence need not be explicitly linguis-

tic,63 but an appropriation of cognitional structure requires a linguistic statement of the distinctions and interrelations of human intentional acts.

This statement may

not be adequate; but the subject's performance continues
just the same, and repeated efforts to explain it may yield
improved accounts. 64
The implication of all this is that methodical inquiry is not limited to a juggling of linguistic formulae.
There can be insights into intentional acts, and, according to the intentionality analysis of Chapter Three, these
insights may reveal the structure of critical consciousness.·
What is then made available is a basis for analyzing how
new terms are invented to express a developing understanding.

Also made available is a formal theory of the

6 3That is, a conscious act of human sensibility (e.g.
touching) can occur without a ljnguistic component. By itself the act is a conscious expression which occurs as part
of a larger flow of expression having both linguistic, bodily, and interpersonal components. Lonergan remarks that
mental acts occur only within a sustaining flow of expression. He cites the work of ~rnst Cassirer (The Philosophy
of S~bolic Forms) as evidence for the interrelation of
spee~, knowledge, and action.
See ibid., Method in Theol-

.2SZ' p. 255.

~

64Recall the distinction made in Chapter Three between the pattern of cognitional performance itself and the
formulation of it. The former is invariant; the latter is
open to change though not to a radical revision of its
basic terms.
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performance presupposed by every h:i.storical paradigm.
While paradigm-followers adopt ·their common terms and
areas of interest much in the way that the 1ndividual
learns about the ordinary meaningfulness of the group's
speech, there are also the originators of paradigms who
break through common usage to new ways of understanding
and speaking. 6 5 This latter group bears wj_tness both to
the distinction between ordinary and original meaningfulness and to the occurrence of mental acts which produce
discoveries outdistancing the given linguistic frameworks
of the day.
In summary, this second section of Chapter Five
treated specific problems confronting claims to historical
objectivity.

We envisioned a strategic need to handle

these problems before proceeding to a complex notion of
objectivity in the third section.
The first problem concerned the determinatton of historical data.

A negative conclusion was easily reached:

historical data are not ready-made items simply g:i ven for
historians to inspect.
so easily reached.

An affirmative conclusion was not

Even prior to our clarificatton of the

relation between the historian and his object of inquiry,
there is a problem: What types of entities are historical
6 5The distinction between paradigm-followers and originators of paradigms is made by F. Lawrence in his article,
"Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 199.
-
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objects?

OUr proposed answer was limited.

We argued

not

what must be excluded or what all must be included in the
field of historical ·objects.

Rather, we argued only that

there are strong reasons for counting constitutive relationships as primary historical objects.

One benefit of

this viewpoint is the light it throws on what can first
seem rather strange: historians treat themselves as historical objects in writing a history of history.
Further efforts were made to clarify the relation
between the historian and his data.

Our earlier arguments

for the relativity of data to subjective interests had to
be clarified if we were not to give the impression that
historical research is wholly a matter of personal preference.

First, we countered this impression by noting a

potential relation of data to researcher--the historian
does not create his materials.
work of the fourth chapter.

Second, we took note of the

The relation between data and

historian contai.ns a critical element:

the historian him-

self who can be intellectually responsible.

His cultivated

detachment stands in contrast to a purely arbitrary use of
historical materials.
Our next move was from historical data to historical
facts.

The distinction was argued on the basis of the ear-

lier conclusion that human knowing is a compound activity.
We added the argument that the procedures outlined in Chapter Four would not make much sense if there were no

r
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distinction.

The transition from data to facts is guided

by anticipatory hypotheses and heuristic frameworks--this

much is assumed after the Copernican Revolution in historiography.

But this assumption is sometimes challenged:

there must be observational historical givens which are
independent of prior interests and constructs.

If not,

what objective checks can there be on an arbitrary construction of historical events? 66 We replied to this question in a preliminary way.

Part of the work of the previ-

ous chapters was to find limits to the variables which
might groun19arbitrary historical procedures.

Particularly

the fourth chapter emphasized the non-preferential check
available in transcendental method.

Hypotheses and other

constructs can be useful devices for guiding a developing
understandi.ng.

Should they become blocks to understanding,

the historian's own intelligence, certain public controls,
and accumulating evidence can provide remedies.
The denial of observational historical givens and the
affirmation of historical construction present another
problem.

Heuristic models may be closely identified with

the cultural heritage of the historian.

Basic assumptions

about historical processes and about science may be part
of those models--so much so that the historian does not
think of them as constructs at all.

Instead, they are

6 6we should note that this question cannot be satisfactorily answered before we explicitly develop the topic
of historical objectivity.
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part of that given understanding which forms the .individual's climate of opinion.

!n handling this problem we made

use of our earlier study of Carl Becker's work.

!f it is

possible to reach behind various "worlds of meaning" to
the performance which produced them, then there is a basis
for intelligently criticizing different historical constructs.
However, we went beyond that earlier study of Chapter Three to consider the problem of the hermeneutical circle.

We argued against the thesis of presuppositionless

history and the confusion of insight with deduction, both of
which supported the charge of a "vicious circle" in historical understanding.

Our response to this charge consisted

in a descriptive analysis of the self-correcting process
of learning.

Finally, a special case of the hermeneutical

circle was considered.

Language forms a context of meaning-

fulness for expressions of preconceptual insights.

If men-

tal acts are denied or ignored in favor of linguistic formulations, then one is left with different linguistic
frameworks containing irreconcilable propositions about the
same events.

But previous work already established that

there are mental acts and that access can be gained to a
performance invariant across differences in linguistic formulation.

With these variables clarified, we can turn to

the main topic of objectivity in the next section.
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EVIDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY
The second goal of Chapter Five is to provide epistemological arguments justifying a conception of historical realism. 6 7 This goal will be reached in two stages.
This third section elaborates Lonergan's epistemology
which he derives from his cognitional theory.

The follow-

ing, fourth section, uses this epistemology to criticize
the "realism" of different opinions about historical facts.
Throughout both sections we will maintain the distinction
between surface and ·deep structures in the historical text.

Our previous work has established that an appropriated cognitional structure provides access to, as well as grounds
for criticizing, precritical elements of the deep level.
That same work has supplied reasons for holding that the
bias infecting surface procedures is neither unavoidable
nor irreducible.

A single thesis remains to be proved:

an epistemology which incorporates cognitional structure
offers a test of the realism of historical perspectives.
The topic of objectivity belongs to an epistemological study of realism.

Dissenting opinions about the possi-

bility of historical objectivity require that the topic
6 7such an epistemological justification was not provided in any compelling way by nineteenth-century historians. (Metahistory, p. 26.) However, our starting point
in cognitional structure may succeed in offering more than
simply another epistemological argument having a pref erential and, hence, variable basis.
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be a

centra~

issue of this chapter.

The complex notion of

objectivity which will eventually emerge will have not
only a specific reference to historical issues but also an
implicit reference to problems of relativism in whatever
field they may occur.

Evidence and Verification
Discussions of objectivity usually involve the topics
of evidence and of verification.

Our study of these two

topics presumes earlier conclusions: that knowing is a compound activity and that distinctions can be maintained
among potential, formal, and actual evidence. 68
Given the discussion in the preceding section on historical data and their relation to an inquiring subject,
we must agree with Collingwood that the notion of potential historical evidence is misleading. 6 9 Lonergan's notion of potential evidence serves a negative function: it
poses a limit to the claims of solipsism.

But when one

speaks of ·historical evidence, there is already a
68Method in Theologz, p. 186.
6 9see The Idea of History, pp. 280-281. Perhaps our
point is too subtle. Historical data (or temporally past
achievements) stand in a potentiar-re1ation to historical
consciousness--this much must be granted to avoid solipsism.
But data and evidence are not equivalent or interchangeable
concepts. Evidence is data as attended to and at least
tentatively connected to some inquiry. Pri~understand
ing guides that inquiry, so that any evidentiary materials
will already be classified in a preliminary way as fitting
this or that problem area. Thus, to use Lonergan's terminology, historical evidence will always be at least formal
evidence.
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classification or interpretation of some entity as historical.

The mode of preliminary interpretation is likely

to be a specific question which anticipates how data and
a problem under study are interconnected.

The historian

asks a specific question because he thinks he can answer
it.

And he directs his question to selected evidence

which he tentatively supposes will help to answer his question.

Therefore, to adopt Lonergan's terminology, though

not his position--all historical evidence is at least formal evidence.70

So we are qualifying earlier statements

about Lonergan's triple classification of evidence.

This

qualification was postponed until after the preceding discussion of how historical interests constitute a field of
historical objects.

A very strong argument can be made

for our thesis that potent;_al historj cal evidence functions
solely as a negative concept.

If it were a positive con-

cept, then everything in the world would be evidence for
70strictly speaking, formal evidence for Lonergan is
not only data as used in asking a question but also as
used in answering a question. (Method in Theology, p. 186.)
Our use of his term, within the above limits, is defensible
since a precise question anticipates possible answers.
Such is the meaning for Lonergan of the "unknown known"
which a question intends. One commentator puts the same
point this way: " ••• in every question there is a hidden
structure directing implicitly the search for answers,
and prior even to the formulation of the answer and imposing a structure upon the answer even before it is formulated. This hidden structure is the domain of intent1-onali ty and, like the nine-tenths of an iceberg below water,
it lies perilously below the level of our cognitive activities." Patrick A. Heelan, @uantum 1'1echanics and Objectivity (The Hague: Martinus Nij off, 1965), p. 156.
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historical c.onsciousness.71

But this conclusion would

undercut the thesis of historical questioning as constructive.

It would also make nonsensical the debates over

what limited field of entities is properly termed "historical.1172
The precedtng comments imply a correlation between
historical questioning and formal historical evidence.73
A question is an anti.ctpation of insight.

If it is a pre-

cise question, it already supposes how an answer might
shape up.

That is, the question proposes a structure-or

organization for handling the anticipated intelligibility
7 1 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 280.
7 2 rn defense of our denial that "historical evidence"
is a predicate belonging to objects independently of historical questioning, we can construct an imaginative scene.
A hunter walks through a dried-up African river bed. He
hears a noise coming from nearby bushes. Eager to flush
out some prey, he looks for an object to throw into the
bushes. He finds a stone and hurls it. Sometime later a
paleontologist walks along the same river bed. He knows
that the river which once flowed here cut out what is now
called the Olduvai Gorge. He too hears noises. Wanting
to scare off an.y predators, he looks for an object to throw.
By chance he picks up the same stone as the earlier hunter.
But he stops to examine markings on it. The stone has been
shaped by some human f orce--this much his earlier training
and purposeful wandering allow him to detect. Suddenly,
for this trained investigator, the object is no longer a
natural entity but an item of historical interest. It becomes part of the paleontologist's world of meaning in
which antecedent classifications stand ready to receive
items of significance. What was not si_gnificant for the
hunter is a historical puzzle for the paleontologist because he already understands how to perceive objects in a
historical way.
73R. G. Collingwood, The ~dea of History, p. 281.
Henri Marrou concurs in the conclusion that historical entities do not exist prjor to the intervention of the historian's curiosity. See his The Meaning of History, p. 311.
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of partially. understood materials.

The inquirer's prior

understanding and his heuristic hypothesis may or may not
be compatible with fully considered eVidence.

If they are

compatible, then the question was well put and the hypothesis is reinforced.

If they are not, then the question

does not cease to have a degree of intelligibility; it
rather appears to be irrelevant to the investigated problem. 74

A precondition for either outcome is an insight

which grasps a possible organization of the selected evidence. 75
The emphasis is on a "possible" organization because
there is still a need for verification.

Is the possible

organization actually relevant to the evidence?

Does the

evidence actually warrant an assent to this tentative organization?

At stake is what is usually referred to as

the "sufficiency" of evidence.

Lonergan provides important

insights into what is meant by the sufficiency of evidence.
First, what is historical evidence for one school of
thought may not be consi.dered evidence by another.
fore, by itself evidence does not compel assent.

Therert sup-

plies a reasonable basis for assent only if it is understood
to be sufficient.

Lonergan's distinction between acts of

74 cr. our remarks in Chapter Four on inverse insights.
75"What is grasped in insight, is neither an actually
given datum of sense nor a creation of the imagination but
an intelligible organization that may or may not be relevant to data." Method in Theology, p. 10.
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direct understanding and acts of reflective understanding
is crucial here.

The former provide the tentative connec-

tions which are usually formulated in a hypothetical proposition.

But the reflective act of understanding grasps

not only the meaning of the proposition but also the relations among it, the events of which it may be affirmed,
and the initial reasons for affirming it.76 !n other
words, a pre-judgmental reflection determines how well a
tentative understanding, one's formulation of it, the
available evidence, and the events under study correlate
with one another.

This reflective act yields a determina-

tion of the sufficiency of evidence, and this determination
is the basis for a reasonable judgment.

The Virtually Uncondttioned
The preceding remarks rather hastily summarized a
complex position.

But they do form an introduction to

Lonergan's notion of the virtually unconditioned.??

The

term "virtually" refers to the fact that the judgment made
has conditions which are in fact fulfilled.

That conditions

7 6 .F.dward M. MacKinnon, Truth and Expression (New York:
Newman Press, 1971), pp. 53-54.
??The basic text for this notion remains Chapter X
of Insi~ht, pp. 279-316. The particularly relevant pages
for his orical judgments are pp. 280-289, and 299-301.
Other sources include "Insight: Preface to a Discussion,"
in Collection, pp. 160-163; and David Tracy's discussion
of the notion in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp.
128-132.
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are involved in the judgment is evident through the mere
asking of a question: Is this interpretation.correct??8
What this question seeks is the evidence (the conditions)
upon which the prospective answer

w~ll

depend.

So the

question is conditioned (or dependent); and what it is conditioned by (or dependent on) is evidence.

Now, in a

judgment of historical fact, the initial historical question (the conditioned) is linked to the known evidence (the
conditions), and an act of reflective insight grasps the
fulfillment of the conditions.?9

Put more concretely, his-

torical problems and relevant pieces of evidence are linked
by intelligent questions yielding accumulattng insights.
This i1nkage grows stronger as the pertinent questions are
asked and answered.

Finally, if there are no further per-

tinent questions, then the conditions are fulfilled, and
it is reasonable to assert one's conclusions.
In our introductory remarks to the virtually uncon-

••

ditioned, we noted that by itself evidence does not compel
assent.

So a determination of the "sufficiency" of evi-

dence requires more than knowledge of accumulated evidence.
What is added to the known evidence is the reflective
? 8 Another way of putting this--a question or hypothesis will be conditioned if arguments and/or evidence are
required to prove it.
?9The basic formal components of a histor:tcal judgment are threefold: (1) the judgment is the conditioned;
(2) its cond1tjons are known; (3) the conditions are fulfilled. This formal structure applies not just to historical judgments but to all reasoned assertions. Insight,
p. 280.

r
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insight which grasps how the conditioning evidence "fits"
the conditioned hypothesis.

In historical judgments this

"fit" is usually only approximate.

This is so because

historical information is incomplete, and the historian
cannot rule out the possibility that further relevant
questions may yet arise.

But if his research has been

thorough and his procedures intelligent, he will be making
more than a stab in the dark when he asserts some conclusion.

What he asserts is usually termed a probable judgment of fact. 80 Why is it labelled "probable" rather than
"certain"?

Some expectation is present that the judgment

and actual facts to which it refers may diverge.

This ex-

pectation arises because the historian recognizes how incomplete his knowledge is.

But he does not suspend judg-

ment simply because his knowledge is incomplete.

What was

previously described as the self-correcting process of
learning allows him to know when he is on the right track.
At least it allows him to claim a mastery of the relevant
issues and, therefore, to speak as one who can provide the
8011 0n the other hand, the probable judgment results
from rational procedures. Though it rests on incomplete
knowledge, still there has to be some approximation towards
completeness. Though it fails to reach the v;rtually unconditioned, still it has to be closing in upon that exigent norm. Thus, one may say that guesses are probably
true only in the statistical sense of diverging non-systematically from true judgments; but probable judgments are
probably true in the non-statistical sense of converging
upon true judgments, of approaching them as a limit."
llli·' p. 300.

r
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best available opinion of his day. 81
In beginning this section we noted that two topics are
usually associated with the broader issue of objectivity:
evidence and verification.

While both topics are treated

above in our discussion of the virtually unconditioned,
the topic of verification deserves a more explici_t statement.

Verification is usually said to be of propositions,

i.e. of formulations of insight.

But the act of verifica-

tion comes at the end of a process which also includes
previous adjustments of terms to understanding, and of
understanding to accumulating evidence.

Cognitional pro-

cess contains these adjustments in various stages of development prior to the judgments which conclude that the conditioned and its conditions are linked and that the conditions are in fact fulfilled. 82 To illustrate these stages
81 "In probable judgments the link is that insights
are correct when there are no further pert;nent questions
and the fulfillment is some approximation of the selfcorrecting process of learning to its limit of familiarity
and mastery." Ibid., p. 315. Our reference to historical
judgments as pr'C5'0a'Dle judgments is not meant to be an identification. Certatn judgments are possible, even likely,
when uncomplicated topics are studied or when studies aim
only to provide negative conclusions. But usually historical judgments belong to approximate jnterpretations of
complex issues; hence, they are most often probable judgments.
8211 But judgments are the final products of cognitional
process. Before the link between conditioned and conditions
appears in the act of judgment, it existed in a more rudimentary state within cognitional.process itself. Before
the fulfillment of conditions appears in another act of
judgment, it too was present in a more rudimentary state
within cognitional process. The remarkable fact about
reflective insight is that it can make use of those more
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of development and, thereby, to clarify how historical
judgments approximate to the virtually unconditioned, let
us return to our earlier example of a historical monograph
on the pre-Civil War cotton trade.

The following stages

in the production of this hypothetical monograph mark advances in the process of verification.
The monograph topic is usually entered into by way
of a general question: "What was the economic condj_ ti on of
the cotton trade in these years--prosperous or in decline?"
Further questions break down the general problem area.into
manageable segments: "How heavy were exports in 1850?";
"What market fluctuations have been preserved from the
Charleston Exchange, and what do they reveal?"

What these

specific questj_ons set up is a link between the narrowed
segments and available materials. 8 3 Tn an anticipatory way,
these questions are already forging a link between the
general problem area and studied materials.
On

the basis of prior knowledge of antebellum econ-

omics, the historian may hypothesize that the cotton trade
rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the
virtually unconditioned." Ibid., p. 281.
8 3These links are formed in a rudimentary or tentative way. The historian intelligently anticipates that
records of the Charleston Exchange will be important to his
topic. However, the link is only tentative. Inverse insights may occur revealing that no relevant link exists.
For example, recall our earlier question about levels of
cotton production in newly planted areas west of the Mississippi. The materials relevant to thjs question were eventually uncoupled from the basic problem of an economic
slump in 1850 because they d i.d not help to explain why the
slump occurred.
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was

basical~y

advance.

sound and probably showed signs of continued

This tentative position will influence the his-

torian's selective use of questions put to his materials.
Stable or climbing prices paid both to producer and to
exporter are a sign of prosperous economic conditions.
So the historian's questions will be directed to evidence
of price levels.

Now the fact that his questions have

this direction reflects an anticipation of how the fulfillment of conditions will occur.

That is, he is at least

expecting that, if the trade was economically prosperous,
this is the way to prove it; namely, by charting price
levels over a twenty-year period.

Of course, verification

requires that the price levels actually be stable in the
short run and climbing in the long run.

Exceptions which

can be accounted for as isolated in their effects and
short-term in their endurance will not require a major revision of the hypothesis.

To discover and to estimate

these exceptions is part of the self-correcting process
of historical learning.
That

self-correct~_ng

process involves coordinating

with one another the insights into different yearly market
conditions.

Judgments have to be made on each year's econ-

omy, and then further judgments have to be made on the relation between yearly conditions and trends over two and
three-year periods. 84 All the judgments must be carefully
84 That is, judgments not only link condi. tions to the
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formulated s.o as not to claim more than the evidence warrants.

Careful formulation is not automatically guaranteed;

so, the historian must reflectively study his own expression.

Does it correlate with his advancing understanding?

Thus, another judgment is called for if the whole enterprise is not to falter over careless wording.
~radually

insights accumulate; market conditions

for individual years are understood; the yearly reports
are interrelated; and by now the histori_an is faniliar
with the evidence which grounds his understanding of both
indi_vidual years and long-term trends.

If he has made a

competent study of relevant materials, his evidence may
seem quite conclusive.

The original question reappears:

nWhat was the economic condition of the cotton trade in
this twenty-year period--prosperous or in decline? 118 5

The

historian's conViction is that the preponderance of eVidence
points to long-term economic prosperity.

Then his ques-

tion for reflection is, "Was the cotton trade in fact pros-

....

perous?" ·His previous work has linked the conditions (e.g.
price levels and yearly market results) to the conditioned
(i.e. the original question).

He has understood the

conditioned (e.g. price levels are a means of evaluating
economic growth or decline), but they also link condit:ions
to one another (e.g. the economic health of the cotton
market in 1848 is matched by that of the previous year).

85 In order to avoid the complaint
.
of a false disjunc-

tion, we should add, "or a period of mixed advances and
declines?" No matter--the self-correcting process will
allow for such indecisive results.
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conditions and judged his grasp of them to be accurate
since he has answered the relevant questions they suggested
to him.

The act of reflective understanding is spontaneous-

ly appropriate at this point.

Do these known conditions

provide a sufficient basis for the thesis that the cotton
trade enjoyed economic health during these two decades?
To this question for reflection the historian will reply,
"Yes."

H~

knows that price levels are essential indicat-

ors of economic health or decline, and he knows that the
indicators point to his conclusion (i.e. the conditions
of the conditioned are in fact fulfilled).
The key moment of verification lies in this move
from the known indicators to the affirmed conclusion.

The

presupposition for actually effecting this transition is
human rationality.

This rati.onality is apparent in the

immanent demand that the evidence be sufficient to support
the conclusion. 86 This demand (Or inner exigence) comes to
expression in the question for reflection.

It is satisfied

only when the questioner judges that his historical conclusion is probably true or is probably not true.

By both

asking and answering his question, the historian is performing as a rational subject.

And what Lonergan's notion

of the Virtually unconditioned explains is how rational
performance occurs.

This notion provides an explanatory

thematization of the formal elements of both verification
86navid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan,
p. 129.
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process and rational judgment. 8 ?

.

Critical Realism
·After working out the relation between the virtually
unconditioned and historical judgments, we are ready to
elaborate the epistemology which is based on Lonergan's
cognitional theory.

Our starting point remains the same:

the spontaneous performance of the subject.

The notion of

the virtually unconditioned both clarified the rational
component of that performance and provided some guidelines
for discussing claims to objective historical knowledge.
The starting point in cogni.tional performance is
specifically curiosity.

For our purposes, the starting

point in historiographical performance is curiosity concretized in the question for histor::i.cal intell:l.gence.

Chap-.

ter Three went to some length to prove that this question
is the first stage of a formally dynamic process.

To ques-

tion is not an end in itself but a means to the end of
acquiring.knowledge.

Questions yield insights which may

or may not be relevant to what one is curious about.

An

act of reflecti.ve understandtng is required to determine
B?Ibid., pp. 127-128 and 130. The term "rationality"
has had iilun'iple meanings in the history of Western philosophy. One benefit of Lonergan's virtually unconditioned
is to explicate the form of rattonal performance which occurs prior to the development of theories about human reason. By relating the virtually unconditioned to various
types of judgments, Lonergan argues the accuracy of this
explanatory account of reason-in-act. Insight, pp. 281-315.
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if one's understanding actually "fits" the topic i.mder
study.

Eventually historical curiosity is satisfied about

the particulars of a topic, i.e. the historian has managed
to answer to his satisfaction all the questions for intelligence which occur to him.

But there remains the possi-

bility that his understanding of the whole is based on an
arbitrary arrangement of the parts.

So what is understood

and formulated as a general interpretation must be analyzed
for defects.

The process which began with simple curiosity

has taken many twists and turns.

As a result, the verify-

ing act of judgment has to be built out of numerous subordinate judgments affirming that the correlation of understanding, expression, and evidence is adequate.
As distinct from our previous cognitional issues,

"

the key epistemological question now is, What is the historian affirming when he replies "Yes" to a question for
reflection?

Simply from a surface analys:is of how histor-

ians speak, we can say that what is affirmed is the truth.
The question for reflection is explicitly a question about
truth: Is my interpretation of economic indicators true?
To reply "Yes" is consequently to say, "I am affirming the
truth of this interpretation."

But since, as Aristotle

remarked, the "true" can be said in many ways, we must be
more precise in responding to the previous epistenological
question.
In the first place, the historian's original questions

339
for intelligence ·were acts of intending, and what was intended was some content of his historical experience. 88
His questions will suggest an imaginative scheme for relating the selected elements of his expertence. 8 9 The insights which are rudimentary in such an imaginative scheme
will grow more precise as he continues to inquire.

At

some point he will attempt to formulate as a concrete supposition the direction which his insights have been taking.
His thinking takes a turn then; what he intends is a formulated interpretation, and an exigence for reflection
intervenes to ask, Is it true?

Directly intended is the

formulated interpretation and the evidence which grounds it;
but indirectly, through the formulation and evidence, is
intended a past reality, namely, the events which are interpreted.
88As noted in the earlier analysis of how historical
facts are related to historical data, components of the
historian's historical experience are the historical "facts"
which critical exegesis establishes. For example, the
historian may accept another scholar's conclusion that certain documents bearing Lincoln's signature are authentic.
His acceptance both makes those documents part of his professional experience and expresses his confidence and belief in a colleague's intellectual honesty and competence.
For the role of belief in historjcal practices, see Marrou's The l1eanin5 of Historl, pp. 301-316; Lonergan's Insight, pp. 703-7 6; and Metnod in Theology, pp. 43 and~33.
8 9we have in mind here both the spontaneous curiosity
of the historian (which Lonergan analyzes) and the poetic
prefiguration of a historical field (which Hayden White
analyzes). The collusion of these two basic processes
yields an imaginative scheme of how events might have taken
place. ;nitially the interconnections among events are
vague and require more careful study.
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\olhat w.e learn from this process of historical intending is that historians do not reflectively posit the truth
of historical data, nor do they affirm the validity of
mere suppositions.
dynamic pattern.

Cognitional acts occur in a formally
Historical curiosity moves historians

from a study of authenticated materials to an understanding
of how these materials fit into a larger context.90

The

events referred to in the understood materials become an
object of thought.

That is, their occurrence and conse-

quences are understood in relation to other components of
the historian's accumulated knowledge.

This adjustment of

prior historical knowledge to new understanding shows up
in the care with which the historian formulates a tentative conclusion or prospective judgment.

Now the curiosity

which moved him from limited contexts to an overview interrelating the parts into an intelligible whole expresses
itself anew in a question for reflection.

Presupposed is

a rational commitment to affirm objects of thought for
which there is reasonably compelling evidence.

So his

question is actually an intending of an object of thought
which may or may not be true, i.e. may or may not be a
historical fact.
90Again, we are presupposing that the task of the
critical historian is not merely to grasp the meanings
conveyed by authors through written reports, but to understand how these reports belong to the broader context
of "what was going forward" at some time in the past.
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We began with the question, "What does the historian
affirm when he replies 'Yes' to a question for reflection?"
Prior to his affirmation, he is intending (in the question
for reflection) an object of thought

~

the evidence which

prospectively "fulfills" or establishes the thought object
as a historical reality.

Note that what is intended is

not merely an object of thought.

The question for reflec-

tion intends both the conditioned (the

histor~_an'

s formu-

lated interpretation) and the conditions (the known evidence
about a past series of events).

This act of intentionality,

thus, transcends the questioner, i.e. it at least intends
~

may be understood and not simply the h:i.stor:tan' s pre-

sent understanding.9l

Now the "what" which is intended is

only indirectly the past series of events.

It is the char-

acter of past events to be past and therefore not present.
Evidence (or "traces") constitutes what is present.

But

also present is the object of thought or formulated interpretation.

In critical history, this thought object is

not some thing but a meaningful reconstruction of events:
their occurrence, consequences, and significance for the

...

group.

Thus, the question for reflection directly intends

the thought object and the supporti_ng evidence.

But, if

9lAn argument from historjcal language can support
this claim. Questions asked by a historian are said to be
"histortcal" questions, i.e. questions about what has been.
If those questions only intended his present understanding,
they would not be historical questions because there would
be no reference, direct or indirect, to the past.
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the thought .object is affirmed to be true, then the act of
judgment intends the series of events.9 2 This intending
of the past is mediated by what the historian has understood by means of historical traces.
Our previous remarks on the virtually unconditioned

help to clarify the mediating functions of both historical
materials and historical understanding.

A prospective

judgment or proposed interpretation is the conditioned.
!t formulates the new discoveries and prior knowledge of
the historian.

The conditions are the evidence as under-

stood and as judged relevant to the proposed interpretation.

By judg:i.ng them relevant, the histor5_an has reflec-

tively linked conditions to conditioned.

So historical

materials mediated his understanding of past events, and
his understanding of the materials mediated his judgment
that the materials supplied appropriate evidence about
those past events.93

To reach the virtually unconditioned,

92How else would it be possible to make an erroneous

historical judgment? Formulati.ons or interpretations which
had no reference beyond themselves could be neither true
nor false. But historlcal interpretations refer directly
to evidence or "traces." An incompetent use of evidence is
likely to yield inadequate or even false h~storical judgments. Are historical errors then a matter of misunderstanding or misinterpreting evidence? But evidence is evidence of or about something other than itself. So interpretatIOns of evidence are answers to questions about past
events, and those answers are mediated by the evidence.
:Errors occur because one affirms answers to the wrong questions (i.e. the fallacy of the misplaced proof) or because
one affirms answers which known or yet-to-be-known evidence
refutes.
93The "circularity" of these mediating moments of
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another act of reflection must grasp the sufficiency of
the known conditions for support:lng the conditioned.

Or,

in other words, the known evidence must mediate an understanding that the formulated hypothesis is in fact verified by the amassed evidence.

Then follows the judgment

which affirms the correctness of the historian's understanding.

What the judgment effects is a transformation of

a tentative correlation of materials and understanding into
a factual correlation.
What, then, is the historian affirming when he answers "Yes" to this last question for reflection?

The con-

clusion we have arrived at is simply put: he is affirming
a historical fact.

But as in the case of the terns "intro-

spection" and "detachment," many opinions have been expressed
on what constitutes a historical "fact."

Thus, we must be

more explicit about the fact which is affirmed by historical
judging.
Our earlier remarks on historical data and historical
facts have covered some of the ground already.

Historical

facts are neither "givens" which historians find ready-made
nor are they arbitrary constructs of historical imagination.
historical understandi_ng must be qualified by our earlier
remarks on the hermeneutical circle. The historian learns
something about pas~events by understanding the traces of
those events; he learns something about the traces by understanding the events. But in the self-correcting process
of learning, questions about past events can gradually isolate the pertinent materials, and those materials will suggest further questions which qualify or correct the prior
historical understanding of past events.

Instead, they are constituted through multiple cognitional
acts.

Historical facts (for critical history) have the

concreteness of an object of experience.94

They have the

clarity of an object which is understood and precisely
described.95

Finally, they have the conditional necessity

of what approximates the virtually unconditioned, i.e. they
might have been otherwise, but as historical events turned
out, the facts cannot now be altered.9 6 Consequently,
historical facts are past events and their consequences
which are known through multiple intentional acts.

Again,

these past events and consequences are mediated by the evidence which the historian understands, by his formulation
of that understandi.ng, and by his rational affirmation that
the meaning of his formulation is true.
These conclusions about historical facts presuppose
an intrinsic relation of historical knowing to historical

"'.

94 For example, newly discovered notebooks of Leonardo
da Vinci were proved authentic by testing the age of the
paper and ink, and by establishing the correlation of
handwriting in the new works with previously accepted
works. These notebooks, then, are materials which the
critical historian may take as concrete historical data.
95The historian answers questions until the loose
ends of his interpretation are tied down. He formulates
his clarified understanding into a descriptive statement
of what may have been the case.
9 6For the notion of "conditioned necessity," see
Insi~ht, p. 331.
The levels of intentional acts which
yiel compound facts are treated.in Method in Theology,
p. 202.

reality.

M~ltiple

intentional acts go beyond historical

data to an intelligible arrangement and account of them.
A further act of reflective understanding goes beyond what
may be an accurate interpretation to an interpretation
which is in fact true.

That is to say, spontaneous cog-

nitional acts which are self-assembling into compound acts
of knowing are likewise a series of intendings which correlate historical materials, historical understanding (the
object of thought or the historical interpretation), and
historical events as what is known to have been the case.
This process of correlation has two sides: cognitional acts
assemble themselves into coupound acts of knowing; cognitional intendings assemble their partial objects (what is
intended) into a single compound object.9?

The act of

judgment which terminates the cognit;onal acts is a judgment
about historical reality which is not s;mply gi_ven or
merely supposed, but which is grasped through the med:tat:ton
of traces, of formulated interpretations, and of the reflective act which links them.
What the preceding remarks imply is that the structure
of knowing historical facts is similar to the structure of
known historical facts.

Lonergan's term for this similar-

ity of structure (or of the relations among components of
knowing and the known) is

"isomo~phism."

The similarity

9?"Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 228.

I

lies in the relations among components of different sets
of terms.9 8 In our study of cognitional structure, the
relations among intentional acts (or terms) were threefold.
The assumption of isomorphism is that the threefold structure of knowing will be reproduced in a similar way as a
threefold structure of the known.

Is this assumption to

remain merely an assumption or can it be justified?
Let us place arguments supporting this notion of
isomorphism within a historical context.

As Hayden White

establishes, historians must make use of heuristic models
if they are to approach intelligently the jumbled remains
of past ages.

He goes on to argue that the models are as-

sumed as a matter of preference and are not theoretically
justified in any compelling way.

Consequently, if two his-

torians operating with different models come to different
conclusions about the same events, then they cannot resolve
those differences.

Relativism is unavoidable since there

9B"Isomorphism, then, supposes different sets of
terms; it neither affirms nor denies similarity between the
terms of one set and those of other sets; but it does assert
that the network of relations in one set of terms is similar to the networks of relations in other sets." "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," Collection, p.
142.
Philip McShane contrasts Lonergan's notion of isomorphism with other views in the history of philosophy. "This
isomorphism is a far cry from that of logical atomism or
that of Spinoza's ordo idearwn. est ordo rerum: it is not an
isomorphism of propositional structure and fact or of ideas
and fact; it is an isomorphism of the structured anticipation of knowing with the real as its object." Randomness,
Statistics, and .Emergence (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 19?6), pp. 144-145. Cf. also ibid., pp. 252255.
-
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is no basis .for mediating the differences.
But the notion of isomorphism poses a serious challenge to such a relativistic outlook.

This notion makes ex-

plicit what is presupposed by every intelligent inquiry
and reasonable argument.

Ea.ch of the differing historians

has an intepretation to propose and to defend as true.

Ea.ch,

therefore, presumes that intelligent arguments and reasonable judgments will produce a convincing proof of what actually happened in some segment of the past.

But this pre-

sumption is precisely what is implied in the notion of
isomorphism.
Ea.ch historian "means" what he says, and he means
that what he says is a true account of past events.

Now

each historian's meaning is doubly-structured since it expresses what he understands about the past through the
available traces.

His meaning may be wrong, but it still

is doubly-structured.

And if cognitional process spontan-

eously moves through experience and understanding to judgment, this doubly-structured meaning will be either affirmed
or denied by an answer to the question: Is this interpretation true?

Hence, the performance of both historians has

the same structure and what they
ture.

~

has the same struc-

That is, they mean to say that their understanding,

based on the evidence, correspon4s to what in fact was the
case.

The prospective historical fact is what they mean

by their differing conclusions.

Perhaps both conclusions
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are not correct, but the notion of isomorphism scarcely
requires that correctness.

What the notion does make ex-

plici ~ is how the pattern of relations between t.he acts
leading to a conclusion is similar in form to the pattern
of relations between the contents of those acts, contents
which constitute what is concluded, namely, the historical
fact.99

Further, the notion of isomorphism provides

99Insi~ht, p. 399. In terms of the historical problem mentione above, this structural similarity refers not
to the variable historical models but to the way in which
the contents of models are, first, anticipated and, then,
actually achieved.
We stop short of investigating the metaphysical implications of the thesis of isomorphism. These implications
are worked out in Tnsight as part of the transition from a
latent to an explicit metaphysics. (Cf. pp. 399-401, 444451, 502-509.) Our methodological interests do not require
that we go beyond the earlier position quoted j_n footnote
98, i.e. isomorphism neither affirms nor denies similarity
between the terms of one set of related acts and the terms
of another set of related contents. This problematic and
controve~ial area cannot be adequately explored without a
lengthy inquiry carried out within an explicit metaphysics.
Such an inquiry would carry us too far afield. However,
in the diagram on the following page, we do take a metaphysical position. Our arguments for the thesis of isomorphism establish the similarity between the structural arrangement of one set of terms and the network of relations
in other sets. Our diagram indicates this by means of unbroken vertical lines. In addition, broken horizontal lines
indicate that there may be a similarity between the terms
of one set and those of other sets. But we draw an unbroken
horizontal line only in regard to the virtually unconditioned
in relation to historical fact. We mean to indicate that
the grasp o~ the virtually unconditioned (and not sim~ly an
approximation to it in a probable historical judgment) involves an identity between the knower and the known. In
other cases (i.e. instances which fall short of the virtually unconditioned), this identity tay be reached; at least
such an identity cannot be ruled·ou until disconfirming
evidence is available, is understood, and is affirmed.
Also in the diagram we indicate that the self-correcting process of human intelligence occurs between the empirical and intelligent levels of human interiority. This process moves in two directions (as symbolized by our arrows):
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part of the basis for comparing the two ways in Which two
historians experienced, understood, and judged a historical
interpretation to be correct.
,

If they differ sharply in

their conclusions, perhaps the origins of their differences
can be uncovered by reviewing the interrelated acts and the
interrelated contents yielding the two different claims to
historical fact.
The argument for an isomorphism between knowing and
the known can be briefly summarized.

The basic assumption

is that historical reality is what is reached through·an
affirmation of correct understanding.
of this assumption require?

What would a denial

First, one would have to crit-

icize the assumption for a failure to understand something
either about the way historical events are accessible to
us or about what historical facts are.

Second, an alternate·

way of intelligently grasping historical knowing and historical facts would have to be proposed.

Third, the alter-

nate position and, hence, the denial of the former assumption
would have to be affirmed as a reasonable conclusion.

But

this is to say that the assumption of isomorphism cannot be
deni.ed w5_ thout an implicit contradiction between the denier's
performance and his statements. 100 So the assumption of
new experiences may challenge established opinions, new insights may make a difference in what one notices j_n the future.
lOO"Briefly, if the assumption that what is real is
what is intelligently affirmed to be the case is to be challenged, it is to be challenged by an intelligent alternative or an intelligent criticism and the reasonable

-.,
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isomorphism.is justified; to deny it one must assume it.
The subheading for this part of Chapter Five was "critical realism."

The previous analyses of the virtually un-

conditioned and of the isomorphism between.knowtng and the
known entail an epistemological position which has been
termed "critical realism."

The basic epistemological posi-

tion of critical realism is to identify the real with the
true, the affirmed.

In the history of philosophy, the real

has also been identified with the sensible, the concrete
body of external experience, the imaginable, the understood,
the coherently hypothesized object of thought. 101

But if

cognitional process has its terminus in knowledge, and if
knowledge is of the real, and if cognitional structure is
a dynamic unity which is irreducible to one of its parts;
then the real cannot be identified with anything short of
the truly affirmed.

Again, the isomorphism between knowing

and the known enta1ls that known realities be more than the
sensed, the supposed or the understood.

Rather, the cog-

nitional acts of the knower assemble their partial objects
(i.e. the intended sensible and intelligible objects) into
single compound objects (i.e. the realities which are
conclusion, 'therefore it is not so•: inevitably, then, the
challenger assumes the position he challenged." Philip
McShane, Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence, p. 255.
101Lonergan relates these alternate philosophical
positions to his epistemological stance, in Insight, pp.
411-425. Cf. also "Cognitional Structure," in Collection,
pp. 231-236.
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affirmed).
What does this epistemological position contribute
to a study of historical realities?

In the first place,

our previous remarks on historical data and historical
facts have obviously presupposed this position. 102 But
that is not to say that those remarks were made in advance

of any proof.

Both the above epistemological position and·

our remarks on historical facts are based on a theory of
human cognition.

If that theory is proved, and we take it

to have been demonstrated in Chapter Three, then historical facts are not to be confused with data or hypotheses or
some unrecoverable events of the past ("unrecoverable" because they are no longer observable).

Historical facts are

affirmed answers to questions for reflection--answers which
approximate to, and in some cases reach, the virtually unconditioned.
In the second place, the identification of the real
with what is or can be verified (i.e. the rationally affirmed) is based not on precritical preferences but on invariant cognitional structure.

Thus, as opposed to Hayden

102 Those remarks did not identify historical facts
with the given materials of historical experience. Nor did
they label as "facts" the formulated hypotheses or imaginative reconstructions of the historian. Rather, both materials and formulated insights were termed "means" to historical knowledge. Historical facts emerge when answers are
given to questions for reflection. Since these answers are
mediated by available materials and formulated meanings,
they united prior cognitional acts and their contents into
the affirmed historical reality.

,
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White's position, we do not hold that this critical realism
is a surface feature of our work which is predetermined by
prior subjective variables.

Instead, the argument for iso-

morphism links an already established cognitional theory
to an epistemological thesis which, in turn, has implications for understanding how historical realism is practiced on the surface level.l03

This link is rationally

based since the denial of isomorphism presupposes it as
part of human knowing..

And the thesis is affirmed because
the conditions for it are fulfilled. 104
In the third place, the identification of the real

with the true, the affirmed, allows us to conceive historical knowledge in a critical way.

The implication is that

other ways of conceiving historical knowledge can be criticized on adequate theoretical grounds.

More important, the

accepted epistemological position provides access to the
sources of divergent views of historical knowledge and
allows us to discaver how mistakes were made. 105 Part of
l03section four of this chapter will work out these
implications. There our effor,ts will be directed toward the
use of this epistemological position to criticize the "realism" of different historical perspectives.
l04Those conditions are the following: cognitional
process assembles elementary acts of knowing into compound
acts of knowing; acts of knowing, properly speaking, are
irreducible to their component (elementary) parts; knowledge is of the real; there is an isomorphism between knowing and the known.
l05Given the assumption of isomorphism, the performance of the subject, both as intending and as knowtng the
real, is the standard for views of historical knowledge.

354

this process of criticizing divergent viewpoints will be
attempted in the following subsection on historical objectivity.

1'ypes of Objectivity
The purpose of this subsection is to relate viewpoints and problems of historical objectivity to the epistemological position of the precedi_ng subsection.

For an

epistemology based on cognitional structure, objectivity
will be envisi..oned as an explication of the patterned set
of cognitional acts.

Those acts occur in a self-correcting

process which is both cyclic and01Inulative.

Accumulated

insights serve as a basis for the refinement and adjustment
of an individual's expression to the many-sided meaning
which he supposes.
suppose.

Still, he can do better than merely to

He intelligently argues and affirms that an inter-

pretation is more than a supposition, it is historical fact.
The claim, then, is to have established something that is
independent of the individual's own personal likes or dislikes.

Given the same evidence, critical techniques, and

professional competence, he expects colleagues to come to
the same conclusion.
This expectation is implicit :in the indi..vidual's publication of his conclusions.

He. usually does not expect

The application of this standard is what Lonergan means
by "dialectics." See Method in Theolog;y;, Chapter 10.
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immediate agreement on all his points.
at his conclusions in a s;_ngle step.

He did not arrive
So in publicizing his

results, he is subject;_ng his claims to renewed inquiry and
critical judgment.
a broader base.

This time the test of objectivity has

Others are likely to raise questions

which he overlooked and which may be pertinent to his topic.
Both he and his critics must answer them and evaluate their
effect on earlier conclusions.

So the verification process

is repeated: new materials may be considered, new discover-

ies linked to original positions, and questions asked-about
how well the revised interpretation correlates with the
evidence.

What this indicates is that objectivity (or the

public acceptance on critical grounds of some position) is
parallel to the complexity of human knowing. 106
Because of this complexity and because there have
been so many conflicting opinions on objectivity, we must
approach the complex notion of objectivity by way of contrasts.

First, historical judgments which are purportedly

objective are judgments about histor:i.cal objects.

!n sec-

tion two of this chapter we argued that the pr:.imary historical objects were constitutive relationships or meanings.
What becomes apparent, then, is that the term "object" has
more than one meaning.

In a world of lived immediacy, ob-

jects are simply encountered without puzzlement, without
questions.

The infant who reaches toward the bright

106rnsight, p. 375.
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ceiling

lig~t

and the exhausted runner who collapses on the

grass after a race are encountering these immediate objects.
But in order to talk about them, we must step back from
this lived immediacy.
named nor described.

Originally the objects are neither
To name and to describe them, we

must understand them and reconstitute them as meanings.
Then our expressions signify that an immediate object is
what is already-out-there-now-real.lO?

The immediate ob-

ject is what is meant by these expressions.

In contrast

to its primary status as what-is-simply-encountered, the
immediate object as signified as an object in a world mediated by meaning.
The object as mediated by meaning is what is puzzled
over and questioned.

It is what becomes understood, af-

firmed, and settled as a matter-of-fact by answers.

The

questioner is related to it immediately by his question
and only indirectly or mediately by the procedures which
yield answers to questions.

Thus, in historical inquiries

past events are intended by questions, but answers are
reached by studying the traces of those events.

The answers

lO?"But in the world med:tated by meaning one can recollect and reconstitute the object of the world of immediacy. Tt is already, out, there, now, real. It is already:
it is given prior to any questions about it. It is out: for
it is the object of extraverted consciousness. It i~here:
as sense organs, so too sensed objects are spatial. It is
now: for the time of sensing runs along with the time of
what is sensed. It is real: for it is bound up with one's
living and acting and somi:ist be just as real as they are."
Method in Theology, p. 263.
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are directly based on the evidence, but indirectly they
refer to the past events because they are answers to questions .108

Historical objects are, therefore, objects

mediated by meanings.
Just as there are at least two meani.ngs for the term
"object," so there are at least two meanings :for the term
"objectivity."

The standard for objectivity in a world of

lived immediacy is the successful satisfaction of animal
needs.

Food satisfies hunger, the ingestion

jects lying ready-to-hand fills that need.

o:f

edible ob-

But things be-

come more complex in a world mediated by meaning.

There

is the experiental objectivity of monuments, artifacts, and
documents which survive from the temporal past ;_nto the
temporal present.

Their objectivity depends on their "giv-

enness," i.e. they are not created by individuals in the
present but are inherited from past generations.
There is the normative objectivity of historical evidence and of historical understanding developed on the basis
of research and of intelligent procedures. 109 This type of
lOBibid., .PP• 262-263.
1 090ur inclusion of historical evidence under the
topic of normative objectivity presupposes our earlier arguments in regard to the determination o:f the historical
character of "given" materials. To say of something that
it is "historical evidence" is already to classi.fy what is
given and to anticipate how j_t will be related to other
historical pieces o:f information. Therefore, the selectivity process has already begun, and the question can be
raised: Has the historian been attentive and intelligent
in his selectivity?
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objectiv:tty is constituted by the spontaneous desire to
know.

That desire produces methodical procedures which

specify how one can achieve knowledge in a particular
field.

The developed procedures and canons are the publicly

available standards for the indiVidual's performance.
Failure to ask the relevant questions, misuse or oversight
of pertinent materials, proposals which express private
wishes rather than solidly based insights--these invite
public censure.

And the basis for this censure is the ex-

pectation that there is a right way (a normative way) of
proceeding with investigations.
There is the absolute objectivity achieved by reaching the virtually unconditioned.

In this third instance,

the results of experiential and normative objectivity are
combined.

Experiential objectivity supplies the fundamen-

tal limits within which historical evidence is selected
and understood.

Normative objectivity supplies the intel-

ligible connections between evidence and the historical
thesis.

This combination produces a thesis which in fact

has its conditions fulfilled or which most probably has
its conditions fulfilled.llO
A further complexity must be introduced.
insights but also judgments accumulate.

Not only

Spontaneous curi-

osity can be attentive to a limitless number of problems-llOMethod in Theolo~, p. 263. Other sources for
these distinctions among ~pes of objectivity are Insight,
pp. 377-383; and "Cognitional Structure," in Collection,

PP• 229-231.
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but not at the same time.

A shifting attention which is

intellectually motivated does not simply discard past experiences and insights in a concern to "see" the latest
novelty. 111 Instead, the attentive subject moves to new
experiences with a wealth of past experiences, acts of
understanding, and judgments.

Particularly these past

judgments provide a reservoir of reliable positions from
which to develop new insights and modes of investigation.
Thus, for example, the scientist develops competence in his
laboratory techniques.

His past experiences and achieved

understanding guide his present work.

Techniques which he

has found useful and results which he has confirmed as
highly probable under controlled circumstances are the
basis for new experiments.

This collection of sedimented

understanding and affirmed conclusions is trusted by the
scientist.

He makes use of it without repeating all the

earlier tests and calculations.

Consequently, his scien-

tific performance presupposes a patterned context of prior
Lonergan locates the primary notion of objectivity within such a context. 112 This fourth distinction injudgments~

troduced into the notion of objectivity can be both defended
and exemplified in historiographical procedures.

111Martin Heidegger has analyzed the curiosity of the
everyday conversationalist. His concise and devastating
descriptions of idle talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neu~ier),
and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) are presented in Being and
Time, pp. 211-219.
112Insight, pp. 3?5-3??.,
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In a

~umber

of places, we have argued that historians

do not come to their work empty-headed.

What they do bring

with them is likely to be an assortment of prejudices, untested opinions, and gleanings from the works of other historians.

This uneven collection of resources belongs to
the relative horizon of the historian. 11 3 But continued
research and inquiry can produce replacements for these
initial presuppositions.

Throughout his professional car-

eer the historian accumulates a vast array of technical
and not so technical information.

Along the way he makes

many judgments which fUture inquiries will presuppose and
go beyond.

What does he say about his earlier conclusions?

Does he say they are merely more opinions piled on top of
the opinions which he held at the start of his career?
No, he repeatedly makes cross-references between present
projects

and past conclusions.

For the most part the

latter are settled and provide a test for new results.
But this is to affirm that new conclusions--as individual
historical judgments--are usually subordinated to the accumulated and interrelated judgments referred to by the
primary notion of objectivity. 114
ll3we do not want to imply that a basic horizon could
not evidence an equally varied assortment. Typically the
undifferentiated basic horizon will contain a mixed collection of vague opinions about human knowj_ng and about what
can be known.
114we say "usually subordinated" because new discoveries and new sources of information may require revisions
within that context of earlier judgments. Again, historical
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The vcµue of the preceding distinctions in the term
"objectivity" becomes apparent when one confronts less
complex views of objectivity.

Hayden W'b.ite notes that nine-

teenth-century historians proposed conflicting· accounts of
historical knowledge. 11 5 ~nvolved in these conflicting accounts were varying opinions about historical objectivity.
Eager to place history on the high plateau of the natural
sciences, some historians identified historical objectivity
with the experiential type. 116 In doing so, they manifested
a misunderstanding of the performance of the empirical scientist and confused one aspect of historical objectivity
with the whole complex notion.

Historians of an idealist

school of thought supposed that objectivity was a matter
of coherence in one's system of thought.
that one could not "see" the past.

They recognized

Rather, there were the

data recorded in documents and the historical interpretations constructed upon them.

These constructions were prod-

ucts of the mind, a mind which developed coherent symbolic
judgments in most cases approximate to but do not reach the
virtually unconditioned. Further relevant questions may
have been overlooked, and so probable historical judgments
are just that--probable--and not certain.
ll5Metahistory, pp. 21 and 26.
116For example, Fustel de Coulanges wrote, "'History
is a science; it does not imagine, it only sees •••• '"
'"The historian ••• seeks facts and attai..ns them by the minute observation of texts, as the chemist finds his in the
course of experiments conducted t-li th minute precision.'"
Quoted in c. v. Langlois and c. Seignobos, Introduction to
the Study of History (New York: Henry Holt, 19~5), p. 216,
?ootnote !.
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universes but was not capable of grasping past events. 117
Here the idealist mistakes normative objectivity for the
complex notion of objectivity.
How is the complex notion of objectivity related to
I

!·

these alternate views of historical objectivity?

First,

because it is a notion parallel to the complexity in human
kn.owing, it allows one to determine in what sense these
alternate epistemological views are correct and in what
sense they are false.

What they affirm is correct: there

is an experiential component and there is a normative component in historical objectivity.

Historical data provide

a field within which evidence is selected; the immanent
demand for a coherent correlation among evidence, insights,
and expression produces an imagtnative reconstruction of
past events.
exclude.

But these views are mistaken in what they

Just as knowing is not simply a matter of sens-

ing, so objectivity is more than careful observation.

Just

as knowing is not simply a matter of understanding what is
experienced, so objectivity is more than expressing insights
into available materials.

The historian has to determine

whether or not these insights are plausible; he not only
links them together in a coherent fashion, he also wants
to know whether his elaborate reconstruction is true.
this complex notion of

objectivi~y

So

is a critical standard

for the alternate views of objectivity.
ll?Method in Theology, p. 239.
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But objections will be forthcoming.

To the experi-

ential component of objectivity one may object that there
is no independently given historical datum.

Now, depending

on how one conceives the givenness of historical data, one
will either accept or qualify this objection.

Quite liter-

ally there is no isolated given which is reached through a
pure sensible receptivity, i.e. a receptivity which wholly
precedes interpretative processes. 118 But equally so, the
118 This point is argued at some length by Israel
Scheffler in Science and Subjectivit~, Chapter 2, pp. 21-44.
Our earlier arguments against the possibility of presupposi tionless history are applicable to the radical view
of a pure historical given. Historical data which stand in
more than a purel;y potential relation to a subject (i.e. are
yet to be noticed) are already classified as "historical, 11
and their connections with the subject's prior framework
and prior historical understanding are already drawn in an
anticipatory way (i.e. the anticipatory way in which specific questions probe for certain possible answers).
Our previous arguments for the qualification of Lonergan' s concept of potential historical evidence presupposed
that one could distinguish between data and evidence. Potential data are the given as given, e.g. a patnting is observed
when we enter a room, but we must approach it in order to
discern what it is a painting of. By noticing the painting in the first place, we have organized a field of vision
which also may include furniture, lamps, other wall hangings. But by a conscious ef.fort we focus our attention on
a particular item and proceed to discern the .features of the
given item.. Our attention is selective, and so the surrounding furniture, etc., "recedes" as a given but undistinguished environment.
Evidence, however, refers not to the intended object
alone but to the constellation of questions and of prior
knowledge w!lich we bring to our selective inspection of the
painting. Before we are interested in it and ask about its
origins or historical significance, it is not evidence-even in a potential way. The basic argument remains the
same.: historical evidence presupposes (1) the selectivity
process, and (2) the basis .for selectivity; namely, a subject's interests and inquiry originating in historical consciousness. Given data are not potential histori.cal evidence because what makes them "historical" is not a potential but an actual relation to historical interests and inquiries.
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historian does not create the materials which he finds already preserved in archives.
Unless one identifies historical research with staring at archival stacks, the· historical objects of research
Will be more than simply given.

As noted in Chapter Two,

history is a problem-solving discipline.

Therefore, his-

torical research is always about something; indiscriminate
potential data are always differentiated when they belong
to historical projects.

Prior to that differentiation (i.e.

the selectivity process), potential historical data are
diffuse.

The archival stacks (i.e. the undifferentiated

field of givens) contain differences, but insofar as the
materials simply lie there and are not part of some present
project, the differences are unnoticed.

Now just as his-

torical research is always about something, so too historical evidence is always evidence
tion of historical interest.

f2!: some problem or ques-

Ye must conclude, then, that

the given as given is first of all a negative concept, i.e.
it is the basis· for avoiding solipsism; and, second, it is
a residue which remains after one subtracts from the precise question about the given: (1) the descriptive terms
used to indicate the given, (2) the categories or classifications expressed by those terms (e.g. historical entity);
(3) the insights on which one's classification is based. 11 9
ll9"Again, the given is residual and, of itself, diffuse. It is possible to select elements in the given and
to indicate them clearly and precisely. But the selection
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Yhat

~his

subtraction leaves is an "object"-of the

world of immediacy.

If it remains in that world, such an

object is neither named nor described.

But this indicates

that historical objects always belong to a world of mediated meanings.

Marks on paper, papers on shelves, stones

on top of stones--these are not given historical objects.
But set an intelligent historian to work on them, and he
will constitute them as historical by classifying them in
relation to other historical objects.

His classification

depends on his antecedent framework of adopted concepts and
modes of explanation, 120 but that framework requires content.
Only experience provides that.

Consequently, there is a

dist~_nct place for the notion of experiential objectivi ty. 121
and indication are the work of insight and formulation, and
the given is the residue that remains when one subtracts
from the indicated
(1) the instrumental act of meaning by which one indicates,
(2) the concepts expressed by that instrumental act,
(3) the insights on which the concepts rest.
Hence, since the given is just the residue, since it can be
selected and indicated only through intellectual activities,
of itself it is diffuse; the field of the given contains
differences, but in so far as they simply lie in the field,
the differences are unassigned." :rnsight, p. 382.
120 rsrael Scheffler has aptly sWDDarized the relation
between categories of meaning and experiential content.
"Categorization does not, in other words, decide the forms
of distrjbution which items will in fact display, nor does
it, in itself, determine the categorial assignments of any
particular item or class of items yet to be encountered.
Such special anticipations may, however, be expressed by
suitable hypotheses. Categorization provides the pigeonholes; hypothesis makes assignments to them." Science and
Subjectivity, p. 38.
121 The content of historical experience is identified
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Objections may be voiced against the normative component of objectivity.

Historjans are often dependent on the

preserved statements of contemporaries to past events.
Those statements are based on actual observations of past
events.

So long as there is no reason to suspect decep-

tion, those statements are the objective standard for the
subsequent works of historians.

In the absence of trust-

worthy eyewitness accounts, historical objectivity is impossible.122
A twofold reply can be made to this objection.

First,

the meaning of any preserved statement depends on the context in which it was made. 123 Eyewitnesses to a Pharoah's
with neither an undifferentiated, sensibly confronted given
nor a wholly constructed datum. Rather, historical frameworks provide antecedent guidelines for distinguishing and
correlating h:i.storical data. At the same time, they do not
supply the data, nor do they determine what particular tentative connections will be made. :&cperience supplies the
data, and the process of discovery leads to hypothetical
arrangements of historical materials.
122J. w. I-Ieiland radicalizes this line of argumentation. Objective historical conclusions are reached by correlating evidence in the present with events in the past.
But one can establish a correlation only by observing those
past events. Since this is no longer possible, historical
objectivity is imposs;ble. The obvious presupposit:ion here
is that historical judgments must be based on "seeing" the
past. J. W. I1eiland, Scelticism and Historical Knowledge
(New York: Random House, 965), pp. 113-120.
12 3n. H. Fischer cites some obvious examples of this
truism. "The statement that a Norman army defeated a
Saxon army at Hastings in 1066 is mean:ingless without reference to a map of England, and also to our calendar. For
a I1oslem, the same event has the different date of 459."
Historians• Fallacies: Toward a Lo ic of Historical Thou ht,
p.

•
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conquest have left inscriptions which exaggerate enormously
the numbers of the vanquished and the amount of plunder
taken.

There is a literal meaning to these inscriptions

and a figurative one.

Both have a historical significance.

The historian must draw upon his prior knowledge and his
sense of the plausible to distinguish the two.

And this

discriminating process requires something belonging to the
second part of our reply.

To assume that primary histori-

cal sources provide the major standard of objectivity,
simply because they preserve eyewitness accounts, compounds
a basic confusion of knowing with seeing. 124
.Primary sources may contain factual statements, but
not merely because the writers were eyewitnesses.

They had

to be attentive to what was going on; they had to understand not every detail of the events but those aspects
which then appeared significant.

They had to formulate

124Lonergan works out the steps through which this
basic confusion develops until one reaches the point where
objectivity appears to be a matter of knowing-throughlooking. In "Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 232-

233.

A further example of this basic confusion occurs in
an article by John Brooke, "Na.m.ier and Namierism," in Studies in the Philosophy of History, pp. 108-109. The autE:Or
draws an analogy oetween our observations of constellations
among stars and the patterns of historical "facts" woven
by the historian. Just as constellations are relative in
appearance to the place of the observer, so patterns of
historical interpretation are relative to the standpoint
of the historian. Consequently, historical objectivity is
impossible. The thesis of perspectivism accounts for relativity in historical interpretations without excluding
the possibility of objectivity. The cited example does
exclude this possibility because it presupposes historical
knowing is like seeing.
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·their recoll.ections.

All this requires more than a look.

So, too, critical history makes a discriminating use of
prtmary sources.

What did the writers mean?

What were

they capable of witnessing and what is interpolation?

How

well does what they say correlate with what is already
known about the reported events?

What consequences have

occurred after those events which were not reported by the
same eyewitnesses but certainly altered the significance
of the events?

These questions proceed from a dynamic in-

telligence seeking to understand materials and to relate
them to a broader context.

Both the original production

of those materials and a subsequent critical use of them
required the operations of direct and reflective understanding.

Thus, there is a distinct place for the normative

component of objectivity.

It is not identified with an

experienced there-ness (the observable) but with the distinct level of cognitional acts termed "intelligence."
To the absolute notion of objectivity, one may object that.historical procedures are never carried out in
isolation from prior preconceptions and values.

Historians

have no set rules to follow which guarantee unbiased results.

They must be selective, and, hence, implicit preju-

dices can affect what use is made of materials and of professional techniques.

The historical understanding which

is achieved will be too incomplete, too thoroughly rooted
in individual preferences to be considered objective.

Any
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judgments

p~ssed

on such understanding will be merely re-

assertions of the basic preferences which guided the inquiry
from the start.
Two responses can be made to this loosely knit set of
objections.

First, there is the response which disting-

uishes between the psychology of historical interpretation
and the logic of historical interpretation. 12 5 There is
no denial that, in order to be selective, the historian
must evaluate and the basis .for his evaluation may be variable preferences, even distorting biases.

This predeter-

mined selectivity affects what questions he asks, but it
does not necessarily affect how well he answers them. 126
Moreover, the answers that he does achieve have yet to be
trans.formed .from hypothesis to .fact.

So

psychological

blocks to correct understanding must not merely be possessed·
by the historian, they must be applied at different levels
of his work.

They must interfere not only with the ques-

tions he asks but also with the procedures which clarify
125ttorton White makes use of this distinction to criticize the historical relativism of Charles Beard. Cf.
"Can History Be Objective?" in The Philosophy of History
in Our Time, p. 199.
126 "\.lhen we ask whether historical inquiry is value
free, however, our chief concern should not be with this
kind of variability. For the different evaluations of historians :i.nvolved in their decision to ask different questions will be ingredient, not in their inquiry, but in their
choice of it. It is when historians give different answers
to the same questions that the problem of objectivity within the inquiry can be said to arise." William H. Dray~
Pnilosophy of History, p. 30.
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and interrelate and finally pass judgment on answers to
those questions. 127 Given the.conclusion of Chapter Four
on the possibility of detachment from bias, we may conclude
that such a recurrence of blocks to historical understanding and to rational thinking may turn up, but that it will
not happen of necessity.

Broadly used, the logic of his-

torical interpretation is concretized in both internal and
external restraints on perduring distortions of intelligence.
For example, the historian's education involves·a
process of internalizing techniques for checking the reliability of materials.

Such a technique may be manifested

in the simple question: Does what this author say in his
autobiography seem suspiciously self-serving?

Now the his-

torian may initially be suspicious of his subject's expressed motivation; however, suspicions have to be confirmed, and the historian must be careful not to allow any
personal antipathy to hasten his judgment.

Even if antip-

athy does· get in the way, there are external restraints
on its effects in the individual's work.

Once published,

that work will be liable to the criticism of other historians more sympathetic to the author of the autobiography.
127Lonergan cites a number of authors who agree that
there are critical procedures which caeteris tartbus lead
to objective historical knowledge. These pub ic procedures off er a measure of control over the variables of personal preference. iience, it is easier to locate and to
remedy mistakes. Cf. Method in Theology, p. 196.
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They may be able.to marshal evidence and arguments against
the individual historian's negative judgments.
There is the objection that absolute objectivity is
a notion foreign to historical work. ·because that work is
always incomplete.

The presupposition here is that one
cannot know anything until one knows everything. 128 .An
ideal of the unconditioned is thus set up: an objective
judgment is one based on a grasp of all there is to be understood.

This ideal can only be reached through a total

understanding which leaves no further questions.

Short of

this total comprehension, there is only partial understanding joined with partial incomprehension. 129 Historical interpretations are open to revision, and hence, are never
objective, i.e. definitive.
But our second response points out that absolute objectivity has been conceived in terms of the virtually unconditioned.

That is, a judgment of historical fact af-

firms, not the whole of history, but a single conditioned
hav~ng

filled.

a finite number of conditions which are in fact fulHistori_cal judgments are, thus, limited commitments

to specific problem areas.l30

It is enough that other

128.Ernest Nagel finds a corollary to this presupposition in the metaphysical doctrine of the internality of
all relations. Applied to history, this doctrine condemns
every historical work as a mutilation of past events. But
the same condemnation will have to be extended to science
also. "The Logic of Historical Analysis," The Philosophy
of History in Our Time, p. 209.
129rnsight, pp. 342-343.
130Ibid., p. 345.

,
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historians can go over the same evidence, can

mak~

the same

connections between evidence and thesis, and can judge the
results.

Historical events are contingent and, for the

most part, unique occurrences.

But a true affirmation of

them is not relative to the one who affirms.

All of which

is a wa:y of saying that the virtually unconditi.oned is a
basis for the public nature of historical knowledge. 1 31
Thus, the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned is part
of historical work.
, Before concluding this section of the chapter, we
should comment on the issue of objectivity in relation to
ethical commitments.

Hayden White considers this issue

under the heading of "ideological implications of one's
view of historical knowledge."

Burckhardt's view of know-

ledge as "pure seeing" is cited as an example of reactionary political thinking. 1 32 Charles Beard was aware of similar ideological implications in the "scientific" school
of historiography founded by Ranke.

"Written history that

was cold,. factual, and apparently undisturbed by the pass:tons of the time served best the cause of those who did
not want to be disturbed."l33

What are the implications of

l3libid., p. 378.
1 3 2Metahistory, pp. 233-237.
l33charles A. Beard, "Written History as an Act of
Faith," The ?hiloso
of Risto · in Our Time, p. 142.
Hayden ' i te arrives at a si_mi ar conclusion. "But objective history, like impressionist art, was a bourgeoise
phenomenon, the history of the middle class; and in refusing
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the complex notion of objectivity?

Does the notion of the

virtually uncond:itioned serve party interests?
First of all, the complexity of the notion of objectivity is parallel to the complexity of human knowing.
Therefore, this notion has a basis in the performance presupposed by every developed school of thought.

The basic

epistemological position (namely, that the real is reached
by intentional acts terminating in an affirmation of the
true, the verified) is likewise derived from an analysis of
cognitional performance.

The major implication of all this

is that historical objectivity is not derived from some
external criterion or control which, when accompanied by
a passionless

devotion or a pure seeing, guarantees fac-

tual conclusions.

Rather, historical objects belong to a

world mediated by meaning and motivated by value.

As a

result, objective historical judgments are reached only
through a subjectivity which develops and adheres to its
own spontaneous attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and· responsibility.

Put another way, objectivity is
a consequence of authentically developing subjectivity. 1 34

to judge the past, the objective historian begged, like
Burke, to escape a judgment of himself." Translator's Introduction, "On History and Historicisms," in Carlo Antoni's
From History to Sociology, p. xxiii.
1 34 Nethod in Theolo~y, p. 265. The criterion of authenticity applies to bot surface and deep levels. It is
the absence of contradictions between what a person says
about his performance and what that performance actually
is. Therefore, intellectual conversion is required. It
is the willingness of the person to conform his procedures
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The

no~ion

of the virtually unconditioned as_ the

basis of objectivity does not imply necessary truths in
history but only judgments of fact.

Historians operate

on a number of levels of factualness.

There are recommen-

dations that historians confine themselves
description of what happened.

to an exact

Given this limitation, his-

torical facts are the reconstruction of what actually happened.

But, as argued previ.ously, critical history con-

structs narratives explaining what was going forward in
the past.

Therefore, evaluative interpretations are made;

significant acts and their consequences are isolated on
the basis of criteria consistent with the historian's view
of historical advance or decline.

The employment of such

evaluative criteria presupposes a speculative philosopbJr
of history.

Though we cannot digress from the analytic

and methodological concerns of this dissertation in order
to elaborate such a speculative system, we can briefly
to the precepts made explicit through intellectual conversion. Therefore, intellectual responsibility or moral
conversion is required.
Since our concern is for the methodological aspects
of historical practice, we do not take up the issue of
moral responsibility in the non-technical areas of everyday liv~ng. However, what is said of intellectual responsibility in regard to the scholar can also be applied to
his decisions concerning non-specialized courses of action.
Authentic subjectivity is not isolated in a single area of
a person's life. Therefore, the same formal maxim applies
in both technical and non-technical areas of human living:
What one knows should guide one's decisions, so as to make
one's doing consistent with one's knowing. We will return
to this maxim later in this chapter.
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indicate that previous chapteis contained two implications
for such a speculative philosophy.
First, the reactionary conservatism of Burckhardt's
view of human knowing is shown to be misguided.

Historical

facts are not si.mply given, but require the intelligent
and rational intervention of the historian.

So, too, the

theory of history which denies the possibility of objective
,,

historical knowledge usually contains a basic confusion
about historical knowing.

This confusion breeds a suspi-

cion that historians are only the artists of a past age and
that they contribute no useful insights for contemporary
decisions and actions. 1 35 But a differentiated basic horizon reveals criteria for evaluating the historical acts
of past figures.

Not only oversights but also the stubborn

maintenance of obscurantist positions become manifest.
And, in terms of what cognitional performance ought to be,
these historical positions are negatively criticized and
their future repetition is warned against.
Second, some criteria of historical progress and of
historical decline can be proposed.

! f human authenticity

is envisioned as a responsible commitment to the desire to
know, then cultures which favor intellectual adventures
can be said to be advancing in at least part of their life.
On

the other hand, closed societies (particularly totalitarian

l35Burckhardt shared this suspicion with others, and
felt no obligation to participate actively in efforts to
change his society. Cf. Metahistory, p. 243.
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states) can be criticized for thwarting the spontaneop.s
intellectual life of their

members~

There are many fac-

tors to social prosperity besides intellectual freedom.
But the absence of intellectual maturity guarantees a lessening ability to respond to the crises encountered by
every society.

Eventually favorable military, economic,

geographical, and agricultural factors will be offset by
the unwillingness of subjects or citizens to respond to
crises in a cooperative and rational way.
Previous compromises of intellectual responsibility
can gradually compound their effects until objectivity is
labelled a "myth" and prejudice is said to be all-pervasive and unconquerable.

Then the willingness of individuals

to respond to social crises in a cooperative way will be
rationalized by a widespread belief that human planning and
decisions cannot affect the outcome of onrushing events.
All of which is a way of saying that the issues of objectivity and critical thinking are not abstruse problems fit
only for the classroom or scholarly journal.

Rather, their

social and ethical implications turn up as part of contemporary problems.
In summary, this third section has taken the first
step in supplying an epistemoiogical basis for determining
the realism of different conceptions of history.

A basic

epistemological position has been derived from human cognitional structure.

Tn the following section, it will be

3??
used to criticize claims to historical realism.
Central to our epistemological study was the issue

ot historical objectivity.

Ye approached this complex

issue by first treating the component issues of historical evidence and verification.

Historical evidence is

usually proposed as a bulwark against solipsism and arbitrary reconstructions of the past.

But what is meant by

historical evidence is not immediately clear.

rn clari-

fying its meaning, we indicated certain preconditi.ons to
historical evidence: the classifying function of historical
intelligence, the specific question which anticipates an
:intelligibility in the evidence.

These preconditions were

the basis for our thesis that historical evidence is always
formal evidence.

An

understanding of the evidence is usu-

ally formulated in a hypothetical proposition requiring
verification.

The process of verifying statements is usu-

ally said to require a "sufficiency" of evidence.

However,

this is another term which is not immediately clear.
Since evidence by itself does not compel assent,
there must be another element to the verification process.
Lonergan's distinction between acts of direct understanding and acts of reflective understanding allows this other
element to become manifest.

Direct insights provide ten-

tative organizations of historical events; reflective insights determine how well direct insights, their expression, and the known evidence correlate with one another.
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But the cone.apt o.f"correlation"needs more precision.

That

precision is supplied by an explanatory thematization of
reason-in-act: the virtually unconditioned.

We worked

through the various steps by which historical judgments
approximate to the virtually unconditioned: the conditioned,
the known conditions, the links between them, and the act
o.f reflective understanding which grasps the fulfillment
of the conditions.

So that this explanatory .form of the

verification process would not seem purely formal, we
exemplified how it might work in a hypothetical instance.
Among other functions, the notion of the virtually
unconditioned gives a clear insight into the rational component of cognitional performance.

This insight was cru-

cial for making the transition from cognitional theory to
epistemology.

Rational performance occurs in the question

for reflection, and the epistemological concern is for what
an answer to such a question affirms.
ened our analysis of the "af.firmed."

We gradually deepOn

the level of or-

dinary speaking, the affirmed is the true.

But what is

true is, in the first place, a formulated meaning and, in
the second place, one's grasp of the interpreted events.
Historical affirmations do not take as their object historical data or historical suppositions.

What is affirmed is

historical fact.
Again, we have a concept requiring clarification.
Historical facts are neither givens nor arbitrary constructs
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(i.e.

purel~

imaginative descriptions).

They emerge when

answers to questions establish a correlation between an
object of thought (the conditioned meaning) and known evidence (the conditions).

And since the questions intend

past events, the answers are mediations of past events and
their consequences.
tion.

There are two poles to every media-

Tn regard to historical facts, there is the side of

the knower: cognitional acts assemble themselves into compound acts of historical knowing.

There is also the side

of the known: cognitional intend:ings assemble partial ·objects (what is intended) into a single compound object.
What is the relationship between these two poles?

The

thesis of isomorphism is Lonergan's response: the structure of historical knowing is similar to the structure of
known historical facts.
The thesis if isomorphism is an explicit link between
Lonergan's cognitional theory and his critical realism.
The validity of the thesis is established by a rather simple argument: to deny it, one must presume it.

This conclu-

sion entails the basic epistemological position of critical realism, namely, the real is to be identified with the
true, the affirmed.

In respect to historical questions,

historical reality is what is reached through an affi.rmation of correct understanding.

.Put another way, historical

facts are affirmed answers (meanings) to questions for reflection--answers which

a~proximate

to and sometimes reach
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the virtually unconditioned.

That same virtually .uncondi.

tioned was exemplified implicitly by the steps taken to
reach this point.

The basic position of critical realism

was the conditioned; its conditions belonged to the "deep
structure" of cognitional performance.

The thesis of iso-

morphism linked the two, and our argument for the validity
of the thesis proved that the conditions were fulfilled.
The affirmed epistemological position was crucial to
our clarification of historical objectivity.

Tt allowed us

to form a notion of objectivity parallel in its complexity
to the complexity of human knowing.

Just as there is more

than one meaning for the term "object," to too "objectivity" has multiple meanings.

The primary meaning remains

that of a patterned context of judgments, and we exemplified this in both scientific and historical learning.

The

experiential, normative, and absolute meanings or types of
objectivity were clarified.

More significantly, we argued

the usefulness of these distinct types by contrasting them
with less complex views of objectivity.

Arguments or objec-

tions based on these less complex views were made against
the complex notion of objectivity.

Since a basic epistem-

ological thesis has been affirmed, our responses to the objections were more than tentative.

But in a sense the re-

sponses were only introductory to the more complex problems
of the following section.

Those responses exemplify an

application of critical realism to problems of objectivity.
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The next sec.tion extends that application to issues of
historical realism, a science of history, and a strategy
for resolving the theoretical impasse of the crisis of
historicism.

"
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HISTORY AND SCIENCE
The primary goal of this section is to manifest how
an epi·stemology based on cognitional structure of:fers a
test of historical realism.

The discussion will be con-

ducted initially in terms of the relation of history to
science.

This way of proceeding is justified because claims

of superiority for one historical perspective over others
have usually been phrased in terms of a science of history.
That is, one conception of history is superior to or

~ore

"realistic" than others because it approximates to scientific methods and results. 1 36 This phrasing of the issue
will eventually be qualified.

-

What will remain intact is

the basic assumption that historical realism can be determined only on the basis of a critical method.

Because of

fundamental differences between science and history, the
needed critical method cannot be "borrowed" from the natural
sciences.

But, as argued already in Chapter Three, there

is an explanatory technique which is not derived from but
rather grounds scientific methods.

Thus, the initial prob-

lematic will be rephrased: How does transcendental method
1 36 rn Chapter Three, we noted how some schools of
historical thought attempted to model their own procedures
upon methods in the natural sciences. We also noted the
revolt initiated by Dilthey against this imposition of an
extraneous ideal. The relationship between history and
science, even if it is not one of imitation, must be clarified. Hence, the problem of historical realism will first
be placed within the context of this relationship.

p
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function as a critical hermeneutical measure of historical
realism?

History and Science: Similarities and Differences
Hayden White's study of nineteenth-century historians
outlines the troubled relationship between history and science.

In the first place, even among those who advocate a

scientizing of history, there is no consensus on what a
science of history would be. 1 3? Multiple conceptions of
scientific history were advanced in the nineteenth century,
but no compelling theoretical reasons established the superiority of one or more conceptions over the rest. 1 38 Some
historians concluded that the search for a scientific history was misguided in the first place.

White's own conclu-

sion is that the demand for the scientizing of history is
but the statement of a prior, precritical preference. 1 39
l37Metahistory, pp. 12-13. Although Hayden White employs the term "scientization" to describe the process of
modeling historical procedures on scientific practice, we
prefer the term "scientizing." Our reasons are twofold:
first, to avoid an unnecessary neologism, and second, to
indicate that the "modeling process" is an ongoing process
of assimilation--at least as an ideal.
l38 Hegel, Marx, Ranke are mentioned as representative
figures of different schools of scientific history. Tbid.,
pp. 432-433·
l39In his own words: "the demand for the scientization
of history represents only the statement of a preference for
a specific modality of historical conceptualization, the
grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but the
epistemological justification of which still rema:tns to be
established." Preface to ibid., p. xii. J. Juizinga has
argued similarly for a preferential basis to the desire for
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And even amqng those who "prefer" to do scientific his-

tory, there will be different conceptions of what constitutes a science of history--different conceptions again
manifesting different preferences.
A study of nineteenth-century historiography, therefore, yields contrasting viewpoints about both the relation
of history to science and the determination of historical
realism.

White identifies one of the key underlying prob-

lems to both of these disputed areas.

No agreement has

been reached over what should count as a specifically.historical datum.

Those who sought to make history a science

recognized that historians did not investigate the same
things as scientists studied.

rnstead, they hoped to study

their own field in a scientific way, i.e. they were to borrow methods and not objects from the scientific field.

But

what was not forthcoming was a consensus on the proper
field of objects for methodical historical investigation.
So, the preliminary step to be taken is to distinguish historical objects from the objects of other sciences.

Obvi-

ously such a distinction cannot be made from within the
historical field.

\rib.at is needed is a metahistori.cal basis

for distinguishing natural and peculiarly historical phenomena.140

We can advance toward such a distinction by

scientific history, in "A Definition of the Concept of History," Philosophy and History, edited by H. J. Paton and R.
Klibansky (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 9.
14011 The resolution of this problem requires a metatheory, which will establish on metahistorical grounds the
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considering in more detail the differences between history
and the natural sciences.
Specific differences between the two fields of inquiry emerged because of a controversy.

One party to the

controversy was represented by J. B. Bury's confident declaration: "history is a science, no less and no more; ••• 11141
The other party took as its motto Goethe's maxim, "!ndividuum est ineffabile. 11142 The latter group argued for the

primacy of individualizing description over the generalizing classifications of the natural sciences.

Human activi-

ties of h:l storical signifi.cance were unique events and not
the expression of a constant ahistorical human nature. 143
The implications of this ineffable individuality were, first,
a distinct subject matter for history and, second, a method
distinctions between ~erely 'natural' phenomena and speci.fically 'historical' phenomena." Ibid., Metahistory, p. 429.
This problem and the need to resolve it, lest history be
tied to nothing in particular, was recognized earlier. See
Langlois and Seignobos, !ntroduction to the Study of History,
p. 215.
141 rnaugural lecture, "The Science of History," reprinted in The Varieties of History, p. 210.
142Meinecke placed this maxim at the front of his
study of this second party. Cf. Historism, p. vi.
143 11 The essence of historism is the substitution of
a process of ind:tvidualisin~ observation for a generalising
view of hUIJan forces {n his ory." Friedrich Meinecke, in
."Preliminary Remarks" to ibid., p. lv. G. G. Iggers summed
up the historicist thesis-:mus way: "There is no constant
human nature; rather the character of each man reveals itself only in his development. The abstract, classificatory
methods of the natural sciences are therefore inadequate
models for the study of [the] human world." The German
Conception of History, p. 5.
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different from, but hopefully no less accurate than, scientific method.

A question mark hung over historical pro-

cedures as a result ·or this controversy.

History was un-

avoidably less precise than science, but in what way was
it more than fiction?
To answer this question, the differences and the similarities between history and science will have to be studied.

As mentioned previously, a long-standing problem has

been how to distinguish between natural and historical objects.

On the basis of earlier conclusions, we can propose

a solution to this problem.

To begin with, the distinction

must be the result of an empirical analysis.

The natural

sciences result from patterned activities (methods) which
repeatedly and cumulatively grasp insights that are immanent, not in what is imagined, but in what is observed.
Similarly humanistic disciplines advance by methodical procedures which focus on empirical data (e.g. monuments, records, art works).

Now the common empirical field which

science and history both presuppose is human interiority. 144
The data of consciousness are not the ex2licit subject matter for either discipline.

But the data of consciousness

are empirjcal, and our proposal is to base on them a metahistorical distinction between scientific and historical
objects.
144Another way of saying this--both science and history are constructed in part through acts of conscious intentionality.
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The third section of the chapter clarified the notions of object and objectivity.

Empirical data, whether

they be data of sen5e or data of consciousness, belong to
theoretical enterprises.

Scientists, historians, philos-

ophers talk about data as experienced.

They dist:i.nguish

what is empirical from what is merely imag-ined, and in doing so they set up a series of classifications and hypotheses which guide their exper-ience.

That is, they mediate

their experience through acts of meaning.

Among these acts

are various ways of denoting the contents of their experience (e.g. ! ! empirical, problematical, measurable).

In

contrast, "objects" in the lived world of immediacy are the
merely encountered, i.e. what is ~ attended to for empirical-theoretical purposes. 145 The implication is that both
scientific and historical data are objects in a world mediated by meaning. 146
145we have in mind here the difference between two
experiences. In one case, a person accidently trips over
a stone in his path. In the other case, an archaeologist
picks up the stone to examine it. The latter shows a theoretical interest guided by an object which for him is an
empirical datum.
146It would not be inappropriate to speak of "worlds"
of meaning instead of a single world of meaning. We choose
the singular here to force an issue tnto the open. Previous discussions of closed systems of thought have referred
to them as closed "worlds" of meaning. This characterization is intended to explicate one consequence of limiting
human intelligence to the level of expressions. Multiple
historical perspectives, as Hayden White indicates, manifest prior preferences for different modes of historical
conceptualization. These different modes are chosen in advan9e of historical research; they will determine the ways
in which historical data are understood and expressed. Now,
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The world mediated by meaning is not identified with
the content of anyone's immediate experience.

Nor is it

identified with the totality of all individuals' worlds of
in the light of two different modes ·or conceptualization,
and on the supposition that meaning is identified with expression, the understood data will not be the same in both
historical perspectives. With a variance in modes of conceptualization, there will be a variance in what is understood. Consequently, those who use different perspectives
will not be able to talk to one another about the same
events. Their speech will be about events in different
worlds.
One way out of this conclusion is to insist on the
distinction between sense and reference. While the sense
of one's terms is dependent on the context in which they
are used (e.g. the term "abnormality" will have different
senses depending on who is using it, psychologist, biologist, doctor), the referrents of the terms maintain a relative constancy. That is, different meanings in different
perspectives still can have a common referrent in what is
observable. (Israel Scheffler uses the distinction between
sense and reference to argue along this line. Science and
Subjectivity, pp. 54-63.)
However, the distinction between sense and reference
is not adequate by itself. The basic issue is one of locating a common norm for different ways of speaking about
the same events. Reference is to an empirical datum for
which there may be many senses. But, on the basis of our
previous discussion of objectivity, what is normative will
be found not in empirical consciousness (which contains
the referrent) but in intelligent and critical consciousness. Consequently, it is the intelligent pursuit of insight which can mediate between referrents and multiple
senses, between the "same events" and different ways of conceiving and talking about them. (Without repeating earlier
arguments in section three of this chapter, we are here presuming that understanding and conceptualization, while mutually dependent, are not identical. Rather insight precedes expression.) Our earlier conclusion (cf. section
three) bears repeating: critical consciousness which develops systems of meaning can also transcend the inherent limits of its thought-products.
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immediate experience.

Meanings are, in the first. pla.ce,

acts which not only refer to what is experienced but also
express an understanding of' the experienced.

And usually

such meanings belong to a context broader than the individual' a lived experience (e.g. insofar as meanings are
linguistic, they participate in a common language which
the individual does not create but shares).

As part of'

this larger context, meanings do not require the presence
of "objects'' in an immediate world. 147 Memories are meanings which mediate what is absent; literary works relate
an author's past thoughts and experiences; historical narratives relate events which once were lived but now are
past.
In a world mediated by meaning, what difference is
there between scientific objects and historical objects?
Scientific meanings have a basis in experience (e.g. the
nuclear physicist tests a thesis against the observable
traces provided by an electron microscope); historical
meanings have a basis in experience (e.g. the historian
takes pains to find evidentiary materials which challenge
his interpretation).

However, the biologist or the physi-

cist is concerned with objects that have a natural origin.
The amoeba is not created by human actions; the structure
of DNA is not created by an artist with a flair for complex
symmetry (though the imaginative model of' a twisting ladder
l 4 ?"Dimensions of Meaning," Collection, p. 253.
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is a construct). · The scientific meanings which mediate
these "objects" are constructed by human intelligence striving to understand and to explain how objects function irrespective of human intentions or actions.
On

the other hand, historical objects are constituted

by human acts of meaning.

For example, where once stood

jungle, now stand the remains of a great Aztec ctty.

His-

torical actions transformed a natural enVironment into a
human world.

Laws were made to regulate human communica-

tion; roads were built in all directions to unite single
cities into an empire.

Hierarchies of officialdom were set

up and preserved to guarantee that the order won at hard
labor would survive the founders.

The components of these

institutions and rules are acts of meaning which themselves
have a history. 148 Institutions, laws, roles in society
develop through ti..me.

Changes in them are not alterations

of physical properties but changes in meaning.

An empire

is radically altered if it loses the loyalty of its subjects.

An institution may grow stronger as laws guarantee

that every social class have access to its benefits.
!n a previous discussion, we proposed that constitutive relat'ionships can be consi..dered primary historical
objects.

That proposal gains added support from our dif-

ferentiation of historical and scientific objects.
148rbid., pp. 253-254. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann devote-a chapter to social institutions as realities
composed of acts of meaning and sedimented relationships.
Cf. The Social Construction of Reality, Chapter II, pp. 47128.
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Historical objects are both mediated (i.e. understood) by
acts of meaning and are constitUted by (i.e. composed of
and by) acts of meaning.

For example, the Magna Carta is

more than ink spots on parchment.

It is a historical ob-

ject composed of expressed intentions to regulate the relationship between king and subjects.

And the historian

grasps those expressed intentions not by simply looking at
the docUiilent but by his own acts of meaning which interpret
what was meant by the writers.
The question invariably arises: Are not the referrents
of meanings the realities?

The meanings themselves are men-

tal constructs which help to clarify what is "really real,"
namely, the concrete objects of experience.

Our previous

work allows us to penetrate this ordinary way of thinking.
The presuppositton is that known objects are the entities
of the lived world of immediacy, i.e. the already-out-therenow-real.149

Since meanings, or better, s~nce objects con-

stituted by meanir.@3are not these concrete immediate entities, knowledge of the former is not knowledge of the real
but an understanding of mere thought-objects.l50

On

the

149This presupposition is manifest among historians
who speak o:f a term, e.g. "England" or a "Constitution," as
a convenient way o:f speaking but not as a term referring to
anything real. What is real are all the concrete objects
which are English or all the concrete practices which are
constitutional.
l50we take this conclusi.on.to be a restatement o:f the
thesis o:f idealism. Within this position, the distinction
between natural and human sciences will be based on the difference between external and jnternal experiences. Sciences

392
basis of previous conclusions, this ordtnary way Qf thinking can be criticized.
First, besides objects merely encountered, there are
objects mediated by meanings.

In science, there are the

meanings (or intelligible relationships) immanent in natural processes which scientific investigation discovers,
formulates, and attempts to verify.

Tn history, there are
the meanings which historical beings constitute. 1 51 Historians proceed from traces to a recovery of meaning.

They

work out the intelligible relationships which contemporaries of past actions may not have known even though they
initiated those relationships.

And like the scientist, the

historian formulates and seeks to verify his organization
of past events and consequences.

Therefore, the world of

lived immediacy does not provide the "really real" which
science or history investigates.

The world mediated by

meaning is the sphere of scientific and historical operations.
Second, the presupposition is that known objects are
the entities already-out-there-now-real.

But knowing is a

consider objects-out-there; humanistic disciplj_nes grasp
introspectively that which is part of our inner experiencing--an internal empirical content. .Matthew Lamb finds
that Dilthey bases his distinction between the natural and
human sciences on this difference. For Lamb's comments
and critique, see "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 146-147.
151~., p. 330, footnote 188.

393
compound actiVity, and what is known is parallel in complexity to human knowing.

Consequently, known objects are what

is correctly understood--in our case, hypothesized arrangements of constitutive relationships which, in fact, have
their conditions fulfilled.

The ordinary way of thinking

contuses one component of the known with the compound object known.

This is its empirical prejudice: to View its

knowledge claims as basically direct experiences of what is
empirically given.

If the ordinary way of thinking rec.og-

nizes complexities in its achievement of understanding, these
complexities are ·usually said to be subjective additions.
To

~ow

is to grasp what is simply there-to-be-seen; any

other operations and their products are ideation and thoughtobjects.

Meanings are, thus, secondary matters; what is

important is the meant.

But historical objects are mean-

ings constituted by human activities.

Those meanings can

be correctly understood (i.e. known); and since the real is
identified with what is correctly understood, the ordinary
way of thinking manifests its own incomprehension. 1 52

152W'hat we have tried to synthesize under a single

heading (i.e. "the ordinary way of thinking") is really two
positions. First, objects are what is already-out-therenow-real; and, second, human meanings are.constructs which
do not reach the "real." If the first posi-eion is stressed,
~hen knowing will be a matter of mere observation.
If the
second is emphasized, then what we understand is not the
real but the ideal products of human intelligence. Lonergan speaks of these two positions as the "horns" of a rather complex philosophical dilemma. "From the horns of that
dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has
not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling
strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms;
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In summary; we began this discussion of historical
objects with a wtdely recognized problem: How does one
distinguish between natural and historical objects?

Given

Hayden White's analysis of the problem, the required distinction must be based on some metahistorical position.
First, we suggested that common grounds for both history
and science are found in the empirical data of consciousness.

Both fields of inquiry presuppose the patterned activities of conscious intentionality. 1 53 Second, since

both fields are theoretical (though not exclusively so),
their intentional objects belong to a world mediated by
meaning.

But here a difference in objects emerges.

Nat-

ural sciences intend meanings immanent in natural processes
while historical studies intend meanings which historical
beings constitute.
both a

natura~

Human decisions and actions transform

world and man himself.

The transformations

have a historical meaning which is the relationship between
event (or act) and consequence (or expression). 1 54 Finally,
that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half
human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism
and idealism and, 9n the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism." Introduction to
Insight, p. xxviii.
l53Because of this common presupposition, the distinction cannot be drawn along the lines of inner and
outer experience.
l54The peculiarly human character of such relationships becomes evident when one considers an example offered
by Lonergan. Scientists could take measurements, note
activities, and count participants in a legal process but

r
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we noted how some basic epistemological confusions can generate an oversight of the reality of historical meanings.
Our distinction between natural and historical objects,
thus, rests proximately on an epistemological realism and
ultimately on a metahistorical, cognitional theory.
The difference between natural and historical objects
is one of a number of differences between science and history.

A second difference is apparent in the way that dis-

coveries are expressed in each of the two fields.

Scien-

tific discoveries must be expressible as parts of an internally coherent system.

The individual discovery must be

valid across a set or series of particular cases.

This

is the characteristic notion of generality or universality
applied to scientific results.

If an individual discovery

is incompatible with a s:ingle relevant case, it is refuted.155

On the other hand, historical discoveries are formulated
as parts of narratives.

They fit into descriptive accounts

of particular persons, places, and times.

Usually there is

no attempt made to generalize from the particular instance
to a larger number of historical instances.

In contrast to

scientific generality, there is a historical admission of
uniqueness. 1 56
never conclude, purely as scientists, that they were in a
court of law. "Existenz and Aggiornamento," in Collection,
p. 244.

l55Method in Theology, pp. 179-180 and 229.
l5Gibid., p. 180.

The "uniqueness" of historical
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thi~d

and major difference between history and the

natural sciences lies in the former's use of ordinary language.

Hayden White's delineation of multiple modes of

historical conceptualization presumed that historians had
not developed a s:ingle mode for

express~ng

their insights.

Scientific insights may be formulated initially in ordinary
language, but professional consensus requires a reformulation of them into a technical vocabulary.

The difference

events is sometimes contemned when contrasted with the generality (and presupposed sameness in instances) of sci-entific results. The classic statement is Aristotle's remark
in the Poetics (?.5): "Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those
of history are singulars." (Quoted from The Basic Works of
Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, New York: Random House,

1970,

P· 1464).

Two remarks are in order. First, the uniqueness of
historical events is never absolute. On the one hand, historical knowledge is not isolated from the common-sense
living of the historian and of his audience. What is
learned about past events may be of use in the present.
Or what is learned about one historical era may shed light
on another era which the historian subsequently investigates. This is not to say that the events of a past era
are repeatable in any exact way in a subsequent era. However, the analogous connections drawn by common sense between experiences widely separated in time do not require
exactness. Ordinary language is not bound to univocal
terms in.the same way as the natural sciences. Nor are its
generalizations required to have the same degree of exactness as usually is demanded in the natural sciences. On
the other hand, the term "unique" is not applied in a vacuum. It is used to characterize the distinctively individual traits of a historical person, place, or time. But
those individual traits are called "differences," and differences are only noted on the basis of similarities. Thus,
the defeat of the Spanish Armada was a unique event both in
time and place. But other foiled invasions share a commonality with this particular defeat. At least linguistic
classification requires this coIJIIlonality since many particular instances can be labelled 11 attem:pted invasions." Patrick Gardiner discusses a number of misconceptions about
historical uniqueness in The Nature of Historical .ExPlana~' pp. 43-46.
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here is not just one of expression but also one of object.
Scientific inquiries seek to formulate the intelligibility
of natural regularities.

In contrast, historical inquiries

usually pursue not the regular or the routine but the exceptional.

A series of past events is usually investigated

because the events and their consequences marked a departure from previous routines.

.Even if the abnormal is not

the main topic, still the historian recognizes some uniqueness in his topic.

What he reconstructs is a past that
most probably will never be repeated. 1 57
Differences in expression and in objects yield differences in knowledge.

Scientific explanation is systematic,

and its formulations have a generality which allows predictability in regard to individual cases.

Historical ex-

planations are similar to common-sense knowledge. Both focus on the particular and the concrete. 1 58 Their results
express an understanding which may be of use in future
l5?Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 230.
1 58w. H. Walsh states this widely held position: History "is not an abstract but a concrete science, and it terminates not in general knowledge but in knowledge of individual truths." Philoso h of Histor : An Introduction, p.
43. Given our ear ier remar s on uniqueness in is ory,
this distinction between general knowledge and knowledge of
individual truths cannot be pushed too far. Generalizations
about governmental policy during a particular period are
made by historians. However, the generalizations are secondary to the determination of individual facts. Perhaps
Collingwood takes the wisest course when he argues that no
precise separation of history from natural sc~ences can be
made in terms of generalizations in the latter and individual facts in the former. See The Tdea of History, pp. 16616?.
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inquiries, but that use cannot be predicted or assumed.
Rather, a new insight will be needed to determine the relevancy of past results to new problems. 1 59 It is also
the case that a historian's own common-sense opinions cannot be used indiscriminately to guide his study of past
ages.

Other peoples and other times had a different common

sense.

Therefore, the historian's own accumulated insights

into human motivation, reactions to crises, and rationalizations of mistakes may be foreign to an earlier period.
Again, the self-correcting process of learning may gradually introduce him to another way of ordinary thinking and
speaking.

Then his historical understanding will still

not be systematic in any scientific sense, but it will contain the incomplete common-sense wisdom of some former
time.160
l59we have in mind here the incompleteness of commonsense knowledge. Chapter Two considered how a new insight
into a present situation must occur before prior cor:u:n.onsense opinions can be applied to it. Similarly, in history,
the study of one revolution does not produce results which
can be automatically applied to other revolutions. Relevant
similarities would first have to be discovered before preVious conclusions about how a single revolution began could
be said to be applicable to other political upheavals.
This is a basis for Lonergan's thesis that historical explanations are sophisticated extensions of common-oense understanding. (Method in Theology, p. 230.) Our discussion
in Chapter Two of relative horizons drew the connections
between these two modes of understanding, but then we were
not concerned with differences between history and science.
160rbid., Method in Theolo5y, p. 305. The difference
between scJ.ence and history that emerges from the distinction between theoretical expression and common-sense expression is sufficiently apparent that Lonergan proposes to base
a terminological distinction upon it. "Science" is the term
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Given the preceding differences between history and
science, some co.I!llilentators have concluded that a scientific mode of explanation is superior to coI:UD.on-sensical historical explanation.

In the n!neteenth century, demands

for the scientizing of history were in some cases based on
just such a value judgment.

However, the preceding differ-

ences indicate that history cannot be a science in any complete sense.

Its proximity to common-sense knowledge is

perhaps the most solid barrier to an:y complete scientizing
of history.

Are the demands, therefore, to remain complete-

ly unfulfillable?
In the first place, the presupposed superiority of
science over history must be qualified.
• •

quiry are not the same for both.

The fields of in-

We have already indicated

that history is primarily a study of constitutive relationships.

The implication of this is that history has a much

wider existential fjeld than, for example, mathematics.

At

the same time, the doing of history presupposes a wider
existential commitment on the part of the historian; his
relative horizon is more obviously at work in historical
interpretations than it would be were he a mathematician. 161
for knowledge contained in laws or pr'5_nciples and either
verified universally or else revised. "Scholarship" is the
term for learning about the coI:lilon sense of former times. In
the latter case, the learning process results in the incomplete knowledge which characterizes common sense. See ibid.,
pp. 233-234.
161Martin Heidegger notes this difference but argues

that each of the fields of inquiry has its own proper
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So in di.f .ferent .fields of inquiry there will be different
demands placed upon the investigator.

In history there is

a demand .for common-sense explanations because the content
o.f the field is made up o.f unique instances and because
the historian seeks to understand the common-sense thinking, speaking, and acting o.f a .former time.
Second, the supposed superiority o.f science over
history is sometimes based on an oversight of diversity
in modes of verification.

A scientific hypothesis can be

tested by repeatable experiments.

But a historical hypo-

thesis about fairly unique events cannot be tested by repeating the sequence of decisions and actions leading to
those events.

Instead, historical verification proceeds

by way of inference from preserved and understood materials to a reasonable approximation of what in fact was the
case. 162 Now this different mode of verification cannot
be labelled "unscientific" or "inferiorn (1) because, again,
it is the proper way of proceeding for a distinct discipline, and (2) because among the sciences there are fields
o.f inquiry which work in the same way, e.g. geology and
some specializations within astronomy.

Our conclusion

is

controls (methods) and is not to be judged superjor or inferior to the other. "Mathematics is not more rigorous than
historiology, but only narrower, because the existential
foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range."
Being and Time, p. 195.
162The inferential character of historical verification is discussed by R. G. Collingwood in The Idea of History, p. 176, and pp. 251-252.

r

t

!.

401

that the natural sciences are not "superior" to hi,story but
are merely different enterprises with different fields of
inquiry and different modes of explanation.

Both history

and the sciences have distinct purposes, and to charge that
history is not scientifically rigorous in its results is
to confuse the purposes of history with the purposes of
the sciences. 163
A contemporary debate among philosophers of history
shows a continuing confusion of such purposes.
generally focuses on causal analysis in history.

The debate
The

~en

tral issue is whether in determining causes of historical
events, the historian is either implicitly or explicitly
making use of laws. 164 We have already noted that historical inquiry into supposedly unique events is not wholly separate from generalizing and classifying ways of thinking.
lG3"It is mistaken, for example, to claim for scientific explanation a superiority over commonsense explanation: both have their use. We do not want to be scientists
all the time. Indeed to quarrel with a co:m.oonsense explanation on the ground that it lacks the precision and comprehensiveness of an explanation occurring in one of the sciences is to complain that it should perform a different
function froIJ the one it in f'act performs, ••• " Patrick
Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, p. 25.
164The literature of this ongoing debate is extensive.
C. G. Hempel's work is of'ten cited as the start;ng point
tor the contemporary discussion of laws in historical explanations. See his article, "The Function of General Laws
in History," reprinted in Theories of HistoH, edited by
Patrick Gardiner, pp. 344-356. The same an ology contains
valuable articles on this topic ~y Morton White, Alan Donagan, and Michael Scriven. William Dray has produced a thorough study of the issues covered by both sides in the controversy. See his Laws and fJ:lanation in History (London:
Oxford University Press, 195 •
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But the qualification must be added that, like common-sense
knowledge, historical knowledge is not primarily a series
of generalizations.

Rather, an explanation of the causes

of particular historical events

rema~ns

confined in its

application to those events until further insights into
different events yield some basis for finding the earlier
explanation relevant to the different events.
This incompleteness of historical explanations across
different situations implies that one cannot deduce the
causes of one set of events (e.g. a revolution) simply by
knowing the causes of a prior set of events (e.g. an earlier revolution).

!ndeed, the term "cause" is not used in

the same way in both science and history.

For scientists,

'
"causal connections" refer to required conditions
of events,

e.g. given chemical mixtures of x, y, and z, phenomenon A
will be observed.

But for historians, "cause" has the

loose, nontechnical meaning of everyday speech.

"Event B

occurred because two people were afraid to trust each
other. 11165 This use of "cause" first appears in the
child's curiosity about events around him.

The common

sense of adults contains multiple uses of the term which
165Henri Marrou, along with others, recommends that
this loose use of "cause" be dropped from historical language. His reasoning is that even scientists have found
more precise ways of speaking about connections between
events. (The Meaning of HistofY, p. 191.) However, the
ordinary language of historica explanation will most
likely continue to include this and other terms of imprecise but flexible meaning.
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make up in flexibility what they lack in precision.
One may argue that historians' performance rather than
a scientific ideal of explanation should guide discussions
about how historians explain events.· A strong support for
such an approach is surely the absence of any convincing
example of a historical law other than a truism. 166 What
historical performance manifests is a constant awareness
that generalizations require proof, and usually the more
cases that are studied the more watered-down become the generalizations.

Truisms will result, but then common-sense

generalizations are usually truisms or else principles
which can only be applied to specific cases after a further
insight into those cases.
So far we have noted a number of differences between
history and science.

There are differences in objects, in

the expression of discoveries, in the use of technical language, in the priority of generalizations, and in the modes
of

explana~ion.

The study of these differences followed

upon two questions.

First, history is unavoidably less pre-

cise than the natural sciences, but in what way is it more
166w. H. Walsh strikes at the basic weakness of the
theory of historical laws by noting the absence of a single reputable example. See his article "'Meaning' in History," in Theories of Histort' edited by Patrick Gardiner,
pp. 303-304. 1Je might add t at the imposition of a deductive model of historical explanation may well proceed from
that basic confusion of deduction with insight studied in
section three.
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than fiction?

Second, are the demands for the scientizing

of history completely unfulfillable?

.Answers to these ques-

~-

tions can be

r~ached

by turning from the differences be-

tween history and science to their similarities.

An obvious similarity lies in the methodical investigation of subject-matter.

Both history and science pro-

ceed in a discriminating and cumulative way.

As opposed to

collections of random bits of information (the building
blocks of some future as-yet-unknown theory), both history
and science are guided (1) by commonly accepted procedures
and (2) by specific problems which may be studied for' any
number of reasons.

Just because historians speak in the

language of everyday living, it does not follow that the
everyday man can do competent history.

At least one pre-

requisite is mastery of the procedures relevant to some
historical specialty. 16? There are professional, public
controls over these procedures in both fields of inquiry.
These controls (e.g. the critique of works through book reviews, the questioning which follows delivery of a paper at
a convention) are the mark of scientific and scholarly disciplines.
Although history is scientific in the sense that it
16?w.· H. Walsh, Philoso h of Histor : An Introduction,
pp. 38-39. John Higham s wor , iis or~: ro essiona Sc o arship in America, narrates the historical development in
~his country from histories written by amateurs (often extremely competent ones) to histories produced by a professional community.
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is guided by method, sttll the results yielded by methods
will not be the same in history and in science.

Cumulative

results in science fill out well-defined systems while
cumulative historical results fill out a narration of particulars.

What remains true of both ways of proceeding is
that the results are public and can be tested by others. 168
However, the modes of testing are more numerous in the sciences than in history.

Usually a critic of some historical

interpretation will arrive at his counter-conclusions only
by going over the same evidence and through the same investigation that the other historian made before him. 169
If both history and science yield verified results
and if those results are publicly verifiable, then there is
no difference in their results insofar as truth values are
concerned.

A nineteenth-century school of historical posi-

ti Vism assumed that historical knowledge, like scientific
168 The emphasis on public control of individual results is evident in Peter Gay's description of a qualified
scientific history: "history is a discipline with its own
criteria of excellence; it is public, self-corrective, never
complete, and in this sense, sctent:ific. And in its character of science, history is a progressive discipline--that
is to say, a discipline capable of progress as well as regression." A Loss of Maste : Puritan Historians in Colonial America, p.
•
e simi ari y ere o science ies
in the possibility of cumulative verification. That is to
say, the bias or errors of the individual historian can be
corrected by other investigators who readily admit evidence
and form hypotheses preViously overlooked or willfully discarded.
169Method in Theologt' p. 219. Again, the inferential
nature of historical insig ts limits the ways in which historians can arrive at conclusions. Scientists can devise
many different experiments yieldin~ the same results. Historians can reconstruct different imaginative schemes of
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knowledge, resulted from a careful exa.I:lination of observable data; in the case of history, the data were preserved
materials.

Our previous work has indicated the mistaken

exclusions involved in such an assumption.

Both history

and science use hypotheses and organizing frameworks which
go beyond what is given.

Both disciplines subject these

intelligible schemes to verification processes.

For a

classical ideal of science, what was verified in science
was a general truth which was not a matter-of-fact but a
necessary law governing particulars.

Since history recog-

nized that its primary concern was for the concrete and
particular, the superiority of science with its apodictic
and necessary principles was assumed.

However, the demise

of the classical conception of science elioinates this basis for judging science to be superior to history.l?O

What

remains is that in both fields results are verified in degrees of probability and only infrequently are said to be
certain.
History then is different from the natural sciences,
but it is similar in that both employ methodical procedures
sanctioned by professional communities and both yield
how certain events might have occurred. But ultimately a
limited evidentiary base will allow only some results to be
highly probable.
l?OMatthew Lar:ib notes that the classical dist4_nction
between episteme and ~hronesis was the basis for this value
judgment. "Wilhelm D1lthey's Critique of Historical Reason
and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth
and Meaning, p. 158.
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verifiable results.

While these two similarities .bring his-

tory closer to the sc:i.ences, they move it away from literary fiction.

Collingwood proposed three general areas in

which historical narratives differed from literary fictions.
Historians are not interested in possible or imaginary
worlds but in events which can be spatially located and
temporally dated within one world.
spect such limits.

Novelists need not re-

In addition, since there is only one

historical world, historical interpretations ideally should
be compatible with one another.

No such ideal governs

literary narratives about fictional people, places, and
times.

Finally, historians are concerned with verifying

the results of thejr methodjcal procedures.
for reflection asks, Is it true?

The question

Such a question would

only be asked of a fictional work if the questioner suspected the author of writing a disguised biography.

When

the question is asked by historjans, it is a question
about the sufficiency of evidence.

Literary fictions need

no more basis than the imagjnation and good style of their
authors. 1 71 It is especially this concern for evidence
which makes history something more than fiction.
The question of whether demands for the scientizing
of history are completely unfulfillable can now be answered.
Some of the differences between history and science rule
1 71 R. G. Collingwood, The Jdea of. History, p. 246.
Lonergan summarizes these three differences, in Method in
TheologJ, p. 219.
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out a complete scientizing of history.

These differences

are simply the result of the proper tasks of history which
are not shared with the natural sciences.

More important,

in view of our promise to supply a metahistorical basis
for distinguishing history and science, they are also differences which are established within human intentionality.
Particularly the distinction between common sense and theory has a prior origin in human consciousness.

Our distinc-

tion between historical and natural objects is similarly
rooted in human intentionality which constitutes a world
of meanings.

But besides these differences, there are the

similarities of methodical inquiry and verifiable results.
To the extent that the natural sciences have led the way in
formulating critical techniques for checking hypotheses,
history, in an imitative way, is scientific. 1 72 Historians
will continue to adapt scientific advances to historical
needs, but the adaptation will never be total because of
the basic differences between the two fields.
One purpose of this discussion was to prepare a reply to Hayden Jhite•s thesis that demands for the scientiz1

ing of hlstory were merely statements of a precritical
preference.

His thesis also extended to those who rejected

1 72 The evidence for a partial scientizing of history
is found in the adaptation of scientific discoveries for
historical purposes, e.g. chemical tests for dating manuscripts, statistical principles for evaluating voting trends
in local populations, computerized bibliographies which
facilitate research.
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these demands: their non-scientific historical models were
also the products of precritical preferences.

Now our

study of the differences between natural sciences and history, ·and subsequent conclusion that no complete scientizing of history is possible, have had a critical basis. 1 73
The distinctions between common sense and theory, and between mediated meanings and constituted meanings proceed
from a metahistorical analysis of the subject's basic horizon.

A differentiated basic horizon allows us to make

the first distinction.

An analysis of the intentional

forms of that horizon (i.e. the relations among cognitional
acts) allows us to make the second distinction.

Therefore,

the limits we place on a possible scientizing of history
derive from more than precr:itical preferences.

Similarly

the scientific aspects of historical work can be noted and
defended on grounds other than personal likes or dislikes.
The previous work of this chapter has prepared us to
take a final step toward the central goal of this dissertation.

That step involves the determination of how one can

decide on the realism of various historical perspectives.
This problem was initially formulated in terms of a science
l73we can also point out that demands for a total scientizing of history proceeded, whatever their preferential
grounds might have been, from an uncritical acceptance of
scientific ideals. An appropriation of one's own basic
horizon allows one to return to the world of theory more
aware, not only of the differences between theory and common sense, but also of the proper functions which each
should be allowed to fulfill in its own way.

f'
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of history.

Our study of both the differences and the sim-

ilarities between the natural sciences and history requires
that the problem be formulated in a new way.

Within limits,

i.e. as a methodical discipline the results of which are
publicly verifiable, history is scientific.

But, because

of basic differences, history and its inherent problems
should be considered distinct from the natural sciences and
their inherent problems.

Thus, the problem of historical

realism is better phrased in terms of an explanatory hermeneutical position which cuts across all differences in
historical perspectives.

Explanatory Breakthrough to a Basic Hermeneutical Position
To begin with, let us restate the problem of historical realism.

The recognized fact is the presence of mul-

tiple conflicting historical perspectives.

Among other

points of conflict, these multiple perspectives contain
incompatible claims about historical realj_sm.

According to

Hayden White's reading of the problem, there are no compelling theoretical grounds for arbitrating among the incompatible claims. None is more scientific or "realistic"
than another. 1 74 All that can be said is that the different
1 74 Preface to !1etahistori, p. xii. The leap from the
absence of "compelling theoretical grounds" to a denial that
any perspective is more realistic than the rest is made on
the basis of an argument •. The grounds for adopting a particular perspective/paradigm are moral or aesthetic, not
epistemological. Hence, any claim to provide a more realistic analysis than ~ will simply reflect variable
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interpretative :frameworks are different.

The

dif~erent

views of historical realism which they espouse are rela-

r·

tive to their authors and approving audiences.

I

torians with incompatible notions of historical realism

Two his-

can only agree to disagree.
What is required to resolve this theoretical impasse?
There are at least two intellectual requirements and one
moral requirement.

First, if the differences among histor-

ical perspectives are not to remain merely uncriticized
differences, there must be a critical method for elaborating the development of diverse perspectives on the past.
Second, if this method is to cut across all differences in
perspectives, it must be shown to escape relativity to particular audiences and to an author's variable preferences.
Third, if the discovery of this basic hermeneutical method
is to achieve some breakthrough in regard to the impasse,
it must be possible for one to alter a prior position on
historical

realism for the sake of consistency with this

discovery.
The first two requirements or conditions imply a universal viewpoint which would allow one to pass in a critical way from one historical perspective to another.

This

preferences for a particular type of analysis. That is to
say, one's epistemological position will have a prior,
precritical basis. In section three of this chapter, we
have already provided a counter-argument to this position.
Critical real:ism, as based on cognitional structure and
the assumption of isomorphism, has a non-preferential
basis.
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universal viewpoint would embrace the multiple

co~flicting

perspec.ti ves and would be the basis for critically evaluating how realistic they were.

The third requirement implies

that, if such a universal viewpoint is attainable, then
one who attains it can, if needed, modify his own position
to conform his historical work to his determination or his~orical

realism.

These requirements or conditions anticipate the steps
to be taken in the following paragraphs.
cipate the content of those steps.

We can also anti-

The main thesis is· that

the potential totality of all historical perspectives lies
in the dynamic structure of cognitional activity. 1 75 The
key argument for this thesis has already appeared.

Every

intelligible historical perspective is elaborated by acts
of an intelligent and reasonable subject.

:-row it would be

naive to suppose that historical perspectives were elaborated in the absence of bias, aesthetic preferences, personal
values.

Eaqh intelligible historical perspective presupposes

not only a potentially reasonable and responsible subject
but also a subject liable to errors, omissions, and shortsighted values.

Tnsofar as bias lies at the heart of a

particular perspective, we can say that the discovery of
a universal viewpoint may prompt its remova1. 1 76 Insofar
l?5rnsight, p. 568.
l?GThe conclusion of Chapter Four on the reducibility
and avoidability of bias is the basis for this claim.
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as a historian's perspective suffers from what we shall
call "moral irresponsibility," ·we will have to prove the
possibility of moral conversion--hence, the reasoning behind our third requirement.

Our strategic goal is to link

these three conditions in proving how it is possible to
evaluate incompatible_ claims about historical realism.
What evidence is there for the envisioned universal
viewpoint?

We can argue that the paradigm theory of his-

tory itself provides evidence.

That theory concludes that

historical paradigms, or perspectives, are discontinuous.
They do not !all into a series of increasingly more accurate and comprehensive accounts of a single historical
field.

Tn short, there is nothing cumulative about them

as distinct and sometimes incompatible models of.the past.
The implication is that no critical comparison of different
perspectives is possible.

They are simply different.

How-

ever, Hayden White does present a comparative study of historical paradigms.

Althoµgh he limits himself to a formal,

non-evaluative study of nineteenth-century paradigms, he
still provides a comparison of different conceptions of
history.

What does such a formal comparison imply?

First, it implies a higher viewpoint which can embrace two different perspectives at the same time, note
their differences, and appreciate the relativity of those
differences.

The situation is much the same for the anthro-

pologist on a field trip.

'j

·.~

He attempts to immerse himself
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in an alien culture and to understand that culture in its
own terms.

In avoiding the "sin" o:f ethnocentricity, he

is care:ful not to evaluate that alien culture in terms o:f
his own prior cultural background.

But then the anthro-

pologist is holding on to both cultural systems at the
same time.

He cannot eliminate his own cultural heritage,

:first, because it is too much a part o:f him and, second,
because his anthropological study only makes sense given
the scienti:fic concerns o:f that heritage. 1 77 The native
culture itself does not, in most instances, produce anthropologists.

So the work of the anthropologist implies a

higher viewpoint which is not identified with either cultural system but is something distinct.
A dist1-nctively historical example can manifest the
presence of a higher viewpoint.

A frequently voiced opin-

ion is that Gibbous history of Rome reflects the preconceptions of his own eighteenth century rather than those o:f
the centuries of the Roman Empire.
imply?

What do such opinions

First, those who voice such a criticism indicate

that they know what the thoughts, values, and judgments
were of both the eighteenth century and the Roman age.
effect, they are comparing two different periods.

In

More

important, they are implying that they are not blinded by
or trapped within the preconceptions (the "climate of
l??Peter Berger stresses this latter reason, in A
Rumor of Angels (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 197U),
p.

8.
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opinion") of their own age. 1 78

If they were in fact con-

fined to a s:ingle per-iod, then ·they could not know that
Gibbon's work reflected his own age more than it did an
earli~r one. 1 79 Consequently, they are affirming a higher
viewpoint which can embrace multiple historical perspectives.
The preceding examples do not speak d:i.rectly to the
issue of whether an implicit higher viewpoint permits an
evaluative comparison of different historical or cultural
perspectives.

However, the paradigm theory of history im-

plies that a higher viewpoint does have a critical aspect.
According to that theory, historical paradig:ns are not only
discontinuous, they are also incompatible.

But that is to

imply they are in conflict; they present rival conceptions
of h:i.storical processes.

Now what such rivalry presupposes

is some common framework in which, first, a comparison of
different paradigms is possible and, second, a discovery
can be made of their incompatibility.

·What that discovery

presupposes is that the common framework contai.ns both
comparative and evaluative grounds.

How else would it be

possible to say that two different perspectives not only
were different but also were at odds?

Consequently, the

1 78 This implication can serve as an argument for our
previous conclusions about the transcendence of closed
worlds of meaning by human intelligence.

I

I

l?9Sidney Hook employs thi$ exanple and argument in
his article, "Objectivity and Reconstruction in History,"
Philoso~hy and History, edited by Sidney Hook (New York:
New Yor University .Press, 1963), p. 259.
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higher viewpoint ·must provide a basis for reasonable comparison and _criticism of different perspectives.

Even if

the higher viewpoint does not decide clearly on all the
issues over which there is disagreement, still there must
be such a critical basis over and above the different perspectives.180
In Chapter Three, an argument for a universal viewpoint was implicitly developed.

Historical perspectives

are elaborated, revised, sometimes even replaced.

Such de-

velopment and revision presupposes a principle of development or revision which is continuous from one position to
the next developed or

revise~

position.

In particular, the

cognitional pattern of developing or self-correcting understanding is presupposed throughout the changes in meaning
and in conceptual order.

Since this principle of develop-

ment or revision persists throughout these changes, it is
the a priori condition for such chanBes.

In Chapter Three,

there were arguments to the effect that this a priori condition was invariant, i.e. it was not subject to radical
revision itself.

We can now add that it is also anticipa-

tory of the totality of potential reVisions in meaning and
in conceptual order. 181 Th~t is, as the invariant, a priori
180rsrael Scheffler develops this line of argumentation in regard to the paradigm theory of science. Science
and Subjectivity, p. 82.
181 Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence, pp. 1-2.
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condition for every revision, it anticipates how each revision will be carried out.

This claim will have to be

clarified and defended.
What needs to be clarified is the "higher viewpoint"
implied in the preced:5.ng arguments.

However, the clari.fi-

cation must ultimately be in explanatory terms.

The alter-

native is to account for this higher viewpoint in descriptive terms; but, then, the resulting description takes its
place alongside historical perspectives which are also formulated in descriptive terms.

As a result, there would be
nothing definitive about this higher viewpoint; 182 it

would be a metahistorical position curiously formulated in
the same way as historical perspectives are formulated.
What we are proposing, then, is an explanatory account of
how a higher viewpoint both permits a transition between
(i.e. a comparison of) different historical perspectives
and provides reasons for modifying them (i.e. the higher
Viewpoint has a normative function in regard to lower viewpoints).
The normative function of transcendental method has
already been discussed. 18 3 It is the basic method grounding all specialized methods and procedures.

I

transcendental

met~od

The basis for

lies ultimately in the desire to know

182 navid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan,
p. 141.

18 3cf. Chapter Three, section four.

r
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which spontaneously moves through component acts t_o the
known.

Our account of this development of knowing and of

the known through cognitional acts has been both descriptive and explanatory.

The descriptive approach was evi-

dent in the examples we used of historical procedures.
The explanatory approach was evident when we related those
component acts together in an account of the formally dynamic structure of human knowing.

It was this explanatory

account which marked a breakthrough beyond description to
definition-by-relation.

"But such def1nition-by-relatton-

of-things-not-to-me-but-among-themselves is exactly what
explanation as distinct from description means." 184
An explanatory thematization of cognitional structure

and the formulation of the normative and critical a.spects
of that structure were carried out in Chapter Three.

It

was proposed that an affirmation of this structure and of
its intentional correlates was the mark of intellectual
conversion.

Tn section three of this chapter, we further

explicated the terms of this conversion.

From the side of

the knower, there is the invariant pattern of cognitional
acts.

From the side of the known, there is the compounding

of partial objects into single complex objects.

The links

between these two sides are reason-in-act (which was also
explanatorily thematized as the virtually unconditioned) and
184navid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan,
p. 142.
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the thesis of isomorphism.

Our

conclusion was that the

real is to be identified with the intelligently conceived
and rationally affirmed.
·This epistemological conclusion and its basis, cognitional structure, are components of the envisioned higher
viewpoint.

Both represent how human intelligence and rea-

son proceed in the development and rev:ision of meanings.
A methodical grasp of the structured and normative process
of achieving, revising, and verifying human understanding
is the first step in attaining the higher viewpoint.

.What

is methodically comprehended is the prjnciple of development or revision which is presupposed by all the shifts
from one perspective to another.
What does this comprehended principle mean for the
work of historians?

The initial position is that intellect

itself (or better, the patterned activities of the desire
to know) is what is common to all elaborated historical
perspectives.

Transcendental method formulates the func-

tions of this common framework.

But at least initially

one is left with a rather .formalistic understanding of how
historical positions are developed.

The relationshi.p be-

tween the common principle and historical procedures needs
to be exemplified.

In Chapters Three and Four we were at-

tempting to do just that by showing the relationship between the transcendental precepts and historical procedures.
Lonergan discusses this relationship in terms o.f a metaphor:

r
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the two blades of a pair of scissors. 18 5
The upper blade of historical interpretation is the
subject's appropriated cognitional structure which proVides self-knowledge having universal implications.

That

is, the act of appropriation is a personal achievement
which reveals the a priori pattern of developing understanding in any human consciousness.

Therefore, the elaborated

meanings which compose any historical interpretation were
developed according to this pattern.

However, an under-

standing of a particular historical theory or interpre-ta-

I
1

tion cannot be reached solely by knowing how hum.an cognition proceeds.

Besides the upper blade of cognitional the-

1

ory, there is the lower blade of historical method revealing the historical meanings which can be organized by the
upper blade.

Consequently, historical results are reached

in neither a purely a priori nor a purely a posteriori fashion.

Rather, for the subject who grasps the universal

viewpoint, historical knowledge is the result of a continuing inquiry which moves back and forth between a transcultural base and increasingly organized historical data. 186
The transcultural base is the a priori scheme or cognitional theory which anticipates how any possible set of
historical acts of knowing were reached irrespective of
place or time.

Such a scheme is made possible by the

185rnsight, pp. 577-578.
186Method in Theology, p. 293.
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immanent and invariant structure, transcendental norms, and
procedures of the human mind.

T~ese

are presupposed by

every speculative development, e.g. the elaboration of
historical perspectives.

This transcultural base is put

to use only in an a Posteriori manner when competent exegesis supplies materials for historical analysis.

These

materials are made accessible through inductive lower-blade
procedures of historical method. 187
Some qualifications should be entered here.

First,

the envisioned universal viewpoint is not some complete
grasp of all that historians do know or can know.

A single

indiVidual cannot comprehend all present historical knowledge, and what future discoveries will be made is not yet
determinate.

But the universal viewpoint does provide an

anticipatory framework for what is known and what remains
to be known. 188 That is, while there is no universal (i.e.
complete) historical knowledge, there is a universal order
which is determinate in regard to how historical knowing
has occurred and will occur.

Second, the universal view-

point does not dictate what steps must be taken to acquire
historical knowledge.

To know the appropriate steps, one

must learn the accepted procedures of the historical prof~ssion

and then follow them (i.e. the lower-blade methods)

18?DaVid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan,
p. 42.

188rnsight, p. 483.
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in a more or less trial-by-error approach.

Third, the

I

application of the upper blade will not reveal all the

I

steps in the development of a particular historical theory

r
I'

or interpretation.

The author of a theory perhaps strug-

gled for years to develop it.

Unknown influences may have

slowed his work at one time and pushed it forward at another.

These and other facets of his developing understanding are unrecoverable. 189
Since these qualifications are formulated as negative

restrictions, it remains to specify the positive content of
the universal viewpoint.

The meaning which Lonergan assigns

to it will have to be clarified in a series of steps.

By

"universal viewpoint" he means a "potential totality of
genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints."l90

We

have already indicated that the potential totality is the
anticipated order of historical theories and interpretations.
More specifically, it is the framework which contains in a
virtual way all possible historical perspectives.

But this

virtual content only becomes determinate through interaction with historical procedures and materials.
The totality is of viewpoints or of what historians
elaborate as meaningful contexts for their partial discoveries.

The focus of the universal viewpoint is directed

189Lonergan treats these unrecoverable aspects of a
development of meaning under the heading of a "canon of
residues." See ibid., pp. 590-594.

l

l90ibid., p. 564.
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beyond the elaborated viewpoints to the acts of meaning
which occur in understanding and judging something about
the past.

These are the acts which are components of cog-

nitional process.

Thus, for the subject appropriating the

universal viewpoint, there is the opportunity to move from
his reflective awareness of his own cognitional acts to the
acts presupposed by someone else's historical theory.

The

other person's developed meanings may differ from his own,
but the cognitional process "behind" the differences has the
same form.

The critical point here is to recognize

t~at

historical meanings are developed through human intentionality, and the basic outline of that development can be
known at least in part. 1 91
The totality of viewpoints is an ordered totality.
The ground for this ordered totality is the subject's differentiated basic horizon.

Horizon analysis yields know-

ledge of genetically distinct levels of meaning (common
sense, theory, interiority), and this knowledge can be used
in

retros~ect

to order the discoveries which have accumula-

ted as present knowledge.

On the basis of one's own self-

knowledge, one can locate in the discussion of these

l

l9libid., p. 565. This conclusion is opposed by
the expec~on that historical meanings are "givens" which
a simple process of intending grasps immediately. However,
arguments in both Chapter Three and in this chapter have
shown the epistemological faults of this expectation. On
the contrary, sources of meaning·are located in the intelligent subject (this is not to deny that external materials supply potentially intelligible data for the subject~
The immanent sources of meaning in the subject wi_ll have a
variable content but an invariant structure.

r
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discoveries various confusions or distinctions among the
genetically different levels. 1 9 2 What makes these confusions or distinctions convincing to an audience can be
analyzed on the basis of one's own cognitional self-awareness.l93
The universality of the higher viewpoint lies in
its potential completeness.

This potential completeness

can be considered both from the side of the historian and
from the side of the historical field.

From the side of

the historian, there is an element of necessity in how
all possible perspectives can be developed.

Historical

interpretations may be interpretations of different objects,
but the different interpreters must be multi-levelled subjects operating on empirical, intelligent, and rational
levels.

·1
And, when a"historian
investigates the expressed

meaning of another subject, he shares this multi-levelled
subjectivity with him.

The recorded meanings of the ear-

lier subject have a material basis in the preserved markings on paper or monuments.

But, for meanings to be as-

signed to these markings, the historian must derive that
meaning from the interaction between his subjectivity and
the expressed (objectified) subjectivity of the other. 19 4
l9 2 0ur critique of the imposition of scientific ideals
on historical works exemplifies this type of analysis.
l9 3 rnsight, p. 565.

I

l94"There are no interpretations without interpreters. There are no interpreters without polymorphic unities
of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness.

r
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From the side of the historical field, historical
interpretations conducted within the profession of critical
history are proposed as approximate accounts of what actually happened and as probable explanations of what happened.

Insofar as they are intent upon settling matters-

of-fact, critical historians seek to recover the fixed content of the past and to express their understanding of it
in narrative forms which are likely to vary from historian
to historian.

The assertions expressed in their works pro-

ceed from various judgments about historical reality •.
As argued previously, the real is identified with
whatever is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed.
Previous arguments also located historical realities in a
world mediated by meaning.

Consequently, there is a paten-

tial totality of historical meanings, and four dimensions
of that potential totality will exhaust the number of possible combinations yielding affirmed historical meanings.
There will be combinations (1) of experiences and lack of
experiences (e.g. an oversight of crucial materials); (2)
of insights and lack of insights (e.g. a failure to grasp
There are no expressions to be interpreted without other
similar unities of consciousness. Nor has the work of
interpreting anything more than a material determinant in
the spatially ordered set of marks in documents and monuments. If the interpreter assigns any meanings to the
marks, then the experiential component in that Eeaning
will be derived from his experience, the intellectual component will be derived from his intelligence, the rational
component will be derived from his critical reflection on
the critical reflection of another." Ibid., pp. 566-56?.

426

how two events are interconnected); (3) of judgments and
of failures to judge (e.g. a lack of critical reflection
on one's own work); (4) of the different orientations of
a complicated human consciousness (e.g. an implicit bias

against one party in a historical dispute). 1 95
These four dimensions of the potential totality of
historical meanings are not arbitrarily presented.

Rather,

they express the a priori structure of intentional acts
which lead to affirmed historical meanings.

If that struc-

ture is a precondition to the elaboration of historical
perspectives, then the four dimensions express how that
precondition can be fulfilled in constructing historical
perspectives.

And to grasp this range of possible combina-

tions is to anticipate the totality of contexts which can
be set up as frameworks for historical studies.

Again,

the frameworks become determinate only when one consults
particular

autho~s

and their works, but, in advance of

that specific inquiry, there is an a priori scheme for organizing the different perspectives.

Quite briefly, once

one grasps the invariancy of cognitional structure and

I

I

works out the epistemological impljcations of it, a universal viewpoint becomes possible. 1 96
The preceding sketch of the universal viewpoint has
not exhausted all the content which Lonergan ascribes to
l95Ibid., p. 56?.
l96Ibid., pp. 567-568.

I
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it. 1 97

We settle for a partial account because our pur-

pose is limited.

This chapter is concerned with the prob-

lem of historical realism.

For the sake of avoiding leng-

thy additions to an already lengthy.chapter, we have not
made explicit mention of the metaphysics contained in the
universal viewpoint.

Similarly we will not attempt a

thorough application of the universal viewpoint to any
specific historical perspective.

Such an application would

require a full hermeneutical study of some historian's work.
In attempting that study, we would have to provide a more
extensive treatment of historical valuing--a topic appropriate to a speculative philosophy of hj_story. 1 98 So we
propose to consider the application of the universal viewpoint to only one facet of historical perspectives, namely,
their epistemological positions on historical facts.
The universal viewpoint envisions not only a genetic
sequence of levels of meaning (i.e. common sense, theory,
interiority, and the specializations of each), but also
dialectically opposed meanings.

Some account of dialectical

differences was already provided in Chapter Two.

The mutual

repudiation existing between two. d:i.alectically opposed horizons was noted.

rt remains to account for such dialectical

l9?The universal viewpoint which Lonergan studies at
length in Tnsight (pp. 562-594), becomes the functional
specialty named "dialectic" to which Chapter 10, of :Method
in Theology is devoted.
1 98 Lonergan locates this topic in the functional
specialty of dialectic. See Method in Theology, pp. 245-246.
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I

I

opposition in terms of the universal viewpoint.
The four dimensions of the potential totality of
historical meanings can be combined in various ways.

Cer-

tain combinations will yield dialectical oppositions.

For

example, a failure to understand what it is to understand
may be combined with an experience of historjcal research
to yield the thesis that historical understanding is a
matter of closely observi.ng the meanings given in preserved
materials. 1 99 In contrast to this thesis, other historians

I

may take note of the constructive and critical aspects of
historical procedures.

For them, historical understanding

is reached not solely by an attentiveness to preserved materials but in conjunction with intelligible reconstruc-

.

tions of historical events.

But this group may itself

split into dialectically opposed parties.

On

the one hand,

some historians may consider their hypothetical constructs
to be the terminus of historical understanding.

The con-

structs arrange historical records in a coherent fashion,
but, because the actual events can no longer be directly
experienced and because subjective bias guides the elaboration of historical constructs, these constructs are not

I
J

truly reflective of the past.

On the other hand, some

l99we have already cited Fustel de Coulanges as a
representative of this thesis. In another sense, Charles
Beard is also representative of the thesis. He operated
under the expectation that historical objectivity should
be a matter of strict attention to given facts. Since he
realized this ideal could not be reached, he concluded to
a moderate relativism in historiography.

r
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historians may operate with a notion of objectivity which
requires coherence between data and interpretations while
not excluding or ignoring the possibility of affirming that
true historical meanings mediate past events.

The latter

group argues that a verified historical interpretation is
probably true and that it thus refers to what was probably
the case.
The dialectical oppositions in the preceding positions become manifest when one asks what the different
groups take to be the objects of

histo~ical

understanding.

For the first group, historical objects or events are what
is given in historical experience.

To understand these

objects, one need only exclude extraneous interests and
carefully examine the presented materials.

For the first

party of the second group, historical objects or events
are indirectly preserved in documents, monuments, art
works, and so on.

They are not presented in any direct way,

so one must reconstruct their occurrence through the intelligent and critical use of the available materials.

But,

for the reasons listed above, what this party produces are
not true interpretations mediating the past to the present.
Rather, they produce, or assume that they produce, interpretations which reflect the needs and preconceptions of
the present instead of what was actually the case. 200
2 00Pragmatic theories of history are likely to represent this party. As an example, see Karl Popper's "Has
History Any !'leaning?" reprinted in The Philosop~ of History in Our Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 00-304.
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These two positions on historical objects or events
do not refer to the same things.

The first group refers

to "given" meanings ·in historical remains; the second refers
to the mental constructions of historical imagination.

In

an earlier section, we developed even a third position.
For the critical realist, historical facts are past events
mediated by true acts of meaning. 201 Is it possible to
mediate these dialectical differences over what historical
facts are?
realism.

The basic problem, again, is one of historical
As argued previously, no appeal to historical

evidence by itself can settle these disputes.
mination or

~he

The deter-

historical field and of historical objects

belongs to a prior perspective/paradigm adopted for variable reasons.

Consequently, the mediation of dialectical

differences cannot be grounded within any privileged historical perspective without prejudicing from the very beginning the attempted reconciliation of differences.
However, besides the specialized horizons termed
historical perspectives, there is the basic horizon which
was sketched in Chapter Two.

rn successive chapters we

have worked out the content of this basic horizon.
ally a universal viewpoint has taken shape.

Gradu-

Can this uni-

versal viewpoint mediate the previous dialectical differences'?

The answer is a qualified "Yes."

It is qualified

because the universal viewpoint itself only uncovers the
201 Method in Theology, p. 239.
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sources of the dialectical differences, it does not automatically mediate them.

,Such differences originate in radic-

ally different perspectives, and proofs of an epistemological sort will not automatically be·accepted as disconfirming parts of the developed perspectives.

What is required

is the radical change in basic assumptions and values
which is appropriately named a "conversion."
Care must be taken in relating a radical change, or
conversion, to the reasons for that change.

Hayden White

proposes that a basic shift from one paradigm to another
involves a prior change in moral or aesthetic convictions.
The implication is that paradigm changes do not occur because of the discovery of new evidence or as the result
of reasonable arguments which prove that a change is needed. 202

They occur because of a dramatic shift in one's

202 0n this point there is an affinity between White's
paradigm theory of history and the paradigm theory of science presented by Thomas s. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The latter argues that the transfer of
allegiance from one paradigm to another is the result of a
conversion experience. (p. 15~) Prior to that conversion,
the two paradigms may be in competition, but their differences are not resolved by proofs. (p. 14S.) Lonergan remarks
that the history of scj_ence supports the view that new scientific positions do not often win over their opponents
as the result of reasonable proofs. He cites Max Planck
to the effect that radical changes win acceptance only when
those who have opposed them have retired from their p:>sitions of authority within the scientific profession. (Insight, p. 526.) However, for Lonergan, the fact of opposition is not identified with the thesis that conflicting
scientific positions are unavoidabl~ closed to rational
mediation. The more likely explana:ion is that established
positions are invested with years of effort and familiarity,
and hence, are not changed without reluctance. Given an
habitual way of conceiving certain problems, a scientist

r
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precritical preferences.

To some extent this is an accept-

able account of the radical changes which mark transitions
between historical or scientific paradigms.

Antecedent

frameworks which organize a field of inquiry proceed from
the complex content of relative horizons.

Among that

content one can find moral expectations and aesthetic preferences.

Thus, a change in those expectations and prefer-

ences may be reflected in a change of frameworks.
However, is this all that is involved in paradigm
changes?

There is some eVidence that more than precriti-

cal preferences are involved.

That eVidence is found in

the debates among followers of different paradigms.

Such

debates are not conducted with appeals to intuitions or
personal experiences or private revelations.

Instead, ar-

guments are formulated by the different parties both to jus-·
tify positions and to convince opponents.

This way of pro-

ceeding implies at least the belief that reasonable arguments can be the basis for changes in paradigms. 203 This
implication expands the number of elements 1.nvol ved in
paradigm changes.

But, perhaps, paradigm debates imply a

belief which actually is only a delusion; namely, reasonable
is unlikely to be receptive to new contrary conceptions.
That is to say, the exercise of intelligence and reasonableness is routinized in the older conceptions and will not
automatically be extended to the newer conceptions. (Ibid.,
pp. 525-526.)
203rsrael Scheffler develops this line of argumentation, in Science and SubjectiVity, p. 79.
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proofs cannot a.f.fect the basic assumpti_ons of an C?PPOSed
school of thought.
This possibility can be treated in two steps.

First,

the possibility that .followers of different paradigms are
deluded in their concern for reasonable defenses of their
positions would involve the collapse o.f a distinction between the psychology and the logic of intelligible frameworks.

The preferences, expectations, and variable choices

which ground the maintenance o.f one paradigm against others
belong to the psychological origins of thought-systems.
Seemingly alien thought-systems will derive from different
preferences, and so on.

At this point one has differences

which appear to be relative to precritical grounds.

Given

multiple conflicting thought-systems, it will be difficult
for one party to understand the historical or scientific
conceptions of another party.

But a question .for reflec-

tion addresses not this difficulty but the factualness of
those alien conceptions.

That is, one asks if' they are

valid even if they seem foreign to one's way of thinking.
By asking such a question, one places ltmits on the relativity of historical positions to psychologi_cal differences.
The question for reflection intends the truth value which
escapes these relative differences. 204
Still, there is a possibility that such a question
204Peter Berger argues along these lines, in A Rumor
of' Angels, p. 42.

r
cannot be answered without simply restating the questioner's own personal preferences.

A second step must, there-

fore, be added to the previous step which distinguished
between the psychology and the logic of intelligible frameworks.
This second step has in effect already been taken.
The universal viewpoint is independent of one's personal
likes and dislikes.

!ts independence derives fron the !

priori status of cognitional structure which does not vary
from framework to .framework.

As previously argued, the

dynamic structure of cognitional performance can be .formulated in transcendentai method.

That .formulation makes

explicit the normative aspects of human intelligence in
regard to all speci.alized interests anddebates.

As a re-

sult, the belief that differences a.oong opposed frameworks
are subject to intelligent criticism has a firm basis.

In

other words, one is not deluded in thinking that rational
debate can play an effective role in settling disputes
over paradigms.

There is the upper blade of transcendental

precepts which requires that debates be intelligently and
reasonably conducted.

There is the lower blade of histor-

ical procedures which provides· the specifi!! content for the
debates. 205
2 05The use of the word "debates" serves a purpose
here. Debates are often trtals for rhetorical skills; to
confound one's opponent takes precedence over the attainment of the truth about some issue• • Even outside such
rhetorical exercises, debates are often conducted in ways
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These remarks were an attempt to clarity the relation
between conversions and the reasons for such rad:tcal changese

Admittedly the presence of ethical, aesthetic, and

routinized ways of thinking·makes the background to these
changes quite compiicated.

However, our basic point is

that there are rational grounds for the debates among followers of different paradigms.

Tn this chapter we have

chosen to exemplify these grounds in regard to the issue

oi

historical realism.

respect to this issue.

Dialectical differences occur in
·What, then, are the rational grounds

for sorting out these differences?
The basic epistemological position and its implications for historical objectivity which were worked out in
section three, provide these rational grounds.

Tn particu-

lar, the complex notion of objectivity provides a basic
standard for evaluating the adequacy of historical views
on objectivity.

The justification of this standard is a

matter of appropriati..ng the structure of human knowing.
·:rhus, if a historical vi..ew of objecti..vity overlooks one of
that approximate to verbal brawls. No effort is made to
understand one's "opponent;" ins.tead, the objective is to
demolish his arguments with any means available. Usually
such a proceedi.ng descends to sophistry. However, if a
universal viewpoint can be formulated to embrace the possible range of positions on the issue, tnen it is possible
to discover the sources of differences prompting the debate.
Again, in keeping with the conclusion of Chapter Four,
we presume that it is possible to reject bias and forms of
obscurantism and so "to close the blades of the scissors"
in a critical way.
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the elements of the complex notion (whether it be .the ex-

.

.

periential, normative, or absolute element), that oversight can be traced to a prior failure to understand some
element of cognitional performance.

Charles Beard has

already been cited as a historian whose confusion over
the use of hypotheses in science and in history can be
accounted for in terms of a cognitional mistake.

That

mistake was to confuse the logic and psychology of historiography and, thus, to collapse judgment into understanding. 206
This move from an explicit theoretical or epistemological position to an underlying cognitional assumption
is made possible by the universal viewpoint.

It allows

one to objectify part of the horizon (in this case, the
basic horizon) of another thinker.

And if the basic jus-

tification for this move lies in one's appropriation of
his own dynamic intelligence, then the subsequent objectification eliminates the relativity of the historical interpreter to ·his own relative horizon.

!t also eliminates the

relatiVity to a relative horizon of the one whose epistemological posit;on is criticized. 2 07 Both subjects, again,
share a common, structured performance.

I

That performance

206Morton White presents this criticism of Beard's
theoretical studies of historiography, in "Can History Be
Objective?" reprinted in The Philosolh~ of History in Our
Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 8 -202.
20?rnsight, p. 58?.

~

43?
can be objec.tified; and the objectification can be made in
explanatory terms.

Consequently, a statement of the under-

lying differences in dialectically opposed viewpoints about

..

historical facts or about historical objectivity can be
exact and can be defended independently of the preferences
of either party.
Two qualifications have to be entered.

The upper

blade of transcendental method is not a series of formulae
which, when applied to historical procedures or interpretations, automatically registers a "plus'' or a "minus" in
regard to the worth of those procedures or interpretations.
OUr discussion has been of the subject's appropriation of

his own critical consciousness and not of the acquisition
of propositions which are guaranteed to expose bias or
The basic method is, thus, fallible because human beings are fallible. 208 However, the

failures to understand.

strength of the method lies in its derivation from the
spontaneities or human cognition which occur prior to any
deliberate obscurantism.

The subject who reflectively

acknowledges his own spontaneous desire to know may later
deviate from that self-understanding, but his failure to

I
f

understand is not final.

Further questions.are likely to

occur, so that he again challenges himself to correct past
mistakes.
Besides the qualification which recognizes human
208Method in Theology, p. 254.

r
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fallibility, there is a qualification which
historicity of the critical subject.

~he

reco~izes

the

universal View-

point does not, so to speak, rise above history either to
reveal the meaning of historical processes or to predict
future hi.storical or intellectual developments.

Rather, the

universal viewpoint has its foundation in the dynamic curiosity which becomes specialized in humanistic and scientific disciplines.

These disciplines have a history of

development and differentiation.

And the universal view-

point permits access to the dynamic consciousness which
actually differentiates itself through these specialized
modes of inquiry.

As a result, the achievement of the uni-

versal viewpoint contains both the a priori basis provided
by cognitional structure and the a posteriori content proVided by actual historical developments, e.g. the Greek
differentiation of common sense and theory.
Given our first qualification, intellectual conversion becomes not.so much a fixed achievement as a continual
reaffirmation, in thought and word, of the basic dynamism
of human intelligence and its consequent epistemological
realism.

That such a conversion does not occur automatic-

ally and is not a single event becomes obvious when one
investigates conflicting opinions about human knowing.
Even before one turns to consider human knowing as a topic
tor investigation, the so-called natural standpoint is
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firmly entrenched. 2 09

That standpoint involves nzy-ths about

reality, objectivity and human-knowledge.

The ordinary

assumptions are that knowing is similar to looking, that
objectivity is a matter of seeing what is given without
adding extraneous subjective variables, and that the real
is what is "out there now" to be seen. 210 These assumptions are not easily changed.

I
I

Even when one begins to

recognize the difference between a world of immediacy and
a world mediated by meaning, it is quite easy to slip back
into old ways of thinking.

So intellectual conversion re-

quires that these assumptions be made e:xplic:l.t, their :tn-

'j

completeness recognized, and the various myths eliminated.
But all of this is no single achievement.

There is a grad-

ual discovery of the complexity of human knowing.

Such a

discovery corrects past misconceptions, but what replaces
them is the product of thinking upon one's own thinking,
and this is no simple task. 211
A large part of our previous work has worked out the
cognition~l

and epistemological content which, through

intellectual conversion, replaces the assumptions of the
209The id~es fixes of the natural standpoint become
apparent in introductory epistemology courses for undergraduates. The teacher's experience is likely to resemble
the gradual process of correction first illustrated in
Socrates' conversation with the young Theaetetus.
210Method in Theology, p. 238.
211some of the steps in thfs task were indicated in
Chapter Three. Our discussion of introspection pointed up
at least one of the problems involved in thinking upon
one's thinking.
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natural standpoint.

But to expand one's basic horizon in

recognizing genetically distjnct levels of meaning and in
appreciating the complexity both of knowing and of the
known, is to present a new set of

!.

cal subject.
sponsibility.

p~oblems

for the criti-

The basic issue is one of intellectual reFor it is likely that some bias or distor-

tion of human intelligence has been present in the subject's
previous work.

Intellectual conversion requires that these

sources.of misunderstanding be rooted out.

This is the

requirement; the actual transformation requires that the
theoretic change of intellectual conversion be matched by
the willingness of moral conversion. 212
Again, our discussion has not been of universal propositions and what can be deduced from them, but of the subject's appropriation of his own critical consciousness.
This appropriation is, in the first place, a series of personal discoveries.

I

I
1

Whether the subject will proceed to

operate on the basis of his acquired self-knowledge is a
question of moral freedom. 21 3 That is, it is a question of
212Garrett Barden, "The Tntention of Truth in Mythic
Consciousness," Langg.age, Truth and Meaning, p. 17.
21 3The issue of human freedom is usually raised (in
the analytic tradition of the philosophy of history) as
part of a discussion of the relation between science and
history. Our previous discussion of that relation did not
digress on this issue. However, even without an explicit
mention of the problem of freedom versus historical determinism, that earlier discussion indicated how we would handle such a problen. We argued that historical explanation
is a developed form of common-sense explanation both because
of the language it uses and because of the particular
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whether the self-constituting subject will choose to make

'I
't

his intellectual statements and procedures consistent with
his awareness of what human knowing is all about.
another way--the universal

viewpoin~

Put

embraces the differen-

tiations of human consciousness and the potential totality
of combinations among cognitional acts.

But the universal

viewpoint does not select from among the potential frameworks and cognitional positions those which adequately
express the self-knowledge of the critical subject.
selection or decision is made by the subject.

That

Thus, the

question of consistency between self-knowledge and selfconsti tuting activities belongs to the fourth level of
human consciousness, the level of responsible deliberation and decision.
rn Chapter Four our arguments for the possibility of
avoiding or eliminating bias led up to this question of responsible decisions based on intellectual conversion.
objects it seeks to understand. Common-sense speech and
explanation presuppose human responsibility, e.g. everyday
expressions of gratitude, praise, and blame presume that
human subjects deserve to be commended or censured. In
turn, this presupposes that their deeds could have been
otherwise. So common sense cannot dispense with the notions of human freedom and moral· responsibility without
losing its ordinary way of speaking. Similarly, historical
speaking and explaining cannot entirely suppress these notions without losing their ordinary way of speaking historically. Isaiah Berlin develops these arguments in a more
thorough way, in Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford
University Press, 1954). See the selection reprinted from
this work, in The Philosoph~ of History in Our Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 49-271.
·
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Chapter Three had already drawn the connection between
human knowing and doing, first, by including as part of
intentionality structure the level of human deciding, and
second, by formulating this· fourth l·evel in the transcendental precept: Be responsible.

What does all this imply?

To begin with, the basis of moral conversion lies neither
in universal principles nor in particular judgments.

Ra-

ther, it lies in that same dynamic structure which is the
pattern of developing understanding.

Just as understand-

ing develops in the subject's operations which advance
through their own inherent exigency, so too the subject
who passes judgment on a particular situation is spontaneously faced with the operation of deci.ding..
that

That is--Now

:r understand what human knowing is, what am T going

to do about it?

The fourth level of human intentionality,
thus, completes the process which began spontaneously. 214
The content of acts of deliberation and of deciding

will vary with different individuals, different cultures,
different contexts.

Therefore, an element of relativity

is unavoidable in responsible decisions.

But the relativ-

ity is primarily attached to what the decider knows and
has previously done.

The child and the adult, the unedu-

cated and the educated, the private individual and the. public leader do not bring the same backgrounds to the moment
214Michael Novak, "Bernard Lonergan: A New Approach
to Natural Law," The Nature of Philosophical InquiXA, edited by George F. McLean and Valerie Voorhies, p. 2 •
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of decision.

However, what remains the same for .all of

them is the spontaneity of both deliberation and the implicit precept guiding that deliberation: In the light o:f
what you know, be responsible for what you do. 21 5

.·-

What implications does this precept have for a his-

torian's procedures?

Given the unity of consciousness, the

historian who seeks understanding and is acquainted with the
professional techniques which promote clarity and discourage
obscurity will spontaneously put those techniques to work.
For a specialized consciousness, the desire to know extends
~rom

the i"ield of technical understanding and expression to

2l5An argument for the effective presence of this
precept can be constructed out of examples of inconsistency
between knowing and doing. The war criminal whose defense
rests on the appeal to orders received from a superior,
pleads innocent (1) because the presumption is that superi-0rs have reasons for their orders and these need not be
told to subordinates, (2) because the subordinate is not
expected to deliberate but to follow orders, and (3) any
moral hesitation can be put aside in the belief that what
is problematic for the subordinate may make sense to superiors. The plea then is to a consistency between knowing
and doing, but that consistency is supposed (at least for
the sake·of a defense argument). It is supposed either
that superiors have reasons unknown to subordinates or else
that the duty to obey orders takes precedence over private
scruples.
The response of the courts to this defense can exemplify the implicit precept. Human responsibility is pre.supposed and deliberation is expected from the mentally
competent. The individual cannot abrogate this responsibility even if he is under orders. The judgment of the
courts will reject the defense argument. However, i:f the
subordinate can show that he was unaware of the consequences of his actions, then his charge is lessened. How many
pled ignorance of what actually -Was going on in "those
camps"? Were they not trying to preserve at least a semblance of consistency between what they did (or failed to
:do) and what they knew?
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the field of technical and deliberate practice.

Thus, the

empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject
is also an intellectually responsible subject. 216
Of course, there are obstacles both to historical
understanding and to historical practice.

The multiple

forms of bias are instances of potential hindrances of
efforts to make practice consistent with knowing.

However,

those hindrances are neither insurmountable nor unavoidable. 217
ble.

Therefore, intellectual responsibility is possi-

The transcendental precept, Be responsible, expres-

ses the immanent imperative to criticize one's practice in
the light of one's knowing.

Intellectual responsibility

is measured by this immanent norm, and moral conversion is
the explicit decision that the desire to know shall be
matched by one's willingness to act according to what one
knows. 218
Again, as in the case of intellectual conversion,
this decision is not a fixed achievement.

Flight from

self-understanding and rationalization of failures to act
responsibly are not forever banished by a single decision.
Just as the pursuit of knowledge can engage a subject
through years of study, so too moral conversion is a life216Insight, p. 599.
21 7The arguments for this assertion form the final
section of Chapter Four.
218 Insight, PP• 691-692e
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long process.

Thus, competence in historical

can increase over many years of practice.

pro~edures

That increased

competence involves ·an increased understanding of how one
should proceed with technical labor if the results are to
be in keeping with known standards.

But to know how one

should proceed does not guarantee how one will proceed.
However, years of historical study have already offered multiple opportunities to criticize bias in oneself
and in others.

Tf the historian has used those opportuni-

ties to transcend his own fa;_lings and to avoid those -of
others, his present practice is likely to shun the same errors.

!n other words, facility in solving theoretical prob-

lems will likely be matched by a concomitant facility in
deciding on the responsible course of action.

This facil-

ity in his doing and in his knowing may win public recognition.

Then his intellectual responsibility is not simply

presumed by his peer group.

On the basis of his past per-

formance, that group will not be quick to charge his mistakes to any deliberate obscurantism.

Such a bond of trust

among professionals is a witness to intellectual integrity
which has been demonstrated time and again.

Implicitly it

·is a recognition of moral conversion since the group acknowledges the efforts of the individual to propose only what
meets the immanent norm of consistency between historical
knowledge and histor;cal practice.
In summary, this fifth section has taken the final

r
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series of steps in resolving the problem of historical realism.

This problem is central to the theoretical impasse

of the crisis of historicism.

Our strategy has been to

show a way around that impasse by resolving the problems
of objectivity, of a science of history, and of historical
realism.

Previous chapters prepared the groundwork for the

resolution of these complex problems, and in this chapter
the resolutions have been presented, clarified, and defended.
The question of historical realism could not be ·handled satisfactorily unless there were compelling theoretical grounds for resolving the dialectical differences over
historical objects and historical knowing.

We anticipated

the content of the needed grounds in two intellectual conditions and one moral condition.

There must be a critical

method for investigating how diverse historical perspectives
are developed.

That method must cut across all the differ-

ences in historical theories in such a way as to escape
relativity to particular audiences and their preferences.
Finally, the discovery of this basic method will only lead
to a resolution of the crisis if it can be implemented in
an unbiased way.

The first two conditions were fulfilled

in the notion of a universal viewpoint which embraces the
potential totality of diverse historical perspectives.

The

third conditton can be fulfilled by a critical effort to
make one's historical practice consistent with what is known

r
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about human intelligence and rationality.

Summary of Chapter V
A repeated theme of this dissertation has been that
Hayden 'White's "solution" to the crisis of historicism was
insuf'ficient on a number of counts.

If a more promising

solution were to be offered, certain obstacles to White's
attempt would have to be overcome.

This fifth chapter

concentrated on two of those obstacles: that paradigms are
closed systems of thought and that paradigm changes merely
reflect changes in precritical preferences.

To the first

obstacle (as formulated in the problem of the hermeneutical circle), we opposed both the self-correcttng process
of learning and the universal viewpoint derived from Lonergan' s cognitional theory.

To the second obstacle (as

formulated in the thesis that no epistemologicaljlstification is available for a view of historical realism), we
contrasted epistemological positions on knowing and objectivity which were critically grounded in cognitional performance.
The problem of historical realism turned up in our
consideration of both obstacles.

Different views of his-

torical realism marked the conflicts among nineteenth-century historical paradtgms.

Likewise, claims about the su-

periority of one view over others (i.e. it was a more
"scientific" or "realistic" view) were not explicitly based

rI
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on critical grourids.

Hence, the claims appeared gratui-

tous to those not sharing the same paradigm.

Clearly the

problem of historical realism requires a metahistorical
standpoint beyond the different paradigms.

This stand-

point must allow a critical mediation of their differences
while at the same time being itself defensible against contrary epistemological positions.
The question of historical objectivity provided a
.focus for incompatible epistemological viewpoints, and,
hence, a .focus for arguments in defense of a particular
conception of historical realism.

Tn section two of the

chapter, we offered some preliminary clarifications of
historical objectivity.

Special attention was given to

the relations between data and the inquiring subject, between data and .facts, and among data, facts, and heuristic
.frameworks.

The relations among the last group are current-

ly discussed as the problem of the heroeneutical circle.
The problem of circularity in interpretations can be viewed
in such a way that one accepts the thesis of closed thoughtsystems.

However, we argued that there is a self-correct-

ing aspect to developing understanding which, in effect,
refutes that thesis.

Moreover, correctly understood, the

hermeneutical circle does not entail that thesis.

We sug-

gested that the belief in such an entailment could originate in three ways: through the thesis of presuppositionless
history, through a con.fusion of insight with deduction,
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through a denial of mental acts.
The clarifications of obaectivity begun in section
two were continued in section three.

The component issues

of evidence and of verification had to be clarified.

His-

torical evidence has its preconditions in the classifying
function of historical intelligence and in the use of
hypotheses.

Such formal evidence is connected to the prob-

lems of verification by questions about the "sufficiency"
of evidence.

What is meant by the sufficiency of evidence

can be explanatorily expressed in the notion of the virtually unconditioned.

This notion is crucial for two rea-

sons: it formulates reason-in-act and thematizes the rational connection between Lonergan's cognitional theory
and his epistemology.

\

This rational connection was further clarified in
noting what was affirmed in answers to question for reflection.

\

I

l

To affirm that a historical interpretation is true

is to affirm that, on the basis of the known evidence, the
object of .thought corresponds to past events and their consequences.

The clarity of this type of correspondence was

not simply assumed.

The thesis of isomorphism was presen-

ted, clarified, and defended as explaining how through inI

tentional acts the subject transcends himself toward intended objects.

A basic argument for the thesis ("to deny

it, one must assume it") also proved the validity of an
epistemological thesis identified as critical realism:
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the real is .the truly affirmed.

This epistemological posi-

tion implies multiple meanings .for the terms "object" and
"objectivity."

These multiple distinctions manifest their

usefulness and validity when contrasted with less complex
notions o.f knowing, of objectivity, and o.f the real.
The complex notion o.f objectivity and the basic epistemological position o.f section three provide the .foundation .for the work o.f section four.

There the purpose is

to manifest how one can evaluate claims o.f historical realism.

I

Those claims are usually .formulated in terms o.f

science o.f history.

a

Thus, we had to clarify the relati_on

between the natural sciences and history.

Because o.f fun-

damental differences, that relation will not be one of
identity or o.f thorough imitation.

Still, stnce both sci-

ence and history proceed in methodical ways, have public
checks on the individual's work, and yield verifiable results, one can speak o.f scientific history.

Our main con-

tention is that the scientific aspects of historical work
can be defended on non-preferential grounds.

Similarly,

the non-scientific aspects of historical work can be noted
and evaluated without reducing history to fiction and without conceding that historical explanation is inferior to
scientific explanation.
The question of historical realism is thus removed
.from its usual context of a proposed scientizing of history.
\.Jh.at context is to replace the usual one?

White's
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comparative .study of historical paradig:I!ls, the cul.tural
interchange of anthropologists, and a traditional criticism
of Gibbon's work provide evidence for a higher viewpoint
beyond historical perspectives.

If there is such a higher

viewpoint, does it allow evaluative comparison of different
perspectives?

The fact that historical paradigms are said

to be "incompatible" implies a coomon framework having comparative and evaluative criteria.
Chapter Three had supplied the fundamental principle
of development and revision in different thought-systems:
cognitional structure is the a priori condition for changes
in meaning.

Therefore, it is also the coI!lID.on framework

containing the potential totality of changes in meaning and
in conceptual order.

The work of Chapters Three and Four

had provided explanatory and descriptive accounts of how
human intelligence and rationality proceed in the development and revision of meaning.
lI

Hence, the common framework

was not left mysterious but was comprehended in a methodical way.

Transcendental method formulates the evaluative

I

criteria of the higher viewpoint, yet it is not immediately

l

tice.

I
l

apparent how its formal criteria apply to historical prac-

Chapter Four had already related the fornal criteria
(i.e. the transcendental precepts) to historical procedures.
Chapter Five further clarified the relation between precept
and practice by means of the image of two blades of a pair
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of scissors.

The· upper blade of appropriate4 cognitional

structure gives access to the development of understanding
presupposed by every intelligible historical conclusion.
The lower blade of historical materials and procedures
gives specific content to which the upper blade can be
applied.
The application of the upper blade has an a posteriori
aspect since historical inquiry must supply the materials
to be organized.

However, there is also an a priori aspect,

and this can be formulated as a universal viewpoint cutting
across differences in historical perspectives.

The univer-

sality of the viewpoint derives from two .facts: the structure of human intentionality is the same for every historian, and the meanings developed through cognitional acts
reflect a limited number of coobinations of' those acts.
That is to say, historical conclusions will re.fleet how
·thejr proponents f'ulf'illed the precondition of' cognj.tional
structure in coming to know something about the past.

This

process of developing understanding can be reconstructed
in part, and the normative function of' transcendental method
allows one to criticize conclusi·ons in terms of the steps
taken to reach them.
This universal viewpoint was used to study dialectical dif'ferences of opinion about historical facts.

These

differences belong to the debates over historical realism
and are

l

representat~ve

of incompatible differences belonging
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to the crisis of historicism.

Disputes which could n.ot be

mediated from within the historical field can be mediated
once the universal viewpoint is grasped.

However, the uni-

versal viewpoint only locates the solirces of surface differences in the combinations of cognitional acts and in the
distinctions (or absence of them) among levels of meaning.
The elimination of confusions and oversights on a deep level
can only be effected by a radical change termed "conversion. 11
Since the need is for a critical mediation of historical disputes, conversions must reflect more than shifts
in precritical preferences.

What evidence is there for

rational criteria prompting conversions?

Debates among

followers of different historical paradigms provide some
evidence.

These debates involve exchanges of arguments,

so the belief is that rational criteria can make a difference in one's conclusions.
selves?

Are the debaters deluding them-

A negative reply is required if at least some dif-

ference is allowed between the psychology and the logic of
historical inquiry.
I

l

A stronger basis for a negative reply

is provided by the universal viewpoint.

'~he

normative

function of transcendental method supplies explicit criteria
for reasonable debate.

Tn addition, the intelligent criti-

cism of opposea conclusions has a distinctively non-preferential base if it is guided by what is known about cognitional performance.

r
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'We exemplified this intelligent criticism in regard
to differences of opinion about historical facts.

The

rational basis for the criticism derived from the epistemological position and complex notion of objecti_vity developed in section three.

One author's difficulty with facts

and objective interpretations was traced back to a prior
misunderstanding of cognitional performance.

Thus, this

exercise in criticism from a universal standpoint objectified part of the basic horizon of an author.

What was ob-

jectified was then criticized on rational grounds, and the
critique was ultimately justified on the basis of a correct
understanding of human-knowing.

Consequently, the critique

in its origins and conclusions escaped relativity to a particular historical perspective or to a particular set of
variable preferences.
Finally, all of these strategic moves around the obstacles to White's attempted solution would be useless if
intellectual responsibility were impossible.

OUr preceding

work has pointed out the need for both clarifications and
corrections in various historical positions.
be met?

-will this need

Actually we limited ourselves to the question, Can

this need be met?

Chapter Four argued that a negative

reply was not necessitated by unavoidable or irreducible
bias.

A more positive approach was taken in this chapter.
Just as one and the same person is both thinker and

l

actor, so the spontaneity of cognitional performance merges
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with the spontaneity of deliberation and decision.-

we

spontaneously guide our practice by our prior learning.
In the technical practice of a scholarly enterprise, that
prior learning includes norms for how one should carry out
a professional inquiry.

Implicitly it is expected that

practice should be consistent with what is known.

Of

course, this expectation is not necessarily fulfilled.
But that is only to admit that intellectual and moral responsibility is asked of free individuals.

Given the self-

knowledge attained through the previous reflection on human
knowing, an individual would have difficulty in holding,
without qualification, those theses which introduced each
of the last four chapters.

r
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If the theses with which Chapters Two through Five
began can no longer be held without qualification, is the
way clear for resolving the crisis of historicism?

The

four theses formulated certain basic difficulties confronting historians and philosophers of history.

These formu-

lated difficulties were in turn categorized under the headings of problems concerning historical objectivity, the
relation of history to science, and historical realism.
In a series of arguments culminating in the lengthy discussion of Chapter Five, we concluded that the aforementioned problems could be resolved in terms of Lonergan's
transcendental method.

By proving the counterproposals of

each chapter, we showed that the diffjculties formulated
by Hayden White and falling within the more general problem
areas could also be cleared up through the same methodological approach.

Thus, it would seem that the way is clear

for resolving the crisis of historicism.
However, our claims for the successful outcome of
this dissertation are more modest.

!n the first place, our

focus has been limited to the three problem areas, and we
have borrowed an understanding of the subordinate issues
in those areas from the work of a single author, Hayden
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White.

Seco~d,

we have centered our attention on Lonergan•s

transcendental method without claiming that other schools
of thought have nothing to add to what Lonergan says.

rn-

deed, in citing works by historians and philosophers alike,
we have admitted that the crisis-problems can be treated
in multiple ways.

But the narrowed focus we have adopted

is not without merit.

Hayden White's I1etahistory was shown

to be a brilliant, if not wholly satisfactory, study of
the underlying problems of the crisis period.

!n addition,

our successful resolution of certain long-standing issues
proves the worth of Lonergan's transcendental method.
A more cogent justification of our narrowed focus is
available.

The crisis of historicism continued in the

absence of critical metahistortcal grounds for mediating
disputes over historical processes and historiographical
procedures.

Both White and Lonergan seek the needed meta-

historical grounds--the one in terms of a linguistic deep
structure, the other in terms of the a priori structure of
human cognition.

Both authors move beyond purely descrip-

tive accounts of historical perspectives and historiographical procedures to explanatory positions accounttng for
those

differen~

perspectives and practices.

White's lin-

guistic-structuralist approach yields an explanatory framework composed of modes of poetic speech and strategies of
explanation.

However, he ultimately grounds his explana-

tory framework in the

subjec~•s

moral and aesthetic
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opinions.

S.ince, as noted before, the measure of .an explan-

atory posi ti_ on is the definition of things in their relations, not to the subject, but among themselves, White's
explanatory framework does not ultimately rest on an explanatory foundation.
This foundational weakness in White's analysis is not
insignificant.

On a descriptive level, he investigates the

origins of diverse historical perspectives--perspectives
already classified under explanatory categories.

In point-

ing out the variables at the root of diverse perspectives,
he describes how different paradigm-choices are made.
However, his descriptive account offers no basis for comparing or criticizing either the perspectives or their variable predeterminants--they are simply different and, in
some cases, exclusively so.

This inadequacy shows up in

_his recommended solution to the sceptical outcome of the
crisis, i.e. in his advocacy of a "will to believe" in
accordance with moral and aesthetic aspirations.
planatory foundation must offer more than this.

An exThe crisis

of historicism originates in radically opposed beliefs,
and the assertion of one more belief is scarcely the way
to resolve the crisis.

On the other hand, Lonergan's transcendental method
does have an ex?lanatory foundation in cognitional structure.

Throughout the last three chapters, we have devel-

oped the implications of Chapter Two's discovery of a
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cognitional element in the subject's basic horizon.

The

strength of this discovery became apparent when we gradually elaborated the critical elements within developing
historical perspectives and·their subordinate meanings.
In Chapter Five, this gradual process culminated in an
abbreViated discussion of the universal viewpoint.

We

argued that such a viewpoint escapes relativity to particular audiences because it rests on the a priori grounds
presupposed by all the different ways of viewing and of
doing history.

Thus, a metahistorical position has been

presented which not only is explanatory but also does not
owe its validity to any single perspective or to any of the
variables "beneath" particular perspectives.
But to discover and defend this metahistorical position is not the same as actually to mediate the disputes
of the crisis period.

We have indicated a strategy of

mediation, an approach which offers compelling theoretical
grounds in place of variable preferences.
this would greatly expand the dissertation.

To do more than
!n particular,

the topics of moral conversion and of the aesthetic elements in historical narration would have to be given considerable space.

For our limited purposes these topics

were sufficiently investigated.

Moreover, even after a

second or third dissertation on moral and aesthetic problems, the actual mediation of the disputes of the crisis
would remain to be carried out.

A historical work written
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in conjunction with the developed universal viewpoint would
.

be the actual test for successfully resolving the crisis
of historicism.

Such a work would not retain the limits

of this dissertation.

It would easily move into areas

proper to the speculative tradition in the philosophy of
history.

But we have avoided those areas, and hence, we

have not attempted to evaluate historj_cal perspectives
in their entirety.
An additional limitation was j_ndicated in Chapter Two.

We did not undertake a special inquiry into human hist·oricity (Geschichtlichkeit).

The additional problems raised

by such an inquiry into the histor-ical being of man himself would add an excessive number of pages to our already
lengthy work.

Such an inquiry is not easily foresworn.

Human historicity is the everyday experience from which
arise all the diverse types of historical writings.

As such

it is basic to the critical type of history upon which our
methodological discussions focused.

But although we did

not speak at length of historicity as the fundamental context of spec:talized inquiry, we did contribute some insights
into that context.

The elements of relative horizons

treated in Chapter Two could be used to specify some of
the content of human historicity.

Nore important, the cog-

nitional structure defended in Chapter

~hree

intellectual and critical aspect of hUrJan

specifies an

histor~city.

The

transcendental method derived from that a priori aspect is
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the norm f'or later specializations aris:i_ng in historical
consc:i.ousness.

Consequently, even within the limits of

the dissertation, a key element of' human historicity has
been explored in detail.
Still, because of' the preceding limi tat;_ons in our
work, we can only claim to have shown a way beyond the
theoretical impasse of' the crisis of' historicism.

This

impasse is composed of' certain basic problems, and we have
indicated how these

p~oblems

can be resolved.

This impasse

can be considered insurmountable--such was one implication
of TJhite's various thesese
ses must be qualified.

But we have shown that his the-

In effect, the three basic problems

of the crisis have not remained unresolved nor have the
mentioned obstacles remained unsurmounted.

So, we can

assert that our strategy has reached its goal, and further
studies may build on what we have accomplished.

r
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